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Preface
Writing a book on Africa seems never easy, as I have realized. I think it 
becomes even more difficult when one is writing about Africa’s devel-
opment. First, your peers will remind you that the African region is 
made of up diverse countries, so caution is in order when making gen-
eralizations. Second, there is the inevitability, when taking serious issues 
with the current state of Africa’s development, of being critical of many 
of its aspects. Furthermore, the central theme of this book is ‘mindset 
change’, and the approaches that I propose are, in essence, breaking 
away from the status quo. So, basically, a critical and a form of activist 
overtone is maintained. Critical views are taken not for the sake of criti-
cising, but to enhance awareness for positive changes.
Hence, I may sound blunt or judgemental, but it should not be con-
strued in any way as demeaning, because the purpose here is to critique 
in a professional manner. I have a special attachment to Africa, having 
lived here when I was a teenager, and over the years befriended many 
Africans. Rather, it is as a result of my belief that Sub-Saharan African 
nations can indeed overcome the predicament that has plagued them 
for so long through change that I have decided to put down my ideas 
in a straightforward fashion in order to contribute to the discourse and 
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actions on Africa’s development. I was heavily engaged in development 
cooperation for the past seven years, and the discourses and collabora-
tion I had with various interlocutors and stakeholders produced much 
positive feedback.
The caveat of discussing Africa as a whole is heeded, but I believe 
there is a great usefulness at this juncture in discussing the Sub-Saharan 
African region. While Uganda is mentioned frequently and has been 
often examined as a case study, I have tried to bring the full picture 
of the region while not losing focus on the key topics. Without being 
 prejudiced, I can say that Sub-Saharan African countries indeed have 
many common traits and cross-cutting issues, as experts and observers 
attest.
My journey to Africa started in 1973, when I landed in East Africa 
at the age of 13. And now, as I gaze out of my office in Pretoria to see 
the Union Buildings, I sense that so much time has passed since then, 
yet there are so many things and issues in this region that remain 
unchanged despite the passage of time.
When you are in Africa—and it does not matter where you are 
located—the issue of development cannot be avoided. I have thought 
about what development is and have concluded that it is the ‘way of 
life’. Unless the way of life of the people, including its leaders, changes, 
the economic development that everyone is striving for cannot come 
about. Africa is a land blessed with so many things and has great poten-
tial for growth, but I couldn’t help thinking that something of its true 
essence was missing.
Asian developing economies had other neighbouring countries 
in the region to use as a benchmark for economic development, but 
I am told that Sub-Saharan African countries do not have one on their 
continent to act as a ‘catch-up’ model. The countries are seen to have 
been exposed to, and to have reacted to, the trends and fickleness of the 
times, without properly formulating and consolidating national strat-
egy that can effectively push them forward towards transformation. My 
work is an attempt to identify the ‘missing links’ to Africa’s development 
and to suggest a new approach in the context of reinventing and rein-
vigorating the development of Sub-Saharan African countries.
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A contribution of this book may be that it makes a forceful case 
that in spite of wide variations in terms of the traits, situation, level 
of development, etc. of different countries, the basic rule of econom-
ics and industrialization that is applicable is the same for all of them. 
Fundamental progress will come about when the most fundamental 
conditions are satisfied. But both the African countries and the inter-
national development community alike have ‘skipped’ many funda-
mentals, hence we see the continuing underperformance of African 
countries.
A drawback in Africa’s development may be that the existing 
approaches have become too technical and shallow. At this juncture, 
mindful of Africa’s complexities, it would be useful to keep matters 
ridiculously simple. In the simplest terms, development can be defined 
using just two variables—the extent of change over time—so the ques-
tion can be how much and how fast change could be made.
It is no secret that things often stall, break down and fail in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the impression we get of the region is one that has 
been submerged for too long in poverty and a host of other troubles. It 
is as if there is a certain formidable obstacle that prevents Africa from 
moving forward. The more we learn about Africa and try to figure out 
what would be the best practical solutions to resolve its challenges, the 
more we seem to be at a lost and do not know where to start.
While Africa’s situation should not be taken lightly, it must not be 
exaggerated either, and we should guard against being biased and super-
ficial. If there had been any lapse in our endeavour, it may be that the 
real root causes were not recognized as such, and the fundamentals 
were ignored. Africa is made up of 54 countries, of which 49 are Sub-
Saharan. In the region, except for a handful of countries branded as 
‘conflict zones’, the majority of countries enjoy peace and stability, and 
they are by no means fettered from pursuing economic prosperity. To 
think that Africa is surrounded by insurmountable forces impeding its 
development is simply wrong.
If anything, in essence, Africa’s chronic poverty is not due to a lack 
of resources or means, but to what can be cursorily described as a ‘man-
agement problem’. If this is not tackled, the prospect of a major turn-
around happening soon in the region remains dim. At the dawn of 
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this millennium, Africa was painted as ‘The Hopeless Continent’ on 
the cover of The Economist.1 About a decade later, in 2011, the head-
line turned into ‘Africa Rising’.2 Then, an article ‘Africa Rising? “Africa 
Reeling” May Be More Fitting Now’ appeared in the New York Times in 
2016.3
Who knows what is in store for Africa next, but the phrase ‘Africa 
Rising’ tells us a lot about the state of Africa and how it is perceived by 
the world. But it appeared that the international business community 
was more excited by the ‘Africa Rising’ narrative than the Africans were, 
perhaps reflecting a difference in their level of interest or expectations. 
Obviously, there would be a large number of foreign firms interested in 
the ‘frontier markets’ of Sub-Saharan Africa.4 Meanwhile, the mood of 
the development community working on the ground at that time was 
much more measured or largely indifferent. Thus, one might even ask: 
‘For whom is Africa rising?’5
There also seems to be a perception gap between foreigners and the 
locals on what constitutes opportunity and challenge. For example, out-
siders look at Africa’s youth population explosion as an opportunity for 
business—future consumers and a potentially huge labour force—while 
many Africans, including political leaders and intellectuals, see this as 
a growing burden and a challenge for social and political stability and 
security.6
Sub-Saharan African nations have largely adapted to the trend of 
the times, but what counts is not the short-term economic trends or 
the question of whether the current situation of Africa warrants opti-
mism or pessimism, because there will always be a mixed bag of both. 
The potential of Africa was always there to begin with. Instead, the key 
question lies in what African countries actually need to do in order to 
achieve development. Private enterprises alone cannot drive the sustain-
able and inclusive growth of a nation—it will take far more than that, 
like a strong social fabric, well-functioning institutions, civic values and 
education, sound economic planning and management, industrial pol-
icy, good governance, accountability, political stability, security, etc.
As for the regions’ political landscape, armed conflicts and coups 
over the past two decades have decreased in number, but the stability 
is relative and fragile, and the risks are still high. Regarding governance, 
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institutional quality remains low and corruption continues to be a 
major hindrance in the region.7 The past few years have seen a series of 
peaceful transition of power taking place in the region through elections 
and other means. In Ghana’s presidential election held in December 
2016, the ruling political party was changed, which is a rarity in the 
region. At any rate, there is a noticeable variance in the political score-
card across the countries and sub-regions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Besides the economic and political trends, what has not been given 
due attention is the task of nation-building, which seems to have been 
long forgotten. Nation-building is about laying the core foundations of 
statehood, and without them firmly in place, states will invariably be 
limited in terms of their performance; the unity, stability and growth of 
a nation will be held back as well. A sign of deficiency in nation-build-
ing is playing itself out for everyone to see. For example, executive 
branch leaders openly and inordinately promote their ruling party, even 
in public functions that should be politically neutral in tenor.
A danger of drifting away in a wave of trends looms for African coun-
tries when they do not have strong institutions and governing mecha-
nisms in place. The peril becomes more nuanced when we accept that 
the world today is faced with the ‘trilemma’ where ‘we cannot have 
hyper globalization, democracy, and national self-determination all 
at once. We can have at most two out of three’.8 This calls for African 
nations to become more cognizant of the situation they are in and exert 
greater ownership and control over their lives and destiny.
There has been no lack of articulations, debates and studies on 
Africa’s development, but the challenge seems as complicated as ever. 
However, we should heed the saying that ‘the more things get compli-
cated, the better it is to return to the basics’.9 The task here is to break 
down and make sense of what seems complex, while reviving the signifi-
cance of the basics that were forgotten or considered banal.
The subjects covered in this book may seem quite extensive. The 
intention is to navigate the issue of Africa’s development by identify-
ing, putting in context or linking together various topics, fields and 
 elements that are deemed relevant. A two-pronged ‘building-block’ 
and ‘building-bridge’ approach is employed. In the grand scheme of 
‘building-bridge’, the Korean development model is brought to the fore 
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and reviewed so that it can be used as a meaningful reference so that les-
sons for Africa can be drawn from it. By ‘model’, I mean a ‘conceptual 
scheme’ that illustrates a set of ideas on the elements, structure and pro-
cess of development rather than a kind of scientific model or mathemat-
ical formula that is meant to be precise and strictly applied.10
Linking up the Sub-Saharan African with the Korean model of devel-
opment offers many benefits. First of all, South Korea, an aid recipient 
turned donor, is a prominent example of successful economic and polit-
ical transformation, and the Korean contemporaries are the living proof 
of this experience. This makes the ‘evidence’ and implications of the 
Korean model all the more authoritative. Irma Adelman notes that: ‘Its 
achievement is frequently referred as “the Korean Miracle” and is widely 
considered as the most successful process of economic development in 
the twentieth century.’11
In addition, bringing Korea into the picture will help ‘crystallize’ the 
status and characteristics of African countries’ development, as well as 
refresh our thinking on the role of foreign aid, government, economic 
policies, etc. This kind of application, in turn, can also shed some new 
light on Korea’s model, so that in the end we have a better understand-
ing of both Africa and Korea, and about development in general. And 
in the context of highlighting the relevance of nation-building in devel-
opment, I have retraced Africa’s colonial past and legacies, and Korea’s 
historical path.
The book starts with an introductory part in which Africa’s paradox 
and the issue of foreign aids are outlined, followed by a review on the 
causes of Africa’s underdevelopment and concluding that the main root 
cause is the mindset. The discussion then moves on to the ‘missing links’ 
in Africa’s development: a sense of nation, ‘development-mindedness’ 
and the strong role of state. This development-mindedness, which I 
have termed ‘KPOP’ (which stands for ‘knowing’, ‘practising’, ‘owning’, 
and ‘passion’), is introduced as a key component of the mindset that is 
conducive to development.
Then, Korea’s path of economic development and the essence of 
Korea’s development model are examined. The relevant features are 
basically in conformity with the fundamentals of the industrializa-
tion process that the frontrunners of industrialization have followed. 
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What stands out is that Korea achieved a highly compressed indus-
trialization and economic growth by virtue of a strong role played 
by the government, the active entrepreneurship of corporations and 
the extraordinary level of the people’s work ethic. ‘Application of the 
Korean Development Model to Africa’, and ‘Africa on the New Path to 
Development’ constitute, respectively, the main and concluding body.
All things considered, the South Korean economic model is not a 
‘deviation’ from the mainstream rule of economics and industrialization, 
but can be considered as ‘reinforced capitalism’. From the perspective of 
developing nations, it only makes sense to keep their economy dynamic 
and structurally transitioning if they are to catch up with the more 
advanced economies. In this vein, the ideas of economists who stress the 
importance of industrialization and dynamic economic policies are duly 
recognized. In particular, concepts like the ‘holy trinity of economics’ 
and ‘economic discrimination’ proposed by Sung-Hee Jwa are consid-
ered to be valuable tools for understanding economic development.12
Anyone who has insights into Sub-Saharan Africa will understand 
that the rural-agricultural sector assumes special importance in every 
aspect—be it economic, social or political—for the countries of the 
region. Hence, many African countries have prioritized this sector, yet 
they continue to struggle in terms of delivering results. Under the cir-
cumstances, Korea’s Saemaul Undong, the New Village Movement, that 
was launched aggressively with success during its period of rapid eco-
nomic growth, offers a meaningful ‘action model’ for Africa in light of 
its value and uniqueness as a community-driven self-help movement. 
How this can be applied to Africa is explained.
Out of all this, ‘a new development formula for Africa’ is deduced. 
This underscores the importance of fostering the ‘missing links’, putting 
into practice ‘economic discrimination (ED)’, pursuing positive indus-
trial policy and forcefully launching initiatives for the mindset change 
aimed at empowering the people.
The book concludes with an emphasis on the need to reset the 
African development approach by prioritizing attitudinal change  
and enacting a bold but ‘harmonious’ process of change. Here, 
a modification to Arthur Lewis’ development model of economic 
dualism in the form of a ‘medium-bridging approach’ is proposed.13  
xiv     Preface
The ‘medium-bridging’ approach has the merit of making economic 
transitions more practical and harmonious, in a ‘going with the grain’ 
fashion.14 The pro-poor, pro-rural policies that some of Southeast 
Asian countries employed can similarly be taken as a medium-bridging 
approach.15 In Rwanda, they call it ‘home-grown solutions’ that resem-
ble Korea’s mindset change and social mobilization campaigns.16
Pretoria, South Africa Jong-Dae Park
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have taken place more frequently, like one a week.
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Part I
The Paradox of Sub-Saharan Africa
3
My Encounters with Africa
There is a famous saying in Korea that with the passage of a decade, 
even rivers and mountains change. Over time, things are expected to 
change, and for the better. Sub-Saharan Africa is so blessed with abun-
dant natural resources, fertile soils and beautiful weather, and it attracts 
so many foreign visitors who come and marvel at the unexpected. You 
can see a lot of dynamism in the capitals, but the vast majority of the 
ordinary people remain poor, to the bewilderment and disappointment 
of many. With globalization and business opportunities, international 
development assistance, advances in technology, etc., one would think 
that the ‘great convergence’ would also apply in Africa.
My early encounter with Africa was a story of fascination and dis-
illusion, and to this day Sub-Saharan Africa largely remains a land of 
mystification and paradox. I still remember how surprised we were 
when we first came to Africa. As a teenager, when I placed my first step 
on African soil in 1973, I was charmed by the unexpected. My father, 
who was a diplomat at that time, was posted to Uganda and our fam-
ily stopped over Nairobi, Kenya, for a couple of days before heading 
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to Uganda. We were struck by the orderliness, cleanliness and level of 
development of Nairobi compared to Seoul.
This was not what we had imagined Africa to be. Kampala, which 
was rather modest compared to Nairobi, was nonetheless very attractive. 
It was a beautiful city full of gardens and greenery, sitting on the rolling 
hills under the fabulous blue sky, and it had a number of good hotels 
like the International Hotel (now called the Sheraton Kampala Hotel), 
which is famous for its swimming pool, which was frequented by then 
President Idi Amin. A scene in the Hollywood film The Last King of 
Scotland (2006), which tells a tale of a Scottish doctor who arrives in 
Uganda in the early 1970s to serve as Idi Amin’s personal physician, was 
also filmed at this swimming pool.
Just before we departed Korea, I and my older brothers were scared of 
going to Africa and watched, of our own accord, the film Mondo Cane 
in a downtown Seoul cinema. This was to mentally ‘prepare’ ourselves 
for the worst in Africa. The movie is a documentary of all the horri-
ble things like cannibalism that happen in Africa and elsewhere in the 
world, but to our relief, we did not come across anything like that. At 
the time, there was not much difference in the per capital income of 
South Korea, Uganda and Kenya ($278, $133 and $142 respectively in 
1970).1 Economic indicators aside, the actual quality of life and even 
some facilities and infrastructure in these African capitals looked better 
than that of Korea. Politically, however, in Uganda, needless to say it 
was trying times under the infamous Idi Amin.
The advantage of being a teenager is that you can be carefree in 
respect of many things, including politics, which can be left to adults to 
worry about. The best thing about Uganda was its beautiful weather all 
year round. The weather then was clearly better than now, being more 
moderate and predictable, without the climate change effect that we are 
currently seeing. I enjoyed the natural environment and the kindness of 
the natives, and the merry moments with my family and friends, like 
when we even went on a safari tour to Murchison Falls National Park 
and fishing on the Victoria Lake.
What was also unexpected was the level of education in Uganda. 
When I entered Aga Khan Middle School, I could see the marked dif-
ference between this school and the school I went to back in Korea. 
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We were taught with Oxford University Press and Cambridge 
University Press textbooks, and the science classes—physics, chemis-
try and biology—were all conducted in laboratory rooms. My English 
teacher was native Irish and the French teacher was native French. Just 
a few hundred metres away from my school towered the Makerere 
University, at that time one of the most prestigious universities in Africa.
That was my early life in Africa. A couple of years later, we departed 
for Turkey, but the time I spent in Uganda left a profound and lasting 
imprint on me. Much later, I entered the Korean Foreign Service and 
the first time that I engaged in work on Africa was when I was stationed 
at Washington, DC as a political section officer. Besides the Korean 
Peninsula and East Asia, I covered the Middle East and Africa.
It was in 2001 that I returned to Africa, this time to Côte d’Ivoire. 
For the first time in its history since independence, a military coup was 
launched in the country in 1999 by General Robert Guéï and politi-
cal unrest ensued. Laurent Gbagbo defeated General Guéï in the pres-
idential election held in October 2000 and it looked as if peace would 
be restored. As I approached Abidjan, the capital, and saw its skyline 
unfold before my eyes, I could see why it was called the ‘Paris of Africa’ 
or ‘little Manhattan’. But in September 2002, a mutiny by disgruntled 
soldiers sparked a civil war, engulfing the country in chaos and uncer-
tainty. I witnessed how a country that was long regarded as a beacon of 
stability and prosperity in Africa with comparatively good institutions, 
infrastructures and sound economy could crumble so easily. All this was 
a good learning experience for me to understand the fragility of African 
states and the dynamics of external influence in the region.
In 2006, I was working on the President’s African tour to Egypt, 
Nigeria and Algeria in the office of the President. It was during this 
tour, when we were in Nigeria, that ‘Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s 
Development’ was announced, the first of its kind for Korea. The visit 
to Algeria in particular was extraordinary and unforgettable, and it 
inspired me to seriously contemplate Korea’s soft power.
Then in 2010, when I was in Rome, I applied for the position of 
the head of our mission to be re-established in Uganda. My gov-
ernment decided to reopen the embassy in Kampala that had been 
closed down in 1994 and I took a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity: to 
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become the head of the diplomatic mission to the country that you 
have always reminisced about, but never thought you would return 
to. When I first heard that the position was open, I still needed some 
time to think about it and to consult with my family. Obviously, phys-
ically setting up an embassy is a really challenging task, especially in 
places like Uganda, a landlocked country of Sub-Saharan Africa. But 
the more I thought about it, the more I felt that it would be a wise 
choice. I made the decision to return to Uganda and there was no 
turning back.
On 18 May 2011, I returned to Uganda for the first time in 36 years. 
As the British Airways plane was hovering over Lake Victoria, approach-
ing Entebbe Airport, my heart started to beat faster. I was anxiously 
staring out the window. It was a dream come true and I couldn’t wait 
to see what Uganda looked like after all those years. Coming out of the 
airport, moving to Kampala, I saw that there were so many more vehi-
cles, but that the road has not been widened at all, and its condition 
had deteriorated significantly, with potholes and torn-off edges that 
I didn’t see back in the 1970s.
Then there was an unbelievable traffic bottleneck of about 10 kilo-
metres into central Kampala. It was Monday morning, making matters 
worse. Boda-boda motorcycle taxis and Matatu public taxis, along with 
other passenger cars and trucks, flooded and converged on roundabouts 
and crossroads as we were approaching the city. I don’t know how long 
we were stuck in the traffic just a few kilometres away from downtown 
Kampala. I have not seen such chaos in my life. The total disorderliness 
on the outskirts of the city made me wonder whether this was the main 
gateway to the centre of the capital.
I sensed that something must have been going wrong for a long time 
for the situation to have come to this. When our car finally mounted 
the hills of Nakasero, things got a lot better, but still I couldn’t quite 
catch a glimpse of the clean and orderly downtown that I used to see 
36 years ago. By the time we arrived at the hotel, we were so exhausted. 
Apparently, population growth and concentration, deterioration of the 
physical infrastructure, environmental degradation in urban areas, etc. 
are common phenomena in the developing world. But it was not what 
I had expected to see. Koreans are used to fast improvement and 
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development, and we tend to take it for granted that with the passing of 
time, things gets better. What I felt this day was a sober reminder that 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, some kind of deep-seated problems persist and 
that they needed to be identified and addressed.
But other than the terrible traffic situation and poorly maintained 
roads, the nature of Uganda is most attractive and visitors soon get to 
understand why Winston Churchill named Uganda ‘the Pearl of Africa’. 
Outside the central urban district, the beautiful, lush greenery unfolds 
wherever you go. I couldn’t forget when I travelled for the first time to 
western Uganda. On the way through the Mbarara District, I saw so 
many wonderfully manicured plantations and rich livestock farms, and 
densely planted vegetables and fruits growing in red and black fertile 
soils. It made you wonder whether this is really Africa and not some-
where in Europe.
Each way you look at it, you sense that for whatever reason, huge 
opportunities have been lost, but still there is great potential for growth 
and prosperity. Someone said that living in perennial poverty amid such 
an abundance and riches of natural gifts, when you have just about 
everything you need, is tantamount to a sin.
Afterwards, to add a little more to our adventure, we drove deep 
into the southwestern end of Uganda bordering Rwanda and, from 
there, ventured into Rwanda in order to arrive at Kigali. How the city 
infrastructure was managed was so impressive, and what I saw there 
was really an eye opener and renewed my hope for Africa. On the con-
trary, my visits to South Sudan after the infighting broke out there has 
reminded me that still in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, even the 
most basic political, social and economic conditions required to run a 
state are seriously deficient.
Fast forward to 2018, as if almost seven years of my assignment in 
Uganda was not enough, I am still working in Africa, of course with 
great pleasure, having moved to South Africa in February to begin 
another tour of duty in the continent. I have arrived at a very inter-
esting time when South Africa’s new President Ramaphosa is trying to 
navigate through tough political and economic challenges in the wake 
of Zuma’s downfall. While the fight against the legacy of apartheid and 
the campaign to redress historical ‘injustices’ continues to be waged 
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explicitly in South Africa, from a developmental point of view, South 
Africa nonetheless poses another dilemma. In a sense, South Africa 
offers an epitome of Africa’s great irony.
A Glimpse Back at Colonization and Its Legacies
Colonial history and legacies, whether one likes it or not, has relevance 
to the nations that have experienced colonialism and is an unavoida-
ble subject of conversation on the development processes of the nations 
concerned. Almost all developing countries of the world today have 
gone through colonialism in one form or another, and the impact it has 
had on Africa is considered to be especially far-reaching. But how the 
colonial experience is perceived by the peoples and how this has shaped 
their relationship with their former colonizers will depend on the nature 
of the colonial rule and how it was pursued, along with many other fac-
tors. Regardless, for any developing nation, understanding its historical 
path and status in the nation-building process is an obvious necessity.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban centres are rapidly becoming globalized, 
but the tendency to view things in terms of their historical connectiv-
ity to a colonial past evidently persists in the region. And many African 
leaders are not shy to speak out on colonial legacies, neo-imperialism, 
the ‘arrogance of the West’, the ‘conspiracy of the West’, the ‘political 
agenda of the West’ and so on, whenever they feel challenged by the 
Western world. It could be political gesturing, rationalization or a way 
of expressing African solidarity. Normally, the rhetoric is not literally 
antagonistic, but rather political or conventional.
A typical case is when African leaders express their displeasure over 
‘political pressures’ from Western countries on such issues as violations 
of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Generally, people in 
the region are very receptive to Westerners and other foreigners, are 
pragmatic and non-ideological, and espouse ‘global civilization’, which 
is predominantly Western in its composition. Based on historical ties 
and geographical proximity, European nations maintain special ties with 
Africa, and they continue to play ‘principal’ roles in the region as major 
partners.
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The influence of the major Western powers was truly far-reaching. By 
1921, the British Empire, at its peak, was covering about one-quarter of 
both the world’s population and territory: about 4.6 billion people and 
37 million km2 respectively.2 France, another former colossal power, 
boasts over 56 member states in La Francophonie on a par with the 
Commonwealth of Nations membership of 53. Interestingly enough, 
those who have lived both in the Commonwealth and the Francophonie 
world would be able to tell there are some differences between them, 
reflecting respective colonial legacies. Most Latin American countries 
were formerly Spanish colonies, and many other colonial powers existed 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The vast majority of developing countries have experienced coloni-
alism in some form or another. The influence of the West in terms of 
political, economic and social institutions, as well as popular cultures 
and the ‘modern’ way of life, has been dominant in the rest of the 
world, and this continues under globalization, although now there are 
more players in the region. Africa was the object of an all-out exploita-
tion by the Western powers in the nineteenth century. Continuous 
population growth and concentration in Europe from around the early 
fifteenth century required an increasing supply of farmland, foods and 
energy, but there were also widespread epidemic diseases, wars and 
exploitation by rulers and landlords. Power struggles, frequent wars 
among Europeans powers and the difficulty in extracting resources from 
their own boundaries led European states to seek wealth overseas.3
The fragmentation of the European political systems actually started 
much earlier, with the fall of the Roman Empire in the late sixth cen-
tury and the expansion of Islamic powers in the eighth century. The 
nobility built fortresses against potential invaders and looters, while 
exploiting the serfs and mobilizing troops to put down rebellions by the 
serfs, and to counter attacks from outside and within. The frequency of 
wars was on the rise and never-ending, and new armouries like cannons 
were developed, driving up the costs of waging war. Crusaders were also 
sent to recapture holy places occupied by Islamic forces. Their objec-
tives, besides religious, were political and commercial in nature, and 
successful campaigns helped reopen the Mediterranean Sea for trade 
and travel.4
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The development of city states in Europe that became the major cen-
tres of trade, together with connections of various trade routes, formed 
a natural ‘world system’ of trade. But the fall of Constantinople in 1453 
caused by the Ottoman Empire’s invasion dealt a heavy blow to Europe 
as the trade route to the East through the eastern Mediterranean Sea 
was blocked by the Ottomans, forcing the West to find alternate sea 
routes to access Asia’s riches through the Indian Ocean.5
Europe’s limited farmland and natural resources, the increasing 
struggle and competition among factional powers, and greed for 
wealth and power drove Europeans to venture into aggressive cam-
paigns outside their continent. During this period of excursions, 
America was discovered and Sub-Saharan Africa was further surveyed. 
A Portuguese expeditionary force in the early sixteenth century ended 
the era of peaceful navigation by introducing maritime trade using coer-
cive means. While the West’s mission to Asia was mostly to find mar-
kets in order to trade commodities, their efforts in Africa were focused 
on mobilizing slaves for plantation farming in Africa and the New 
World.6
In Latin America, the two powerful Aztec and Inca Empires were 
known to have flourished by the fifteenth century, but they were con-
quered by the Spanish expedition and subjected to harsh domination. 
Also in Africa, before it was colonized by the West, there existed many 
empires in Sub-Saharan Africa, besides those in Maghreb or the North 
Africa region. They were mostly concentrated in West Africa, but other 
empires or kingdoms were identified in central, eastern, western and 
southern Africa as well.7 The most prominent ones were the Ghana 
Empire, the Mali Empire, the Benin Empire, the Mossi Kingdoms, the 
Aksum Empire and the Ethiopian Empire.8
While the features of European incursions into Asia, Africa and 
America varied, they all had one thing in common, in that they were 
carried out coercively, by ‘gunboat trade’, conquest, imposition of 
terms, etc., based on the Europeans’ superior arms and fighting capa-
bility. As time passed, the exploitive nature of the West’s adventurism 
intensified and degenerated to the point of doing anything possible, like 
conducting forced opium sales and the gunboat diplomacy in Asia in 
the nineteenth century.9
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The continents that Europeans targeted to advance their wealth and 
power—Asia, Africa and Latin America, including the Caribbean—
were themselves more or less inter-connected in the dynamics of grow-
ing international trading system. But the trade in the Indian Ocean, 
even before Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and France embarked on 
the ‘armed trade’, was robustly carried out by regional players, includ-
ing Islamic powers, India and China. Natural resources such as gold and 
silver were introduced to China and India, and from these countries 
fabrics and other commodities were exported to neighbouring regions. 
Some items like cotton fabrics were distributed beyond East Africa to 
reach West Africa.10
In the process, the Western imperial powers erected what can be 
called a world trading system. An example of its sub-system is the one 
which was based on plantation systems in Africa and South America 
and Caribbean. The Atlantic world was connected to two triangular 
trade systems which emerged in the seventeenth century and were com-
pleted in the eighteenth century. The most widely known one is that 
linking the Britain, Africa and America: sugar cane, timber and fisheries 
from America were exported to Britain, and manufactured goods from 
Britain were sold to Africa in exchange for slaves, who were exported 
to America. The other system involved the export of rum to Africa 
from the North American British colony, the sale of African slaves 
exchanged for rum to the Caribbean, and the export of molasses from 
the Caribbean to New England. Through such trade systems, the colo-
nial rulers amassed huge wealth.11
How such a large-scale slave trade could have been brazenly and per-
sistently carried out for many centuries is unimaginable today, but at 
that time human expropriation and exploitation were not uncommon. 
Muslims are said to have engaged in trans-Saharan slave trade well 
before this transatlantic slave trade took place, while various kingdoms 
and states in Africa were operating slavery in one form or another. Of 
course, slavery itself was prevalent in many regions and throughout our 
history, and skin colour was of no relevance in terms of becoming a 
slave. When you look up the word ‘slave’ in the dictionary, you will find 
that it is derived from the ‘Slavs’, who were sold off in great numbers 
into servitude by conquering forces in the early Middle Ages.12
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Wars, conquests and subjugation of the weak by the powerful—in 
other words, the rule of the survival of the fittest—were commonplace 
among Europeans. The development of modern nation states in Europe 
in some ways exacerbated the rivalry and divisions in the region, cul-
minating in the two World Wars in the twentieth century. When we 
reflect on the history of imperialism and colonialism of the West, peo-
ple may see these as ‘sins’ committed by the West on others, but back 
then there were no such thing as universal values like human rights, let 
alone the kind of international norms or regulations that we take for 
granted today.13
However, the word ‘imperialism’ in today’s context only has negative 
connotations. It implies greed, exploitation, control and subjugation of 
the weak. In ancient or medieval times, empires might have been help-
ful in reducing wars or bringing about stability. However, with growing 
populations and political entities or states having limited land and nat-
ural resources, Europe was increasing engaged in internal rivalries and 
conflicts, not to mention clashes with foreign (namely Islamic) forces.
Europe’s internal tensions could have been relieved as European 
states focused on expanding into other continents: Portugal and Spain 
led expeditions to find new sea routes and riches, and embarked on the 
colonization of foreign lands during the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries, while the Netherlands, Britain, France, Belgium and Germany fol-
lowed suit. After Asia and America, it was Africa’s turn to be subjected 
to renewed exploitation, culminating in the Scramble for Africa by the 
European powers in the late nineteenth century. The Berlin Conference 
of 1894 and subsequent arrangements among the colonial powers 
largely defined the territorial boundaries of African countries that we see 
today. The colonial expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries is referred to as the New Imperialism.
However, as it turned out, the West’s power game did not end with 
such partitioning of sphere of influence. Meanwhile, the Industrial 
Revolution that started in Britain and spread to other European coun-
tries as well as to the US and Japan, also upgraded the technology and 
output of weaponry, making wars all the more devastating. The tensions 
were brought right back to the continent of Europe, where the First 
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World War was triggered. This was followed by the Great Depression 
and the Second World War, which was unprecedented in the history 
of humankind in terms of the scale of its casualties. The surfacing of a 
whole different form of nationalism in Europe—Nazism and fascism—
showed the dangers inherent in Western democracies degenerating into 
something far worse.
Imperialism and colonialism withered following the World Wars, and 
as the principle of self-determination of nations was declared. On 14 
December 1960, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted 
a resolution called the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples’. Most Asian and Middle Eastern 
countries were decolonized by the 1950s, while almost all African and 
Caribbean countries achieved independence by the 1960s. For African 
countries, decolonization was not the end of the story of interna-
tional intrusions. They were still being drawn deep into the forces of 
the international political economy, and faced challenging tasks of 
nation-building and development both during and after the Cold War 
and into the era of globalization.
No doubt, for Sub-Saharan African nations, extensive colonization, 
subsequent decolonization and continued close ties with their former 
colonial powers have helped them to become open and engaged with 
the West and the world as a whole. In the process, Western ideas, 
education, cultures, political, economic and social systems and know-
how continued to flow in, having a truly profound influence on the 
region.
African colonization was a conquest launched by the West equipped 
with superior armoury and professional expeditionary forces. Before 
the twentieth century, there were no widely established norms like 
human equality and non-aggression in the world as we know it 
today, and many in Europe viewed the white race as being superior.14 
Europeans went about taking the lands and assets of others by forceful 
means in the context of building empires or enriching themselves and 
their motherland. The politics of sheer realism prevailed. There were not 
many objections to those actions taking place outside of Europe and 
even when Europeans clashed with each other, it was not considered 
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to be extraordinary. With the passage of time, however, the exploitive 
apparatus of the colonial settlers turned into a more stable and routine 
governing mechanism that later provided a groundwork for state-build-
ing by Africans.15
Although Sub-Saharan African countries adopted Western-style 
modern state institutions and governing systems, and pursued mar-
ket economics early on, common syndromes such as the weakness of 
state institutions and the weakness of national identity or a sense of 
nation persist. Modern states or nation states that we see today began 
in Europe, although in other continents, such as Asia, there were highly 
centralized and developed kingdoms or dynasties. As mentioned earlier, 
there were already empires and kingdoms in Africa before colonization 
and to this day, some of those sub-national kingdoms persist. Uganda is 
an example of a country having officially five kingdoms or monarchies: 
Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, Toro and Rwenzururu.
In medieval Europe, there existed a variety of forms of authority or 
rule over people like feudal lords, empires, religious authorities, free 
cities and other authorities.16 Students of international politics have 
learned that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which was the outcome of 
the Thirty Years’ War, gave rise to the development of modern states 
having a sweeping capability for taxation, a sophisticated bureaucratic 
system and coercive control over their populations. The form of state-
hood that became prominent in Europe later spread to the rest of the 
world through the process of colonization and decolonization. Modern 
colonialism has deep roots in the Western history of the formation of 
nation states and we are reminded of its influence on the rest of the 
world. It is argued that among the countries that were colonized, some 
types of modern states were developed in Asia and elsewhere prior to 
colonialism, but they were largely displaced by colonial rule.17 The 
West’s military capability, technology and expansionist posture made 
the difference.
Jürgen Osterhammel points out that colonialism contributed to mak-
ing the European concept of the modern state universal and that this 
is one of the greatest impacts colonialism had on the world.18 Before 
Western colonization, it is said that only centralized despotic powers 
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like the Mughul Empire had the semblance of a modern state. Other 
than this, political powers in Asia and Africa had the appearance of 
being rather informal, personal and ritual-religious. These entities were 
not based on sound institutional structures, but were founded on loose 
networks of loyalty. On the other hand, colonial states of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries were secularized and administrative states were 
backed up by a military apparatus.19
A problem here was that while the colonial states and subsequent 
independent states were territorial states, they were hardly nation states. 
In other words, there was a discrepancy between the concept of territorial 
state and nation state due to arbitrary territorial boundaries set by the 
colonial powers. It was an outcome of social Darwinism thinking and the 
‘divide and rule’ policy of European colonialists, which may explain why 
to this day so many ethnic, religious conflicts occur in Africa.20 However, 
a mismatch between territorial boundaries and the peoples does not 
necessarily correlate to conflicts, and it would be virtually impossible to 
divide up territories in order to suit every ethnicity or tribe. Correcting 
the ‘territorial mismatch’ can still bring about conflict, as can be seen in 
the case of South Sudan, which became independent from Sudan.
The prime objective of the colonial state was to maintain control over 
the people conquered and establish conditions or mechanism through 
which the colony could be exploited economically to serve the interests 
of the colonial power. In addition, colonial states were equipped with 
a highly developed bureaucracy. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
current modern state structure that was ‘transplanted’ by the West and 
also many of its institutional components emulated by African countries 
are in most cases functionally weak, inefficient and unreliable, and are 
frequently riddled with corruption and bad governance.
Unlike in other regions, where the state acquires its sovereignty in the 
political process of building capacity for the statehood and is eventually 
recognized by other states, African states gained their sovereign status 
instantly by collective recognition by the international community, such 
as the UN. Despite the fact that more than half a century has passed 
since most African countries gained independence, they are still strug-
gling with the fundamentals of statehood and governance.
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Continuing Woes and Dilemmas in Africa’s 
Development
Many decades have passed since the independence of Sub-Saharan 
African countries, but to this day not much has occurred in terms of 
fundamental progress in their development. When Ghana, then the 
wealthiest nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, became independent in 1957, 
it was more prosperous than South Korea, but by the early 2000s, 
Korea’s gross national product (GNP) per capita was over 20 times that 
of Ghana. Nigeria collected over $600 billion in oil revenues since the 
early 1960s when it started oil production, but a study conducted in 
2004 revealed that as much as $400 billion has disappeared, while the 
majority of its population suffers from acute poverty.21
How the predicaments have persisted expansively and commonly 
over many decades throughout the region is quite astonishing, as 
Martin Meredith observes: ‘Although Africa is a continent of great 
diversity, African states have much in common, not only their origins 
as colonial territories, but the similar hazards and difficulties they have 
faced. Indeed, what is so striking about the fifty-year period since inde-
pendence is the extent to which African states have suffered so many of 
the same misfortunes.’22
Crawford Young also notes African countries’ similarities on many 
fronts, such as in cultural patterns ‘that underpin the regular invoca-
tion of an “African Society” as a generic entity by leaders and analyst’.23 
Other similarities include the ‘defining impact of the colonial occupa-
tion’, the fact that most of the countries decolonized at the same time, 
the similarity of regime structures at the outset, the ‘high degree of 
political diffusion in the political arena’ and Africa’s poor developmental 
performance.24
From the perspective of development, Africa’s history since coloniza-
tion can be broken down into five periods: (1) the period of exploita-
tion by the colonizers; (2) the period of early nation-building (the 
mid-twentieth century, roughly the 1950s–60s); (3) the period of ‘deep-
ening’ of international aid (the 1970s–80s); (4) the period of post-Cold 
War globalization (the 1990s–2015); and (5) period of the Post-2015 
Development Agenda (2015 onwards).
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Colonial legacies still matter today. It is evident that African coun-
tries became independent under the most adverse circumstances. They 
inherited very meagre agricultural or industrial foundations and lacked 
human capital and other assets required for rapid growth. The trans-
atlantic African slave trade over some 400 years also had a profound 
impact on Africa. There were also slave trades within the region and 
across other regions, but these were smaller in scale. The early phase of 
colonization was marked by extensive human exploitation and plunder-
ing of natural resources. African economies became extractive to serve 
the colonizers and most infrastructures served the needs of the export 
market rather than internal development. The coercive force used 
to manipulate labour turned the economies into monocultures, and 
Gareth Austin notes that under colonialism ‘African societies ceased 
being self-sufficient as they began to import manufactured goods and 
basic foodstuffs, while exporting raw materials. To this day, the per-
ceived comparative advantages of many African economies are little 
more than their colonially derived specializations, even though export 
agriculture had begun to develop in late pre-colonial times’.25
Ever since African countries were decolonized, up until now, they 
have continuously missed opportunities and faced dilemmas regardless 
of how international dynamics and environment have evolved, to come 
to a state of ‘African paradox’. During the early nation-building period, 
the goal of African states was to build autonomous states, but they faced 
strong counterforces holding them back or even driving them back-
wards towards structural and psychological dependency.
In the era of ‘deepening of aid’ in the 1970s and 1980s when empha-
sis was placed on targeting the poorest and correcting the ‘dual econ-
omy’, Africa again missed the opportunity due to its political unrest, 
tribal conflicts and wars, continued mismanagement, corruption, etc. 
Then, entering the 1990s, the demise of the Cold War ushered in the 
era of political transition, economic liberalization and globalization. 
Again, what could have been an opportunity disguised as a challenge 
presented itself to Africa, but the countries were virtually irresponsive. 
The adaption to the changing world was limited maybe due to failure 
to fully grasp the weight of dilemma they were in with respect to indus-
trialization under globalization.
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The globalization, and especially the financial liberalization, of the 
1990s was a force to be reckoned with and not many saw it as such. 
Even South Korea, which in 1994 espoused segyewha (globalization) as 
a national policy was hit hard by it in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Given the global economic environment and trends, in retrospect, the 
1990s may have been the last real opportunity for Sub-Saharan African 
economies to solidify their industrialization capacity. The emergence 
of ‘Africa’s new tycoons’ or ‘business giants’, while meaningful, can-
not be a credible indicator of the countries’ transformative economic 
development.
The global development regime entered a new chapter with the 
launch of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 after the completion of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The lesson learned from the 
MDGs may be that such global efforts may have been good in terms of 
tackling Africa’s humanitarian needs and crisis, but were hardly effective 
in pushing African countries to have greater ownership and be develop-
mental in substantive terms. The dilemma continues because when the 
dust settles, everyone is back to their routine business.
The irony is that Sub-Saharan African nations that should be most 
distressed about their state of development and therefore should be the 
most eager to undertake the necessary actions to lift themselves out of 
present situation in fact appear to be the least bothered in this regard. 
While serious deliberations and debates have taken place in and around 
the UN and other development forums like the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD DAC), equally serious soul searching by Africans 
within the African continent has been lacking.
The syndromes of dependency and ‘backtracking’ that will be dealt 
with later on seem to be quite widespread in the region. There is every 
reason to believe in the positivity of Africa rising in the long term, but 
for now, the great potential of Africa has not materialized and largely 
remains as potential. Yet in order to be able to move forward with con-
fidence, countries would need to learn the lessons of their past trials 
and errors, and come to a clear understanding of where they stand. The 
dilemma for African countries was that as they were embarking on the 
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path to national autonomy, they soon found themselves held back by 
the structure of dependency that has re-emerged in the aftermath of 
decolonization. In the absence of conscientious and sustained efforts to 
be autonomous, it would have been difficult for the newly independ-
ent states to delink themselves from the strong influence of their former 
colonizers.
A governance crisis was seen as a main culprit for Africa’s poor perfor-
mance in development. But in Sub-Saharan African states, the capacity 
and institutions of governance have never really been strong since the 
colonial period, nor was the sense of nation or national identity. Even 
after gaining independence, many of these states were not effectively 
prepared for self-government and had to deal with various social and 
political tensions that were created or neglected by the colonial regimes.
During this time of ‘paradox of nation-building and dependency’, 
the most important means sought was foreign aid. Aid was a prime 
objective for African nations and the main policy tools for developed 
countries. This was particularly so during the Cold War era, when the 
developing countries joined the political-ideological blocs. Although 
some small amounts of aid were given by some European countries for 
their colonies in the early twentieth century, it was after the Second 
World War that international aid as we know it began to be institution-
alized and expanded to become an international norm.26
Initially, aid was primarily targeted at emergency relief, rehabilitation 
or national reconstruction and was directed at Western countries. After 
the war, much of Europe was left in ruins and it was the Marshall Plan, 
or the European Recovery Program, pushed forward by the US, that 
first set up the international aid regime. The rise of the Soviet Bloc and 
the beginning of the Cold War increased such efforts. So the purpose of 
aid during this period was to serve the donor’s diplomatic, political and 
strategic objectives.27
Later, mostly in the 1960s, the majority of Sub-Saharan African 
countries gained independence. Since African countries became inde-
pendent at the height of the Cold War, from a strategic point of view, 
they could have used the international political dynamics to advance 
their own economic development. By all accounts, this should have 
been a golden opportunity for Africa to grasp because the external 
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conditions were benign. In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant aid 
strategy was to focus on developing countries’ need for investment cap-
ital and modern technology so that they could boost their economies.28 
Emphasis was placed on offering financial assistance and expertise to 
help plan and manage infrastructure and other economic development 
projects. The expectation was that modern technology and know-how 
in institutional building and organization would have trickle-down and 
spreading effects. But not much consideration was given to promoting 
links between urban and rural areas, and agriculture and industry.
High expectations and optimism can quickly turn into disap-
pointment. In the 1960s, there was growing dissatisfaction with this 
approach, as the majority of the populace did not benefit from both 
the aid and economic growth that followed decolonization. Foreign 
aid was not having the desired effect on all parts of the targeted areas. 
It was during this time that much self-criticism in the donor com-
munity was voiced towards the tendencies of ‘dual economy (a divi-
sion between a modern, urban-based economy and traditional peasant 
economy)’ in the developing countries, and the term ‘white elephants’ 
became popular. In sum, the main point of criticism was that the poor 
got very little out of such assistance and that the technology used was 
not adaptable to local conditions.29
As early as the beginning of the 1970s, when developed countries 
already have well-established aid programmes, there were talks about 
‘donor fatigue’ and ‘crisis of development’ within the donor community. 
What finally came out of all these debates and criticisms regarding the 
way forward for aid were ‘basic human needs’ rather than stimulating 
long-term growth. Immediate and direct benefit for the poor was the 
focused goal of donors in this period.30 The fall in primary commod-
ity prices, the mood of détente, the lessening of rivalry between the 
West and the East, the international oil shock and the responses of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and oil-
rich Arab countries may have also contributed to this. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the general tendency of donors’ approaches was placing greater 
emphasis on, and distributing more aid towards, the poorest countries, 
with an increased portion of aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa.
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The dominant aid strategy during this time took the form of ‘inte-
grated rural development (IRD)’ projects, which were aimed at large 
parts of the local economy, especially small farmers, and engaged much 
of the central and local government bodies with the goal to reaching out 
to large parts of the targeted group. Planning units were set up within 
the central ministries to coordinate multi-sector projects,and interna-
tional and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) started to 
take part in international assistance programmes.31
However, the aid strategy of the 1970s encountered various prob-
lems, such as the extreme complexity of the integrated development 
projects demanding a level of coordination that was beyond the admin-
istrative capability of most countries and too much faith placed on cen-
tral planning. Also, the success of the welfare state system that many 
industrialized countries experienced in the 1960s and the aid strat-
egy that was more or less influenced by such economic development 
optimism were out of touch with reality, given developing countries’ 
resources and capacity.32 I think that the international development 
community was right to bring comprehensive rural development to the 
forefront of its strategy, but unfortunately this approach lost steam and 
withered because of the very problem that still haunts Africa today—the 
lack of initiation for change and corresponding actions on the part of 
Africans themselves.
While rural development is a fundamental task for any developing 
country, it is unclear what really ignited the ‘integrated rural develop-
ment approach’ to take centre stage in the international development 
arena in the early 1970s. Interestingly enough, it was in 1970 that 
Korea’s New Village Movement, the Saemaul Undong, was launched. 
But the reason why Korea’s movement was successful while IRD pro-
jects failed is probably because unlike the former, the latter was driven 
and assisted by donors and did not induce locals to work voluntarily in 
a self-help fashion to generate resources and income on their own.
In the 1980s, amid a lack of progress in aid programmes and the 
looming dangers of further debt crises in developing countries, as the 
Mexican debt crisis of 1982, soon spread to other parts of the Third 
World. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
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led the structural adjustment programmes that demanded liberaliza-
tion and the removal of state control for macro-economic stability. The 
debt crisis turned the 1980s into the ‘lost development decade’: before 
the path of development and poverty alleviation could be resumed, 
they had to implement painful polices of stabilization and structural 
adjustment.33
However, because of the inherent limitations of applying such formu-
lae in rigorous fashion to developing countries and also of the apparent 
need to continue assistance for building infrastructure and directly tar-
geting those most in need, the structural adjustment programmes were 
only partially executed, accounting for only a fraction of the total loans. 
And many bilateral donors and UN organizations continued to work 
in the same way as they had in the 1970s.34 From the 1970s to the late 
1980s, we can see the aid focus on poverty reduction shifting to struc-
tural adjustment and back again to poverty reduction. In the late 1980s, 
there were growing criticisms in the international development commu-
nity that adjustment policies neglected the poor.
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a number of signifi-
cant changes in foreign aid. Most of all, the disappearance of the East 
European Communist Bloc and dissolution of the former Soviet Union 
changed the attitudes of major donor countries’ aid policies vis-à-vis 
their allies and the former Communist Bloc countries. The US and 
other Western countries were increasingly linking aid to the state of 
governance of developing countries rather than supporting any friendly 
countries from a foreign policy standpoint.
As a result of the end of the Cold War, some countries lost the strate-
gic value that the US and others have placed on them, and the amount 
of aid flowing to them dropped sharply. Also, great attention was given 
to assisting the political transition processes in former Communist Bloc 
countries. Therefore, much rhetoric and many efforts were directed 
towards the governance, democracy and political transition of the 
developing or newly independent countries in this decade. Amid grow-
ing donor fatigue, the total amount of aid funding fell quite markedly, 
while demands for political reforms became stronger.35
The instruments donors used with the focus of aid were sector pro-
gramme support, capacity-building, policy dialogue, ‘selective assistance’, 
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etc. All these methods were geared towards responding to the widen-
ing scope of aid targets in a more focused manner, with lower amounts 
of aid available in a bid to achieve greater aid-efficiency. But the devel-
opment community continued to be dismayed by the lack of progress 
shown, especially in the poorest nations of Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa’s 
crisis of governance and moral hazard problem were very frequently dis-
cussed during this period.36
In 2000, the UN adopted the MDGs, which targeted eight areas: (1) 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieving universal primary 
education; (3) promoting gender equality and empowering women; (4) 
reducing child mortality; (5) improving maternal health; (6) combat-
ing HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental 
sustainability; and (8) developing a global partnership for development. 
Each of these goals has specific targets and set dates for achieving those 
targets.37
In 1999, the IMF and the World Bank initiated the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach, a comprehensive coun-
try-based strategy for poverty reduction. This approach was the IMF’s 
and the World Bank’s recognition of the importance of ownership and 
the need for a greater focus on poverty reduction, and it has become 
integral to the negotiation of development assistance for African coun-
tries. Its aim was to support heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) 
and provide the crucial link for aid flows with poverty reduction strat-
egies developed by the aid recipient countries. It was to help the coun-
tries meet the MDGs, which aimed to halve poverty between 1990 and 
2015. The PRSP has become a key benchmark for most countries in 
Africa for accessing external finance through bilateral and multilateral 
sources.38
In addition to MDGs and the PRSP, at the turn of the new century, 
there appeared more new initiatives, including Africa’s first self-devel-
oped initiative. In 2001, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
(now the African Union (AU)) endorsed the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) for economic regeneration of Africa, 
with the goal of eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable growth and 
development, integrating Africa into the global economy, and acceler-
ating the empowerment of women. NEPAD, which is a merger of the 
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Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) 
and the OMEGA Plan for Africa, was hailed as ‘Africa’s own initiative, 
Africa’s plan, African crafted and therefore, African-owned’.39
It was argued that NEPAD ‘constitutes the most important 
advance in African development policy during the last four decades. 
Undoubtedly it is an ambitious programme and represents perhaps one 
last hope for Africa to reverse its slide into irrelevance.’40 But seven years 
after its launch, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, who was one of 
its initial backers, accused NEPAD of wasting hundreds of millions of 
dollars and achieving nothing.41
Following the end of the Cold War, special emphasis was placed 
on aid effectiveness. Besides donor fatigue, recipient fatigue was also 
acknowledged. The donor community began to realize that its many 
different approaches and conditions were imposing a huge burden 
and costs on developing countries, making aid less effective. It began 
to consult and coordinate closely among its member states and with 
developing countries to enhance the impact of the aid given. The aid 
effectiveness movement, led by the OECD DAC, picked up momen-
tum in 2002 with the Monterrey Consensus reached during the 
International Conference on Financing for Development held in 
Monterrey, Mexico. The participants of the meeting agreed to increase 
its funding for development, but acknowledged that more money alone 
was not enough. A new paradigm of aid as a partnership, rather than a 
one-way relationship between donor and recipient, was evolving.42
As follow-up measures, a series of High Level Forums on Aid 
Effectiveness was held in Rome, Accra, Paris and Busan (Korea). The 
fourth meeting in Busan (2011) is considered to have marked a turning 
point in international discussions on aid and development. It brought 
together over 3000 delegates to take stock of the progress made in aid 
delivery and to come up with collective aid plans for the future. The 
forum culminated in the signing of the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation by ministers of developed and developing 
nations, emerging economies, entities of South-South and triangular 
cooperation and civil society. This declaration established for the first 
time an agreed framework for development cooperation that embraces 
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traditional donors, South-South cooperators, the BRICS nations 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), civil society organiza-
tions and private funders.43
The UN was involved intensively in drawing up the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, playing a facilitating role in the global conver-
sation on this subject and supported broad consultations, leading to its 
launch during the UN Development Summit in September 2015. The 
process of formulating the Post-2015 Development Agenda was led by 
member states, with broad participation from major groups of nations, 
international bodies and other civil society stakeholders. Numerous 
inputs have been made to the agenda, producing a set of SDGs. This 
was an outcome of an open working group of the General Assembly, 
the report of an inter-governmental committee of experts on sustainable 
development financing, General Assembly dialogues, etc.
These efforts notwithstanding, the era of full-fledged globalization 
that began in the early 1990s has not been benign in relation to Africa. 
Thus, it is caught in a very long stretch of a third dilemma that we can 
call the ‘globalization-industrialization dilemma’. In order to realize 
economic transformation, countries need to first build and strengthen 
the basis on which economic growth can take place, and then work on 
building the manufacturing industry sector along with or based on agri-
cultural sector development.
But ironically, globalization which entails trade-investment liberaliza-
tion, free market access, global competition, etc. perhaps poses a serious 
obstacle to this African dream. As such, the task of achieving transfor-
mation in the era of hyper-globalization from the perspective of African 
states is quite a big challenge. Certainly, there is an increasing awareness 
within Africa of this issue, but there do not seem to be clear ideas and 
answers in terms of what concrete measures should be taken. Figure 1.1 
illustrates Africa’s continuing predicament. It shows the increasing gap 
in the average per-capita income level between Africa and rest of the 
world.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the points made here with respect to Sub-
Saharan Africa’s paradox viewed from a historical perspective.44 It also 
shows Africa’s continuing tribulations and challenges. In the colonial 
era, Africa was subjected to all-out exploitation. Upon independence, 
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African states had the opportunity to newly shape their destiny, but 
failed to move on and were held back by inherent ‘limitations’, such 
as a lack of true sense of nation. Then, with favourable international 
settings, Africans aspired to achieve economic development, but the 
negativities like dependency syndrome and ‘backtracking syndrome’ 
deepened so as to offset what was gained.
Africa continued to miss out on the opportunities in the changing 
international political-economic environment. The end of the Cold 
War ushered in an era of full-fledged globalization, but the ‘readiness’ 
of African nations in terms of nation-building and development mind-
edness, let alone industrialization and economic competitiveness, is a far 
cry from what was expected. To this day, many political leaders, poli-
cy-makers and economic experts in African do not seem to fully grasp 
the nature of the problem. As for the income gap shown in Fig. 1.1, the 
extended projection shows the gap growing into 2030. The question is: 
when will African countries break out of this dilemma? The basic coun-
try profile information of 49 Sub-Saharan African countries is shown in 
the Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and in Chapters 2 and 3.
Table 1.2 Country classification by income in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source World Bank list of economies, June 2017




Benin Malawi Angola Botswana
Burkina Faso Mali Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea




Chad Rwanda Cote d’Ivoire Namibia
Comoros Senegal Djibouti The Seychelles
Congo, DR Sierra Leone Kenya South Africa
Eritrea Somalia Ghana
Ethiopia South Sudan Lesotho
Gambia Tanzania Mauritania
Guinea Togo Nigeria
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Criticisms of Foreign Aid
Since the early 1980s, there have been exhaustive debates on foreign aid 
focusing on its failures in Sub-Saharan Africa. The literature on foreign 
aid to Africa, especially among intellectuals, is most often critical of 
its disappointing performance in terms of poverty reduction and eco-
nomic development. Critics argue that the aid architecture in Africa 
presents a sad story of hundreds of billion dollars of aid poured into 
the continent to virtually no avail. A large number of Africans are today 
even poorer and many African states are less developed than they were 
before. Despite continuous massive inflows of foreign aid far exceed-
ing debt servicing outflows, Africa has failed to use aid to make signifi-
cant improvements in its development. It is the last region in the world 
where official aid inflows outstrip private capital inflows by a very large 
margin. And Africa is so dependent on aid not only in terms of quantity 
but also in terms of the institutional mechanisms.1
Among many people from various backgrounds, including govern-
ment officials, diplomats, development experts, scholars, businessmen, 
NGO workers and journalists, with whom I have had discussions with 
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over the years in Africa, no one seems to refute the fact that aid in itself 
cannot lead to development. Aid, in the form of financial assistance or 
material supply, can be easily diverted to be ‘consumed’ for various pur-
poses. Facilities and equipment that are donated usually become useless 
or ‘white elephants’ as soon as they are handed over. The irony is that 
the more aid that is provided, the more it will be seen as given and its 
value will decline in the eyes of its recipients. It is as if aid is ‘public 
goods’ provided free and without limits. Hence, conditionality is being 
applied, but the reality of Africa is such that applying conditionality in 
itself poses challenges. Some critics go as far as claiming that the provi-
sion of foreign aid itself contributes to Africa’s troubles and underde-
velopment by fuelling dependency syndrome and weakening African 
states’ governance or administrative capacity, or even legitimacy.
Peter Bauer, who was considered a pioneering critic of foreign aid, 
believed that government-to-government aid was neither necessary nor 
sufficient for development, as it only entailed the danger of increasing 
the government’s power, promoting corruption and the misallocation 
of resources, destroying economic incentives, eroding civil initia-
tives and dynamism. Bauer persistently criticized the big push model 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943), which provided the intellectual support for 
allocation of aid to stimulate economic growth. He argued that donors 
do not know which investments are appropriate for developing coun-
tries and that aid not only fails to jump-start growth, but actually hin-
ders it.2
In his book Emerging Africa, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu suggests 
that perhaps the main element that has caused the underdevelopment 
of the African continent is foreign aid. He asks whether several decades 
of huge amounts of development assistance have failed to produce any 
significant development, and if this is self-evident, why African leaders 
have not reacted to this in kind. He stresses that development, by defi-
nition, is a process that should be driven internally by organizing the 
production economy in an efficient manner.3
Researchers have found out that the per capita gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) of Africans living south of the Sahara declined by an average 
annual rate of 0.59% between 1975 and 2000. Over that period, per 
capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity declined from $1770 
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in constant 1995 international dollars to $1479.4 An observation is 
made that over the past 60 years, at least $1 trillion of foreign aid is said 
to have been transferred to Africa, but real per capita income today is 
lower than it was in the 1970s.5 For critics, aid has not only impeded 
economic growth in Africa, but has also led to the huge debt burden 
that many African countries are saddled with today.6
Many point out that aid flows into Africa have left the continent 
worse off: ‘Aid cannot be blamed for all the mistakes made in the pro-
jects it bankrolls. However, by providing a seemingly endless credit 
line to governments regardless of their policies, aid effectively discour-
ages governments from learning from and correcting their mistakes. 
Giving some Third World governments perpetual assistance is about 
as humanitarian as giving an alcoholic the key to a brewery’.7 In their 
paper ‘The Curse of Aid’, Simeon Djankev and others liken aid to nat-
ural resources, in that it provides a windfall of resources to recipients, 
which may result in the same rent-seeking behaviour as is the case with 
the ‘curse of natural resources’.8 Abdoulaye Wade, the former President 
of Senegal, said: ‘I’ve never seen a country develop itself through aid 
or credit. Countries that have developed … There is no mystery there. 
Africa took the wrong road after independence’.9
Bill Easterly has been perhaps the most pronounced critic of aid 
since the turn of the twenty-first century and his ideas are expressed in 
a series of books. The central theme of Easterly’s book The Elusive Quest 
for Growth is that ‘incentives matter’: despite all the efforts and money 
spent trying to remedy extreme poverty in the developing world, the 
donor countries have repeatedly failed because they have neglected the 
fundamental rule that individuals, businesses, governments and donors 
respond to incentives.10 In The White Man’s Burden, he contends that 
existing aid strategies provide neither accountability nor feedback, but 
without accountability, the problems are never fixed, and without feed-
back from the poor, no one will understand what exactly needs to be 
fixed.11 In The Tyranny of Experts, he claims that development experts 
consider poverty in technical terms and focus on fixing immediate 
problems without dealing with the political oppression that caused the 
problems in the first place.12
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According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the failure of aid for Africa is 
not due to a vicious circle of poverty per se. Poverty is instead an out-
come of ‘economic institutions that systematically block the incentives 
and opportunities of poor people to make things better for themselves’. 
In sum, the problematic economic institutions that are extractive in 
nature are blocking their aspirations today in a similar manner to what 
South Africa’s apartheid regime did to black people.13
The basic criticism of aid is that it neither goes where it was intended 
nor helps those anticipated. Paul Collier, in The Bottom Billion, high-
lights the ‘four traps’ that contribute to this problem—the conflict trap, 
the natural resource trap, being landlocked with bad neighbours and 
having bad governance—but aid can potentially help turn things by 
incentives, skills and reinforcement.14 And on the question ‘is aid part 
of the problem or part of the solution?’, he points out aid is part of 
the solution, although it has serious problems and is not in itself suf-
ficient.15 Of course, there are self-criticisms within donor community 
that they have taken too much responsibility for solving Africa’s prob-
lems and that aid-dependency syndrome has become deeply rooted in 
Africa’.16
On the other hand, there are strong advocates of aid like Jeffrey Sachs 
who think that donor countries should increase the amount of aid to 
poor countries. In The Age of Sustainable Development, Sachs again 
stresses the need to push for global sustainable development, which 
‘is a way to understand the world, yet is also a normative or ethical 
view of the world: a way to define the objectives of a well-functioning 
society, one that delivers wellbeing for its citizens today and in future 
generations’.17
Foreign aid has had a positive impact on health and humanitar-
ian needs. The issue is what impact it has on economic development. 
According to Sebastian Edwards, the overall findings of a large body of 
research have been ‘fragile and inconclusive’, with some experts con-
cluding that ‘in the best of cases, it was possible to say that there was 
a small positive, and yet statistically insignificant, relationship between 
official aid and growth’.18 Meanwhile, Steve Radelet observes that ‘the 
pendulum has swung, with more evidence that aid has a modest posi-
tive impact on growth’ (Table 2.1).19
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Who Is to Be Blamed? Donors or Recipients?
If aid has indeed failed, then who should be blamed for this? Looking 
at the dismal state of development of Africa, many intellectuals and 
experts in this field have fallen into a habit of doing two things: accus-
ing foreign aid of being a failure or even evil, and blaming it all on the 
donor community, sometimes insinuating that they are evil-doers. But 
the way I see this issue is that aid is only as good as the recipients’ ability 
Table 2.1 Official aid received by Sub-Saharan Africa (US$, million, 2015)
Source World Bank, Data—Net Official Development Assistance and 
Official Aid Received (2015), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.
KD?locations=ZG
Country 1960 2015 Country 1960 2015
1. Ethiopia 15.35 3233.99 26. Chad 0.03 606.67
2. Congo, DR 82.09 2599.24 27. Guinea 0.16 538.45
3. Tanzania 10.36 2580.47 28.  Central African 
Republic
0.03 486.94
4. Kenya 21.11 2473.78 29. Benin 0.02 430.22
5. Nigeria 32.64 2431.60 30. Angola −0.05 380.09
6. Mozambique 0.02 1815.03 31. Burundi 7.53 366.54
7. Ghana 2.94 1768.29 32. Mauritania 0.04 318.11
8. South Sudan - 1674.83 33. Togo 0.11 199.62
9. Uganda 20.6 1628.25 34. Djibouti - 169.56
10. South Africa - 1420.64 35. Cape Verde - 152.57
11. Somalia 2.47 1253.55 36. Namibia - 142.4
12. Mali 0.08 1200.45 37. Gambia 0.54 107.85
13. Liberia 9.92 1094.46 38. Gabon 0.02 98.77
14. Rwanda 7.53 1081.72 39. Guinea-Bissau - 95.08
15. Malawi 4.16 1049.39 40. Swaziland 8.49 92.63
16. Burkina Faso 0.2 977.05 41. Eritrea - 92.11
17. Sierra Leone 6.72 946.39 42. Congo 0.02 88.92
18. Sudan 27.59 899.9 43. Lesotho 1.56 83.14
19. Senegal 0.13 897.2 44. Mauritius 0.53 76.55
20. Niger 0.04 865.87 45. Comoros - 65.78
21. Zambia 0.92 797.14 46. Botswana 3.43 65.58
22. Zimbabwe - 788.09 47.  São Tomé and 
Príncipe
0.11 48.95
23. Madagascar 2.65 677.01 48. Equatorial Guinea - 7.51
24. Cameroon 0.38 663.62 49. The Seychelles 1.1 6.78
25. Cote d’Ivoire 0.13 653.4
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to make use of it. Foreign aid itself is just a means, with some good 
intentions behind it at least. Aid can be made very good use of or can 
bring about unintended outcomes. Sub-Saharan Africa’s continuing 
woes are caused not by foreign aid, but by all the negative elements and 
inherent problems that have come into play.
The correct assessment would be that Sub-Saharan African countries 
are experiencing problems in spite of aid, not because of it. With all the 
issues that African countries have had to deal with after their independ-
ence, they might have done actually worse without aid. In the absence 
of aid, there could have been more conflicts and political instability, and 
this could have fuelled more uncertainty and desperation. Remember, 
in the 1990s, when aid was significantly curtailed, conflicts were on the 
rise. There could have been more irregularities, corruption, illegal trad-
ing, environment destruction, etc. So, if foreign aid was withdrawn and 
only ‘unfettered free market-ism’ prevailed, would Sub-Saharan Africa 
have fared much better?
It is not that the international aid community did not consider var-
ious aspects and approaches to development. As already mentioned, 
the international development community’s track record shows that it 
worked hard to find the right approaches to make aid more effective 
and relevant, and there was much trial and error. It should be noted that 
the donor community actually espoused and quite vigorously pursued 
an industrial policy approach for Africa in the 1960s, although it had 
to be shifted towards a poverty reduction approach in 1970s, following 
great disappointment with the former’s performance.20
Also, there is another important factor worth mentioning. Various 
entities give various types of aid to Africa. Some are less liable to diver-
sions, and donors have increasingly sought ways to check against the 
possibilities of misappropriation of funds or materials provided. On the 
one hand, we have the ‘budget support’, which is transferring money 
directly to recipient governments; on the other hand, there are also 
wide-ranging programmes like capacity-building that are either fully 
under the control of donors or under strict supervision regarding use of 
funds.21 Soft loans, compared to grants which constitute the majority 
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of the type of aid offered by developed countries, are much more sus-
ceptible to irregularities, given the state of governance of the recipient 
countries.22
Most of the reports, studies or commentaries that have been made 
on African development tend to find fault with either the poor perfor-
mance of foreign aid or the lack of competence and responsibility of 
donors and development experts. The perception that what donors do 
only matters is not only wrong but is also detrimental, because this is in 
effect giving up on the ability of African countries to play their part in 
the process.
We can easily be hypocritical and out of touch with reality, and 
what people seem to be oblivious of is the fact that donors do not bear 
prime responsibility for the development of poor countries. It is not the 
donors who hold the key to Africa’s development. There are plenty of 
resources to tap into and enormous opportunities for African countries 
if earnest efforts are made to utilize them. Adversities that African coun-
tries face, like the four traps outlined by Paul Collier (see above) and 
other elements that have been cited as a hindrance to Africa’s develop-
ment (unfavourable climate, epidemic diseases and lack of basic health 
care, tribalism, neopatrimonialism, etc.) are actually mostly man-made 
and thus can be overcome.
The reason to be optimistic about Sub-Saharan Africa’s future is that 
there is open-mindedness and receptiveness to the ideas and policies of 
the outside world. While the word ‘dependency’ has negative connota-
tions, in certain circumstances, dependency may not the worst thing; 
rather, exclusivism, isolationism, dogmatism and radicalism are much 
more dangerous and self-destructive. In fact, inter-dependence has 
become the general feature of today’s world, and maybe African lead-
ers are seeking regional unity and integration to enhance their collective 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the world in order to develop more interde-
pendent relationships.
Dependence may not be too big a problem in itself if it is short-lived 
or transitional; rather, fundamentally the bigger problem may be the 
lack of ambition. If people have true ambitions in life, they will not be 
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satisfied by being dependants of aids. The reason why many people are 
not as energetic as they should be is not because they are getting enough 
from donors, but because they have very limited ambitions in life.
Even when people are talking about their aspirations, the first thing 
that they are looking for could be the funding source. But without 
breaking the vicious cycle in which poverty, a weak social fabric and 
‘bad governance’, among other factors, are inter-connected, simply 
pouring in resources for the sake of assistance will not produce positive 
outcomes. So, the question reverts back to: ‘What are the conditions 
that justify foreign assistance?’
There is no such thing as all-out altruism in the modern world. 
Everything good and useful entails human endeavour and hence brings 
with it costs. Sooner or later, it comes with a price tag. Charity in times 
of calamities and humanitarian crisis comes naturally. But when altru-
ism is expected to be delivered in everyday life for an indefinite period 
of time by outsiders, this is a sign of trouble and abnormality. So, an 
appeal by African leaders, like Paul Kagame of Rwanda, that African 
countries steer clear of foreign aid and dependence on outsiders only 
makes sense.
One day, when I was giving a lecture to Ugandan local counsellors 
in a training institute, I challenged them by asking: ‘What is develop-
ment?’ I told them that it is essentially about two things: change and 
speed. How much positive change you can make in a given period; in 
other words, how fast you can make changes for the better. I asked them 
again: ‘Who should change?’ They were all silent, but seemed to under-
stand what I was trying to convey: it is you, not the donors.
Those who are quick to criticize donors for not doing enough had 
better think first whether they are not being overly harsh or unrealis-
tic in light of what donors can actually do. Yes, donors have their pro-
fessional commitments, but also their national interests, organizational 
interests and personal interests, and they tend to become bureaucratized 
over time, and we have to accept this as a reality.
Critics of foreign aid also point out that a significant proportion 
of aid money is drained before it reaches its intended beneficiaries, 
the local populace. Basically, two factors contribute to this. First, pro-
jects inevitably entail considerable administrative costs. High costs are 
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incurred because from the standpoint of donors, the costs of bringing 
projects to Africa are high. Many aid projects involve experts and other 
human resources, materials and equipment from developed countries, 
and of course these need to be covered by the budget. Allotting suffi-
cient funds to ensure the proper functioning of aid staff on the ground 
is also important. The level of dedication and service of aid project 
managers and workers who face very adverse conditions is perhaps 
the most important determinant of the success of their projects. This 
is because in a demanding environment like Sub-Saharan Africa, extra 
devotion and perseverance are required to get things done.
Second, the relevant government departments of the host country 
usually try to secure some funds of their own from the donors in the 
name of necessary administrative funds for collaborative activities. Risks 
lie not only in the planning phase of projects, but also during their 
actual operation. Hence, persistence in such efforts as fighting graft and 
reporting irregularities in the work of officials to their higher authorities 
is important.
Inherent Limitations of Foreign Aid
Debating whether foreign aid is good or bad in a dichotomic fashion 
misses the point in terms of what the real issues of development are. 
The usefulness of aid will depend, first, on what types of aid are used 
in the given circumstances and, second, on how they are planned and 
implemented. There should be no ambiguity in the fact that foreign aid 
has inherent limitations and one should not expect this aid to automat-
ically deliver the desired results. This is because most likely, donors have 
to undertake their aid programmes in the least favourable or most diffi-
cult conditions and circumstances in which they can find themselves to 
begin with.
The usefulness of aid should be judged in terms of what objective it 
wants to achieve. In the case of a natural or man-made disaster or crisis 
calling for humanitarian support or emergency relief, the usefulness of 
aid is obvious. The more acute the needs, the more appealing they will 
be. Any forms of support—money, food, materials or various human 
46     J.-D.  Park
services (by rescue crew, doctors, aid workers, etc.)—will be appreci-
ated. Then there are casual acts of charity like donating basic goods and 
materials or providing voluntary services to the poor and needy. Here, 
the goal is achieved through the delivery of the items or services. But 
things become more complicated as we move into larger-scale and more 
sophisticated aid programmes. For such types of projects, the work of 
planning, constructing, operating and post managing are all difficult 
tasks. When working with locals, which donors cannot avoid, unfore-
seen events like the local subcontractor suddenly becoming bankrupt 
and suspending their work may occur, prolonging the duration and 
hence raising the overall cost of the project.
Development-oriented aid includes construction projects (build-
ing factories, hospitals, vocational schools, etc.), consulting projects, 
facility or systems upgrading projects, training programmes, physical 
infrastructure projects, technical cooperation, funding programmes 
(including budget support) and much more. Because the execution of 
foreign aid involves two collaborators—donor and recipient—with very 
different standards, practices and levels of skills and technology, expect-
ing positive outcomes to come from aid is always going to be a tough 
proposition.
We can compare aid with domestic projects that developed countries 
carry out in their own countries, like social welfare programmes or pub-
lic facilities construction projects. The governments have to deal with 
their regulations, public opinions and various stakeholders, but at least 
things are predictable and manageable from their standpoint. Yet, for 
foreign aid or development cooperation, donor governments bear the 
extra burden of having to conduct activities where they not only do not 
have administrative or legal authority, but where their working condi-
tions are adverse as well. In addition, lack of personnel and staff on the 
ground, lack of local expertise, etc. compound the problem.
The biggest hurdle is perhaps the issue of ownership, which is also 
linked to sustainability. Aid projects are implemented over a given 
period, ending when the contracted term expires, followed by hando-
vers or completion of programmes. Officially, donors’ obligations end 
there and they no longer have the contractual basis to be responsible. 
Yet, in order for the projects to produce the desired outcomes and be 
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sustainable, the recipients really need to assume ownership of the pro-
ject in terms of operation and management, otherwise the projects (as 
they often do) will end up as ‘white elephants’. Herein lies a dilemma. 
The poorest countries need assistance because they lack the necessary 
resources and skills, but once they are provided with these facilities by 
donors, their lack of managerial capacity, discipline, commitment to 
ownership and accountability makes the project untenable and in many 
cases useless.
There are expectations both in Sub-Saharan Africa and developed 
countries that aid will contribute substantively to the former’s economic 
and social development. That is the rationale of aid. The most desired 
outcome would be that aid helps Africans to reduce poverty and gen-
erate income. However, there seems to be a basic misunderstanding 
that wealth can be obtained by transfers. Yet, the fact remains that the 
wealth of a nation cannot be amassed by transfers, but rather by crea-
tion. In order to become wealthy in an economic sense, one has to be 
productive. Wealth is created by producing additional value, goods and 
services, but there seems to be a tendency in the region where people 
want to become better off not by being productive, but by benefiting 
from the work of others, e.g., through simple redistributions.
Donors, on their part, must also find ways to better carry out their 
assignments. While gearing towards more pragmatic and result-oriented 
approaches, they need to think more from the viewpoint of recipients’ 
interests in order to have a greater impact. Thus, many aid experts and 
workers are dispatched to Africa, and their expertise and know-how 
accumulated over many years no doubt become precious assets in this 
field. However, as the work of these specialists becomes more regular, 
their perspective can also become routinized, leading to a ‘fixing’ of 
their views on Africa.
Aid specialists who think they have a good understanding of how 
locals think and behave could subconsciously consider such elements to 
be a ‘given’, and hence have low expectations of what can be achieved. 
When they take action accordingly with such a mindset in place, this 
can encourage the continuation of the status quo rather than promot-
ing change. Unless they exhibit strong passion to bring about change 
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despite the difficult conditions, their expertise and professionalism may 
in fact contribute to the ‘perpetuation’ of Africa’s underdevelopment.
Unlike natural science, in the realm of social science, over-reliance 
on compartmental expertise has its dangers. It is just like the problem 
of deepening bureaucratization. If you are the head of an organization, 
having many experts at your service can be convenient and encouraging. 
They can produce various reports or studies that you can circulate or 
report to your bosses for recognition. But when it comes to producing 
‘physical’ results in terms of implementing what is in the paper, it can 
be a very different story; that is, you might have as many experts as you 
want, but still cannot get the job done.
Deepening of expertise alone may not be the solution to problems. 
Experts are by definition specialists, as opposed to generalists, and their 
field of speciality is specified. As such, they are inherently limited in 
terms of their scope of vision and ability to make decisions on mul-
ti-dimensional and deep-rooted issues. Then there is always the danger 
of being immersed in too many technicalities and details. The need to 
follow so many reviews, procedures and regulations, and to collaborate 
with so many players also poses great burden on donors, making the 
delivery of aid projects that much more challenging.
The moral hazard of aid recipients and development partners alike 
can be understood in the context of ‘bureaucracy’ that has been formed 
in this field. Indeed, there are many competent and dedicated people 
working in this profession, but there are some from developing and 
developed countries alike who seem to spend more time enjoying their 
‘privileged’ status than working to make a difference with a true sense of 
mission.
Aid workers and volunteers on the ground commonly admit that the 
most difficult challenge they face in Africa is the human factor. When 
things do not go right, time after time, and frustration mounts, one can 
feel inclined to give in and ‘adapt’ to the reality. But it is not easy for 
people on a mission to give up fighting either. As such, the struggle goes 
on, but in the end the lessons are learned, usually with mixed feelings.
Another challenge arising from the evolution of donors and their 
policies that affects both aid recipients and donors is ‘aid fragmen-
tation’. This refers to the problem of too many donors providing too 
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little aid (or giving aid in so many small pieces) as to undercut the effi-
ciency of aid.23 According to International Development Association 
report, over 50 donor countries, including emerging donors, over 230 
international organizations, regional development banks, funds, etc., 
are involved in development activities, with the result that the average 
number of donors per recipient increased from three in 1960 to 30 in 
2006.24 This problem was acknowledged in the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (2005), which called for a pragmatic approach to the 
division of labour to increase complementarity and decrease transaction 
costs.25
The complex and uncoordinated nature of aid allocation patterns 
can create gaps and duplications of aid for the aid recipient group. 
Fragmentation of aid entails transaction costs both for donors and part-
ner countries. The principal drawbacks for donors would be the lack 
of specialization and scale inefficiency. If donors are active in so many 
places and sectors, then naturally their staff will need to be spread over 
a wide area. As a result, they will face an inability, in terms of having 
enough knowledge or expertise and manpower, to carry out all the pro-
jects in a successful manner. At the same time, high fixed costs will be 
incurred for a limited number of projects. As for recipients, bureaucratic 
costs to meet the administrative requirements imposed by a multitude 
of donors will be substantial.26
However, in recent years, several donors have also taken the decision 
to concentrate their aid on fewer partner countries. One reason behind 
this decision is to rationalize aid in order to achieve better results. 
However, some of these decisions may also have been brought forward 
by increased fiscal austerity as a result of the economic and financial cri-
sis. It all comes back to the question of national interests versus multi-
lateral governance.
Since aid fragmentation is a reflection of bilateral donors’ tenden-
cies and their competitive nature, it will not be easy to rectify it soon, 
although some measure of improvement may be found.27 There may 
be ‘recipient fatigue’ for the elites or officials in charge of develop-
ing countries, but for the people in general, it is a very different story, 
which justifies the need for the robust involvement of donors in Africa. 
A study on aid recipients’ attitudes conducted in Uganda several years 
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ago showed that elites and the masses have different perceptions towards 
foreign aid—the masses strongly preferred aid over government pro-
grammes, while the elites preferred government programmes.28 This 
attests to the widespread corruption, patronizing and clientelism on the 
part of the privileged class in the region. The local people know that 
they will get the benefits from foreign aid agencies, but distrust their 
elites strongly.
If aid has failed, it is not because aid itself is the problem or that 
donors had other intentions. At best, donors’ responsibility for this fail-
ure is no more than being ineffective or being not aggressive enough to 
‘induce’ change on the part of recipients. Reckoning must come from 
within, from the developing countries. It is not a question of a lack of 
materials, but is essentially about the mindset and the willingness to act.
The Issue of Reciprocal Compliance
Even scholars and practitioners involved in the development of Africa 
seem to be still baffled by the ‘African paradox’ after many decades 
since the world began trying to address Africa’s plight. In the history of 
humankind, no continent has drawn such worldwide, collective atten-
tion and support on a sustained basis as Sub-Saharan Africa. This may 
seem obvious because the majority of the poorest countries on earth, 
the least developed countries or ‘the bottom billion’ are to be found in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
But let us not forget that the African continent itself is blessed with 
natural endowments and has huge potential for growth. In terms of 
geographical size, Africa is colossal, the second-largest continent after 
Asia, and is the same size as the US, China, India and Europe com-
bined. It has the greatest number of countries with varying condi-
tions as well as commonalities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the climate and 
weather are mostly favourable and there are many large areas of land 
with fertile soil and plentiful water. The negative description of Africa’s 
geographical and climatic conditions by development experts is quite 
overblown and misleading.29
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Meanwhile, the amount of aid provided to developing countries 
reached an all-time high in 2013, rebounding from two years of fall-
ing volumes despite continued pressure on budgets in OECD countries 
since the global financial crisis. Donor provided a total of US$134.8 
billion in net official development assistance (ODA), of which US$55.7 
billion went to the African continent in 2013.30
At the global level, we have turned a new page with the completion 
of the UN MDGs and the adoption of the SDGs in 2015. The MDGs 
focused on the alleviation of absolute poverty, as well as social sector/
humanitarian assistance, but even by the UN’s standards, only three 
out of the eight goals were on track in the case of Africa.31 As the title 
suggests, the post-2015 goals rightly highlight sustainable develop-
ment with an emphasis on economic development. But the outcome 
of MDGs and the lessons learned from them were nothing to be very 
excited about in terms of having more confidence and clarity in the 
way forward for Africa’s development. Rather, the track record of Sub-
Saharan Africa over the past 50 years only seems to add to the lingering 
sense of disillusionment, doubt, scepticism and uncertainty.
The year 2016 was marked by a series of terrorist attacks in Europe, 
the refugee crisis and the rise of anti-immigration, nationalistic senti-
ments in the Western world, while the political developments that 
unfolded in the US and elsewhere in 2017 only added to the uncer-
tainty of the international order, as if we were entering uncharted 
territory. In 2018, the world continues to be unsettled by various devel-
opments in the international arena, but there are also some encouraging 
signs like a trend for global economic recovery, so the overall picture 
is mixed. In any case, it is unlikely that the international dynamics 
will have a major impact on Sub-Saharan Africa and the global donor 
community.
The international development architecture of Sub-Saharan 
Africa will likely prevail, despite the shortcomings and criticisms it 
has entailed. African countries’ strong desire for the continuation 
of aid, coupled with the ‘readiness’ of donors and the ‘short cycle’ of 
response—decision making, formulation and implementation of pro-
jects—characteristic of developed countries in order to meet time 
constraints, perpetuates the existing framework of aid policies. And it 
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would be naïve to discount the national interests—whether perceived 
or real—that all donor nations pursue, as well as natural competition 
among donors. Add to this the pressures coming from various opinion 
leaders, groups and organizations, and the tendency to stay the course 
becomes quite clear.
If the existing aid architecture cannot be overhauled in the foreseea-
ble future, what are the practical and realistic ways in which the effec-
tiveness of aid to Africa can be improved? The international community 
and African countries alike should not stomach continued lacklustre 
performance in Africa’s development. There should be a clear awareness 
on the part of African nations and the donor community that improved 
measurements must be applied.
However, it is unrealistic to expect ‘sweeping’ reform to take place 
across the continent, irrespective of how good the idea might be, as 
could be seen in the case of NEPAD. Regional initiatives requiring 
various coordination efforts among member states present themselves 
as another challenge rather than as readily applicable solutions. This 
also holds true for trade and investment initiatives like the African 
Continent FTA (AfCFTA) and the BRICS-Africa collaboration that 
are now taking shape. Certainly, there is a sound logic behind the con-
solidation of regional markets in Africa. But the ultimate bulwark of 
Africa’s development is of course its states. Without enhancing the level 
of governance and capacity of African states, their sustainable develop-
ment will not be properly achieved. Regional integration initiatives will 
not succeed if the member states do not have sufficient capability to 
govern and manage their own affairs.
The best-case scenario for Sub-Saharan Africa would be that success 
stories of national development emerge one after another, setting exam-
ples for others to emulate. Development cannot be bestowed by others. 
No matter how much aid a country receives, development cannot be 
attained by external assistance alone. It is essentially an internally driven 
process of a nation and is not one which can be injected exogenously by 
outsiders. Thus, it does not really matter what the international devel-
opment community discusses or plans if the subject or owners of devel-
opment—the African nations—are not taking the lead in the process.
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Like all other forms of partnerships, the donor-recipient partner-
ship must be based on mutual trust in order to be fruitful and lasting. 
Let us consider this relationship from the standpoint of ‘reciprocity’. 
For instance, a business partnership can be robust when the participat-
ing parties are mutually committed to meeting each other’s needs.32 
Logically, a low level of or unequal reciprocity will in all likelihood not 
yield the desired results compared to a high level or equal reciprocity.
The problem with current state of the aid structure for Africa is not 
only that the level of reciprocity is low, but, more importantly, that 
the reciprocity is very much asymmetrical. It takes two to tango, and 
the parties involved—namely the African countries and the donor 
community—must find ways to significantly upgrade their partnership 
in terms of strengthening the reciprocity.
Africa’s Compliance to Donors’ Needs
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the matrix of reciprocity in part-
nership between Sub-Saharan Africa and the donor community. It 
depicts the level of ‘compliance’ of donors and Sub-Saharan African 
countries towards each other. Donors’ compliance can be measured 
in quantitative and qualitative terms. The amount of aid provided 
would be a basic indicator of the quantitative response. The qualitative 
response is about how much attention and effort donors put in their 
aid programmes to meet the needs of recipient countries. Factors such 
as areas of assistance, content of aid programmes, level of study, prepa-
ration, involvement and coordination with host government agencies, 
input of experts, ‘harmonization efforts’, etc. should be taken into 
account. For aid recipients, their compliance can be gauged by the level 
of various administrative support and facilitation provided to donors 
and donor programmes, the degree of ownership and accountability 
demonstrated with respect to the management of aid projects after their 
handover, etc. But the irresponsibility and lack of sense of duty of gov-
ernment officials, widespread corruption, poor work ethics, the lack of 
development mindedness of the people, etc. are impeding efforts for 
development.
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Figure 2.1 shows four different combinations of partnerships. The 
purpose is to gain a general idea of the dynamics in the whole region. 
The actual situation will, of course, vary depending on each country 
and project. The present state of partnership between African coun-
tries and donor community, in most cases, would correspond to either 
a no. 1 ‘low reciprocity’ or a no. 2 ‘donor-active’ partnership. Regarding 
donors’ responsiveness towards Africa’s needs, they can be seen either as 
actively engaging or falling short of expectations, depending on how the 
recipients and others view it.33
But the fundamental problem lies in the recipients’ attitude. The 
prevalent low compliance by African countries is what undermines 
the effectiveness of aid and frustrates the morale of aid officials on the 
ground, and sows the seeds of doubt. Both donors and African coun-
tries seem to have forgotten that the justification of development aid lies 
in it being temporary in nature. However, things are not as simple as it 
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might appear, and there are clearly limits in terms of how far the donors 
and African countries can be compliant with each other.
It is true that international organizations and bilateral donors have 
been struggling with the task of aid effectiveness from their end, while 
the innate weakness in governance on the part of African countries is 
cited as a reason for the poor performance of aid. There is a saying that 
where there is bad governance, aid is ineffective, and where there is 
good governance, aid is unnecessary. But the governance issue is a mat-
ter to be sorted out by African countries.
The ‘low reciprocity’ partnership represents an untoward state of reality. 
Aid is provided mostly for the sake of consumption and serves vested inter-
ests. A typical feature of this is recipient governments taking aid for granted 
and making little effort to be forthcoming in relation to the donor’s require-
ments, other than when they see their own interests (such as budget alloca-
tion). Donors, for their part, go about ‘routinely’ with their work, adhering 
to formalities without worrying much about the outcome (conveniently 
putting the blame on the environment and recipients) and struggling to 
make a real impact. However, it is true that the major aid organizations 
maintain strict guidelines and discipline in their operations in order to try 
to make them as efficient as possible in the given circumstances.
A ‘recipient-active’ partnership would be rare in Africa, where coun-
tries are highly receptive to donors aid programmes, actively and vol-
untarily undertaking the necessary measures to make them work (with 
sound governance), while donors, in comparison, are not as proac-
tive.34 South Korea in the 1960s may fall into this category. Lastly, a 
‘high-reciprocity’ partnership is an ideal situation where both donors 
and recipients will get satisfaction and credit for a strong and successful 
partnership. An example of such a case could be Rwanda.
The most common form of Africa’s partnership with mainstream 
donors is seen to match the ‘donor-active’ type. In this case, the prin-
cipal donors, whether multilateral and bilateral, have been making 
continuous efforts to make their programme more relevant to African 
countries, while the responsiveness of African countries towards them 
has more or less remained the same. The compliance gap between 
donors and African countries must be narrowed so that the partnership 
status can shift to ‘high reciprocity’ or ‘recipient-active’.
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Dismayed by Africa’s seemingly never-ending troubles amid concerns 
that the region may be entrenched in an ever-deepening fix, people 
from both the region and the development community may be inclined 
to either find scapegoats to take the blame or to come up with excuses. 
When things go right, everybody wants some credit for it, but when 
things go badly, the blame game is on. Passing the buck is particularly 
serious in Africa, and this is also a problem in itself. In intellectual cir-
cles, many observers, experts and academics are seen to come up with 
standardized, textbook-style explanations in keeping with the line 
of their thinking rather than searching for fundamental reasons and 
exploring new ideas or solutions.
What seems to be an insurmountable state that African countries 
find themselves in may give cover for foreign countries and inter-
national organizations, as well as African leaders and the privi-
leged class, to follow the status quo as if nothing can be done to 
change Africa’s fortunes. Unfortunately, in many instances, Africa’s 
political leaders in effect take advantage of the entangled situation to 
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hold on to power. And in some cases, an unexpected and ironic polit-
ical situation emerges. I was quite appalled to watch BBC News Africa 
(8 October 2017) reporting on Liberia, which aired on the eve of the 
nation’s presidential elections, showing Liberian citizens expressing how 
much they missed their imprisoned former leader Charles Taylor and 
that they would vote for him should he run again.
Despite how much conundrum the African issues may pose, the 
goodwill and enthusiasm on Africa’s development on the part of the 
global community has not been lost, and numerous internationally 
based private entities are robustly engaged in activities to help tackle 
Africa’s fundamental problems with their professional expertise and 
international network.1
This chapter is a prelude to the next chapter, which will unearth the 
root cause of Africa’s underdevelopment. But identifying or agreeing on 
the root cause(s) has been very elusive as there have been so many differ-
ent views and interpretations on this subject. Nonetheless, the objective 
of this book is to make the case that there is indeed such a thing as a 
principal root cause for Africa’s underdevelopment and to provide ideas 
on how it can be redressed.
In this chapter, I will very briefly discuss conventional explanations 
or arguments that are frequently made as to what constitutes a funda-
mental cause or a set of fundamental causes for Africa’s continuing pov-
erty and other troubles. These include: colonial legacies; ethnicism and 
neo-patrimonialism; institutions, governance and democracy; the role of 
government; natural conditions like climate and geography; and other 
factors (geography, corruption, globalization and China).
Colonial Legacies
Can historical experiences have a profound impact on the nations to 
the extent that they leave a permanent imprint in their lives and deter-
mine their fate? Certainly, our civilization, cultures and traditions, social 
behaviour patterns and even the way in which we view the world can 
be affected by the events of the past. How much impact they will have 
will depend on many things, including the scale, intensity, duration and 
nature of historical events, and how they have been perceived.
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But what is also true is that people and nations have the ability and 
resilience not only to react to various phenomena or forces, but also to 
‘interpret’ them in a context that is variable. The negativities of history 
can also bring about the opposite in later generations, like renewed pos-
itive resolve. And we can see many such examples in our history, both 
recent and old. It may be more accurate to say that this is not the excep-
tion but the rule in our lives.
The history of humanity bears two facets: being subjected to difficul-
ties (adversity, survival, tribulations, struggles and conflicts) on the one 
hand, while also overcoming hardships (adopting, persevering, creat-
ing new things and making progress) on the other. Individuals, people, 
societies and nations have the ability not only to tame natural condi-
tions but also to respond and overcome various obstacles. Action leads 
to reaction, and that is how life has evolved. Nothing is static about 
human beings and their lives. It is one thing to say that European colo-
nizers were utterly exploitive towards Africa, which they were, but quite 
another to say that Africans are ‘bound’ by the colonialism of the past 
and its legacies, even to this day.
The slave trade and the inflow of weapons in exchange of slaves on 
a grand scale for many centuries must have had a devastating effect on 
Africa, both economically and socially. And then, during the later stages 
of colonization, European powers arbitrarily imposed their artificial 
criteria of creating states in Africa. This, along with the manner in 
which they managed their colonies, is deemed to have inhibited 
national identity or nation states from properly emerging and develop-
ing in Africa.
In his book Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy 
of Colonialism, Mahmood Mamdani argues that colonialism led to sys-
tems that impeded the development of democracy in African states. 
The colonialists’ indirect rule in Africa produced ‘decentralized despot-
ism’, giving rise of new chiefs who become more despotic as they were 
empowered by colonial authority that was not embedded in local socie-
ties, which undermined the existing mode of accountability.2 Mamdani 
explains that this led to a ‘bifurcated’ system: direct rule was exercised 
in the urban centres where civil powers (mostly the expatriate colo-
nial community) prevailed, while indirect rule was maintained by the 
rural tribal powers (native authority).3 Mamdani argues that politicized 
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ethnicity is the source of much of the political-social problem in Africa 
today and that the colonial politicization of indigeneity was the greatest 
crime of colonialism.4
The colonialists arranged their rule in Africa so as to keep indigenous 
people separate and under political control. Due to European coloniz-
ers’ policy of dividing the indigenous population along perceived eth-
nic lines, the latter’s sense of citizenship or individual national identity 
was never fostered during the colonial era. And when independence was 
finally achieved, their tendency was towards expanded politicization of 
the ‘ethnic community’ rather than pushing for politics at the national 
level.5
Meanwhile, Englebert and Dunn note that the European colonial 
conquest of Africa was remarkably brief. It took just a few years to bring 
down the African political systems, some of which had endured for cen-
turies. But the European institutions they introduced were surprisingly 
shallow and ‘the colonial reengineering of African politics was haphaz-
ard and superficial’.6 Interesting but all important point they are mak-
ing is that while European colonization of Africa is often criticized for 
‘dividing’ the continent and hampering African unity, in reality ‘there 
never was any political African unity, and colonisation actually con-
solidated a myriad of diverse political systems into some fifty territo-
rial states, dramatically reducing the already Balkanized nature of the 
continent’.7
All in all, it would be fair to say that while Western colonialism had 
a profound impact on Sub-Saharan Africa, it is too far-fetched to hold 
it principally accountable for the region’s current state of development. 
The colonial period, the post-colonial era and the period of more than 
half a century since independence should not be bunched together as 
one. Some might like to think in terms of historical determinism, but 
the reality is that the colonial legacy is only one of many factors that 
have had consequences. Exaggeration of the influence of past history 
carries with it the danger of vastly underestimating the voluntarism, 
spontaneity, subjectivity and will of the population. In this regard, ‘con-
structivism’ is deemed an instrumental tool to be used alongside con-
ventional method of study.8
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Proponents of neo-colonialism argue that Europe’s colonization of 
Africa continues even after independence and, similarly, a group of left-
ist ideologists and scholars influenced by Marxian class theory have for-
warded such theories as dependency theory and world-systems theory 
explaining the systematic exploitation and manipulation of the Western 
powers in Africa and other developing countries through international 
trade and economic systems.9 But with the end of the Cold War and 
the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and socialist regimes along-
side the rise and success of Asian economies, these theories lost their 
appeal, persuasiveness and relevance. In the post-Cold War era, the top-
ics that draw international attention are globalization, climate change, 
terrorism, humanitarian crises and so forth, and these pose important 
challenges to both the developed world and developing countries alike.
Crawford Young sums it up well: ‘the explanatory power of colonial 
legacy, initially compelling, becomes less central as time goes by. The 
half century of postcolonial existence now matches the historic duration 
of effective colonial rule’. In other words, the number of Africans hav-
ing a personal recollection of ‘being colonized’ is dwindling.10
Ethnicity and Neopatrimonialism
Much has been made of ethnicity and neo-patrimonialism when it 
comes to the problem of Africa’s development, and they are interesting 
themes. Generally, the discourse on Africa’s ethnicity and neo-patrimo-
nialism tends to treat these negatively, suggesting that they are inimical 
to Africa’s development. ‘Colonial legacy’ is more or less an ‘imagined’ 
factor, but ethnicism and neo-patrimonialism certainly can have more 
relevance to real life, in that they are social elements. Certainly, eth-
nicism can play out to undermine social cohesiveness. For its part, 
neo-patrimonialism, which is generally understood as the practice 
of leaders and state officials parasitically using their state offices and 
resources for the furtherance of informal patron–client relationships in 
which they are engaged, can also be problematic.
It is true that the prominence of ethnicity is markedly high in Sub-
Saharan African compared to the rest of the world. For the entire 
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Sub-Saharan African region, the probability that two randomly picked 
individuals belong to different ethnic groups is 66%, compared to 
36% for the whole world.11 However, it should be noted that there are 
wide variations in ethnic heterogeneity among the Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
Another salient feature that is observable in the region is the ten-
dency to espouse what seem to be incompatible or contradictory aspects 
of their perception, to the point that it is mystifying. For example, peo-
ple basically identify themselves primarily in terms of their ethnicity, 
but they also show in no ambiguous terms a sense of national identity. 
Experts of Africa’s ethnicity point out that subnational citizenship and 
national citizenship coexist in Africa. It is pointed out that: ‘The simul-
taneous display of subnational and national identity is one of the most 
puzzling dimensions of identity politics in Africa.’12
In general, people’s attachment to their nation seems to fall short of 
what we call patriotism; rather, it appears to be more associated with 
opportunism. Perhaps it can also be understood in terms of ‘realism’, 
‘openness’, ‘flexibility’ or ‘pragmatism’. In other regions, the term ‘sense 
of nation’ may mean being patriotic in terms of sacrificing oneself and 
serving one’s country. But the situation seems quite different in Africa. 
When I was attending a seminar on history in Kampala, we had a 
chance to discuss Ugandans’ perception of their national identity and 
sense of nation. A Ugandan participant expressed that ‘since we already 
belong to this country, we might as well get along’. His lukewarm 
response towards nationhood did not sound out of the ordinary under 
the circumstances. After more than 50 years since Uganda became inde-
pendent, I thought that at least the Ugandan intellectuals would have a 
stronger sense of nation. One panellist, a scholar, even said that life in 
Uganda was better before independence.
As many have pointed out, the duplicity of people’s adherence to dif-
ferent identities is common in Sub-Saharan African nations. Moreover, 
the characteristic of ethnicity is that it is malleable rather than immuta-
ble and exclusionary, as different ethnic groups coexist and live peace-
fully with one another most of the time. A high degree of ethnicity can 
even have a mitigating effect on the potential division at the national 
level. The openness and accommodative attitude of Africans with 
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respect to other ethnic groupings and different identities are evident.13 
Ethnic clashes mostly surface in relation to issues concerning land rights 
and government policies or interventions (or the lack thereof ). Ethnic 
tensions or conflict are also exacerbated when leaders try to use ethnic-
ity for their own political purposes. In the case of ‘kingdoms’, the issue 
can relate to local autonomy and authority vis-à-vis the state.
The pursuit of self-interest and opportunism seems to be the prev-
alent motivation for society. One might be perplexed to see many 
Africans ‘display both ethnic polarization and nationalistic fervour’.14 
Tim Kellstall points out how the tendency of Africans to have multi-
ple identities has led to a ‘fragmentation of the self ’, and in their quest 
for survival, people develop links to potential patrons in a bid to garner 
as many favours as possible: ‘The ways in which people make a living 
in Africa encourages them into plural identities, which prevents them 
from organizing collectively over time, thereby foreclosing certain types 
of social movement and power.’15 It may be even called a ‘multiple 
personality’.
Edmond Keller notes that in Sub-Saharan Africa, ‘one’s social iden-
tity is fluid, intermittent, and experimental’ and that two forms of 
citizenship exist in the minds of people in their daily lives: ‘a form of 
communitarian citizenship and a form based on residence in a national 
community largely created as a by-product of colonialism’.16 Keller 
observes that among the most common causes of inter-group conflict 
in Africa today are disputes over identity and citizenship, exacerbated 
or prompted by bad politics. And they are inherently linked to land 
rights and immigration issues, as was the case in Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, 
Rwanda and Kenya.17 ‘Ethnic groups are not closed corporate commu-
nities, bouncing off each other like billiard balls; rather, they are per-
meable at the margins and are entangled with ‘the other’ in numerous 
ways. Crawford Young observes that ethnic consciousness can vary 
widely in its intensity, depending on the depth of cultural resources on 
which it draws and its degree of mobilization’.18
Is Africa’s ethnicity the cause or consequence of what is taking 
place in Africa? Does it negatively impact nation-building or is it like 
many other factors, being essentially neutral, depending on how it is 
employed? I think what we need to be careful of in this discourse is 
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the possibility of having a ‘Eurocentric bias’. From the perspective of 
Western countries, a sense of national citizenship, civic society, good 
institutions and governance, and a free-market economy are considered 
to be factors that are conducive for development. But from the stand-
point of developing countries, many feel that these are the features of 
the end results, not the causes, of development. How can we reconcile 
such differences?
The identity and ethnicism of Africans seem to be a reflection of how 
Africans are adapting to reality. The ethnic community, considered as an 
expansion of one’s family and relatives, constitutes a basic foundation 
or system of people’s life. But confronted with the reality of deepening 
‘dualism’ in every aspect of life—the economic, social and political gap 
or discrepancy between rural and urban areas—people have come to 
realize the limits of what their ethnic communities can provide to them, 
in contrast to the opportunities and benefits that can be sought from 
the state or foreign partners. For Sub-Saharan Africans, differences in 
terms of religion and political views do not seem to matter and they are 
rarely made into an issue, except in some isolated cases. For ordinary 
people, their fundamental concern has been subsistence or survival, 
while the privileged class has sought the maintenance of the status quo 
or the protection of their vested interests.
Ethnicism should not be viewed as the primary motivator for peo-
ple’s actions; there are many other elements that account for social 
dynamism. When problems seemingly taking on an ethnical dimension 
arise, it is usually the outcome of a combination of various factors at 
play and is not solely due to ethnicism.
A landmark paper on ethnicity published by the Harvard Institute 
of Economic Research in 2002 revealed that the Sub-Saharan African 
nations were the most ethnically diverse in the world.19 Since many 
Sub-Saharan African countries are seen as fragile, conflict-ridden and 
poor, there may be a natural inclination to presume that ethnic diversity 
leads to more conflicts and hinders economic development and democ-
racy. There have also been quite a number of studies purporting to back 
such a view, but it is also true that there are many different ways to con-
duct research and interpret the data.
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On the question of whether there is a correlation between ethnical 
diversity and development, including stability and governance, the more 
prudent and objective studies seem to suggest that it is inconclusive or 
conditional at best. Ethnicity is just one factor among many that have 
an impact. If we think of ethnicity in terms of the ‘fragmentation’ of a 
nation, it is all relative. Ethnicity depends on how we define it concep-
tually and technically. The ‘diversity’ and ‘fragmentation’ of a nation is 
common all over the world. Even if a nation is racially homogeneous, 
there are sub-regional or socio-cultural divides in most countries. Even 
in developed countries, cases of regional animosity, stereotyping or even 
discrimination are not uncommon.
Korea is acknowledged as probably the most homogeneous nation 
on earth. But ethnical homogeneity does not make democracy or 
development any easier to come by. Despite being the same homoge-
neous nation, the two Koreas could not be more different from each 
other in so many aspects. As the example of North Korea shows, 
political ideology and the type of regime in place can eclipse all other 
factors.
There are many examples all over the world where ethnical homo-
geneity does not guarantee development. In Africa, Somalia exhibits 
unusual national homogeneity, with the same languages, religion and 
race,20 but unfortunately it suffers from extreme internal conflict, dest-
abilization and divisions due to clan warfare and rivalry. On the other 
hand, Uganda, which is considered one of the most ethnically diverse 
countries in the world, has enjoyed relatively positive political stability, 
security, economic growth and business prospects for a Sub-Saharan 
country. And political and social tensions within homogeneous societies 
cannot be always less than those of heterogeneous societies.
Rather, I think that conflicts and other problems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are not caused by ethnic diversity or ‘fractionalization’ per se, but 
fundamentally by the ‘concentration’ of power that inordinately favours 
one particular group over others. Paul Collier also notes that except for 
a few specific cases, ethnic diversity neither increases the likelihood of 
civil war nor obstructs economic growth: ‘multi-ethnic societies can 
usually be socially and economically fully viable’.21
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Surprisingly, many African intellectuals that I have met have stressed 
that in Africa, ethnicism is not the fundamental cause of troubles; 
instead, it is being used as a rationalization or means to enhance one’s 
leverage whenever political leaders are faced with problems. The con-
flict in South Sudan that started in December 2013 is a telling example 
of this. What started as a power struggle between President Salva Kiir 
and the former Vice President Riek Machar developed into a broader 
conflict of seemingly ‘ethnic’ proportions. But as the conflict continued, 
it became increasingly evident that its nature was more of a personal 
power struggle rather than a civil war between different ethical groups.
Along with ethnicism, neo-patrimonialism is another distinctive fea-
ture of Sub-Saharan Africa. Neo-patrimonialism is a term that is mostly 
used to characterize the state of Africa and can be defined as ‘a system 
whereby rulers use state resources for personal benefit and to secure the 
loyalty of clients in the general population’.22 A more elaborate defini-
tion of this term is given by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle: 
in a neo-patrimonial state, ‘relationships of loyalty and dependence per-
vade a formal political and administrative system, and officials occupy 
their positions less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, 
than to acquire personal wealth and status’.23
There are scholars of primordialism who believe that ethnicity is a 
deep-rooted, non-negotiable element defining one’s identity in Africa. 
According to primordialism, Africa’s ethnic diversity is seen to be a 
cause of conflict and the reason for the poor functioning of its states.24 
Because there is widespread corruption and continual economic- 
business failures and poverty in black Africa, it is easy for Afropessimists 
to blame the region’s ‘cronyist-neopatrimonial’ tendencies for such prob-
lems. As a result, ‘stressing the cultural or neopatrimonial dimension of 
African business (and states) promotes a determinism about African busi-
ness whereby it is ineluctably corrupt: the very nature of patron-client 
ties in Sub-Saharan Africa would appear to render the expansion of legit-
imate commerce extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible’.25
A typical social culture in many countries in the region is that ordi-
nary people do not distinguish their immediate family members from 
their relatives (even distant relatives) when it comes to referring them 
as ‘brothers’, ‘sisters’, ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’. The tradition of ‘extended 
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family’ persists, and those individuals who have acquired the means 
or power are expected to help out the other members of the extended 
family who are in need. Critics would see such cultural elements as 
making Africa’s neo-patrimonial practices even more detrimental to 
development.
But just like ethnicism, being fixated on neo-patrimonialism without 
taking into account the wider picture of interacting elements poses the 
danger of exaggerating or misrepresenting its significance. Based on his 
case studies on Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, and Rwanda, Tim Kelsall 
argues that neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental 
ends, provided that mechanisms can be found to centralize economic 
rents and manage them in the long term.26 Neo-patrimonialism embod-
ies aspects that breed corruption and are not consistent with the prac-
tices of developed nations, but it cannot be singled out as a determinant 
for underdevelopment. Similar traits existed in Asia, Latin America and 
even Europe. Botswana is a model country for democracy and govern-
ance in Africa, despite its patrimonial politics.27 Rather, it should be 
viewed more as a sign or outcome of a failure on the part of African 
countries to meet the challenges and properly adapt to the new environ-
ment brought about by their independence.
Theoretically, we can trace the concept of patrimonialism back 
to Max Weber’s famous three types of legitimate authority or rule: 
traditional, charismatic and rational-legalistic authority. Weber 
defined patrimonialism as a component of traditional authority, 
a system in which personal relations dominate in the political and 
administrative power relations between the ruler and the ruled. 
Many Africanists observed that traditional patrimonialism has 
endured into contemporary African regimes in the post-colonial era. 
Alongside African leaders’ essentially patrimonial behaviour coex-
ist formal institutions, laws and bureaucracies, making the task of 
comprehending Africa ever more complicated. Hence, the notion 
of neo-patrimonialism was developed to cope with the two dimen-
sions of African states: essentially patrimonial rule coexisting with 
legal-rational authority.28
Neo-patrimonialism is a testament to the lack of or weakness of an 
authoritative mechanism for the impersonal and rational allocation of 
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state resources, and hence to the disappointing state of nation-building. 
The crux of the matter is that leaders in general have used the modern 
state apparatus to serve their personal and immediate interests instead 
of being ‘bound’ by it to advance the public interest. Hence, the oppo-
site of modernization or nation-building has been taking place: the state 
institutions have been adapted to the existing socio-cultural practices 
instead of institutions bringing about changes and progress in society by 
making the people conform and adapt to them.
Goran Hyden, Julius Court and Kenneth Mease identified three 
dimensions of governance from the development context: economic, 
political and administrative.29 In order for a nation to properly follow 
the path of development, a clear separation between the public domain 
and the private domain must be observed. Equally, economic, politi-
cal and administrative governance should be pursued ‘independently’, 
without their boundaries becoming blurred by personal interests and 
short-term political considerations. This would require a strong com-
mitment and moral authority from the top. But what is probably more 
important is the ‘empowerment of people’ not only as an effective check 
against the abuse of power and mismanagement by the authorities and 
the privileged, but also to make things work in terms of the everyday 
business of the nation.
There may be various reasons why neo-patrimonialism is so prevalent 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, but I think the big issue here is the absence of 
a critical turning point or occasion to ‘break away’ from the past and 
‘shift’ the mindset of the people so that it fits into the developmental 
mode. Western countries underwent political struggles and upheavals, 
and many Asian countries experienced national movements or polit-
ical uprisings, both during and after colonization. The political con-
sciousness of the people, the sense of socio-political rights expressed 
in actions, movements and campaigns that constitute the bedrock of 
nation-building and development were feeble in Sub-Saharan Africa. To 
this day, African leaders and elites are largely unable (whether willingly 
or unwillingly) to change the unwholesome syndromes typical of Africa, 
a subject I will address in more detail later in this book.
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Institutions, Governance and Democracy
Debates on Africa’s institutional problems can be taxing to both the 
proponents and critics of Western institutions. It boils down to the 
question of what makes institutions work and who is responsible 
for the weakness or failure of Africa’s institutions. There is no ques-
tion that democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good gov-
ernance are universal values and principles to which virtually every 
nation would aspire. The challenge for developing countries is how 
these goals can be realistically and substantively attained. This is a 
fundamental task that calls for open-mindedness on the part of all 
stakeholders.
Is adopting Western-style modern state institutions, good govern-
ance and democracy the surest way for Africa to realize development? In 
other words, are weak institutions, bad governance, and undemocratic 
and authoritarian rule chiefly responsible for Africa’s shortcomings? The 
mainstream donor community would think that it is a matter of course. 
However, this seems to be misperception or oversimplification of such a 
premise, which needs to be viewed in a more objective light.
Much has been made about institutions, but ‘institution’ itself is a 
vague term. Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as a prototype case of the 
mismatch between ‘having’ and ‘doing’. This mismatch shows no sign 
of dissipating and the institutional problem is a good example of this 
reality in the region. Having good institutions is one thing and making 
them serve their purpose is another. What makes institutions work are 
the actions of people who uphold them.
In essence, good institutions and governance, the rule of law, freedom 
of speech, human rights and democracy are essentially ultimate goals 
or the end state of development rather than the means to achieving 
development. These are the features that emerge from successful devel-
opment through the process of ‘embodiment’, which in itself requires 
arduous endeavours. They are not what can be simply ‘introduced’ and 
‘adopted’ upon wish. The same applies to economics. Many seem to be 
unaware or have forgotten that economic growth and income genera-
tion cannot come about by transfers of wealth, but by the creation of 
76     J.-D.  Park
wealth or the production of goods and services. Their preoccupation 
is mostly with the distribution of wealth rather than the creation of 
wealth.
Another important aspect that may be overlooked is that democracy, 
the rule of law and good governance are in reality ‘modes’ rather than 
‘substance’. In Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy is viewed too much in 
terms of ‘freedom’, while the sense of ‘responsibility’ and citizenship, 
which is just as important as freedom, is woefully neglected. In a mature 
democracy, freedom does not mean unfettered liberty that does harm 
to others, but that is responsible. Freedom of speech and individuals’ 
rights alone cannot guarantee progress, and the obsession to ‘duplicate’ 
Western-style institutions and norms only superficially could hinder 
Africa’s path to genuine democracy.
Developed nations and the established international community 
regard politics and development premised on the notion of ‘rational-
ity’. Because in the West ‘rational’ thinking prevails in life, Westerners 
may take it for granted that others will think in the same terms. This 
applies in relation to universal values and norms, business and the mar-
ket economy, development, science and technology, global challenges, 
etc. However, as people will soon discover, the reality of Africa seems to 
be quite removed from such expectations.
The Sub-Saharan African countries have maintained the state sys-
tem that is the continuation of the former colonial establishments. 
The introduction of the European rational-legal state has led to a 
Westernization of the political order in Africa and around the world. 
But Bertrand Badie states that a crucial consequence of this is the failure 
in terms of ‘loss of meaning’ in the relationship between rulers and the 
ruled which ‘discourages the individual in his effort to adapt to an insti-
tutional life of no concern to him’.30
Not only have Western political institutions and values failed to take firm 
root in most African countries, but the manner in which they have been 
pursued or applied is also seen to have inhibited the growth of the very fab-
ric that makes them work. After independence, Sub-Saharan African polit-
ical leaders ‘adapted’ to the reality in the way they saw convenient, resulting 
in the formation of ‘hybrid (or mixed) regimes’ which are neither true lib-
eral democracies nor the kind of outright dictatorial regimes.31
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Basil Davidson suggested that the Western colonization of Africa 
actually held Africa back from forming nation states in its own way: it 
is the imposition of the European nation state rather than an intrinsic 
African characteristic that is at the root of the most of Africa’s political 
problems, and colonialism promoted the rise of alienated African elites 
largely trained in Europe and oblivious to their historical foundations 
of political legitimacy.32 According to Davidson, what Africa’s leaders 
inherited was ‘a crisis of social disintegration’ from which sprang the 
current problems of Africa: while it was commonly assumed that Africa 
had no indigenous models for ruling nation states, it was in fact well 
into the process of evolving its own models for the nation state. The 
Asante kingdom of modern-day Ghana, for example, was ‘manifestly a 
national state on its way to becoming a nation-state with every attrib-
ute ascribed to a Western European nation-state’ and even after Africa’s 
independence, the adherence to African tradition was still derided as 
‘tribalism’ and viewed as an obstacle to development.33
So what we see today in Sub-Saharan Africa is the perennial gap 
between what is in spirit and what is actually being practised. African 
countries all have modern executive, legislative and judicial branches 
modelled after the Western political system and over many decades, 
their leaders and political elites were orientated in this modern model 
of statehood. Every nation should follow good governance, the rule of 
law, accountability and democracy—the standards that are now taken 
for granted as global norms. But these values or standards have been 
achieved over centuries of historical progress in the West through many 
internal and regional conflicts and social, political, economic turmoil 
and evolutions. And it was only in the twentieth century that these 
Western ideas and norms gained the status of being ‘universal values’.
There is no denying that Africa’s fate and development rests squarely 
with Africans, not the Western world or the international develop-
ment community. How deep an impact the colonial legacies have had 
on Africa is matter of debate, but what is not debated is who are the 
owners and subjects of development. No matter how convenient and 
tempting it may be to place the blame on ‘outsiders’, these ‘outsiders’ 
only play a secondary role at best, and the unshakable truth is that 
the protagonists of Africa’s development are none other than Africans 
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themselves. And Africa’s development is inexorably tied to nation-build-
ing, which is a process that is still very much in the making. But 
nation-building is not about just ‘adopting’ or ‘adapting’—it should be 
about carrying out the arduous tasks of making and undergoing change. 
If African countries have not been able to do this up to this point, after 
half a century of independence, who should they blame for this other 
than themselves?
In the meantime, the political dynamics in Africa are seen to fol-
low their own unpredictable course. As stated by Dani Rodrik, accord-
ing to Freedom House’s count, more than 60% of all the countries in 
the world are electoral democracies, meaning that their regimes have 
emerged through competitive multi-party elections. But the majority of 
these ‘democracies’ are in fact ‘illiberal democracies’ that brought about 
the rise of popular autocrats with little regard for the rule of law and 
civil liberties. Rodrik reminds us that liberal democracy rests on distinct 
sets of rights—property rights, political rights and civil rights—and 
that democratic bargaining can work only when the masses are able to 
organize and mobilize around common interests. And, historically, such 
mobilizations have been the product of industrialization and urbaniza-
tion, wars or anti-colonial struggles. But in the developing world, these 
bargains, by their very nature, produce electoral democracies rather than 
liberal democracies, so that in practice, the emergence of liberal democ-
racy is rarely seen today.34
The ‘irregularity’ of political developments is common in Africa. For 
example, in Burundi in May 2015, people took to the streets to pro-
test against the removal of term limits for the President, and a military 
coup was attempted against President Pierre Nkurunziza, who wanted 
to remain in power. On the other hand, in Rwanda, with two years 
left before the next elections, people were petitioning Parliament to 
amend the Constitution, which limits presidents to two terms, in order 
to allow President Kagame to stand for President again. Even the sec-
ond-largest political party, the largest opposition party, has backed the 
removal of term limits for elected political leaders.35
David Booth and Diana Gammack’s observation is a telling reminder 
of the reality in Africa: the reason why the ‘development business’ most 
often fails in Africa is because much of the effort of the development 
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community is predicated on false assumptions about how progress 
takes place in human societies. For the last two decades, development 
efforts have been based on the thinking that good governance provides 
a universally valid prescription for economic transformation and social 
advance, but this ‘ahistorical view takes insufficient notice of the fact 
that Western states did not become economic powerhouses (from the 
1750s onwards) … by adopting good governance institutions. Full-
blown capitalism creates the social structures and organisational capa-
bilities that lead to democratic governance, not the other way around’.36
Brian Levy also makes a case that over the long term, good govern-
ance may indeed be a final destination where developing countries can 
see their governance systems converge. However, he argues that ‘the 
ability to describe the characteristics of effective states does not conjure 
them into existence out of thin air. Best-practices approaches assume 
that all policies and institutions are potentially movable and can be 
aligned to fit some pre-specified blueprint. But they cannot. The central 
question has less to do with the end point than with the journey of get-
ting from here to there’.37
Those who have lived in Africa long enough will agree that one of the 
syndromes plaguing Africa today is that people by and large are good 
at expressing their views, but there is very little corresponding action 
or responsibility taken to make good on the words spoken. Liberal 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance will bear fruit when 
they become the way of life and are embodied in the leaders and the 
people alike. We should not forget that liberal democracy was not 
bestowed by the rulers, but was earned by the people who struggled for 
it. Democracy is something that cannot be ‘provided for’, but which has 
to be ‘won’. What seems to have been forgotten during the course of 
liberalization and globalization is that democracy cannot be realized by 
‘free expressions’ alone, but requires concrete deeds and toil.
The problem in Africa is that the mismatch between ‘lofty expecta-
tions’ and continued ‘disingenuousness’ on the ground persists in a kind 
of vicious cycle, only to breed disappointments and ill feeling without 
actually getting things done. This has produced the problem where 
African elites, whether in government or the private sector, talk the talk 
but do not walk the walk. Often, their motive is to present a good face 
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to donors and receive aid or benefits, whilst knowing they will fall short 
in their obligations. Despite the challenging environment, efforts to 
attain sound institutions and governance should not be stopped. Recent 
studies have shown that the vast majority of people surveyed in Sub-
Saharan African countries thought that democracy was preferable to any 
other kind of government. Obviously, it would be in the best interests 
of the African countries if they can espouse and ‘internalize’ these values 
as much and as early as possible.
Critics may find fault with the way in which the Global North is try-
ing to ‘impose’ its values, but the Global North will be criticized even 
more if it was not seen to be steadfastly upholding the universal values. 
Isn’t the European Union referred to as the ‘normative power’? But an 
important thing for Western countries to realize is that it is not enough 
to only ‘assert’ these values; equal weight should be given to address-
ing how to reach the goals, while taking into account the local condi-
tions, indigenous elements and socio-cultural characteristics of African 
nations.
While most African countries inherited democratic constitutions 
in the decolonization process, few maintained them. Botswana and 
Mauritius are just about the only countries that were born democratic 
and have remained so over the years, although in the case of Botswana, 
the same political party has been in power since independence. The vast 
majority of other African countries followed a path that consisted of a 
few years of democratic multi-party systems, followed by the progressive 
establishment of single-party regimes or a military takeover.
But most often in this process, there have been frequent polit-
ical deadlocks and crisis. By and large, formal democratic institu-
tions proved incompatible at the time with the rise of personal rule 
and neo-patrimonialism. Formal institutions lost their importance 
and power became concentrated in a close circle around the personal 
ruler. Many of these rulers then organized single parties, mass mobi-
lization movements that were then seen as plausible instruments of 
nation-building. The rapid failure of democracy in African is a sobering 
reminder of its inherent drawbacks to democracy, particularly in light of 
the fact that in the post-Cold War era, donors made extensive efforts to 
promote democracy in Africa.
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What transpired from this for the majority of African states was the 
rise of authoritarianism and the deterioration of citizens’ rights. Many 
rulers argued that traditional African values such as consensus-seeking 
and loyalty justified the adoption of regimes that were seen as dicta-
torial across the continent. Within a few years of independence, most 
of the region’s democratic aspirations had been stifled. Whatever the 
merits of the cultural arguments of some African elites to justify their 
domination, the relative ease with which African dictatorships persisted 
for decades suggested that many countries shared conditions favouring 
this type of regime. So what caused this? There must have been some 
commonalities in effect for the countries to produce such similar results 
across the continent. I believe that the problem is caused not by the fail-
ure of institutions themselves, but rather by the inertia and noncommit-
tal attitude when it came to upholding institutions.
Institutions do matter. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s 
book Why Nations Fail is an inspiring work that tries to explain why 
some nations become prosperous, but others remain poor. The authors 
argue that the answer lies in the difference between inclusive institu-
tions and extractive institutions. The former ‘are those that allow and 
encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activi-
ties that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individ-
uals to make the choices they wish’, while the latter have the opposite 
properties ‘designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset 
of society to benefit a different subset’.38 They argue that nations that 
develop inclusive institutions have far greater potential for growth than 
those that support extractive institutions that transfer rather than create 
wealth.
The authors have also pointed out the stark contrast between South 
and North Korea. They described the former as having inclusive eco-
nomic institutions, while the latter has extractive economic institutions. 
Koreans are homogeneous people with a history of many thousands of 
years of sharing a national identity, language and culture. No doubt, it 
was the nature of North Korea’s institutions—its regime and ideology—
that turned North Korea into a failed state.
However, despite their appeal, the terminology of ‘inclusive’ and 
‘extractive’ institutions comes with some question marks. I cannot help 
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thinking that the term sounds tautological, as if to say ‘what is good 
(inclusive) is good (prosperity) and what is bad (extractive) is bad 
(poor)’. ‘Institution’ is instead an abstract term that implies many things 
like ideologies, policies and actions of the state besides formal governing 
bodies. The question remains as to why such institutions came about 
in the first place and what drives them to continue functioning in this 
way. And the authors seem to have come up short in proposing specific 
mechanisms for encouraging better institutions.39
Institutions, however well thought out and meticulously stipulated 
into law, are only as good as the intention, persistence and capacity to 
‘operationalize’ them. The success of institutions depends not on the 
existence of seemingly good institutions, but rather on the commit-
ment and ability to make those institutions work, including continuous 
efforts to improve or reform public service mechanisms. The majority 
of Sub-Saharan African countries may have the ‘right’ institutions, but 
the pace of moving ahead with governance and development is all but 
gratifying.
Perhaps from a developmental perspective, what should draw our 
attention the most is the Human Development Index (HDI): out of 188 
nations in the world that were surveyed, the bottom ten countries are all 
Sub-Saharan countries, and among the ‘low human development’ group 
of 41 countries having the lowest scores, 36 nations are from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The Fragile State Index (2018) shows the top ten most fragile states 
and includes seven Sub-Saharan African countries (South Sudan, Somalia, 
the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe). In Freedom House’s Country Freedom Index 
(2017), five Sub-Saharan African countries were included in the top ten 
least-free countries (Eritrea, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Equatorial 
Guinea). Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (2016) 
found that four countries in the region ranked in the top ten most nega-
tively perceived states (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau).
As Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn explain, what is troubling 
for both the donors and Sub-Saharan African countries alike is that 
there has been no visible progress in the region’s governance during the 
period from 1985 to 2012 over which the study was conducted, no 
matter what indicators (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, 
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World Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index or the Political Risk 
Service) were used.40 The World Bank’s latest Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which measures four areas (clusters) 
of governance—economic management, structural policies, policies for 
social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institu-
tions—illustrates that there was a slight downward trend in the regions’ 
governance over the period from 2008 to 2016.
However, there are countries in the region that usually rank in the 
top ten in most of the indicators—the usual suspects like Mauritius, 
Botswana, Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, 
Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and the new rising star 
Rwanda—that should also be given due attention. An exception might 
be Ethiopia, which is the fastest-growing economy in the region, sus-
taining around 10% growth per annum in recent years.
Lastly, what cannot be stressed enough is the importance of gov-
ernance in Sub-Saharan Africa. From a worldwide perspective, while 
debates on the correlation between democracy and economic develop-
ment remain largely contentious and inconclusive in the light of the 
Asian experience, and notably China, which is a recent example, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa things seem to be quite different. In this region, it 
is clear that the countries exhibiting a high level of democracy and gov-
ernance also fare well economically. For example, countries that are cat-
egorized as ‘free’ by Freedom House like Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana 
and South Africa are all ranked as ‘high-middle income countries’, 
and other countries scoring high in governance like Cape Verde, the 
Seychelles, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Benin 
are some of the fastest-growing economies in the region.
The reason for this may be found in the difference in the level of 
the work ethic: in Asia, a strong work ethic and government’s role, 
and discipline in bureaucracy are seen to offset the negativities of weak 
democracy and corruption, but in the case of Africa, which is seen 
to lag behind in such traits in comparison to Asia, there is an extra 
burden posed by rampant corruption, ethnicism, nepotism, neo- 
patrimonialism, rent-seeking, etc., and here, as a result, democracy 
and governance must make up for such drawbacks in order to catch 
up with other regions. Yes, institutions, governance and democracies 
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should be fervently upheld, but the path to reaching the point where 
these become effective would require a massive endeavour by society as 
a whole, entailing enhancement of performance in virtually every seg-
ment and sector of the nation (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3).
The Role of the State
According to Irma Adelman: ‘No area of economics has experienced as 
many abrupt changes in the leading paradigm during the post-WWII 
era as has economic development. These changes have had profound 
implications for the way the role of government has been viewed by 
development practitioners and their advisors in international organi-
zations’ (see Note 40). The issue of the role of government regarding 
development is nothing new, but it continues to plague African coun-
tries and must be re-examined.
On the face of it, African governments have a high degree of cen-
tralization and strong presidential systems. Apparently, out of 49 states 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, no less than 40 have presidential executives. The 
centralization bias is considered both the colonial legacy as well as the 
reflection of reality: the inclination of the colonial administrations was 
to retain central authority and personal rule prevailed, while African 
societies were forcefully integrated into the post-colonial mold.41 
Another distinct feature of African governments is that they have a 
rather large number of ministerial posts.
However, despite their large ‘horizontal’ government structure, 
African executives do not have big ‘vertical’ bureaucracies in terms of 
formally employed civil servants. More importantly, African govern-
ments suffer from weak capacity to undertake given tasks in terms of 
implementing policies, solving problems and providing public services. 
The Fragile States Index (formerly called the failed states index), pub-
lished annually by the Fund for Peace, assesses states’ vulnerability to 
conflict and collapse, using a total of 12 indicators that fall into one of 
the following three groups: social (4), economic (2) and political indi-
cators (6). Among the political indicators are state legitimacy, public 
services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, etc. The 
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Table 3.1 The Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2016)
Source Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 2016
Governance as the provision of the political, social and economic goods that citi-
zens have the right to expect from their state
The IIAG assesses progress under four main conceptual categories: safety & rule 












1. Mauritius 79.9 +2.3 28. Liberia 50.0 +8.7
2. Botswana 73.7 −0.5 29. Swaziland 49.7 +1.0
3. Cape Verde 73.0 +1.9 30. Sierra Leone 49.4 +3.8
4. The 
Seychelles
72.6 +4.0 31. Ethiopia 49.1 +7.0
5. Namibia 69.8 +3.6 32. Gabon 48.8 +1.5
6. South Africa 69.4 −1.9 33. Madagascar 48.5 −7.6
7. Tunisia 65.4 +3.4 33. Togo 48.5 +9.7
7. Ghana 65.4 −2.1 35. Gambia 46.6 −3.9
9. Rwanda 62.3 +8.4 36. Djibouti 46.5 +2.3
10. Senegal 60.8 +3.7 36. Nigeria 46.5 +2.5
11. São Tomé and 
Príncipe
60.5 +2.9 38. Cameroon 45.7 −2.1
12. Kenya 58.9 +5.1 39. Zimbabwe 44.3 +9.7
13. Zambia 58.8 +4.3 40. Mauritania 43.5 −2.7
14. Morocco 58.3 +5.7 41. Guinea 43.3 +1.9
15. Lesotho 57.8 +0.3 42. Congo, Rep. 43.0 +2.6
16. Benin 57.5 +0.7 43. Burundi 41.9 −2.1
17. Malawi 56.6 +1.1 44. Guinea-
Bissau
41.3 +4.0
18. Tanzania 56.5 −0.6 45. Angola 39.2 +5.0
19. Uganda 56.2 +3.4 46. Congo, DR 35.8 +2.7
20. Algeria 53.8 −0.6 47. Equatorial 
Guinea
35.4 +2.0
21. Cote d’Ivoire 52.3 +13.1 48. Chad 34.8 +2.3
21. Mozambique 52.3 −1.8 49. Sudan 30.4 −0.6
23. Burkina Faso 51.8 +1.0 50. Eritrea 30.0 −5.6
24. Egypt 51.0 +3.5 51. Libya 29.0 −18.0




26. Comoros 50.3 +3.7 53. South Sudan 18.6
27. Niger 50.2 +5.9 54. Somalia 10.6 +0.3
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2017 Index showed that 32 Sub-Saharan African countries were ranked 
in the top 50 most fragile.42
A conspicuous feature of Sub-Saharan African countries is the 
weakness of their governing power and hence their weakness in per-
forming the basic functions to serve the public and realize economic 
development that is worthy of their potential. Many African govern-
ments apparently lack the drive and persistence to achieve short and 
mid to long-term national goals. And as is often the case, well thought-
out national policies are rendered nominal when confronted by hard 
realities.
Unfortunately, corruption, bad governance and inefficiency have 
become almost synonymous with African governments, so that donors 
and the African people may be wary of the notion of governments being 
‘strengthened’. Yet, for developing countries that are still in the midst of 
nation-building, discrediting the need for strong government and giving 
up on the state could be extremely detrimental.
European countries built their nation-state system with centralized 
government and a highly developed bureaucracy over a long period 
in their tumultuous history. On the other hand, in comparison, Sub-
Saharan African countries lacked a strong social fabric, political norms 
and systems that form the basis of state. And such elements as tribal-
ism and neo-patrimonialism, while they cannot be branded as definitive 
causes of underdevelopment, are still very much prevalent and perti-
nent. Under the circumstances, if African leaders, elites and people are 
serious about developing their country, it is imperative that they find 
ways to make their government much more functional, and naturally 
this will take some time to achieve. But what is more disconcerting is 
that Africans themselves may not be well aware or concerned about 
this problem. And development partners do not seem to be particularly 
interested in helping ‘empower’ African governments either.
However, the donor community tried various approaches in the early 
stages of development assistance for poor countries, including efforts to 
empower the state with optimism. As John Harris notes: ‘In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the centrality of the role of the state and the need for reg-
ulation of markets was hardly questioned. It was generally understood 
that economic development must involve industrialization.’43 In the 
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1960s, donors indeed espoused such a stance in their aid policy, put-
ting trust in working with African governments so that the latter would 
follow the course of state-building and economic development, count-
ing on a trickle-down effect for rural development and industrializa-
tion. But the approach was short-lived, due to unforeseen disappointing 
results and also because of the inherent restraints in the political dynam-
ics of the donor community that was impatient with ongoing failures 
and was under pressure to seek alternative measures.44 Kingsley Chiedu 
Moghalu also notes that: ‘In the 1960s, the main focus of aid was on 
large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects. This was the golden 
age of foreign aid; one which could be justified as a catalyst of growth 
and development. Dams, roads, bridges and railways were constructed 
across the continent. But this phase didn’t last long.’45
The approach that focused on building infrastructures and creating 
local industries, preferably starting with the agricultural sector, should 
have been pursued for far longer, instead of quickly shifting to poverty 
reduction programmes in the 1970s. The policy choice was right and 
timely. However, what was lacking was commitment as well as funda-
mentals like ‘internalization’ efforts and a sense of ownership on the 
part of developing nations.
The golden opportunity for African countries seems to have been 
missed in this period encompassing the 1960s and 1970s. If they had 
indeed capitalized on this opportunity and exerted themselves, many 
success stories would have emerged in the region, as was the case in 
Asia. While African countries today have registered high economic 
growth, this masks many worrying features: overdependence on raw 
materials; continued underdevelopment and low-value addition of the 
agricultural sector; the ‘curse of resources’ and the extractive industry; 
the dominance of foreign companies; a lack of industrialization; over- 
reliance on foreign, multi-national companies and negligible indigenous 
manufacturing industries; rapid population growth and youth unem-
ployment, etc.46
Turning to the international development architecture, the world 
has witnessed transitions in mainstream development theories and 
policy orientations: the structuralist/modernization theory-domi-
nant period (from the end of the Second World War to 1979); the 
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neo-liberalism ascendency period (1979–1996); and the ‘revision-
ist’ or ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ period from 1996 onwards. The 
‘revisionist’ school advocates a dynamically changing mix of state and 
market interactions. The World Bank published a report, ‘The State in 
a Changing World (1997)’, in which it stated that development with-
out an effective state is impossible, stressing the need to find a balance 
between the market and the state, and recognizing that there are market 
failures as well as state failures.47
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced into 
African countries in the mid-1980s to reduce the role of the state in the 
development process and give market forces a greater role in the alloca-
tion of resources, but ended in failure and worsened Africa’s economy. 
As a result, an overall policy shift was made, and the New Orthodoxy 
Era (1996–2010) unfolded for Africa.48 But, apparently, African coun-
tries have not yet learned to ‘right’ the role of the government.
The global economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 was another 
turning point in the thinking on economic development. Following 
the crisis, there appears to have been a convergence of ideas, at least 
within the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations 
Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA), on the imperatives of eco-
nomic development. The two reports, the ‘UNECA/AUC Economic 
Report on Africa (2011)’ and ‘Governing Development in Africa: The 
Role of the State in Economic Transformation (2011)’, suggest that the 
state has a crucial role to play in meeting the development challenges in 
Africa. Their recommendation is that the ‘developmental state’ approach 
should be used through disciplined planning, while avoiding the pit-
falls of state intervention.49 The notion is quite sound, but putting this 
into practice this still remains a big challenge in the absence of concrete 
actions.
African countries missed the golden opportunity discussed above 
because successful development through industrialization is becom-
ing increasingly difficult for developing countries to achieve. Dani 
Rodrick reminds us that historically, rapid growth has always been 
associated with industrialization. But today, even BRICS countries, 
including China and India, have not realized the full-scale development 
(in terms of percentage of employment by economic sectors) of the 
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manufacturing industrial sector that characterizes the growth path of 
Western economies, but instead have prematurely dipped in the indus-
trial structure, that is, deindustrialization. Rodrik mentions that only 
South Korea succeeded in achieving sufficient industrialization before, 
making a transition to an advanced industrial structure that we see in 
Western economies. He points out that ‘less room for industrialisation 
will almost certainly mean fewer growth miracles in the future’ and 
that ‘today’s developing countries will possibly have bumpier paths to 
democracy and good governance’.50
Capitalism’s most important components include private property, 
production factors, capital accumulation and competition.51 Private 
property rights are a central tenet of capitalism, and the land ownership 
question can be most problematic but crucial for developing countries. 
In classical economics, labour, land and capital constitute production 
factors, but today elements such as technology, entrepreneurship and 
innovations are considered as crucial means for enhancing production. 
This is all the more so in the increasingly competitive international 
environment under globalization.
According to Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, the fundamental require-
ments for successful capitalism are innovation, property rights, and 
financial and capital markets, but none of these is present to any sig-
nificant extent in Africa.52 This is a fair assessment, but the interesting 
thing is that these three fundamental factors—innovation, prop-
erty rights, and financial and capital markets—all invariably demand 
focused, disciplined and ‘intrusive’ government intervention. Hence, 
on the question of whether African countries need strong govern-
ment, the answer seems to be self-evident. First of all, regarding land 
reform, only the government can authoritatively certify, allocate and 
regulate land ownership for the people. Technical innovation requires 
active, systematic and long-term investment and support of the state. 
Developing, regulating and reforming financial markets, and operating 
capital resources to assist the private sector are all rudimentary tasks of 
the government.
The responsibility for the lacklustre development of African coun-
tries rests with Africans themselves, not the donors or the interna-
tional environment. And ‘to imply that entrepreneurs can carry on in 
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environments in which governments are failing in their duty to provide 
an enabling environment for value-adding business activity is to make 
a case for failed states dominated by stunted entrepreneurs’.53 But few 
people in the region seem to take this seriously enough. The reality is 
that both market failures and government failures are commonplace. As 
long as we are talking about the development of ‘nation states’, mindful 
that Sub-Saharan African countries are still a long way from complet-
ing the task of nation-building, it is imperative that strong, function-
ing governments must be zealously sought. And the scope of governance 
that is required is not what the international community can provide on 
behalf of African states.
The international community must also be reflective and understand 
that in order for African states to properly tap into and implement pol-
icies, and to enhance their output, the latter need to have an effective 
government. In light of all the problems that African states have expe-
rience up to now, it could be argued that it would be better to have as 
little government as possible. But outsourcing just about everything that 
the government should be doing while forgoing their task of ‘learning 
by doing’, which is the case in most African countries, is tantamount to 
the state’s self-denial of its raison d’être.
Sub-Saharan states are marked by the weak functioning of the gov-
ernment and an inappropriate or ‘wrong’ policy orientation for eco-
nomic growth. Many Sub-Saharan African regimes have the facade of 
authoritarian power, but in reality they lack the focus and determina-
tion to get things done and to push the agendas through, as East Asian 
countries were able to do. The Asian experience provides fertile ground 
for sober reflections on the part of both African countries and the donor 
community. In this vein, not enough lessons have been learned, while 
some experts are dismissive of the East Asian examples, claiming that 
the ‘conditions are different’ and they are not applicable. We need not 
simply stick to the examples of the East Asian Tigers, since there are also 
good case studies in other Southeast Asian countries.
In his book Asia-Africa Development Divergence: A Question of Intent, 
David Henley explains why Southeast Asian countries have become 
much more prosperous over the last half-century compared to African 
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countries, which have stumped without visible signs of a major turna-
round. Regarding the scope of divergence, he points out that:
[I]n [the] 1960s, South-East Asians were on the [sic] average much 
poorer than Africans; by 1980 they caught up, and by 2010 they were 
two and a half times richer. In South-East Asia the whole of the interven-
ing half-century was a period of almost continuous growth, apart from a 
brief hiatus at the turn of the century caused by the Asian financial cri-
sis. In Africa, per capita income stagnated in the 1970s, declined in the 
1980s, grew weakly in the 1990s, and in 2010 was still barely higher than 
it had been in 1975.54
Henley argues that state-led rural and agricultural development that 
led to higher incomes for peasant farmers has been central to Southeast 
Asia’s economic success, while its absence in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
critical for the continent’s failure. The policy prescriptions by the world 
development agencies like the World Bank and IMF demanding lib-
eralization, deregulation, and privatization and austerity measures 
in Africa were contradictory to the reality of strategic planning of the 
national economy that underpinned the success in East Asia. For devel-
oping countries, the weaker the government, the more it is likely to be 
dependent on outside forces, jeopardizing their chances of development.
When coming up with initiatives, especially in multilateral forums, 
African leaders did show a certain level of energy and enthusiasm. For 
example, in 1980, African governments adopted their own economic 
blueprint—the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development 
of Africa 1980–2000 (LPA)—calling for collective self-reliance. But 
this was scarcely implemented and, moreover, did not sit well with 
the international development community, as it repudiated the logic 
of neo-liberal thinking, ending up in failure.55 After the aborted LPA, 
African leaders launched a second major attempt to reclaim African 
development agenda and adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) in October 2000. But again, African countries 
failed in this endeavour, drawing considerable criticism because it was 
never properly implemented.
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The reason why Sub-Saharan African countries continue to struggle 
with economic transformation and remain poor while being heavily 
dependent on foreign aid and capital may be attributable to the inabil-
ity to push for development or a lack of determination and willingness.
Natural Conditions
The geographical and natural conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa, char-
acterized by the existence of many landlocked countries and vast inland 
territories that are very difficult to access due to very poor and sparse 
roads, the harsh tropical climate and widespread diseases like malaria, 
are often cited as obstacles to development for the region. The narrative 
of the history of colonization of Africa by the Western powers that we 
are familiar with might have contributed to the stereotypical worldview 
of the continent.
However, two things must be pointed out: first, foreign explorers and 
settlers back then must have faced great hardships, but the geographi-
cal condition for development should be judged not from the outsid-
er’s point of view but from the locals’ position; and, second, objective 
assessment should be made based not on historical documents, but on 
the present situation.
In The Age of Sustainable Development (2015), Jeffrey Sachs, a pioneer 
in the research on geographical differences between places, reiterates 
that the geography of Africa and adversity of the African climate mat-
ter for development. Paul Collier similarly views that being ‘land locked 
with bad neighbours’ makes African countries’ development harder. In 
his book Prisoners of Geography, Tim Marshall depicts Africa as a his-
torically remote and isolated continent cut off from the centres of trade 
and disadvantaged in terms of lack of navigable rivers and having too 
large a land mass to be effectively connected as a single region or even as 
sub-regions.56
The effects that geographical and climatic factors can have on the 
development of countries should not be downplayed and it is a fact that 
landlocked countries face huge challenges in making their economy 
competitive in terms of exporting commodities and attracting foreign 
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investment. For the majority of foreigners who have never been to 
Africa, the mere notion of travelling to this region would entail great 
adventurism and a psychological challenge.
But this is just one aspect of Sub-Saharan Africa in its natural form, 
and to a certain degree it is deceptive, masking the overall, accurate pic-
ture of Africa. When the Ebola epidemic broke out in West Africa in 
2014, it alarmed the international community and travel to and from 
Africa was greatly curtailed. However, I remember an international 
health expert telling CNN that people should not be panicking because 
Africa is not a country but a very big continent.
We must bear in mind that Africa is a huge continent with diverse 
geographical and climatic features. I know all too well that Africa is not 
only attractive for foreigners to live in, but undeniably also has a huge 
potential for growth and development due to its rich natural resources 
and many other things. Thus, we should be careful not to be simplistic 
and prejudiced when talking about the ‘conditions’ of Africa. If there 
are places where the conditions are adverse, there are also places where 
the conditions are most favourable. And when one visits Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it doesn’t take long for one to realize that here so many places are 
far more ‘favourable’ than other parts of the world.
The geographical and natural conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa 
should not be construed as a root cause of its underdevelopment. 
Instead, it is the human factor, the failure to deal with these condi-
tions that has led to the perpetuation of the problems. Strictly speaking, 
even endemic and epidemic diseases are largely man-made. But sadly, 
we tend to attribute the failures of human beings not to humans, but 
to what we think is convenient. We do not need to mention Arnold 
Toynbee’s famous axiom ‘challenge and response’, as it is apparent that 
human endeavour to overcome adversities makes all the difference. 
Many rich nations had to tame geographical and natural conditions 
much harsher than those in Africa in order to arrive at where they are 
now.
Uganda provides a good example at this point. Its nature—the 
weather, agricultural conditions and natural resources—provides all that 
one could ask for. It is no wonder that it is called the ‘Pearl of Africa’. 
Other East African countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, 
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Ethiopia and even South Sudan all boast wonderful natural condi-
tions. We need not mention countries in the south like South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia. And there 
are so many countries in western Africa that are richly endowed. I have 
not heard of instances where great natural calamities such as earth-
quakes, volcano eruptions and tsunamis have occurred in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Because of global warming and climate change, the whole world 
is suffering from unexpected or extreme weather conditions. In sum, 
it is Africa’s negative and stereotyped image, along with many other 
things, rather than the actual workings of the geographical and natural 
conditions that has far more debilitating effects. Unduly exaggerating 
the given conditions will only breed despair and dependence.
Other Factors (Population, Corruption, 
Globalization and China)
We also could conceive of various other factors that may not necessar-
ily be the root cause of Africa’s underdevelopment, but can affect the 
region’s development. Corruption readily comes to mind, but there can 
be other elements like population size and the effects of globalization 
that also have a bearing.
Regarding population size, conventional wisdom would suggest that 
it will be easier to foster and run democracy in a smaller nation than 
a larger one. Direct democracy like the Athenian democracy would 
only be possible if the size of the community of the people is limited. It 
could also be argued that the formation of identity and consensus of the 
people and maintaining of social order will be easier when communities 
are small. Certainly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least-populous nations, 
such as the Seychelles, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
Botswana and Namibia, are among the highest scorers in governance 
and freedom. But countries like Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial 
Guinea, which have very small populations, score very low in terms 
of governance and freedom, so this is not a reliable criterion. Another 
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factor that may need to be considered along with population is the size 
of the territory or the sparseness of the population.
The correlation between the size of the population and economic 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa is not easy to gauge either. GDP 
and per-capita income are generally in a trade-off, hence it is difficult 
to rank highly in both. GDP represents economic influence or market 
size, while per-capita GDP represents the level of wealth enjoyed by the 
people. For developing economies in particular, both of these matter, 
and the degree of income or social inequality should also be counted 
in assessing a nation’s overall economic performance. In terms of GDP, 
the top five countries are Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Sudan and 
Ethiopia in that order; however, the top five in per-capita GDP are the 
Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Gabon and Botswana.
A major issue for Sub-Saharan Africa is the population explosion that 
has produced an extraordinarily large youth population, which poses 
huge social economic challenges, given that most of the countries expe-
riencing such phenomenon are the poorest and most fragile countries. 
It is pointed out that the SSA’s population, which is currently over 1.0 
billion (that of the entire African continent is over 1.25 billion) may 
double by 2050.57 The population of Nigeria, the biggest in the con-
tinent, is expected to grow from 191 million in 2017 to 411 million 
in 2050 to become the world’s third-most populous country, behind 
India and China. However, it would all come down to how the pop-
ulation is managed. The youth population can turn out to be an asset 
or a huge liability depending on how the state and society respond to 
this, which in turn hinges on their ability, commitment and mindset for 
development.
Compared to the demographic timebomb, corruption is viewed as 
being outright negative, and many suggest that this is the biggest reason 
for Africa’s problems. But corruption can also be viewed as a reflection 
or outcome of more fundamental problems, in addition to being a rea-
son for underdevelopment. Corruption exists everywhere, in any soci-
ety and country, but is more conspicuous and widespread in developing 
countries and is seen as a general attribute of a weak social fabric. But 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is so rampant that it is relentlessly 
exposed time after time in the news.
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As a continent, Africa continues to top the list in the category of 
having the most highly corrupt countries, with 12 countries rank-
ing in the top 20 and five in the top ten, according to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (2016), which surveyed 
177 countries worldwide. An African Union study conducted in 2002 
estimated that corruption cost the continent roughly $150 billion a 
year. The foreign aid that Sub-Saharan Africa received from devel-
oped countries amounted to $22.5 billion in 2008, according to the 
OECD.58 According to the East African Bribery Index of 2009, com-
piled by Transparency International, over half of East Africans polled 
paid bribes to access public services that should have been provided for 
free. Corruption in Africa, which ranges from high-level political graft 
to low-level bribes given to public officials, has a hugely corrosive effect 
on basic institutions and unduly increases the cost of doing business. It 
is argued that academic research shows that curtailing corruption can 
drastically enhance the economic productivity of a country, and some 
economists propose that African governments need to fight corruption 
instead of relying on foreign aid.59
There are several reasons why corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
particularly detrimental to the region’s development. Its regularity and 
rampancy are unmatched. Corruption can be defined simply as ‘the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain’.60 Hence, discussions on 
corruption usually centre on ‘public sector corruption’, but corruptive 
behaviours or ‘irregularities’ are not confined to political leaders and 
public officials; they extend far beyond to include the private sector and 
the public in general.
Except for a very small number of countries, Sub-Saharan African 
nations experience corruption as the ‘norm’ rather than the ‘excep-
tion’, with people taking advantage of the ‘opportunities’ whenever they 
arise, political graft and systematic extortion by the powerful (leaders 
and their inner circles) being deeply entrenched and persistent without 
being challenged, politicians and top officials routinely and incessantly 
engaging in private business, officials at various levels in government 
departments and public offices frequently being involved in ‘organized’ 
irregularities, and police, customs officers and other officials in public 
service taking bribes. And this is not the end of the story.
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Another form of corruption is ‘absenteeism’, which is also a very 
serious problem in the region: government organizational (central and 
local) officials, teachers, doctors, etc. frequently being absent from their 
offices to the detriment of the public interest. Corruption in Africa is 
linked to many other facets and problems inherent in African societies 
and therefore its scope and impact is as much far-reaching. And the neg-
ativity of neo-patrimonialism, ethnicism and other issues related to vari-
ous syndromes, the mindset and ethics, etc. all contribute to corruption.
While ‘corruption’ is broadly defined to mean all the ‘irregulari-
ties’ taking place in a society, corruption is also widespread in the pri-
vate sector as well. It is difficult to distinguish between corruption and 
theft, and maybe it is meaningless to make the distinction. Especially 
for foreigners, the difficulty in countering corruption in Africa is that 
one doesn’t know who is involved and at what level. The widespread 
and common practice of seeking ‘commission’ is another good exam-
ple of how corruption can take many forms in the region. Not only 
are the most fundamental public services that are taken for granted in 
the developed world not properly provided, even those expensive util-
ity installation services, for instance, that users have to pay high cost to 
access do not come automatically.
Foreign aid projects can also (and often do) become the targets of 
corruption. They can be subtle in their approach, but it is customary for 
officials who are involved to explicitly or implicitly ask donors to give 
them some kind of ‘commission’ for receiving aid. It is true that donors 
often feel they have to ‘pay’ for the good deeds they are trying to do, 
instead of being fully embraced and appreciated.
What makes Africa’s corruption more nuanced compared to that in 
other regions is that it is combined with many other negative factors. 
The case in point is that although corruption was widespread in Asian 
countries, this did not prevent these countries from achieving fast eco-
nomic growth. Hence, we need to look at the whole picture, taking into 
account all the relevant factors and the reality on the ground. An inter-
esting observation has been made that ‘corruption in African countries 
tends to be of the decentralised and disorganised type in which paying 
a bribe to one official does not guarantee that a service will be pro-
vided. This type of corruption may be more deleterious to growth and 
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development than the centralised and organised type found in Asia. For 
all these reasons, it is most likely that corruption could have a different 
effect on economic development in African countries than elsewhere’.61
The state of Africa’s corruption is a reflection of the African reality. 
Fundamentally rectifying this problem will by no means be an easy feat 
and would require all-out and sustained responses. Nonetheless, various 
supervisory, sanctioning mechanisms to enforce transparency and disci-
pline in the relevant institutions and offices, along with pressure exerted 
by the development community, should be stringently applied.
Another subject that deserves our attention, I believe, is the conse-
quences of globalization on Sub-Saharan African countries. While glo-
balization can in general be seen in a positive light in terms of Africa’s 
business and cultural connectivity with the world, its overall impact is 
anything but simple to assess, and it can entail various risks and side- 
effects, depending on the capacities of the countries. There is no 
 denying that today African countries find themselves in a quite differ-
ent international setting compared to when they gained independence. 
And globalization—inter-dependence and inter-connectivity among 
 economies—may be the most potent force affecting developing and 
developed countries alike in today’s world.
The impact of globalization is clearly felt in Sub-Saharan Africa, as 
this was reinforced by the acts of both the international community 
and the African countries. Perhaps the first major shockwave of globali-
zation to hit the continent came in the form of policy measures: the 
neo-liberalist policies prescribed by international financial and devel-
opment institutions during the period of structural adjustment and the 
Washington Consensus. In order to obtain aid and loans from donors, 
African countries had to show commitment to market-oriented eco-
nomic reforms and good governance. And while African countries did 
not have much choice but to conform to donors’ terms, they actually 
opted for a pro-business liberal economy for a number of reasons.
The elites of Sub-Saharan African countries are pragmatists, who are 
keen to obtain wealth by seeking business opportunities with foreign 
companies and partners. The limited financial resources and capabilities 
of African states is understandable, but the major problem is really the 
lack of entrepreneurship, commitment and perseverance to successfully 
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pursue business demonstrated in African business circles, and their ina-
bility or hesitation to make the necessary investments for future returns. 
This has left a huge vacuum that foreign investors and partners have 
had to fill. In many instances, even in remote provinces, landlords and 
local communities are willing to sell off chunks of land they possess at 
low prices to foreign investors. Since the locals do not have the means 
to make use of their land in any case, it would make sense to find an 
option with those who can develop it. For landlocked African countries 
in particular, the need to remove trade barriers and make their markets 
more accessible and appealing is deemed to be crucial in order to offset 
their disadvantages.
Obviously, there are also downsides to globalization, which are the 
ultimate price developing countries have to pay for being integrated 
into the global economy. For example, over the years, East African cur-
rencies have undergone a continuously sharp drop in their value against 
the US dollar, but the East African governments have admitted that 
there is not much that they can do to counter this phenomenon.
The deepening of liberalization over recent decades and the way in 
which African countries have ‘adapted’ to it have no doubt undermined 
their economic ‘autonomy’. For them, the window of opportunity to 
approach the ranks of industrialized economies has been narrowing 
because of the slow pace of structural changes and the absence of stra-
tegic thinking and genuine efforts to ‘catch up’, amid increasing inter-
national competition and faster cycles of technological ratcheting-up. 
Confronted with the economic tasks at hand, African leaders have 
opted for convenient solutions like inviting foreign capital and exper-
tise to fill their financial and capacity gaps, without concurrently taking 
competitiveness-enhancing measures at their end. This is mostly true 
throughout the region, including South Africa, where there is a juxtapo-
sition of the ‘First World’ and the ‘Third World’, making it an interest-
ing testing ground for ‘radical economic transformation’.
For developing countries, continuously relying heavily on for-
eign firms and capital would not be the best solution in relation to 
economic development. The goal should be for African countries to 
build an industrial economy that is suited to their own specific situa-
tion in which they enjoy ownership, even while they trade freely with 
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the outside. Unfortunately, many Sub-Saharan African countries have 
opened up and sold off their precious economic rights too soon to 
foreign companies, without even realizing their long-term value. The 
prospect of earning immediate profits, perhaps with ‘premiums’, can 
override consideration for the long-term national interests. A good 
example of this is the telecommunications market. African countries 
easily gave away their frequency usage rights to foreign companies, una-
ware that this is tantamount to giving up their strategic leverage and 
valuable economic sovereignty that could be used for many decades to 
come.
Lastly, as a feature of globalization, China’s increasingly proac-
tive economic engagement with Africa deserves our attention. But the 
impact that China has on the landscape of Africa’s development, the 
ODA policy of traditional donors and the overall economic dynamism 
of Africa are uncertain. What is clear is that China’s method of eco-
nomic cooperation is quite different from the mainstream donor com-
munity, so African countries tend to think of China as an alternative to 
Western partners.
China’s greatest strength lies in its financial capability and readiness 
to do business with Africa. China, employing generous assistance and 
sumptuous loans as tools, has made tremendous inroads in infrastruc-
ture-building and the energy development market in particular, based 
on their price competitiveness of labour, which is unmatched. For 
African countries desperate to find any financial resources for large-scale 
construction and engineering projects, China’s partnership becomes 
handy. As both China and African countries will point out, these come 
with ‘no strings attached’.
However, while there might not be any strings attached, various 
socio-economic costs may be incurred. The impact on the already-frag-
ile governance and business practices in Africa comes to mind. 
Furthermore, it is no secret that Chinese goods and work that are found 
in Africa often turn out to be substandard, while Chinese merchants’ 
businesses in retail frequently attract complaints from local competitors.
A latest report by the McKinsey Global Institute shows the profile 
of China’s economic footprint in Africa in comparison to other coun-
tries, including the US, Germany, France, the UK and India, in terms 
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of trade, FDI, aid and infrastructure financing. We can see that China’s 
lead is absolute in trade and infrastructure financing, and while China’s 
FDI is comparatively low, it is registering fast growth; its ODA level is 
also considerable, on a par with the UK.62
In the past, corruption scandals involving Chinese firms appeared 
frequently in the African news, and the region’s overall perception 
of China’s economic expansion and mode of doing business in Sub-
Saharan Africa is mixed, as is captured by surveys. However, we should 
not be unduly critical. Many Chinese firms enter African markets tak-
ing risks in the areas where no one else is likely to venture. Contrary 
to conventional thinking, aggressive as they may seem, Chinese com-
panies are not necessarily successful in Africa. In fact, they commonly 
face stiff competition even among themselves and many withdraw from 
African markets after incurring losses. Maybe the biggest downsides to 
such a ‘no-strings-attached’ way of doing business with Africa lies in 
the possibility that it can make African countries more complacent and 
exacerbate the already-serious dependency syndrome, moral hazard and 
poor governance. And it is my impression that there is still a considera-
ble misperception amongst African leaders and elites about the situation 
of their markets and economies, and how companies do business and 
operate to make profit.63
In this regard, the presence of big multi-national corporations and 
aggressive Chinese firms may have had an undesirable impact in terms 
of making people overestimate the capacity of these entities and to have 
inaccurate views on how business works. For instance, they seem to 
think that big foreign companies can operate and make a profit for as 
long as possible and can do anything.
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The Forgotten ‘Mind Over Matter’?
As we grapple with the question of what went wrong with Africa’s 
 development and what the way forward should be, it is no surprise 
that so many studies have been done on Africa in wide-ranging fields 
by various experts and organizations. However, in the eyes of the global 
community at large, Africa is still very much an unknown, yet-to-be-
discovered region and hence much academic, scientific and fact-find-
ing research on Africa will follow suit. In business circles, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is described as ‘the last frontier’ but the region is already open for 
the outsiders to take advantage of its potentials.
Africa’s development can be an interesting and fascinating subject 
to ponder on. What makes the field of development most challeng-
ing is that, in sum, it is about carrying out the task of bringing about 
changes where normally the conditions are the least favourable for 
doing so. Development bears an aspect of international relations and 
is an inter-disciplinary field, but it is unlike any other, especially from 
the practitioners’ perspective. For example, development cooperation 
has a fundamentally different working structure compared to other 
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areas of engagements or dealings, including conventional diplomacy, 
public diplomacy, trade and investment, security, the environment, etc. 
In these fields, countries participate as ‘equal entities’ and each party 
focuses on advancing its position from its own end. Whether it is about 
negotiating or carrying out PR activities, the process is simple and pre-
dictable. It is not necessary to worry about the situation of one coun-
terpart or its capacity to play its part; the responsibility that one bears is 
confined to one’s own responsibility.
However, in development cooperation, things are very different and 
practitioners cannot go about conducting their own business in a mat-
ter-of-fact fashion, paying no attention to the situation of others. It is 
not enough to have shared goals and reach an agreement, and doing 
well on your part: one has to involve one’s counterpart or partner in 
doing the difficult and necessary things. Development projects are con-
ducted and assessed over the long haul, and for donors, their assignment 
is not substantively fulfilled until the collaborative work bears fruit in 
the end. People cannot feel lighthearted when things break down or 
become white elephants immediately after they have handed over the 
facilities or programmes to African countries.
Hence, ‘rationality’ and standard procedures that we are used to fol-
lowing in most fields in international relations do not necessarily apply 
in development cooperation. If aid projects are to be responsibly car-
ried out in order to produce tangible results, then extra ‘human toil’ 
is required, such as a greater level of patience, perseverance and devo-
tion. Frustration and stress levels can become very high when officials in 
charge in the aid recipient country do not properly respond and follow 
up.
I think development as a specialized field in its own right has, over 
time, lost the zeal it needs to have and has settled for the pursuit of 
human needs and stability. This was driven largely by the unmitigated 
challenges that the development community has faced in its conven-
tional domain, but current events have also played a part. For instance, 
what could have been a promising second decade for the world in the 
new millennium began with an uncertain and troubling international 
landscape: political destabilization, the eruption of new conflicts, a new 
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form of international terrorism, and a refugee crisis impacting Europe 
and having global ramifications, among others.
We could be overwhelmed by the challenging developments and 
contingencies around the world, but development initiatives must 
be focused on the development agenda instead of following the fickle 
of times. The more the current situation appears to be entangled, the 
greater need there is to focus on the fundamentals, root causes and ‘ulti-
mate solutions’. This is because development is possibly the best answer 
to most of the ills and problems we face today. As such, it was hearten-
ing when, recently, even David Beasley, the Executive Director of the 
World Food Programme (WFP), said that ‘humanitarian dollars should 
be turned into development dollars’.1
We need to have a better misunderstanding of what foreign aid 
can do. Not all aid is geared towards economic development and, all 
things considered, the actual portion allotted to economic development 
is quite small. This is because the spectrum of foreign assistance has 
expanded over decades to include just about everything, as is reflected 
by the adoption of universal Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The clear phenomenon observable in African development is that the 
distinction between ‘economic development’ and ‘economic welfare’ is 
increasingly blurred, which I think is a big problem in itself.
To simplify matters, foreign aid can be broken down into four cat-
egories: (1) humanitarian assistance; (2) ‘social welfare’-type assistance; 
(3) development assistance; and (4) the promotion of democracy and 
governance. Humanitarian assistance is for the emergency relief of 
those suffering as a result of disasters and crises. Social welfare-type 
programmes target the socially vulnerable or disadvantaged, providing 
various services to meet their basic needs. While the first two types of 
assistance are meant to serve the immediate or basic requirements of the 
recipients, development assistance is for the mid- to long term sustaina-
ble development of the recipient nations. These include various types of 
cooperation like capacity-building, technological cooperation, the con-
struction and handover of facilities and infrastructures, the provision of 
materials and equipment, the injection of funds, etc. in multiple sectors. 
Lastly, the promotion of governance, democracy and human rights, and 
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regional security are also important areas in which Western donors pro-
vide assistance.
Therefore, foreign aid that directly supports economic development 
in African countries is not particularly apparent. And this is further 
‘compromised’ by how the recipient countries utilize this aid. The prob-
lem is that various economic projects often turn out to be short-lived 
programmes that mainly benefit the officials of counterpart agencies 
or a limited number of the people concerned. In sum, even these have 
turned into ‘welfare’ programmes instead of acting as sustainable means 
to assist economic development.
Basically, universal economic activities can be considered as either 
wealth creation or wealth distribution. Wealth creation is about realiz-
ing additional production and value that drives economic growth, lead-
ing to overall development. Wealth distribution, in policy terms, is the 
act of ‘correcting’ market failures from a socio-political standpoint like 
addressing income inequality and providing public services. If there 
is no wealth creation, then there is no wealth to distribute. Thus, for 
Sub-Saharan African countries, the priority should be ‘enlarging the 
pie’ through wealth creation, but their general mindset is fixated on the 
transfer of wealth. Under such circumstances, various assistance pro-
grammes are likely to fail. The ‘welfare mentality’ is so widespread in the 
region that everyone is looking for solutions to come from somewhere 
else, while readily blaming outsiders and external factors for their own 
poverty and troubles. More troubling is the failure or unwillingness to 
take action, and the deep-seated practice of ‘non-implementation’ poses 
the biggest mystery, obstacle and threat to development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The ‘mindset’ of people should be brought to the forefront of our 
attention and considered as a key term in the discourse on Africa’s 
development. If people were to ask what the single most important root 
cause is of underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa, the best answer I 
can think of is the ‘mindset’. Among the myriad of things that can be 
considered, the ultimate solution to break the impasse lies in a change 
of mindset. It is one thing to find reasons for past failures, which is 
what everybody has been doing, but quite another to make things right 
in practice, which seldom takes place in the region.
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The ‘mindset change approach’ beings with it great benefits, in that 
it is conducive to the ‘internalization’ of development, enhancing 
awareness for ownership, and is action-oriented. It brings home what 
people have forgotten: the plain and simple truth of mind over mat-
ter. ‘Mindset’ can be an elusive term, but it would be useful to confine 
its meaning to what is relevant to development. Bringing the ‘mind-
set’ to the fore in discussion propels search for answers ‘from within’, 
which is what development ought to be about in the first place. Too 
much energy has been spent on secondary and peripheral issues without 
addressing the core issue of mind over matter.
To make this kind of attitudinal change will not be an easy task, 
but it is not impossible. It is certainly achievable and there are prece-
dents to prove it. The most prominent example, I would argue, is 
South Korea. In Africa, Rwanda is seen as an emerging case, following 
a similar model. Uganda has already adopted this mindset change pro-
gramme, although it is still in the initial, exploratory phase of doing so. 
Sub-Saharan African nations should go beyond acquiring knowledge 
and capacity to espouse mindset change if they are indeed serious about 
‘radical transformation’, and rightly so.
The good news is that in some places in Sub-Saharan Africa, people 
are beginning to at least be aware and are talking about the mindset 
issue in an open manner. Uganda is one of those where Korea’s expe-
rience and know-how in this field has had an influence. Since 2009, 
the Canaan Farmers School, an institution in South Korea which spe-
cializes in mindset change and agriculture programmes, has worked 
with Uganda. Born out of the destruction of the Second World War 
and the subsequent Korean War, the Canaan School is reputed to 
have played an instrumental role in leadership and agriculture train-
ing in the early stages of Korea’s economic development. The objec-
tive of this institution was to eradicate poverty and attain sustainable 
development through changing the mindsets of rural leaders, who, in 
turn, would spearhead the change of mindsets in their communities. 
The School’s methodology was adopted later in the model of the New 
Village Movement (Saemaeul Undong ) that became a national campaign 
in South Korea from 1970. The Saemaul Undong became an icon of a 
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successful community-driven, self-help rural development endeavour of 
Korea that contributed to its overall success in economic development.
The ‘Mindset Change’ Issue in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Few international experts and observers know that South Korea’s 
economic miracle began with the mindset change campaigns con-
ducted at a national level. When you see various books and articles 
on Korea’s rapid economic growth or ‘miracle’ written by economists, 
both Korean and foreign, there is hardly any mention of the mindset 
change campaigns like the Saemaul Undong. It is only in recent years 
that the Saemaul Undong was recognized and promoted internation-
ally as a development model, and the Saemaul Undong archives were 
added to UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register in 2013.2 In 
the international development community, UN bodies like the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) are the pioneers in embracing this 
approach.3
There may be many reasons for this, but two things come to mind. 
One is the tendency or influence of mainstream economics and the 
other is the fundamental ‘political’ propensity or bias. First, mainstream 
economists do not deal with ‘extraneous’ factors like the people’s ‘mind-
set’. What approximates ‘mindset’ according to scholars is the ‘hard 
work’ or ‘work ethic’ of Koreans. Even Alice Amsden’s Asia’s Next Giant 
(1992) does not mention the Saemaul Undong at all. Also, it might be 
that orthodox economists would have shunned such an ‘interventionist’ 
movement.
Another reason why the Saemaul Undong has not received  universal 
praise inside Korea is because of the ‘political divide’ in the nation. 
No sooner had Korea achieved rapid economic development, the pro-
cess of its socio-political evolution, democratization began to unfold. 
Despite the fact that the Saemaul Undong had a substantial impact 
on rural development, because it was initiated by the authoritative 
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government, the progressive-minded population half-heartedly admit-
ted, or were even critical of, its outcomes. Also, as times have changed 
and people have become wealthier and more self-centred, they tend to 
be dismissive of things done in the past and do not enough thought 
to the situation back then, regarding these things as ‘outdated’ or 
‘irrelevant’.
Korea and Sub-Saharan African countries share many similar his-
torical experiences. No sooner had Korea been liberated from Japanese 
colonial rule in 1945 than it became divided. The subsequent Korean 
War that started in 1950 devastated the nation. But the great turna-
round started with the public programmes to empower the people in 
the 1950s, and the story of South Korea that unfolded provides valuable 
lessons for Africa’s development.
No one will disagree that without a fundamental change in the 
mindset of the leaders and the populace, there cannot be real progress. 
Setting up goals and expressing aspirations is an easy part, but this 
would be of no avail if they are not followed up with concrete actions. 
There have been serious misperceptions, negligence or intentional ‘look-
ing the other way’ on the subject. Development is not a ‘stock’ but a 
‘flow’ concept in economics, and it is all about change and dynamism, 
not the maintenance of the status quo. But many in the region seem to 
mistakenly believe that national wealth can be transferred and stocked 
up like material goods. But even materials and equipment need proper 
usage and maintenance in order to be useful. Many facilities built to 
serve the public, like medical clinics, factories, schools and welfare cen-
tres, become useless shortly after they are opened and handed over due 
to a lack of care and ownership, accompanied by corruption.
Although many factors come into play, the real issue is not the lack of 
resources or means, but the mindset of the people who are involved and 
responsible for undertaking the work. Evidently, poor work ethics—
the habit of not thinking ahead and making necessary preparations, 
not being focused and devoted in relation to one’s work, easily quitting 
one’s task, not keeping to deadlines and promise, etc. does so much 
harm, but this is not mentioned enough. When people imagine poverty 
in Africa, they tend to think of poverty in terms of lack of means, but 
one has to think further that poverty can be caused or sustained by the 
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failure to manage oneself, like saving money and having plans for mak-
ing a living and for spending.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is customary to see people attributing their 
problem to outside elements. One East African journalist writes:
[W]hat is it that inhibits our ability to produce our own technologies? 
Note that most sub-Saharan nations possess political institutions and 
public policies that (we are told) ensure prosperity. Is it, therefore, our 
education system which is the problem? Is it our social organization? Is it 
our colonial history that destroyed our self-belief in our ability to produce 
our own technologies? Is it the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism 
that keeps us looking outward for the solutions to our problems?4
There are different ways to deal with these needs and problems. People 
can be introspective, inclined to seek answers and solutions from 
within, or can have the opposite tendency and put blame on others or 
expect others to solve their problems. If we had two distinctly different 
societies, one being ‘introspective’ and the other having ‘disowning’ ten-
dencies, which one would fare better? The answer is obvious.
The value of being ‘introspective’ is that over time, individuals are 
likely to improve and achieve something because of the ‘know thyself ’ 
kind of effect that it will have. Skills and technologies can be gained 
when one strives for them. On the other hand, knowledge and insti-
tutions are of no consequence when people are idle and irresponsible. 
Worse, this ‘disowning’ tendency breeds a ‘don’t care’ mentality. Because 
people are not the drivers of their own life, they cannot have high 
expectations of what can be achieved.
It is baffling as to why people should be reluctant to do the things 
that will only benefit them, particularly in the longer term. This is not 
limited to the economic field. Institutions, the rule of law, governance 
and democracy are only worth anything if they are put into practice. 
We studied at school that the essence of democracy was deeds and 
practice. It can be a hollow echo of rhetoric which can degenerate into 
endless political strife if democracy is not properly understood and 
embodied by the people.
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Development is about making difficult changes, and admitting and 
targeting one’s own weakness and problems rather than trying to con-
ceal them, so that they can be overcome. Development is what is earned 
and not what is bestowed by others, and there is no magical formula for 
it, except that people and the government all have to work conscien-
tiously with a common purpose. In this regard, much more harm is 
done by being ambiguous, disingenuous, hypocritical and manneristic 
than being honest, straightforward and practical. Being politically and 
diplomatically correct all the time may not be a good thing for the sake 
of development, and straightforwardness could yield better outcomes.
Fortunately, within Africa, people are showing an increasing aware-
ness that the mindset needs to be changed. The call for mindset change 
has been aired in various regional bodies including the African Union 
(AU), and it is not uncommon to see African leaders and intellectuals 
speaking out on this.5 Everyone seems to agree that people’s mindset 
should change, but when it comes to how this should be done, people 
seem to be at a loss and lack clear ideas. This is where we need to break 
out of the box. Rather than give up or try to avoid the matter, it should 
be tackled head-on. The ideal scenario would be that the African peo-
ple themselves take the initiative and make full-fledged efforts in this 
regard. Development partners can approach this issue with good inten-
tions and without prejudice, being circumspective in relation to the 
nature of the matter.
Efforts to this end have already been made in Uganda through such 
projects as the establishment of the National Farmers Leadership Centre 
(NFLC), which is a training round for mindset change and agricultural 
development.6 Perhaps the best way to break the yoke of the inaction 
or powerlessness of the people is to ‘provoke’ them to change. This is 
because as far as human behaviour is concerned, ‘voluntarism’ is the 
surest way forward. The ‘mindset change’ of the people, if effected, can 
have far-reaching and ‘explosive’ repercussions on their lives and society.
There are a number of parallels between Korea’s experience and the 
situation in which Sub-Saharan African countries currently find them-
selves. One of the areas that Korea identified as crucial for national 
transformation was the mindset of the people, and the campaign for 
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mindset change was essentially about empowering the people. The 
Korean experience will be examined in Part 4 of this book.
With respect to the substance of the problematic mindset in Sub-
Saharan Africa, I believe that the following can be identified as the syn-
dromes or traits that commonly exist in the region: (1) the dependency 
syndrome; (2) the ‘what’s-in-it-for-me’ syndrome; (3) the ‘backtracking 
syndrome’; (4) expediency or short-sightedness; (5) a lack of action and 
implementation; (6) a weak sense of responsibility or ownership; (7) 
a weak sense of nation or patriotism; and (8) a ‘commission culture’.7
First, we are all so familiar with the talk of a ‘dependency syndrome’ 
in Sub-Saharan Africa that it sounds like a cliché. It is so widespread 
throughout the region, at all levels in society and the state. For instance, 
at the provincial level, the general tendency is that the locals wait indef-
initely, hoping that the government will come to their aid for the most 
basic things that they can do for themselves. I had the opportunity to 
participate in a series of ‘community clean-up’ exercises in and around 
Kampala, and on one occasion I was appalled to see first-hand the scene 
of total negligence and irresponsibility. The site was not a slum by any 
measure, but apparently the residents were waiting for the city author-
ity workers to show up and remove the rubbish. Even on the very day 
we were conducting clean-up exercise, many locals, particularly young 
men, were sitting idly and gazing at us, smiling but declining to take 
part in the exercise. It was an awful state to witness because this had 
nothing to do with the people lacking knowledge, capacity or financial 
resources (the reasons frequently cited for people failing to act), but was 
a simple matter of willingness.8
The ‘what’s-in-it-for-me?’ syndrome is also a widespread phe-
nomenon among the population in the region. This is a tendency to 
consider one’s own interests at all times before anything else. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, it is a well-known fact the poor delivery of public ser-
vices wrought by civil servants who are devoid of any sense of duty 
and responsibility is a major hindrance to development. It is a com-
mon practice for government officials to engage in personal businesses, 
and even in their official duties their priority is often misplaced, put-
ting their personal interests over the public interest. There is a ten-
dency to put the official assignments on the back-burner or neglect 
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them altogether if they fail to see what is in it for them. Such practice 
not only breeds conflict of interests and corruption, but also, more 
fundamentally, drastically undercuts the government’s performance. 
Economic loss due to disruptions and delays in public service, not to 
mention outright acts of corruption, is said to be enormous.
The ‘backtracking syndrome’ is the tendency to hold back or back 
pedal instead of moving forward to build on what has already been 
achieved. I have always thought of this as a great paradox. It is the prob-
lem of failing to ‘keep pace’, stopping short of meeting the target, and 
not being consistent and living up to expectations. Where dynamic eco-
nomic growth is enjoyed, people take it for granted that things improve 
over time. But this is generally not the case in Africa. There are actu-
ally many things that get worse over time, the most noticeable being 
the deterioration of physical infrastructure and facilities, but it goes well 
beyond that.
The backtracking syndrome is observable on many fronts and it has 
huge accumulative or multiple effects at the national level. What is so 
disheartening is that in many cases, local employees, if they are not 
placed under the ‘special attention’ of the management, end up causing 
problems or missing out on the opportunities that will definitely benefit 
them (like long-time employment). What we can call the ‘self-regulat-
ing’ or ‘self-disciplining’ ability of workers is visibly poor. Overall, their 
will to ‘appeal’ to their bosses in terms of diligence and performance 
is short-lived and they do not respond well to the continuing pressures 
of work. Because Africa’s organizations and companies have a weaker 
management or governance structure compared to foreign entities, 
their overall organizational output or efficiency is also weaker. In con-
trast, those who do receive greater recognition in foreign organizations 
enjoy many benefits and opportunities. They can even be headhunted 
by higher-paying government organizations and companies.9
In any organization, local workers can only benefit if they are attuned 
to maintaining their level of work because normally, over time, they will 
gain expertise and productivity in relation to their work. Their pay will 
increase and it should be a win-win situation for the organization and 
the employees. But, to our dismay, many show ‘regression’ instead of 
steady progress, with the result that they are eventually fired from their 
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job. The strange phenomenon is that when rewards and incentives are 
given to employees, one should expect them to perform more positively, 
but often the opposite occurs—rather than responding in kind, employ-
ees become spoilt, complacent and ask for more. This results in an 
ironic situation where the good intentions of one party are met by the 
negative reaction of the other party, which defies logic and rationality.
The next trait is expediency or short-sightedness. This is quite evident 
in daily work practices. Cutting corners is a tendency of most techni-
cians and workers in the region, meaning that in order to avoid this 
as much as possible, customers’ intervention in terms of continuous 
on-site ‘supervision’ is required. This applies to a whole variety of work, 
ranging from menial chores to construction projects. Sloppy work, the 
habit of leaving things undone, a failure to keep to deadlines and prom-
ises, etc. are the ‘norm’ rather than the exception.10 Generally, there is 
a lack of attention to detail and thinking ahead, so that even the most 
basic things to expect like the standardization and linear, geometric cor-
rectness of products are not met most of the time.
The lack of implementation or action is another distinctive feature of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Ian Clarke, an Irish missionary doctor who became 
the Mayor of Makindye Division in Kampala, gives a vivid account of 
such a problem:
Uganda was a great country to live in: the weather was lovely, the vege-
tation beautiful, and the people friendly and outgoing. Some foreigners 
came to work in Uganda and were at first enthralled by what they found, 
particularly by the social life and by how articulate people are, but they 
often got a rude awakening when it came to the work practices and work 
ethic. If people could talk their way into making things work, Uganda 
would have been the best developed country in the world. Donors were 
impressed with people’s grasp of problems and understanding of the steps 
which should be taken in finding solutions, but then confused as to why 
so many basic issues on the ground remained unresolved. The problem 
lay in implementation: many public servants were good at analysing and 
talking about what should be done, as if the very talking was the same 
as doing it, but then nothing happened. This lack of implementation of 
simple things in the public domain was so common that it was accepted 
as the norm, and one only remarked when anything actually changed.11
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The disinclination to act is a very serious problem under any circum-
stances. Everybody seems to agree that there has been too much talking 
and too little action. There is the saying ‘easier said than done’, but the 
wise have admonished us against frivolity and talkativeness: ‘silence is 
golden’, ‘an empty wagon makes more noise’, ‘action speaks louder than 
words’, ‘the superior man acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks 
according to his action’, etc.12
Lack of responsibility and ownership is also a serious obstacle to 
development. Institutional mechanisms to enforce accountability are 
important, but what is much more needed is a greater sense of respon-
sibility of the people. The seriousness of the problem is frequently 
expressed:
It’s very hard to get things done, even at the smallest level. But it is very 
easy to sit and complain about things. Reading social media, one gets the 
sense that we have increasingly become a complaining nation, not a doing 
nation. Everywhere complaints abound about our failing healthcare and 
education system, of corruption and abuse of office. But one hardly reads 
a story of what those complaining are doing to change the situation. Are 
we waiting for intervention from God?13
What I also see as typical of Sub-Saharan Africa is the practice of offer-
ing amnesty in the name of national reconciliation. Political leaders are 
quick to call for amnesty, thereby promoting impunity. Betrayal and 
treachery are also common. When I was in West Africa, I saw internal 
conflicts in many countries where the military as well as political leaders 
conveniently ‘switched sides’. Opportunism prevails, and this leads to a 
protraction of conflicts because there is no clear will for or path towards 
its closure. In eastern Africa, South Sudan provides the latest worst-case 
scenario of what personal greed for power and impunity of leaders can 
do to a nation.
Weakness in the sense of nation and patriotism is another general 
trait in the region. The weak sense of nation and patriotism corre-
lates with the weak functioning of states and these two feed off each 
other. From a national standpoint, the spread of patriotism that tran-
scends tribalism and sectarianism will be an ideal goal to achieve. Many 
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African countries suffering from internal strife and disunity ought to 
realize the fact that this could easily be exploited, engulfing the whole 
country and the region into a state of crisis.
So how can a sense of nation, national identity, solidarity or patriot-
ism be fostered? The greatest responsibility rests with the political lead-
ers and elites, who should be leading their nation forward by example. 
But this need not be top-down only—it can work both ways, from top-
down and bottom-up, in an interactive fashion with people’s volunta-
rism. Sometimes tragic events can serve as a critical turning point for 
nations. A good example is the case of Rwanda. What the country has 
been able to achieve in the aftermath of the genocide is remarkable and 
has set a high bar for other African countries to match. For an African 
country, Rwanda has tackled seemingly improbable tasks: good govern-
ance, the civic-mindedness of the people, social order and discipline, 
national solidarity, etc. Most surprising is the cleanliness and orderliness 
of the capital city Kigali to the extent that it makes one wonder if it 
is indeed a city in Sub-Saharan Africa. What developing countries des-
perately need is the government setting an example to ‘empower’ the 
people rather than simply trying to curry favour with the people, but 
without enacting essential reforms.
Lastly, there is a widespread practice of people at all levels wanting to 
be given ‘commission’ as if they are entitled to it. Foreign investors are 
the easy targets and can be hassled by various people, including high-
level government officials, who are hell-bent on rent-seeking. The ‘com-
mission culture’ is one of the many facets of corruption, but because it 
stands out so prominently in Sub-Saharan Africa, it can be regarded as a 
syndrome.
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 3. Internationally, UN development bodies are believed to be the pioneers 
of recognizing and accepting the Saemaul Undong as a model for rural 
development. For instance, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA) chose the Saemaul Undong as a base model for the 
Sustainable Modernization of Agriculture and Rural Transformation 
(SMART), programme in 2008, and the Saemaul Undong was officially 
introduced to the UNDP in 2015 at the same time as the adoption of 
the SDGs. Edward Reed, the former country representative of the Asia 
Foundation to Korea, is a noted international scholar who had studied 
and written about the Saemaul Undong.
 4. Andrew Mwenda, ‘Africa Through North Korean Eyes’, The 
Independent, 6 April 2017, https://www.independent.co.ug/columnists/
andrew-mwenda.
 5. For instance, Dr. Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma, the African Union 
Chairperson, stressed the need for Africans to change their mind-
sets to achieve development while briefing the Speakers of the African 
Parliament regarding Agenda 2063 in August 2014. When I came to 
Uganda in 2011, I noticed that the term ‘mindset change’ was already 
a familiar term in government circles perhaps due to Korea’s Canaan 
Farmers School’s activities in Uganda.
 6. The National Farmers Leadership Centre was formally opened in 
Uganda in May 2016. This centre, which focuses on mindset change 
(Saemaul Undong ) and agricultural training, is the first of its kind to 
be created by the Korean government in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is dealt 
with more in detail in other parts of this book.
 7. The observations and propositions made in this book, including the 
description of typical syndromes in Sub-Saharan Africa, are based on 
my own experiences in Africa. My personal involvement in devel-
opment cooperation, including the planning and implementation 
of development projects in Uganda, provided the inspiration and the 
empirical grounds for my work.
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 8. However, I was very pleased to learn later on that this community did 
indeed turn itself around and became one of the recognized examples 
of community environment improvement.
 9. Africa’s prominent executive bodies that are highly sought-after by 
white-collar workers also struggle to keep their employees disciplined 
and in check. So, those who have had a ‘good training’ and a track 
record of working in foreign organizations are often preferred by those 
offices.
 10. African countries approach this issue from the viewpoint of ‘skilling’, 
but I think this is a fundamental mindset or work ethics problem. 
The advocates of skilling have the point of correcting identifying the 
problem as essentially vocational rather than academic in most African 
countries. But limitations in ‘skilling programmes’ is that skilling alone 
cannot address what skilling is purported to achieve; it has to be com-
plemented with work ethics and social ethics.
 11. Ian Clarke, How Deep Is This Pothole? (London: Ian Clarke, 2010), 
p. 195.
 12. ‘An empty wagon makes more noise’ is a Korean proverb and ‘the supe-
rior man acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his 
action’ is a saying of Confucius.
 13. Andrew Mwenda, The Independent, 20–26 February 2015, p. 9.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution 
and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative 
Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or 
exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the 
copyright holder.
Part III
Africa’s Forgotten Mission of Nation-
Building: What are Missing
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Internalizing Development: The Question 
of Intent
One would think that by now, more than 50 years since the majority of 
Sub-Saharan African countries gained independence, they would have 
completed the task of nation-building. But the reality is that a big mis-
match exists between Africa’s legal, political and economic institutions 
in name and what these actually deliver in practice. This appears to be 
an outcome of a serious lack of ownership and a failure to ‘internalize’ 
development. Such a perception is shared by African scholars.1
Before people can ‘internalize’ development (that is, being oriented 
towards development as individuals), some kind of visions or schemes 
for development at the national level to which people can ascribe would 
be required. Hence, the government’s ‘moral authority’—which derives 
from leadership, credibility, performance, etc.—is vital to encourag-
ing people to actively comply with government initiatives. Certainly, 
the formation of a national consensus and unity will be a huge boost 
for development. But as many Africans would divulge, their national 
identity, sense of nation and patriotism are comparatively weak and 
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ambiguous. This, together with the weakness of the role of the states, 
has impeded the ability of African countries to pursue development. 
As a result, many African nations have spent decades following inde-
pendence with the facade of development, like electoral democracy and 
economic liberalization, without substantively making much progress in 
the essence of nation-building and modernization.
There is a popular saying that poverty should not be passed on to 
the next generation. The task of development has to be taken seriously 
by African countries because they are certain to face mounting social, 
economic and political pressures that can erupt and unleash untenable 
consequences.
As far as the political system is concerned, the ‘hybrid regime’ that is 
typical of Sub-Saharan Africa has proven to be unsuccessful and should 
also be redressed. Africa’s hybrid regimes which combine the formality 
of liberal-democratic polity with neo-patrimonial authoritarianism are 
the outcome of the adaptation of the Western political system to ‘local 
needs’. The problem is that they have the attribute of being neither 
democratic nor transformative, but in essence are status quo-oriented. 
Rather than being transitory, this type of polity coupled with problem-
atic electoral democracy appears to be assuming permanence in Africa.
The downsides of this kind of system are that it seemingly satisfies 
(even if in a minimalist fashion) popular demand, while protecting 
the vested interests of the privileged class, so that it is ultimately status 
quo-promoting. But what may be a comfort zone for political leaders 
can turn out to be exactly the opposite of what ‘national development’ 
requires. David Booth and Dianna Cammack rightly point out the clear 
gap that exists between formal democratic institutions and the reality in 
Africa: ‘The trouble with democracy, as a substantive reality and not just 
a set of formal arrangements, is that its effectiveness depends on social 
and economic conditions that are not yet enjoyed in most developing 
countries’.2
African countries should pause and think about how to comprehen-
sively and meaningfully alter their approach of development rather than 
following the same course that will only yield the same results. This is 
a critical task of ‘internalizing’ development, and it comes down to the 
basic question of intent. There are so many variables that can have an 
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impact on the livelihood of nations, but African countries should be 
able to discern between ‘external variables’ and ‘internal variables’ and 
understand their implications.
The reason why Sub-Saharan Africa’s ‘development frame’ has been 
ineffective in comparison to other regions like East Asia is that Africa 
got the priorities or sequencing wrong: it treats the external variables as 
the ‘principal’ variables while relegating the internal variables to a ‘sec-
ondary’ status. Sub-Saharan African countries have always tended to 
seek explanations and solutions ‘outside’ of themselves, and they con-
tinue to do so, even though they talk about ownership. Many Asian 
countries, and particularly South Korea, understood that development 
is what comes from within, like taking action to catch up with rich 
countries with a strong sense of responsibility and ownership.
South Koreans could have placed the blame for the country’s predica-
ments on a range of external factors like the colonial legacy, the Korean 
War, geopolitics, geographical and natural conditions, etc. They could 
have relied on foreign aid without making strenuous efforts for develop-
ment, leaving the nation’s destiny in the hands of outsiders and external 
dynamics. If this had been the case, Korea would never have even come 
close to what it achieved.
So the real question lies in the intent of Sub-Saharan African nations. 
How much do African leaders, elites and the general public want to see 
change? What is the thinking of political leaders and are they really pri-
oritizing national development or are they more interested in amassing 
wealth for themselves and simply staying in power as long as they can? 
What is certain is that economic transformation and the overall national 
development that entails structural changes will not occur as a result of 
technical prowess and the introduction of systems only.
One of the misguided thoughts that is widely held in the region is 
that people cannot do things and need assistance from outsiders because 
they lack the necessary ‘capacity’. But capacity is not something that 
can be injected into someone and then have an immediate effect like 
vaccination; there is the ‘knowledge’ part and the ‘application’ part, and 
while the former can be gotten from others, the latter is totally up to 
oneself. In the absence of determination and implementation, knowl-
edge will end up merely as knowledge. When there is a willingness to 
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learn, it will simply be a matter of time before knowledge and skills will 
be acquired. Nothing can happen all at once and everything is achieved 
through the ‘building-block’ approach, as no one has skills and expertise 
from the beginning.
An overwhelming number of invitation programmes for capaci-
ty-building, study tours, conferences, education, cultural exchanges, etc. 
are offered to Africans of various backgrounds by donor countries and 
organizations. Many entry points are provided, but apparently many 
Africans are not fully taking advantage of these programmes to promote 
their individual and collective capacity.
Edmund Phelps, the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
2006, rightly points out that ‘economic growth is dependent on the 
character of the nation’.3 Mindful of this, it will be worthwhile to fig-
ure out what would be the ‘missing links’ to development. In my view, 
they are the following three elements: (1) a sense of nation or national 
identity; (2) ‘development-mindedness’; and (3) a strong role played by 
the state—coherent industrial policy, prioritization of agriculture-rural 
development, etc. For African countries, securing these missing links is 
certainly achievable if there is the intent to do so.
But we also need to take account of the realities such as the ‘odd’ 
electoral democracy, the influence of the internet/social media and glo-
balization, the government’s policy of providing handouts, etc. The 
development of ICT enabling greater access, sharing of information and 
inter-connectivity, along with economic globalization, are also affect-
ing the lives of African people. These would make people conscious of 
global trends and raise their expectations of the things to come.
This, coupled with the dependency syndrome which seems to have 
only been exacerbated over time by the government’s policy of pro-
viding handouts, has fostered a troubling environment where peo-
ple’s demand keeps growing to the extent that meeting these demands 
becomes unsustainable. The paradox is that while political leaders and 
civil servants struggle to respond to people’s demands with what avail-
able resources they have, the population do not become any more 
empowered in terms of becoming more responsible and productive. 
Social pressure mounts when African states continue to fail to deliver 
public services and mismanage the economy.
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African countries and the international community alike should 
take a long hard look at what takes place underneath the facade of 
African dynamics. Let us take economic growth, for example. It is 
true that over the last decade or so, many Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries have achieved quite impressive growth and this is to be com-
mended. However, when one looks at the substance, growth was led 
by extractive industries (and now the downturn because of this), and 
multi-nationals or foreign companies were the ones that profited the 
most. Business, investments and economic growth did not translate 
into meaningful industrial transformation, the creation of a manufac-
turing sector or the creation of significant job opportunities for the 
masses.
When African economies are assessed in terms of the key parame-
ters of economic development like industrial structure, infrastructure 
and agriculture, there is hardly any country that would qualify as a suc-
cess.4 A raw materials or commodity-based industrial structure, absolute 
shortage and poorly maintained physical infrastructure, a rudimentary 
and non-competitive agricultural sector, etc. are the causes and at the 
same time the reflections of chronic weaknesses of the Sub-Saharan 
African economies.
Many countries are belatedly prioritizing the expansion of physi-
cal infrastructure and the increase in power-generating capacity. It is 
surprising to see that the countries are still struggling to achieve the 
minimum level of the most basic features of infrastructure, like roads, 
railways and electricity supply. This is often attributed to a lack of fund-
ing, but human failure, which manifests itself as mismanagement, diver-
sion of funds, lack of will and follow-up actions, is more responsible for 
such deficiencies.
In many cases, the conditions and efforts for ‘economic take-off’ 
were not put together from the start. Rural-agricultural development, 
a backbone for economic transformation, has not been given due 
attention and pursued energetically because of a lack of understand-
ing of the basics of economics and a reluctance to foresee the problems 
ahead. When it comes to the formulation and, more importantly, the 
implementation of national policies, the myopic approach has always 
incurred heavy costs.
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Many things that people are hoping for in developing countries may 
not easily come about when the leaders’ and people’s way of life and 
work patterns are steadfastly maintained. The situation is that people 
are unwilling to change their attitudes and yet they want to become bet-
ter off. But how you change without changing? This demands a holistic 
and long-term view of the problems and solutions, and self-reflection.
What African countries can easily do if they have the willingness to 
do so is to hold national dialogues, leading to action-oriented national 
campaigns to enhance people’s awareness of national tasks and to build 
a national consensus on the way forward. Nation-building is far from 
being achieved in the region. The identification and pursuit of soci-
etal and national objectives and values are vital for the nation to move 
forwards, and common goals or interests should be established at the 
national as well as the community level.
But what will be counterproductive is sectarianism or sectarian inter-
est-seeking at the extreme, especially when the social fabric and social 
capital are weak, as is the case in Africa. There is no shortage of pub-
lic gatherings or events, and very long hours are spent conducting pro-
tocols and listening to what everyone has to say. These should become 
venues for leaders and the people to engage in fruitful discussions and 
debates on public agendas and how to work together to achieve national 
goals.
A Sense of Nation and National Identity
It is generally recognized that the sense of nation and national iden-
tity in Sub-Saharan African nations are not as strong as in many other 
nations in different regions. A high level of ethnic diversity is what 
stands out as a distinct characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa, but eth-
nic diversity in itself cannot be correlated to instability or considered 
to be a direct cause of underdevelopment. And ethnicism and loyalty 
to the state do not necessarily come into direct conflict. This is all the 
more so when people realize that the state and their ethnic entity are 
at different levels. What impact ethnical divergence or multi-ethnicism 
would have on the nations would vary from country to country, and the 
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overall outcome of the studies on ethnicity and development tends to be 
inconclusive.
Crawford Young talks about Africanism, territorial nationalism and 
ethnicity as ‘the ambiguous triple helix of identity’ and concludes that 
they operate on different tracks: ‘Territorial nationalism usually does 
not compete directly with ethnicity; in contrast to what happens in 
Europe, in Africa ethnic groups are never referred to as “national minor-
ities” juxtaposed to a titular nationality … the prevalence of multilin-
gualism lowers the temperature of language issues that are so volatile in 
India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Belgium or Canada’.5
One thing that is quite remarkable and should be taken note of 
regarding territorial nationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa is that the ter-
ritorial boundaries of African states that were drawn during the peak of 
the colonial era remain virtually intact today, long after the independ-
ence of nations. While the artificially set linear territorial boundaries did 
not match the ethnic identity map, Africans have been able to main-
tain their existing state boundaries. A more accurate way of putting it 
may be that they have opposed the fragmentation of their territory or, 
because of the apparently huge task that any effort for re-alignment of 
territories would entail, they might have accepted living with what has 
already been given. Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn point out that 
‘for all the talk of the emphasis on ethnicity in Africa, one of the most 
salient and puzzling features of African politics is actually the surprising 
degree of national identity that African states have managed to produce 
among their citizens, and the extent to which the latter profess nation-
alist sentiments despite their subnational divisions’.6 As mentioned by 
these authors, this is somewhat paradoxical, given the colonial origins of 
these states.
Considering the degree of Africa’s ethnic diversity, nationalism in this 
region (or, to be more precise, territorial nationalism) can be viewed as 
quite remarkable. But in reality, Sub-Saharan Africa’s nationalism is nei-
ther forceful nor ideological. It is rather weak, as is in the case for the 
role of the state. Territorial nationalism might have been maintained 
because it is conveniently in compromise with ethnicity, not supersed-
ing it. Another reason could be that from the standpoint of ethnic enti-
ties, since the ethnic composition is complex, they would see no point 
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in seceding to form a separate state entity when they lack the capacity 
and self-sufficiency in terms of resources and infrastructures, as well as 
being impeded in terms of geographical remoteness, etc.
Nationalism, which originated in Europe centuries ago, evolved 
in other regions around the world in the twentieth century with the 
rise of anti-colonialism and doctrine of self-determination during the 
independence struggles of the colonized. In the process of fighting for 
independence, the inhabitants of colonial territories became a nation. 
By the early second half of the twentieth century, ‘nationhood’ became 
universal and the international political norm. Sub-Saharan African 
countries, in the wave of independence, strived for nation-building 
which was necessary in order to gain not only internal legitimation but 
also international respectability. Crawford Young points out that ‘the 
nation-building project generally did succeed in representing territorial 
nationalism as a higher form of identity distinct from ethnicity, existing 
on a different identity track. Ethnicity was deemed legitimate within 
a purely cultural and private kinship realm but not as a discourse of 
statehood’.7
In Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic tensions can be latent, subdued, spo-
radic or exploited, but they do not often degenerate into all-out vio-
lence, although there are some exceptions to this. It would be fair to 
say that in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity does not directly 
challenge or pose a danger to territorial nationalism. In some instances, 
a high degree of ethnicity can have a moderating effect on potential 
cracks or the break-up of a nation. Uganda provides a good case study 
in this respect. It is viewed as the most ethnically diverse nation on 
earth, but its very multi-ethnicity makes the predominance of any sin-
gle ethnic group virtually impossible as others will be united against it. 
Ethnic checks and balances, even if they are far from ideal, are having 
an effect. The people of Uganda have lived through tough times and 
lengthy civil wars in the past, during the eras of Idi Amin and Milton 
Obote, the Bush Wars and the fight against Joseph Kony and his Lord’s 
Resistance Army. And over the course of time, they have learned the 
lessons of the dangers of ethnical sectarianism getting out of hand. 
Rwanda, by African standards, is one of the least ethnically diverse 
countries, but it experienced the most horrific genocide in Africa.
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The ‘backtracking syndrome’ is also at work here. At the time when 
Sub-Saharan African countries gained independence, a major feature of 
nationhood was about differentiating it from, and transcending, tribal-
ism or ethnicity. At the beginning, many African leaders considered that 
ethnicity would soon become a relic; the Guinean leader Sekou Toure 
declared that ‘in three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, 
ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much 
damage to our country and its population’.8 Like Toure, subsequent 
nationalist leaders of the new African nations vehemently rejected eth-
nic nationalism, seeing it as a threat to their states.9 But, as it turned 
out, this was all an illusion. Ethnicism never withered, but the existence 
of states itself was not seriously threatened either. Later on, the leaders 
themselves would often take advantage of ethnicism for their own polit-
ical purposes.
Nation-building with the sense of nation or patriotism at its core 
is not the task of leaders or government only, but should also be sup-
ported and driven by the people. If the masses have no part in it, there 
is no point in pushing for nation-building in the first place. How 
nation-building was achieved in most other countries was through 
‘movement’ rather than in a customary fashion. The realization of 
nation-building without the people’s support and fervour is hard to 
imagine.
So why has nation-building still not been accomplished in Sub-
Saharan African countries? Why has the weakness of nationhood in 
Africa continued for so long? Many have attributed this to colonial 
legacies and the way in which post-colonial transitions took place. 
Normally, new nations around the world have developed a sense of 
nation and national identity over the course of their history or through 
their struggle for independence. But as some have pointed out, Sub-
Saharan Africa’s independence by and large did not feature ‘vehement’ 
struggles in a political sense, as was the case in many other coun-
tries outside the region, and the colonialists’ state apparatus was vir-
tually handed over to them. Since independence was not earnestly 
fought for, the result is a weak sense of nation and patriotism.10 The 
mismatch between the euphoria of independence and the reality that 
unfolded thereafter in Sub-Saharan Africa is still repeating itself in the 
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twenty-first century in a rather dramatic fashion in South Sudan: no 
sooner had South Sudan become independent than it was drawn into a 
much deeper turmoil of constant internal conflict and chaos.
A sense of nation—the feeling of togetherness as a nation—that has 
a special meaning and value of its own as an integral part of people’s 
lives and which matters for their livelihood is what constitutes an essen-
tial foundation for nation-building and national development. But in 
Africa, not only is this noticeably weak, but it is also often misinter-
preted or purposely distorted.
Many still blame the ‘colonial legacy’ for this, but what should be 
considered even more seriously is the ‘Africans’ legacy of missteps’. 
It does not make logical sense to blame the former while being silent 
about the latter, which is much more pertinent to the reality of Africa 
today. So how can the sense of nation and patriotism, which should 
have been cemented a long time ago at the outset of independence, be 
erected at this time of ever-heightening liberalization and inter-depend-
ence on a global scale? I believe this will be a true test of the commit-
ment and readiness of Sub-Saharan African countries to move on to the 
next stage of development. The answer is simple: make conscientious 
effort now before it become even more difficult.
Development-Mindedness
Now, we are coming down to the crucial part in the discourse on devel-
opment: development-mindedness. It seems that everyone in Africa 
wants to see their country develop, but not many seem to genuinely 
understand, let alone do, what it takes to being about that development. 
This could be due to many things, but in my view, what is most funda-
mentally missing is ‘development-mindedness’.
So what is development-mindedness? It is a matter of definition and 
I have purposely simplified it to mean what is ‘functional’; it falls within 
the realm of ‘work ethics’. Development-mindedness is a mindset that 
is conducive to the development or fulfilment of one’s work. This book 
takes a logical viewpoint (of ‘structural functionalism’ in sociology) that 
a nation (‘the whole’) is made up of its members, the individuals (‘parts’ 
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or ‘entities’), and that national development is the aggregate sum of 
their actions. I base my proposition on the premise that human factors 
or actions are the single most important component of national devel-
opment, because the essence of development lies in ‘doing’ or ‘taking 
action’, and not on ‘possessing’ materials or resources.
So, what constitutes development-mindedness? In an effort to search 
for the answer to this question, I had to think about what cycle people 
generally go through or what the things are that people have to do in 
order to successfully achieve their aims. What I have deduced is the fol-
lowing, ‘KPOP’: (1) knowledge; (2) practising (embodying); (3) own-
ing; and (4) passion (devotion). The sequencing may not necessarily 
occur in this order and could vary, and these elements tend to be inter-
active. I may refer these elements, which are pertinent to national devel-
opment, as ‘steps’ or ‘phases’ for the sake of convenience.
The first thing anyone must do is to know what and how to do 
things. But know-how itself will be of no help if it is not put into 
practice. As the saying goes, knowing and doing are two very different 
things. It should also be plain that practising involves ‘embodying’ pro-
cess, and these two tend to go together. ‘Practising’ means going beyond 
just knowing—to really digest and put into action what needs to be 
done. The next phase is taking ‘ownership’, which means that the indi-
viduals themselves are ‘taking charge’ of their work in an active, respon-
sible manner. This would entail broadening of thinking on the planning 
and execution of tasks. The last phase is ‘passion’, where people show 
genuine devotion and motivation for their work. This is what really 
pushes people to excel and reach the culmination of their work.
This rule applies to everybody from all walks of life and at every level: 
national leaders, politicians, bureaucrats and public service workers, 
CEOs and businessmen, labourers, farmers, students, specialists, tech-
nicians, academicians, etc. ‘Knowing’—that is, acquiring knowledge 
or expertise—is an initial but important step. One learns through nat-
ural process, studying and training in various forms. Many upper and 
middle-class people are well versed in the category of ‘know-how’ and 
have a grasp of the issues and the way forward, thanks to their enthusi-
asm for, and early exposure to, higher education and frequent contacts 
with the outside world. In fact, their ability to express themselves in an 
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organized manner impresses many visiting foreigners. In elite circles and 
the well-to-do class, their level of knowledge and expression is up to the 
‘world-class’. But the domain of ‘knowing’, while essential, is only an 
introductory part, and it has to followed by the ‘main body’ of embodi-
ment, application, ownership and passion.
But ‘knowledge’ is by no means a given. This is especially true for 
ordinary people like the youth and the rural populace. What is encour-
aging to see is that at least the students are enthusiastic and have a 
yearning for education in many parts of Africa. Of course, a great dis-
parity in terms of the quality of education exists between urban centres 
and rural areas, where teachers’ absenteeism is very high and the con-
tents of education or knowledge imparted often have little relevance to 
reality.
Practising or applying knowledge is a much more challenging part. 
The main issue here is twofold: either very little work has been done 
or things are done improperly. No doubt, a widespread propensity of 
inaction and non-implementation is evident in Africa. Even worse, 
people frequently apply their know-how not to where it is due, but 
to do things that are detrimental to society and the public interest. 
This is common among civil servants throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Government departments, law enforcement authorities and local gov-
ernance bodies are deeply entrenched in irregularities, corruption and 
abuse of power, so that the problems have become institutional and 
undermine what little progress is made.
The picture outside the public sector is no less bleak. Sometimes 
workers have little regard for the most basic things. We can see many 
instances where knowledge, practice, ownership and devotion are all 
missing. Many things break down easily, but people tend not to mind 
and take it for granted. What is clearly visible and can be very easily 
fixed is often ignored. For example, I heard a story of local employees at 
a training institute in Uganda who did not bother to do anything about 
newly purchased classroom chairs. They were new and in good condi-
tion, except for a few loose joints that could be easily fixed manually. 
The employees were blaming the product and saying it was now use-
less. The principal of the institute, a foreigner, was at a loss in relation 
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to their utter irresponsibility, and he fixed the chairs himself by simply 
tightening up the screws.
Unnecessary wastage and loss due to such indifference and careless-
ness is beyond our imagination. In general, some point out that it is not 
only the ‘commoners’ but also the ‘capitalists’ of Africa who are known 
to be wasteful.11 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the ‘mismanagement’ is so prev-
alent, ranging from something small to something on a national scale, 
that ‘good management’ is considered rather rare. Probably the more 
profound harm done is that people become numb to the seriousness 
of the problem. A question that comes to mind is: ‘If expectations and 
standards for work are set at such a low level, will development ever be 
possible?’ A testimony by an Asian national who runs a mechanic shop 
in Kampala is reflective of this; he half-jokingly said ‘a good thing about 
working in Uganda is that customers don’t complain about my work, 
even when my equipment they purchased is not working properly. Better 
still, they never call me up late in the night to ask me to come and fix it’.
In our world, this KPOP combination can sound like an ideal type. 
But logically speaking, if the mindset or work ethics cannot keep pace 
with basic standards, what are the chances of progress? As such, stren-
uous efforts should be made to bring about the enhancement of qual-
ity and productivity of work to meet the acceptable ‘standards’. Let us 
take an imaginary salesman, for example. In the phase of ‘knowing’, the 
salesman has to learn the basics—the nuts and bolts of sales and mar-
keting, and company rules and policies. The next ‘practising’ step would 
require him to act as a salesman, ‘embodying’ the routines, being cus-
tomer-friendly, service-oriented, keeping up with his work schedule and 
so on. Then in the ‘ownership’ stage, he would be going beyond rou-
tine work to have a sense of responsibility and attachment towards his 
organization. And finally, he would become fully devoted to his work, 
exhibiting the level of passion to make him a competent and profes-
sional businessman.
It is generally recognized that many African nations suffer from mis-
management or a lack of management capabilities. The reason for the 
scarcity of successful and sustainable businesses run by those native to 
the region is due to this. And the reason why government projects and 
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services fail time after time, businesses go bankrupt, factories, hotels and 
restaurants need foreign managers to keep their business and reputation 
alive, etc. is because of this shortcoming in development-mindedness.
The human factor of ownership, responsibility and implementation 
is particularly important. But so much time has been wasted looking 
elsewhere for answers without addressing the real root causes of the 
problems of the region. Everybody involved, including the development 
partners, will have a share of responsibility for this, but no one could 
deny that the primary responsibility rests squarely with the African 
people.
This is where mindset change approach can come in. Instead of 
waiting for the lengthy process to be completed in a sequence, if the 
mindset change campaign can cause the people to be self-driven and 
passionate, that is, to go directly to the fourth stage, then stages one, 
two and three will be taken care of easily and almost automatically. This 
is the reverse engineering of development-mindedness. Those who feel 
passionate about doing something will be driven to learn, execute and 
own the things they want to do of their own accord. The reason why 
‘knowing’ is not often followed by ‘practising’ and ‘devoting’ is that 
people are, for some reason, ‘involuntary’ or ‘half-hearted’. In such a sit-
uation, coercing people would be counterproductive.
This ‘reverse engineering’ method can succeed where conventional 
approach fails. There are examples of such a model of development 
being tested and applied in Africa. The National Farmers Leadership 
Centre (NFLC) situated in Kampiringisa in the Mpigi District of 
Uganda is a prominent case in point. This institution, constructed by 
the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in Uganda, was 
formally opened in May 2016, following the completion of all the facil-
ities, but it had actually been operational for about a year and a half by 
this point.
During its trial operating period, in January 2015, about 50 
Ugandan farmers from the Millennium Village Project in the Isingiro 
District were selected for a two-week mindset change and agricul-
ture-livestock development courses. What I witnessed was striking. 
I have not seen such remote villagers attending a training course this 
elated, energetic and determined. They were said how much gratified 
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they were, and impressed by, the mindset change training which was 
something they had never experienced before. What was surprising is 
that this Canaan Farmers School style mental-disciplinary programme 
had such a strong appeal to the locals. The aim of this course was to 
‘reform’ the trainees’ mind to become self-confident and disciplined.
The benefits of this programme are having a sense of self-esteem, 
confidence, responsibility and being motivated to work. Those on the 
programme have to wake up at 5 a.m. every morning to participate in 
jogging and cleaning-up exercises before having breakfast and starting 
their classes. To my amazement, I later learned that these farmers, long 
after having returned to their villages, had stuck to this daily routine, 
chanting ‘I can do it’ slogans well before dawn. And this sounds almost 
like magic because it is all done voluntarily. The reason why it appeals 
to them in such a way may be because it felt innately ‘natural’ for them.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the basic stages of evolution of devel-
opment-mindedness and the reverse engineering scheme respec-
tively. The sequencing shown in Fig. 5.1 need not be taken literally; it 
is simply to illustrate a general idea and the order may vary depend-
ing on the individuals involved and the relevant circumstances. 
Fig. 5.1 Basic stages of development-mindedness (KPOP)
Fig. 5.2 Reverse engineering of development-mindedness
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Figure 5.2 shows the logic of the mindset change programme that was 
successful in South Korea. A successful drive for mindset change has 
the advantage of instantly impacting human attitudes and behaviour. 
Instilling people’s mind with a can-do spirit, positive motivation and 
encouraging them to work cooperatively so that they become the spon-
taneous agents of rural transformation is the logic behind the Saemaul 
Undong, the New Village Movement. When people are motivated and 
passionate, their intensity of learning and practising will naturally 
become greater, if not automatic.
Figure 5.3 illustrates a repetitive pattern in Sub-Saharan Africa: the 
‘backtracking syndrome’. The biggest problem here is not so much the 
scope or level of knowledge, but the low level of intensity of actions 
like, in many cases, a surprising lack of attention to basics and details. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that what is steady, consistent and pre-
dictable is much better than what is irregular, arbitrary and unpredicta-
ble. The advantage of the former is that over time, it will have positive 
accumulative effects, while the latter will entail so many impediments 
like slow and meagre performance, frustration, uncertainty, rise in costs 
and loss of confidence.
As shown in the figure, backtracking syndrome is represented 
by ‘regressions’, the act of falling back and failing to stay on track 
towards progress. People may give up very early in their work or may 
not quite make it to or keep up with the ‘practising’ or the ‘owning’ 
phase. ‘Tentative actions’ is when the ‘embodiment’ of knowledge has 
not properly taken root in the individuals. While the term ‘backtracking 
Fig. 5.3 ‘Backtracking syndrome’
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syndrome’ is used here for the first time, this is a common and recog-
nizable phenomenon typical of Sub-Saharan Africa that many locals 
frankly acknowledge. Moreover, it occurs both in individuals and in 
organizations, including the government.
The Strong Role of the State
The weak role played by states poses another major vulnerability for 
Sub-Saharan African countries. From a broader context, the perceived 
lack of capacity and credibility of African governments seems to be 
due, in no small part, to the issue of the mindset or development- 
mindedness. The inefficiency or poor output of governments is deemed 
to be more attributable to lack of commitment and the problem of ‘not 
doing’ the basics than to the matter of policy choices because there are 
always many ways to make policies work.
As for the role of government in economic development, different 
theoretical perceptions have been put forward: the neoclassical view, the 
revisionist view, ‘market-friendly view’, the ‘functional approach’ and so 
on.12 But today, the prevalent view in the development community is 
that the government’s role matters and is important for economic devel-
opment. No doubt, the successes of ‘developmental states’ in Asia is a 
powerful testament that developing nations can indeed achieve fast and 
successful economic transformation based on the positive role of state.
I believe that the developmental states model still is very relevant and 
deserves to be examined because its lessons and applicability can cer-
tainly benefit African countries. Jordan Kyle points out that ‘between 
1960 and 1995, the economies of 10 East Asian countries – Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore, China, Thailand, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Japan – grew faster than those of nearly any 
other country in the world … In each of these economies, the govern-
ment played a significant role in development process’.13
Nations should not treat the maxim ‘actions speak louder than 
words’ as a cliché. Countries in the region had ample time for nation- 
building and economic transformation, but the desperation was lack-
ing. Thandika Mkwandawire is absolutely right that ‘neither Africa’s 
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post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful 
“developmental states” rules out the possibility of African “developmen-
tal states” capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto’, but 
equating a scholarly ‘misreading (in this case Myrdal’s concept of “soft 
state” that he coined in 1968)’ to ‘denying Africa of the opportunity to 
think creatively’ is far-fetched.14 As long as the leaders and society as a 
whole fail to take measures to rectify the situation and scholars continue 
to justify the reality on their behalf, little progress can take place; taking 
responsibility and ownership is key.
The tasks requiring direct action to be taken by a nation, like 
nation-building and economic development, should not left to be ini-
tiated, planned and shaped by theorists and directed by international 
organizations that do not and cannot bear responsibility on behalf of 
developing countries. South Korea and other Asian countries did not 
develop because they were guided by theories and the donor commu-
nity. Explanations or model-building comes after, not before, the accu-
mulation of results and samples. If Sub-Saharan African countries find 
themselves at odds with the international development community, the 
chances are that this is due mostly to donor fatigue exacerbated by the 
slow-paced, non-committal response of the former. Everyone involved 
in the partnership suffers from consequences like delays, breakdowns 
and rising costs when parties repeatedly renege on their obligations. 
International recognition and favourable terms are won on the basis of 
merit, not on insistence.
The role of the state is deemed to have become more important in 
light of growing global challenges and inter-dependence. It is true 
that globalization in the form of greater economic and social inter- 
dependence calls for complex decision-making processes, which take 
place at various levels (namely sub-national, national and global), pav-
ing the way for a growing multi-layered system of governance.15 The 
need for enhanced cooperation and regulation on a wider scale in the 
international arena justifies the more robust and effective role of states 
in the process. Imagine the uncertainty and chaos that would ensue 
should states start reducing and abandoning their role. The emergence 
of global civil society or world government that was once imagined by 
transnationalists seems less likely than ever.
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African countries have every reason to push for a strong state in 
which the government plays an active role in relation to economic and 
social development. Developed countries and international organiza-
tions, on their part, should be supportive of Africa’s endeavour in this 
regard. Economic stability and predictability that countries around the 
world need would come from credibility in actions. The question is how 
African countries can move in this direction. With respect to the suc-
cess of East Asian economies, debates have taken place as to whether 
this was due to policy choice, i.e., selecting the right polices, or to ini-
tial conditions like better state capacity and autonomy, higher human 
capital formation, etc. While both policy choices and initial conditions 
were proper, the more fundamental and decisive factor was the latter, 
as stressed by Keun Lee.16 But ‘initial conditions’ should not be taken 
literally as something already given that cannot be replicated. The lesson 
for African countries is that there is no shortcut to development, but 
that it is achievable when the necessary effort is indeed made.
Western nations undertook a variety of mercantilist policies to 
increase national wealth and pursued aggressive industrial policies to 
develop and transform their industries; the latecomers to industriali-
zation followed this course in order to catch up with the forerunners. 
Ha-Choon Chang observes that the role of the state was central in the 
initial stages of the evolution of economics and in Western Europe 
the role of states increased with the emergence of nation states 
and the development of capitalism. During the golden era of capitalism, 
the rise of the state both in terms of economic theory and practice was 
dramatic.17
The states were not only preoccupied with exercising sovereignty 
for the defence and maintenance of order, but also actively promoted 
economic transformation. European countries have incessantly pushed 
forth, tested and refined the state’s functions or roles in order to meet 
domestic and international needs or challenges. The welfare state, which 
is seen as a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare and capital-
ism, is another example of the state playing an active role in the social 
and economic wellbeing of its citizens.18 Originating in Europe, the 
welfare state has spread to different regions, taking different forms as it 
has done so. Others have retained significant government roles, as can 
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be seen in the strong regulatory role played by the US government. 
Western nations, which started economic development in the primary 
industry, are still materially involved in protecting and promoting the 
agricultural and other sectors.
Today, developing and developed nations alike need to have a strong 
and well-functioning government to handle various economic and 
social tasks, in addition to security challenges that take many different 
forms. The role or intervention of active government to promote eco-
nomic growth in itself should not be regarded as simply being pro-
tectionist or anti-free market. Despite all the clamour of neo-classical 
liberalism and neo-liberalism in the theoretical or academic realm, in 
practice, how many countries would indeed fit the description of 
‘laissez-faire capitalism’ or a ‘night-watchman state?’ In reality, there is 
no such thing as a free market without the government’s involvement. 
Even in the most neo-liberal economies such as the US, the ‘invisible 
hand’ is a myth. Today, the role of government in developed countries 
remains robust and is even upscaled to meet the challenges of economic 
globalism.
So what are the lessons to be drawn for Sub-Saharan Africa? One 
of them could be that the so-called adverse international develop-
ment regime that many hold accountable for Africa’s continued eco-
nomic plight, such as structural adjustment policies, the Washington 
Consensus and neoliberalist policies, cannot be an excuse of giving 
up the strong role of government. Since independence, Sub-Saharan 
African countries have had every opportunity to build a consolidated 
and effective state to push for economic development with the backing 
of the international community.
Back in the 1950s and 1960s, the centrality of the role of the state 
and the need for market regulation was widely accepted, and there 
was a general perception that economic development called for indus-
trialization, following the path of many Western economies.19 At the 
time, Gerschenkron, who analysed the cases of France, Germany and 
Russia, which wanted to emulate Great Britain, suggested that a back-
ward economy might take a considerably different form of development 
from the advanced economies and that ‘there could even be advantages 
for late industrializers because they might be able to leapfrog into more 
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technologically advanced sectors, by learning from and imitating the 
pioneers’.20 He later argued that ‘the greater the degree of backward-
ness, the more intervention is required in the market economy to chan-
nel capital and entrepreneurship to nascent industries’.21 Hence, in this 
period, the goal of development was growth and the agent of develop-
ment was the state.
Despite an optimistic worldview on the part of ‘modernization’ and 
‘big push’ theorists, and the developmentalist zeal of first-generation 
African leaders, the disappointing performance of African countries in 
this regard brought about a great shift in development thinking around 
the late 1970s and early 1980s influenced by neo-liberal thought, which 
was well reflected in the World Bank’s report Accelerated Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, commonly known as the Berg Report.22 The 
report attributed the failures of Africa’s development to all the negativ-
ities of African governments’ problematic intervention, missteps and 
mismanagement.23
The essence of the problem was not the strength of government or 
governmental intervention per se, but rather the failure of states to 
assume their roles as developmental states. In the meantime, countries 
in East Asia, namely the NICs, were making strides in terms of eco-
nomic growth and development. Without addressing the fundamental 
problem of underperforming or dysfunctional government, the pendu-
lum shifts in policy adoptions are not likely to bring about the desired 
outcomes.
Liberalization and privatization have become popular catchwords and 
norms for Sub-Saharan Africa’s leaders, policy-makers and business sec-
tors. But many have also cast doubts, in hindsight, on the appropriate-
ness of this policy orientation, especially with regard to the manner in 
which they were implemented, in the absence of sound governance and 
oversight of the state. The United Arab Emirates case of Dubai provides 
a good example of a successful marriage of proactive economic liberali-
zation and highly disciplined and effective government oversight.
Fortunately for the United Arab Emirates, it has the riches, the oil, 
but many other resource-rich countries have not capitalized on their 
resources. Generally, the hallmark of the strong role of the state in 
developing countries should be industrial policy. Developing countries, 
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as latecomers to industrialization, should be able to drive economic 
development forward with a sufficient level of ability and authority. 
The more a country lags behind others, the more it will need to exert 
itself through an industrial push to catch up with the others, instead of 
leaving everything up to the markets. The word ‘transformation’, which 
has become fashionable in the region, implies making real change and 
breaking the status quo, which is contrary to the general inclination of 
African states. It is an irony that people want change and yet they them-
selves are not willing to change.
Regarding the Korean model of latecomer development, Keun Lee 
argues that Korea’s sustained economic growth is due to the capacity of 
the people and enterprises rather than the role of government, depart-
ing from the conventional debates on the state-market dichotomy. 
According to Lee, the real lesson to be learned from Korea is not the 
role of government, but the fact that it was able to build up the capa-
bilities of people and companies, thus inducing sustained growth for 
decades.24 He makes a powerful statement that neo-classical econom-
ics focuses on macroeconomic stability and trade liberalization, but 
these are hardly connected to capacity-building, and such ‘bias in eco-
nomics dates back to the intrinsic limitations of neoclassical econom-
ics when the word “capabilities” (and by implication, “learning”) did 
not exist’.25 The classical theory advocates effective allocation or ‘opti-
mization’ of resources, with an implicit assumption that the necessary 
resources are already available. But for developing countries, optimiza-
tion of resources cannot be their preoccupation because they lack such 
resources as capacity to begin with, and so the more pressing and critical 
task for them is how to build such capabilities.26
Sung-Hee Jwa proposes that economics must take governments and 
business firms into account alongside market mechanism because gov-
ernments and corporations also drive the economy. Hence, he calls 
markets, governments and corporations the ‘holy trinity’ or the three 
key entities of economic development. He claims that markets are old 
as human civilization and are not a new feature of the capitalist world. 
As the case of South Korea shows, what also matters is the role of the 
government and firms in addition to market mechanism. Korea in the 
1960s and 1970s, during the tenure of President PARK Chung-Hee, 
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successfully combined these three components to achieve the ‘miracle 
on the Han River’, according to Jwa (2015, 2017). Its secret was sin-
sangpilbhur, a Korean axiom meaning ‘reward good deeds and punish 
wrongdoings’, which he termed ‘economic discrimination (ED)’. He 
argues that the sustained economic growth of Korea during the tenure 
of President Park was possible because economic policy-making and 
implementation was insulated from political influence; the strict appli-
cation of ‘economic logic’—efficiency, incentives and competitiveness—
while disallowing political influences and considerations for welfare was 
the key to success.27
The examples of South Korea and other East Asian countries demon-
strate that governments and firms can be formidable ‘pro-capitalist’, 
‘pro-market’ agents or forces complementing and reinforcing market 
mechanism. In this respect, Jwa’s theorizing work on the ‘extended mar-
ket mechanism’ that brings government and firms into the equation is a 
valuable contribution to economics. In developing countries in particu-
lar, market distortions and failures often occur not necessarily due to 
too much government intervention, but more often due to weak insti-
tutions and a weak role played by the government; this is all the more 
true in view of their imperfect economic environment.
When the functioning of government is meagre, not only will gov-
ernment projects fail, but the general public will suffer the most. Since 
poor public service delivery reflects a lack of discipline amongst and 
responsibility of civil servants, this will have a negative effect on the 
society as a whole. In many countries in the region, the spirit of ‘serving 
the people’, whether it concerns public service by government workers 
or customer service by the private sector, is markedly weak. The per-
ennial poor delivery of service lowers people’s expectation of service 
and they take this to be the norm. This translates into less pressure on 
those on the government payroll to do their job. Hence, the vicious 
cycle of poor service and performance, wastage of public resources, mar-
ginalization or disempowerment of the public, and weak accountabil-
ity in the public sector continues. Furthermore, officials are engaged 
in widespread corruption, aggravating the problem in the public sec-
tor. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Index on Governance 
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released in October 2016, the level of red tape and corruption in gov-
ernments in Africa has increased over the last ten years.
Agricultural-rural development in the wider context of industrial pol-
icy deserves the special attention of African leaders because this should 
be the bedrock of industrialization and economic transformation for 
any developing country. There is clearly a renewed advocacy for agricul-
tural development in the community of African elites, Africanists and 
international development organizations.
David Henley sheds light on Asian states’ pro-poor agriculture-rural 
development policies, which African countries have not been able to 
successfully adopt and implement. He views that the divergence in per-
formance between Africa and Asia boils down to the ways of combin-
ing rapid economic growth with mass poverty reduction, and the fact 
that African leaders have never shown a serious intention to pursue such 
pro-poor development: ‘Their development models, implicitly or explic-
itly, have focused not pragmatically on mass outreach and rapid impact 
in the battle against poverty, but on ideas of technological and cultural 
modernity based on conditions in already rich countries’.28
Joe Studwell outlines the crucial roles that governments of Asia 
played in economic development: (1) the restructuring of agriculture as 
a highly labour-intensive household farming to maximize output along-
side land ownership reform that provided land for small farmers; (2) 
using the proceeds from surpluses in agriculture to build an export-ori-
ented manufacturing sector; and (3) intervening in the financial sector 
to direct capital towards the small farming and export-oriented manu-
facturing sector.29
Let us revisit the classical economic growth theory of Walt Rostow. 
This is a theory of modernization development postulating that 
developing countries go through the following five stages: (1) tradi-
tional society; (2) establishing conditions for take-off (underdevel-
oped economy); (3) economic take-off (developing economy); (4) 
drive to maturity (developed economy); and (5) high mass consump-
tion (post-industrial economy). The first stage, traditional society, is 
associated with the country having the majority of its people engaged 
in subsistence agriculture. The second stage is entails change in order 
to build up the conditions for growth and take-off. It is characterized 
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by the massive development of raw materials, increase in capital use in 
agriculture, and the mobilization of funding and investments. There is 
also a shift from an agrarian to an industrial or manufacturing society, 
and trade and other commercial activities are broadened. In the third, 
take-off stage, urbanization increases, new industries expand rapidly and 
a technological breakthrough occurs. This is characterized by dynamic 
economic growth and the reinvestment of increasing profits in new 
industrial plants. The fourth, drive to maturity stage features the diver-
sification of the industrial base, the expansion of multiple industries, 
the shifting of manufacturing from investment-driven capital goods to 
consumer durables and domestic consumption, and the rapid and large-
scale development of social infrastructure. The fifth stage is about high 
mass consumption, with the industrial base dominating the economy 
and with widespread consumption of high-value consumer goods.30
An important point to make here is that economic development 
started from the agricultural-rural sector. For non-Western countries, 
the development path need not follow such an order, but this is not the 
central issue. What should be recalled is that not only the East Asian 
economies but also the Western economies that have industrialized 
much earlier have taken the course of achieving economic transforma-
tion on the basis of successful agriculture-rural development.
In Common Wealth, Jeffrey Sachs lays out his version of the economic 
development stages of poor countries rising to the status of wealthy 
economies in which agricultural development plays a key role: (1) sub-
sistence economy; (2) commercial economy (large boost in agricultural 
productivity); (3) emerging market economy (expansion of infrastruc-
ture); and (4) technology-based economy. And he observes that ‘once 
the economy gets an initial surge in food productivity (stage 2), it 
begins to grow and prosper on its own. This is because the initial surge 
in wealth allows private citizens and the government to make invest-
ments in health, education and infrastructure’.31
All in all, we can argue that what is fundamentally lacking in Africa 
that East Asian countries and much earlier Western economies were able 
do during the early phase of their development are: (1) the construction 
and operation of strong government functioning mechanisms; and (2) 
an effective policy drive for rural-agricultural development.
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So why haven’t most of the countries in the Sub-Saharan African 
region been able to take advantage of these historical facts and lessons? 
The models of development did not emerge out of a vacuum; they are 
the outcome of decades or even centuries of efforts. It is up to devel-
oping nations to figure out what best suits their situation, given all the 
facts and experiences. What is obvious is that true economic transfor-
mation takes objective, consistent and broad-scoped thinking, planning 
and, most of all, action.
After popular optimism of the ‘Africa rising’, indications of the flaws 
in the economic state of Sub-Saharan Africa continue to show them-
selves. For example, the deterioration of the economic situation in 
Zambia has threatened to send the copper-rich country that was hailed 
as a middle-income nation to a point of near-collapse. For decades, 
Zambia reaping heavily from its sole mineral export, copper, which 
accounted for nearly 70% of the country’s export earnings, and was 
the second-biggest copper producer in Africa behind the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. But today, Zambia provides a lesson on the perils 
of overdependence on a single commodity and a handful of multi- 
national mining companies. Declining copper prices and a severe elec-
tricity shortage were the biggest reasons for its fall from grace. Zambia’s 
economic growth rate, which had averaged seven per cent annually 
for the previous five years, fell to an estimated 3.4% in 2015, leading 
to speculation that it might have to turn to the IMF for assistance.32 
Fortunately, however, for Zambia and other resource-rich African coun-
tries, commodity prices are on the road to recovery in 2018.
Nigeria is just one of many countries that have suffered in recent 
years from over-reliance on oil production without having proper gov-
ernance in place. As of early 2017, as the largest oil-producing nation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, where oil income accounted for 35% of its GDP 
and 75% of government revenue, Nigeria was facing a serious short-
age of electricity even in Lagos, following a 35% fall in the value of its 
currency over the previous year amid rampant corruption, which saw 
billions of dollars of oil revenue disappearing into thin air. Nigeria has 
been the biggest tomato-producing country in Africa, but was import-
ing tomato pastes from abroad because it did not have sufficient manu-
facturing facilities to make the product domestically.33
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Rick Rowden noted that: ‘Africans were told to simply privatize, lib-
eralize, deregulate, and get the so-called economic fundamentals right. 
The free market would take care of the rest. But this advice neglects the 
actual history of how rich countries themselves have effectively used 
industrial policies for 400 years, beginning with the U.K. and Europe 
and ending with the ‘four tigers’ … This inconvenient history contra-
dicted free market maxims and so has been largely stripped from the eco-
nomics curriculum in most universities’.34 It is up to African countries to 
decide how they want to develop but they should be at least cognizant of 
historical facts and lessons to be able to make the right decisions.
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Positive Signs and Reasons for Hope
The challenges and tasks facing African countries may seem daunting, 
but this does not warrant an overtly pessimistic judgement, as there are 
in fact positive aspects in the countries that when properly recognized 
and utilized can be instrumental in the development of the region. 
Africa’s problems, which have been cited by so many, are exhaustive, but 
I have reason to be optimistic and believe that Africa can indeed suc-
ceed in transforming itself. Here I would like to explain why.
I can think of at least seven reasons to be positive. First of all, the 
root cause of underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa is essentially 
a matter of ‘intent’ rather than being structural or environmental in 
nature. Second, there is a prevalence of openness and pragmatism in 
the region. Third, Africa’s political, economic and social structures are 
not ‘fixed’, but dynamic. Fourth, there is great potential for develop-
ment because of the ‘cushions’ they have: an abundance of land, includ-
ing vast fertile soils, untapped natural resources and a growing young 
population that can be turned into ‘assets’. Fifth, there have been so 
much disappointments and shortcomings that now the time is ripe 
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for accepting the inevitability of ‘change’ and doing things differently 
on the part of Africans and the international development community 
alike. Sixth, an increasing number of Africans are beginning to under-
stand that not only the world but also their sub-regions are becoming 
ever more competitive and that they need to develop competitiveness in 
order to survive and prosper. Seventh, there are a number of very posi-
tive traditions or customs conducive to development in Africa that have 
been overlooked, forgotten or underestimated, but which should be 
duly recognized or brought back into play.
Regarding the first question of intent, changing the mindset of the 
people is by no means easy and some say that it can be the most dif-
ficult thing to do. But when mindset change actually does occur, even 
partially and incrementally, it can unleash a powerful force that brings 
about changes beyond people’s imagination. Mindset change is impor-
tant not only for development but also for dealing with social problems 
like violence, killings and abuses that plague the people, because such 
problems cannot be resolved through law enforcement alone. If the 
mindset change of the individuals takes place collectively, its impact will 
be huge and can bring about a sea change. As much as there are aspira-
tions for growth and prosperity in the region, there has to be an equal 
level of seriousness for mindset change.
I do not see Africa’s development problem as a fundamentally struc-
tural one that cannot be overcome despite human efforts to do so. 
Africans are not subjected to perennial wars, natural disasters and dis-
eases on a grand scale, although it tends to be big news when these do 
occur. Africa is a huge continent and except for some limited trouble-
spots and isolated cases, the vast region is mostly calm, peaceful and 
stable. There is nothing that coercively suppresses the people from 
developing. Wars are man-made and epidemics are, strictly speaking, 
also man-made. To treat Africa differently from the rest of the world by 
depicting it as always being in a more adverse state than other regions is 
simply wrong. I have met so many locals who were very proud of their 
heritage, and some even suggested that Africa lags behind other regions 
because it is blessed with an overabundance of so many things.
What is also striking is that there is a genuine passion for education 
and learning among the populace. In every circumstance, education is 
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the key and it will make all the difference. But apart from regular aca-
demic teaching, subjects on socialization or ‘national ethics’ should be 
newly introduced and pragmatic, vocational skills training must be 
expanded. In the end, Africans have to, and eventually will, come to 
terms with this critical matter of ‘intent’ because this is unavoidable, if 
not quintessential.
The second reason is closely related to the first one. I personally 
think that the most attractive and promising feature of the people in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is that they are predominantly open-minded and 
pragmatic, and not ideological, self-closing or dogmatic. In fact, I find 
virtually everyone—elites, intellectuals and the general populace—in 
the Sub-Saharan African region to be very receptive and friendly. Nearly 
all African countries are seen to pursue pro-development, pro-liberal 
market economy policies and want to very much enhance business in 
collaboration with foreign firms and partners. Religious extremists and 
terrorist organizations are mainly confined to Somalia and northern 
Nigeria. What is interesting, however, is that South Africa, which is eco-
nomically the most advanced country in Sub-Saharan Africa, is perhaps 
the most ideologically charged nation in the region, mostly due to the 
legacy of apartheid.
Third, Africa’s political, economic and social structures are not ‘fixed’, 
but are dynamic and still in the making. I think that many will agree 
that this is true, which is why I am rather optimistic about the future 
of Africa. I have a sense that in due course, Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries—and if not all of them, then at least an increasing number of 
them—will experience an ‘awakening’ with respect to their reality and 
will take charge of their destiny.
Fourth, Sub-Saharan Africa is promising in terms of its sheer size of 
the ‘untouched’ fertile land mass. It is also abundant in untapped natu-
ral resources and boasts a growing young population, which should be 
regarded as a potential asset rather than an economic and social bur-
den. Some point out that the demographic dividend could be a huge 
advantage for Africa: ‘You don’t need to stay long in any African city to 
feel the entrepreneurial energy on the streets. For those of us who grew 
up on the continent, it is very much a fact of life. But for those visit-
ing, perhaps for the first time, it can seem overwhelming. There is no 
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single reason, of course, for this bustle and energy. But a big part of it 
comes from the fact that Africa has the youngest population of any con-
tinent.’1 It is a matter of how people perceive things and what choice of 
actions they take.
These are all valuable ‘cushions’ that Africa can take advantage of in 
the future exigencies of this world. Ironically, the uncertainties of the 
world like global climate change, shortage of foodstuffs, the impact of 
ageing society in industrialized countries, etc. may make Sub-Saharan 
Africa increasingly attractive. There is also a special ‘affection’ and eager-
ness on the part of international community to recognize its positive 
developments.
The fifth point I want to make is that now many people appear to 
be craving something new and different that can work. People are liter-
ally fed up with the rampancy of corruption, mismanagement, breach 
of laws, and irresponsible and immoral acts that mar the basic func-
tioning of society and the state. In this respect, we should acknowledge 
that there is an apparent variance on this point across the African con-
tinent: at one end of spectrum, some countries are viewed in a positive 
light, giving rise to optimism, while at the other end, certain countries 
are suffering from prolonged crises involving unending internal conflict, 
destabilization and human suffering. Even within a country, the situ-
ation may vary depending on the region, but hopefully good practices 
will prevail and spread.
The sixth argument is that even in Sub-Saharan Africa, ‘competi-
tion’ has set in as a stark reality. By now, state leaders, elites and busi-
nessmen should know that economic performance or capacity is what 
matters. They are not only competing among themselves for foreign 
development assistance, but also—and more importantly—for trade, 
investment and tourism. Competitiveness is becoming a key word 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and there will be countries ‘running away’ and 
receiving increased recognition and opportunities, while others lag fur-
ther behind. The pursuit of equality and welfare is like a double-edged 
sword for development: it can hurt if it is too little or too much. But 
the principal driver of economic growth is competition and comparative 
advantage.
6 Reasons for Optimism and the Tasks at Hand     163
Lastly, Africans nations and donors alike should ‘rediscover’ the 
valuable ‘gems’ of Africa that have been underestimated. African peo-
ple greatly value recognition, like earning academic certificates and 
degrees, and winning citations and awards. The sense of pride that I see 
in ordinary African people for being honoured for their achievements 
is immense. Another positive element is the tradition of communi-
ty-based self-help work. In Uganda, this is called Bulungi Bwansi (for 
the good of the nation) and in Rwanda Umuganda (coming together 
for a common purpose), while in Burundi it is called Ibikorwa Rusangi. 
Many other countries, including Ethiopia, have similar traditions. In 
Uganda, the Bulungi Bwansi movement has weakened following the 
influx of foreign aid and the popularization of the ‘welfare’ policy of 
the government that exacerbated the dependency syndrome of the local 
populace. The situation is more or less the same in most other African 
countries.
It will not be difficult for devoted Africanists to soon recognize that 
‘Africa has rich, ancient traditions of what we call public work—self 
organized communal labours. These are crucial foundations for a demo-
cratic way of life that existed long before Europeans brought the term to 
the continent’.2 But many such traditional virtues have been neglected, 
discouraged or sabotaged with political intent by African rulers after 
independence. The unwholesome electoral democracy prevalent in the 
region is seen to have smothered the voluntarism that would have really 
empowered the people.
In any case, we should neither be naive and optimistic nor overly pes-
simistic and cynical. Only being truthful and candid about the prob-
lems will be of help. As the saying goes, ‘truth will set you free’.
The Task of the Donor Community
What are the things that donors should do to improve the situation 
and the efficiency of aid? Compared to what African countries need 
to do, which are basically fundamental things, the tasks facing donors 
are more technical in nature, including features like coordination, 
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know-how transfer, supervision, etc. But the reality obliges donors to 
not only carry out such technical tasks but also to constantly ‘press’ 
others, the aid-recipients, to do their necessary part as well. From the 
donor community’s perspective, aids provided to African countries 
since their independence were not having desired outcomes and African 
countries needed to assume greater responsibility as aid recipients. The 
end of the Cold War brought about fundamental changes in inter-
national political dynamics and this lead to a basic change in donors’ 
stance as well:
The 1990s was an era of the re-examination of aid’s effectiveness and 
imposition of ‘conditionality’ with increased donor fatigue and call 
for good governance to root out corruption. Emphasis was also placed 
on reducing aid dependence as well as liberalization and privatization, 
while there was a resurgence of the poverty alleviation objective.3
As for the development doctrine in the 2000s, the development 
community ran out of ‘big ideas’. Following the turn of the century, 
it seems that no one was confident to lay out a clear prescription in 
terms of theory and policy. Instead, the international community came 
up with action-oriented plans like the Millenium Development Goals 
(MDG), and the problem of aid fragmentation was seriously consid-
ered. Since the new millennium, while the Washington Consensus has 
been ‘muted’, there have been bits of everything without a clear aid 
policy-orientation.
Development paradigms before the MDGs lacked formal inter-
national agreement, but the MDGs emerged as the first ever of their 
kind in terms of their formality (although the agreement was incom-
plete) and specific action goals. The MDGs were mainly the out-
come of the work by a small group within the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
Millennium Declaration, which lacked the formal approval of the UN 
General Assembly. Hence, developing countries tended to view MDGs 
as part of the developed countries’ agenda, but the SDGs were an out-
come of much more broader deliberations and were formally adopted at 
the UN summit. Therefore, it can boast greater legitimacy in that both 
developed and developing countries can claim its ownership.4
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Good governance is also rightfully stressed, as political stability and 
sound institutions are vital to sustainable growth. The need for indus-
trialization and building infrastructure, and private sector participation 
in the funding for development, among other factors, are also under-
scored. On the other hand, the fact that SDGs have a very broad scope 
in terms of issue areas and items, and that these goals are designed to 
be taken up on a voluntary basis by the states will likely prompt both 
developing countries and developed countries to act in a discretionary 
and selective manner suited to their national interests.5
So, what should the task be for the donor community? First, the 
international community should take a long hard look at the real-
ity and limitations of existing approaches, and realize the need to be 
more open-minded and creative about making improvements. Second, 
the donor community as a whole must forge closer collaboration, and 
where it is appropriate and possible to do so, should try to be less com-
petitive and be more complementary.
We have seen the evolution of the aid doctrine since the 1950s. At 
the multilateral level, the aid doctrine and policies have been driven by 
developed countries through their organizations, namely the OECD 
DAC, along with the World Bank and IMF. While international organ-
izations ensure the consistency, predictability and stability of interna-
tional aid policies, as well as providing specialized or tailored assistance 
for a whole range of needs, bilateral donors are the major funders of 
international organizations and at the same time are their collaborative 
clients or partners on the ground.
Looking back, the MDGs were touted by the UN as ‘the most suc-
cessful anti-poverty movement in history’.6 But it would be fair to say 
that the MDGs had limited success in terms of the overall development 
of Africa, as the goals were focused on poverty reduction and assistance 
for ‘basic needs’. The lessons learnt are already incorporated to a certain 
extent in the action plans of the SDGs, and as this is the general frame-
work of development at the global level, the UN is doing its fair share 
to spearhead this. But the UN cannot be guarantors of Africa’s transfor-
mation, and it is only at the national level of African countries that the 
successful implementation of the SDGs can be achieved.
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While the donor community has inherent limitations, it also provides 
a meaningful support that we can call ‘limited external governance’. 
To understand the value of this ‘limited external governance’, one only 
needs to think what would have happened if foreign aid personnel—
officials, experts, workers and volunteers—were suddenly withdrawn 
or aid programmes were stopped. Hence, the basic challenge regard-
ing aid is twofold: how to overcome dependency syndrome and how 
to improve the overall governance. And I think the theme of enhanc-
ing aid effectiveness captures both. But things have to change and can 
change for the better. One way to do this is by avoiding the ‘Samaritan’s 
dilemma’.7
Aid can end up just as one-time transfers of wealth or can be ‘wealth 
creating’ if used properly. Therefore, the principle of ‘rewards and pun-
ishments’ should be applied and the tools of incentives and competition 
should be employed, along with consideration of the needs of African 
countries. Foreign aid should be value-adding and ‘giving credit where 
it is due’, ‘reward based on merit’ or ‘effective resource reallocation’ 
ought to be the catchphrases that donors should be honouring.
I have already mentioned that democracy and governance are basi-
cally an outcome of development rather than its precondition. Western 
countries were not democratized when they were industrializing, and 
the East Asian economies achieved rapid growth under authoritarian 
political regimes and imperfect governance. Of course, the better the 
governance, the better it will be for development. This is all the more 
true for Sub-Saharan African countries. Corruption, irregularities and 
political repression were also common in East Asian countries, nut 
Asian nations were much more development-oriented in terms of state 
leadership, policy focus and work ethics compared to African nations.
Countries that ranks high in terms of development in the region, 
such as Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Cape Verde, the Seychelles and 
South Africa, all boast high marks in governance and democracy. But 
needless to say, the ideal condition for developing countries will be to 
have both strong a work ethic and good governance. While it will be 
no easy feat to achieve both at the same time, if at least steady improve-
ments can be made in these, the countries will no doubt make great 
progress.
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The vast majority of official development assistance (ODA) is pro-
vided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) mem-
bers. The DAC is comprised of 29 countries, plus the EU, of which all 
except for two (Japan and South Korea) are Western countries. In 2016, 
the OECD DAC’s net ODA totalled USD 142.62 billion, which rep-
resents an 8.9% increase compared to 2015; the top five donors were 
the US (USD 335.9 billion), Germany (USD 246.7 billion), the UK 
(USD 180.1 billion), Japan (USD 103.7 billion) and France (USD 95.0 
billion); the DAC has provided USD 267.4 billion to Africa, of which 
88.9% has been directed at Sub-Saharan Africa.8
The official donors, which comprised 20 countries in 1960, has 
now become 48, including non-OECD DAC members that report to 
the OECD DAC. This excludes some countries like China, India, and 
Brazil that do not report to the DAC.9 In Africa, the non-OECD DAC, 
emerging donors such as China, India, Brazil, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates—the so-called seven emerg-
ing donors—have been active to varying degrees for many decades.10 
China, the outright biggest donor in this group, is estimated to have 
dispensed USD 7.1 billion in 2013, making it the sixth-largest donor in 
the world.11
So what does diversification of donors mean for Africa? We may start 
by comparing traditional donors with emerging donors. The OECD 
DAC is the mechanism that spearheads established donors’ develop-
ment agenda; it is the body of policy consultations and coordination 
and lays out principles and guidelines for its member states. Among 
them is the criterion for evaluating development assistance: relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.12 And the emphasis 
it places on aid recipients’ governance is clearly enunciated.13 The basic 
difference between the established donor community and the emerging 
donors can be summed up by the words ‘governance’ and ‘concessional-
ity’. According to Courtney Meyer, ‘the emerging donors have begun to 
establish a new status quo, one without policy strings attached and one 
which focuses on infrastructure, innovation, exports and health, rather 
than governance’.14
Among the emerging donors, China is the most important provider 
of aid to Africa that resembles ODA provided by the OECD DAC, 
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and according to one study, China’s share represented about 76% of the 
total commitments from the seven emerging donors for Africa over the 
period from 2003 to 2012.15 Hence, the role of China’s aid to Africa 
and its implications on the current aid architecture in Africa will be an 
interesting and noteworthy theme of Africa’s development. There is a 
need to view the relationship between traditional donors and emerging 
donors in terms of possible partnership, but basically the relationship 
is seen as being competitive. Yet, in reality, they can be complementary 
in nature, even enabling some kind of division of labour. But forging a 
meaningful and systemic collaboration between the two donor groups, 
while ideal, would be not so likely, at least in the near future, for the 
following reasons: (1) political and strategic calculations; (2) a technical 
logjam; and (3) inherent limitations in the capacity of recipient coun-
tries. However, some degree of de facto division of labour can emerge, 
given the basic differences in their fields of assistance.
From the traditional donors’ perspective, their aid ‘leverage’ towards 
African countries could be curtailed if countries like China, which pur-
sues a fundamentally different aid approach compared to the OECD 
DAC, provides African countries with an alternative to traditional 
donors’ aid. Some leaders even express publicly that the West’s support 
mostly goes into ‘consumptive’ areas that do not yield sustainable eco-
nomic benefits and want Western countries to invest more in infrastruc-
ture building like China. Many Sub-Saharan Africans admit that their 
leaders have been trying to play the West off against other non-Western 
players to elicit as much benefit from all these countries as possible.
How much commonality in substance will the BRICS countries find 
with one another and whether BRICS will prevail as a coherent and 
forceful body wielding influence on the global stage is still uncertain. 
This is true because China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa all 
derive their economic power and status from their links with the global 
economic system in which the Western world is dominant; furthermore, 
these countries’ interests and positions could diverge more than con-
verge when it comes to regional and international politics.
The 10th BRICS summit that was held in July 2018 in South Africa 
gathered many African heads of state as the host, South Africa, was pro-
moting BRICS-Africa business and investment. The summit was held 
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under the theme: ‘BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth 
and Shared Prosperity in the Fourth Industrial Revolution’. As expected, 
China’s investment charm offensive highlighted the event, along with 
the call for free trade and multilateralism by the participants. Many 
African leaders voiced their wish to collaborate with BRICS for employ-
ment opportunities for the youth, industrialization and infrastructure 
development.
The traditional donors, in principle, may want to espouse China and 
draw it closer to the OECD DAC framework. However, considering 
China’s strategic stance in Africa as well as its foreign policy orienta-
tions, I see little reason why China would want to adapt itself to the 
OECD DAC regime, which essentially reflects Western values. In this 
sense, everyone—traditional donors, China and other emerging donors, 
and Sub-Saharan African countries—would all want to maintain the 
status quo because the current dynamics in regional aid architecture 
serve their interests under the given circumstances.
The ‘technical logjam’ that I mentioned above relate to the difficulty 
of coordinating aid policy among donors. Given that aid coordination 
is difficult enough among the OECD DAC members, we can only 
imagine how challenging will it be to coordinate both the OECD DAC 
members and emerging donors. The third element, ‘inherent limitations 
in the capacity of recipient countries’, is another reason why concerted 
action or coordination between traditional donors and emerging donors 
will not easily occur. Donors do not simply give away aid and African 
countries do not simply take aid as it comes. Both sides have to work 
out arrangements and plans, and follow procedures. If the two groups 
were to engage in some sort of consultation or coordination mechanism 
with regard to aid plans for Africa, naturally, aid recipient African coun-
tries would have to be brought on board as well.
ODA is here to stay, despite all the criticisms it has attracted. 
Considering the trend and the demand of African countries, in all 
likelihood, the amount of global ODA will continue to increase for 
the foreseeable future, barring extraordinary circumstances like a dras-
tic downturn in the global economy. The proliferation of donors 
means that while it would be difficult to establish formal coordina-
tion mechanisms among donors, nonetheless, some kind of donor 
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‘inter-connectivity’ could emerge across the board, leading to a de facto 
‘division of labour’ among donors.
The growth of donors and inter-connectivity or inter-dependence 
among various donors or donor groups also needs to be considered. 
There is no denying that today’s engine for economic growth is global 
free trade and investment, and that the rise of emerging economies is 
attributable to them being closely integrated into the global economy. 
Different countries with different political regimes may have different 
ways of running their economies, but the universal ticket to national 
pre-eminence depends on wealth creation and this can only come by 
actively engaging in global economic transactions.
In this regard, China draws our attention in light of its perceived 
growing influence and assertiveness on the global stage and especially 
its aggressiveness in advancing into African markets. Is China a rival, 
a potential threat to the existing development norm and order or 
can it be a benign force, a constructive partner of traditional donors? 
Economically, China’s growth has been possible by taking advantage 
of the global market economy, and many countries have also bene-
fited from China’s economic power. The trend seems to be that China 
is economically increasingly linked to the world. When I visited the 
Brookings Institute in July 2009, I found an interesting book entitled 
Power and Responsibility in its bookstore. This book advocated resur-
recting US global leadership by building partnerships and institutions 
for cooperation with traditional and emerging powers, mindful, as the 
authors pointed out, that rising powers such as China ‘recognize that 
their economic growth relies on a strong and resilient international and 
finance system’.16
With respect to China’s economic rise, the principal architects of US 
foreign policy at that time seemed to have concluded that there was no 
cause for concern as long as China was integrated into the prevailing 
international regimes. Their logic was that the US might no longer be 
the hegemonic superpower it once was, but that it has sufficient power 
to lead the world through smart multilateralism. This seems to be the 
correct perspective. Joseph Nye asserts in his book Is the American 
Century Over? that the US will remain the strongest power in the world, 
with no visible sign that its status will be altered in the foreseeable 
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future. He recognizes that China poses the biggest challenge to the US, 
but China still lags considerably behind it in the three aspects of power: 
military, economic and soft power.17
On the third point that there should be a division of labour among 
donors, we should see this from the standpoint of international collabo-
ration and coordination, being mindful of the difference in the ‘lifetime 
experiences’ of donors. To a certain extent, this is already happening in 
a natural way, as donors would have certain areas of expertise that they 
would wish to impart to developing countries.
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Understanding Korean Development 
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177
Historical Background, Liberation and State 
Building
There is an advantage in studying the Korean case of development 
because it provides a clear-cut picture of economic transition due to 
its ‘compressed’ story or timeframe of dynamic economic development 
spanning only 50 years. There are different ways to describe and ana-
lyse its phases of development. First, it can be divided into decades: (1) 
the 1950s: post-war reconstruction; (2) the 1960s: laying the ground-
work for a self-supporting economy; (3) the 1970s: upgrading indus-
trial structure and rural development; (4) the 1980s: transition to 
an open and liberal economy; (5) the 1990s: globalization and struc-
tural adjustment.1 Or we can divide the period into: (1) liberation and 
state-building (1948–1959); (2) export promotion and industrialization 
(1960–1979); (3) stabilization and liberalization (1980–1997); and (4) 
economic crisis to the present day (1997–).2 Another way of defining 
the phases can be as follows: (1) state-building; (2) economic take-off; 
(3) policy adjustments and liberalization; and (4) new challenges and 
policy responses.3
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At this juncture, it would be useful to briefly sketch Korea’s historical 
heritage. One thing that stands out on the global map is that Korea is 
a nation in the Far East surrounded by neighbours much bigger than 
itself. Moreover, it is the divided nation and there is a psyche among 
Koreans and outsiders that Korea is a small country. But when the area 
of the Korean Peninsula, South and North Korea combined, which is 
about 220,000 square kilometres, into account, it is not actually under-
sized as it approximates the size of the UK or Italy. In terms of popu-
lation, South Korea’s population is over 50 million and North Korea has 
over 24 million, making a total of 74 million, which is larger than that 
of UK, France or Italy and a little less than Germany, which stands at 
81 million.
Historically, Korean society is a composition of varied peoples who 
gradually forged together culturally and ethnically as a homogeneous 
nation. Scholars point out that the core cultural traditions of Korea are 
shamanism and Confucianism: its shamanism was able to survive into 
modern times and has influenced the Korean way of life in general and 
its ‘sub-consciousness’, while Confucianism (or Neo-Confucianism to 
be more precise) has heavily influenced the social consciousness and 
cultural orientations of the majority of Koreans for many centuries.4 
Kyong Ju Kim points out that: ‘In Korean Shamanism, the notion of 
absolute truth and goodness is denied. Everything is placed on a con-
tinuum … and everything can change depending on the vicissitudes of 
society and nature.’5
Korea has only been divided since 1945, when it was effectively par-
titioned by the US and the Soviet Union following the end of Japanese 
colonial rule. Before this division, Korea was one of the oldest continu-
ously unified states in the world. The Korean Peninsula became unified 
in 676 and remained so until the mid-20th century. And  today, it is 
considered as one of the most homogeneous nation on earth. Korean 
people merged into a single ethnicity sharing one language. It was their 
language in particular that bound them together and distinguished 
them from their neighbours.
There were times when China seemed to wield considerable influence 
over Korea, and Korea imported China’s ideas about government and 
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politics, as well as its culture, but Korea maintained its independence, 
cultural distinctiveness and national identity:
Koreans were fiercely independent. Much of their history has been the 
story of resistance to outside intruders. Korea’s position as a tributary 
state was usually ceremonial, and for Koreans it did not imply a loss of 
autonomy. Chinese attempts to interfere in domestic affairs were met 
with opposition. Indeed, some today view the Korean past as a saga of 
the struggles of a smaller society to resist control or assimilation by larger, 
more aggressive neighbours.6
Another notable feature of Korea is the remarkable continuity of its 
history:
From seventh to the twentieth century only three dynasties ruled Korea. 
The second ruled for almost five centuries and the third for more than five 
centuries; both were among the longest-ruling dynasties in history. The two 
dynastic changes that did take place did not bring about a vast upheaval. 
Elite families as well as institutions were carried over from one dynasty to 
another. This, along with a Confucian concern for examining the past, con-
tributed to a strong sense of historical consciousness among Koreans.7
In the nineteenth century, Korea remained a ‘Hermit Kingdom’ 
adamantly opposed to Western demands for diplomatic and trade 
relations. Over time, a few Asian and European countries with imperial-
istic ambitions competed with each other for influence over the Korean 
Peninsula. Japan, after winning wars against China and Russia, forcibly 
annexed Korea and instituted colonial rule in 1910. The colonization 
process stimulated the patriotism of Koreans. Korean intellectuals were 
infuriated by Japan’s cultural assimilation policy, which even banned 
Korean-language education in schools. On 1 March 1919, a peaceful 
demonstration demanding independence spread nationwide. Although 
it failed, the 1 March independence movement created a strong bond of 
national identity and patriotism among Koreans, and led to the estab-
lishment of a provisional government in Shanghai, China, as well as an 
organized armed struggle against the Japanese colonialists in Manchuria.
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Koreans rejoiced at Japan’s defeat in the Second World War in 1945. 
However, their joy was short-lived as the liberation did not instantly 
bring about the independence for which the Koreans had fought so 
fiercely. Rather, it resulted in a country divided by ideological differ-
ences wrought by the emergence of the Cold War. Korean efforts to 
establish an independent government were delayed as the US forces 
occupied the southern half of the peninsula and Soviet troops took con-
trol of the northern half.
In November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 
calling for general elections in Korea under the supervision of a UN 
commission. But the Soviet Union refused to comply with the reso-
lution and denied the UN commission’s access to the northern half of 
Korea. The UN General Assembly then adopted another resolution call-
ing for elections in areas accessible to its commission. The first elections 
in Korea was carried out on 10 May 1948 south of the 38th parallel, 
and accordingly the new government was inaugurated on 15 August. 
Meanwhile, the communist regime was set up on 9 September with the 
support of the Soviet Union.
The American military government, which was in charge of South 
Korea between 1945 and 1948, tried to introduce a modern market 
economy system there. The sale of confiscated Japanese-owned prop-
erties during the US military rule was an important first step towards 
establishing a market economy based on private property ownership. 
Divesture continued under the newly established Korean government 
and sales reached the peak during the Korean War in the early 1950s. 
By 1958, as a result, most Japanese-owned properties were converted 
into privately owned assets. Such an achievement is deemed significant 
in light of the tendency towards socialism, even on the part of right-
wing politicians, at the time.8
It is said that the colonial government’s land surveys and registration 
conducted in the 1910s established the first modern system of  property 
rights in Korea, which significantly reduced land transaction costs. 
But measures to protect small farmers were not followed, leading to a 
wide disparity in land holdings. After independence, the Korean gov-
ernment tackled the increasing demand for agricultural land reform by 
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enacting the Farmland Reform Act in 1949 and revising it in 1950. The 
land reform was based on the principle of ‘compensated forfeiture and non-
free distribution’, whereby the government bought farmland from land-
lords at predetermined prices and sold it to farmers at below-market prices.
Agricultural land reform contributed not only to state-building, 
but also to redistributing wealth and reducing income inequalities. 
Everyone was now placed on a more or less equal footing, and individ-
ual effort and ability rather than family wealth became the most impor-
tant determinant for people’s success. Many believe that the Koreans’ 
typical diligence and their emphasis on education were motivated by 
this perception of equal opportunity. However, on the negative side, 
restrictions on farmland holdings hampered the growth of large-scale 
farming and contributed to the low productivity growth of the agricul-
tural sector in later years.9
Syngman Rhee, an intellectual educated in the US and former inde-
pendence fighter, was elected as the first President of the Republic of 
Korea in 1948. His foresight was instrumental in establishing a separate 
government in South Korea, laying the groundwork for a democracy 
and a market economy. He strived to rebuild the economy with a series 
of reconstruction plans aimed at expanding economic infrastructure, 
building key industries like cement and steel, and increasing the pro-
duction capability of manufacturing.
Rhee’s desire to construct a self-sufficient Korean economy with 
such plans was in direct conflict with the US government’s intention 
to rebuild an East Asian economic bloc with industrialized Japan at 
its centre. The US urged Korea to liberalize its market, stabilize the 
value of the Korean currency and expand cooperation with Japan. To 
Rhee, this implied nothing but the revival of the Greater East Asian 
Co-Prosperity Sphere and the re-colonization of the Korean economy. 
Rhee made full use of Korea’s geopolitical value to frustrate America’s 
efforts, while promoting import-substitution industries through 
reconstruction plans.10
The Korean government also differed with the Americans on the 
issue of what kind of foreign aid it would receive. The Korean govern-
ment preferred project assistance, while the US government wanted to 
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provide non-project assistance to private enterprises for civilian use. In 
the end, the preference of the US prevailed, with non-project assistance 
making up 73% of the total, while project assistance made up only 
27%. In any event, various reconstruction plans envisioned by Rhee’s 
administration failed to spark economic growth in Korea, as they were 
not substantively executed.11
On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched an unprovoked invasion 
into the South, triggering a three-year war that devastated the nation, 
with millions losing their lives. In the South, 42–44% of manufactur-
ing facilities and 40–60% of power-generating capacity were destroyed. 
Basic infrastructure like housing, schools, health centres, water and 
sewage, roads and communication facilities were utterly razed. The 
scale of total civilian damage reported was bigger (1.05 times) than 
Korea’s GNP of 1953.12
Hence, the economic policy objective was then to bring the nation 
back to life from the ashes of war, restoring and rebuilding basic infra-
structures, and stabilizing people’s livelihoods. In order to do this, massive 
funding was necessary, but the only thing Korea could do was to turn to 
foreign assistance. From 1945 to 1960, South Korea received a total of 
$2.94 billion in aid, of which the amount provided by the US accounted 
for over 80%.13 Although the government tried hard to build the neces-
sary structures for industrialization, there was an inherent limitation in 
that Korea’s economic performance in the 1950s was wholly dependent 
on foreign assistance, the vast majority of which came from the US
The US aid comprised projects, non-projects and technical assistance: 
projects were mainly for the restoration or expansion of social infra-
structure like power, communications, transportation, education and 
health facilities; non-projects mainly included the supply of necessities 
such as wheat, oil, fertilizer, raw rubber, spun rayon, medicine, etc.; 
technical assistance was minimal in terms of scale and involved training 
and consulting. The ratio of projects to non-projects was around 4 to 1 
on average.14
In the post-war reconstruction period, the government’s economic 
policy focused on rehabilitation following destruction, and its efforts to 
curb inflation was largely successful. The assistance provided by the US 
was crucial, but there were also friction between Korea and the US over 
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the usage of aid funds. While the Korean government wanted to use 
the resources to purchase more equipment and build factories, the US 
insisted on allocating them primarily for commodities and raw materials 
to increase the counterpart fund. Non-project aid (the commodities), 
were sold to civilians and the profits were turned into a counterpart 
fund that was in turn used for reconstruction projects.
Rhee was finally ousted from power in 1960 by student demon-
strations protesting against his protracted rule and election frauds as 
he was strengthening his authoritarian rule. The situation deteriorated 
when many demonstrators were shot by the police. Rhee announced 
he was stepping down and took refuge in Hawaii. Shortly afterwards, 
the Constitution was amended and the cabinet system and bicameral 
national assembly were adopted.
Under the new Constitution, the regime led by Prime Minister Jang 
Myeon was launched, but the political situation became extremely frag-
ile with political struggles and protests by students continuing una-
bated. In May 1961, a group of young army officers led by General Park 
Chung-Hee seized power in a military coup. In the presidential election 
that was held in October 1963, after two years of military rule, Park 
Chung-Hee, having retired from the military, was elected President and 
was inaugurated in December.
The Economic Take-off Period
The government led by President Park set up a five-year economic 
development plan under the slogan of ‘modernization of the father-
land’ and achieved rapid economic growth by implementing an export- 
oriented policy. Subsequently, a heavy and chemical industries (HCI) 
plan was boldly but successfully launched.
In the following decades, Korea achieved unparalleled economic 
growth. It was one of the poorest countries in the world in 1948 when 
the government was formed following independence from Japan. 
Korea is considered a unique case of an aid recipient having success-
fully turned into an advanced country in terms of full-scale economic 
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transformation and democratization in the latter half of the 20th cen-
tury. Korea’s rapid development has been dubbed ‘the Miracle on the 
Han River’. This began with the all-out efforts launched in the 1960s. 
The country vigorously pushed ahead with the development of national 
land, the construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway and subway lines, 
the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), and the creation of 
heavy and chemical industry.
After having become President, Park proclaimed that economic 
development would be the central feature of his administration. He 
and his policy team were well aware of the importance to reaping eco-
nomic success in order to legitimize their seizure of power by force. 
The new government set out to depart from the foreign aid-dependent 
economy and lay the groundwork for a self-sustaining economy so as 
to terminate the vicious cycle of poverty and to realize high economic 
growth. Although Korea at that time was a predominantly agricultural 
nation and food shortages were serious, the government focused on 
industrialization. In the early 1960s, over 40% of the Korean popula-
tion was suffering from absolute poverty and the government believed 
that the only way to offset this was by achieving high growth through 
industrialization.15
It seemed that the regime did not have a clear ideology or scheme 
on free market economy from the very outset, but somehow it managed 
to adopt active export promotion, which in effect turned out to be a 
critical factor for its resounding performance. Initially, export promo-
tion was pursued in response to the rapid depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves.16 Exports began to quickly increase following the devaluation 
of the currency in 1960 and, encouraged by the success, the government 
undertook more serious efforts to promote exports in 1964–1965. First, 
a new exchange rate regime was put in place in 1964, and various ad 
hoc export subsidies and the export-import link system were phased 
out, while a comprehensive and consistent export incentive mechanism 
was introduced. Key measures were export credits that were extended 
to exporters who turned in letters of credit, and tariff exemptions on 
imports of intermediate inputs. And these incentives were reinforced by 
administrative measures like ‘export targeting’, the holding of monthly 
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export promotion meetings, the establishment of the Korea Trade 
Association and the Korea Trade Promotion Agency, etc.17
Industrialization was the focus of the five-year economic plans that 
began in 1962. With the first five-year plan (1962–1967), the gov-
ernment laid out its ambition to modernize the industrial sector and 
enhance its international competitiveness by rapidly expanding the key 
areas (cement, fertilizer, industrial machinery, oil refineries, etc.).18 The 
government promoted exports, but maintained restrictions on imports 
to contain current account deficits and protect domestic industries. 
Tariff rates began to decline slowly in the early 1970s, but their levels 
remained high until the early 1980s.
In the early 1960s, the government increased its intervention in 
domestic financial markets to support the economic growth strategy. It 
took full command of commercial and special banks, while strength-
ening its grip on the central bank. The primary role of the monetary 
authorities during the government-led growth period was to supply 
‘growth money’ and price stabilization was treated as being a far lower 
priority. One of the key measures was the credit programme: by con-
trolling the financial sector, the authorities were able to provide vast 
amount of directed credit with low interest rates and share the invest-
ment risk with private enterprises.
In pursuing the five-year development plans, the most fundamental 
problem the Korean government confronted was the question of how to 
come up with the funding. To encourage domestic savings from which 
capital can be funnelled to development projects, interest rates were 
raised substantially in 1965 to match the demand and supply of capital. 
Accordingly, savings grew rapidly. In addition, the taxation system was 
reformed and strengthened in 1966, greatly increasing revenues. These 
encouraged an active pursuit of development projects and government 
expenditure was greatly enhanced.
But the major injection of the necessary funds had to come from 
abroad and there was a large increase in foreign borrowing during this 
period. While foreign capital inflow was encouraged to fill the gap in 
domestic savings, capital liberalization remained selective and par-
tial. What was of significance in terms of the accumulation of capital 
funds was the agreement reached between Korea and Japan in 1966 
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to normalize their diplomatic ties in return for Japan’s reparation pay-
ments of $500 million and commercial loans of $300 million. The pay-
ments were used to build the POSCO and make investments in various 
sectors.
The success of the first five-year plan encouraged the government 
to continue pushing ahead with its ambitious plans. The emphasis of 
the second five-year plan (1967–1971) was placed on HCIs, includ-
ing the steel, machinery and petrochemical industries. The Steel 
Industry Promotion Act was enacted in 1969 to support the construc-
tion of a large-scale integrated iron and steel mill and other kinds of 
mills by granting them tax exemptions. For other industries, simi-
lar laws were introduced to provide financial and tax incentives: the 
Machinery Industry Promotion Act (1967), the Shipbuilding Industry 
Promotion Act (1967), the Textile Industry Modernization Act (1967), 
the Petrochemical Industry Promotion Act (1970) and the Nonferrous 
Metal Producing Business Act (1971).
What the government considered as particularly important then and 
which later proved to be a strategic move was the construction of an 
integrated iron and steel mill and a petrochemical complex. The Pohang 
Iron and Steel Company (currently POSCO) and Ulsan petrochemi-
cal complex, which were built in the early 1970s, had to rely almost 
entirely on foreign technology and capital, and they faced a multitude 
of difficulties at the outset.19 Meanwhile, a Korean oil refinery had 
already been built as early as 1964.
In hindsight, Korea undertook a very bold and seemingly inconceiva-
ble number of projects of such magnitude despite of its ‘capacity’, but it 
successfully undertook what other developing nations were not able to 
do, which is the ‘synchronization’ of all fronts of industrialization. And 
this was done despite doubt, disapproval and reluctance on the part of 
donors. But scepticism turned into praise as Korea continued to deliver 
results that far exceeded the international community’s as well as its own 
expectations.
Projects were also vigorously pursued to ease the shortage in the eco-
nomic infrastructure, like power and roads. What is remarkable is the 
fact that soon after electric power development projects were launched 
from 1962, the supply of electric power came to exceed demand by 
7 Korea’s Path of Development in Retrospect     187
the mid-1960s. Another major accomplishment to facilitate economic 
activity was the construction of roads, the most noticeable being the 
completion of major expressways: the Seoul-Incheon, Seoul-Busan and 
Honam Expressways were opened in 1968, 1970 and 1973, respectively.
The economic achievement in the 1960s was a resounding success 
in view of the situation in which Korea found itself. Despite various 
challenges, Korea was able to fulfil the first and second five-year devel-
opment plans with a level of performance exceeding targets and expec-
tations. The GDP growth registered 8.5% and manufacturing sector 
growth 17.0% on average during the 1960s; per-capita income jumped 
from USD 82 in 1961 to USD 253 in 1970, a threefold increase. 
Unemployment rate fell from 8.1% in 1963 to 4.4% in 1970. The 
driving force behind rapid industrialization was strong exports. During 
1962–1971, exports increased annually by 38.6% on average. And the 
timing was just right, with the favourable international trade environ-
ment in the 1960s.20
Korea made good use of labour, which it had in abundance, and also 
financial capital, which was scarce and had to be borrowed from over-
seas. The light industries of labour-intensive manufacturing such as 
wig-making, clothing and footwear absorbed the surplus labour force 
discharged from rural areas. As these industries launched their produc-
tion in industrial complexes near urban areas, they also contributed to 
the growth of large cities and the urbanization of the population.
The success in building up a manufacturing industry in Korea was 
due to a number of factors, including the entrepreneurial skills of early 
generations of pioneering businessmen who started as small traders, and 
the unlimited supply of labour from the agricultural sector that gener-
ated explosive growth in the light industry sector. Wage levels in Korea 
were one of the lowest in the world, and the workers were relatively 
well-educated and diligent, making labour-intensive industries of Korea 
competitive.21
Rather than restraining its ambitions, the government launched a 
full-scale drive towards HCIs in 1973. Six strategic industries—steel, 
nonferrous metal, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, and chemical 
engineering—were selected under the HCI initiative.22 The committee 
to drive forward HCIs was created and the targets were set to achieve 
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per-capita income of USD 1000 and annual exports of USD 10 billion. 
The reasons for adopting HCI drive were twofold: national security and 
the need to upgrade industrialization to ensure exportation. First, con-
cerns about national security grew with North Korea’s increased mili-
tary provocations and US government’s announcement in 1968 that its 
ground troops would be gradually pulled out of Korea. Second, the gov-
ernment felt it was necessary to upgrade the industrial structure to com-
pete with newly industrializing countries over export markets.23
In the 1970s, compared to the 1960s, the level of wages, savings 
and exports all increased, along with the heightening of industrializa-
tion. As wage levels rose and competition from low-wage economies 
intensified, capital-intensive, high-productivity manufacturing assumed 
importance over labour-intensive, low-productivity manufacturing. 
The share of services increased continuously in terms of both value-ad-
dition and employment, while that of agriculture declined. Within 
manufacturing, HCIs increased their share at the expense of light indus-
tries. Meanwhile, the domestic saving ratio increased from an average 
of 15 in 1961–1970 to 23% in 1971–1980, while the investment ratio 
increased from 19 to 29% respectively in these periods.
The focus of industrial policy shifted from the export drive in the 
1960s to the building of HCIs in the 1970s. To successfully undertake 
an ambitious task of upscaling industrialization, the government inter-
vened more forcefully in the economy in the 1970s. The HCIs required 
not only enormous capital but also significant technological expertise. 
Very few, if any, Korean firms were able to take up such a task with-
out the proactive support of the government. The Vietnam War became 
another source of foreign currency income to support industrialization 
as Korea received US economic aid for its military participation in this 
war. The government’s bold intervention and active support led to the 
inflow of investment in HCIs. The growth of HCIs registered an aver-
age of 20.0% over the period from 1971 to 1979, driving the growth of 
the overall manufacturing sector, which stood at 18.2% over the same 
period.
In summary, what Korea was able to achieve in the 1960s and 1970s 
is unique and unmatched in the history of industrialization and devel-
opment. The growth was led by the manufacturing sector, the output 
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of which grew annually by 17% in the 1960s and 16% in the 1970s. 
Korea was considered to be a high-risk country in the international cap-
ital market, so it experienced difficulties in terms of finding lenders. 
Furthermore, because its natural resources were not abundant, Korea 
only had human resources to rely on to build the economy: an abun-
dant labour force and the hard work of the people.
The role of the government was critical in accelerating the growth 
of manufacturing. During the first and the second five-year economic 
development plans that were undertaken in the 1960s, the government 
invested heavily in physical infrastructure to lay the foundations for 
export-driven industrialization. It established state-owned enterprises 
in key industries and mobilized other policy measures, involving for-
eign exchange, taxation, finance and customs regulations to promote 
exports.
The export structure underwent dramatic changes. In 1970, the 
primary industries amounted to 17%, the light industries 70% and 
the HCIs 13% of total exports. By 2008, these shares changed to 2, 6 
and 92% respectively. The share in the gross value addition of sectors 
also underwent huge changes (comparison between 1953–1960 and 
2001–2009): agriculture 41.9 → 3.4%; manufacturing and mining 
13.4 → 27.3% (it reached 30.0% in 1987); public utilities construction 
3.7 → 9.6%; and services 41.1 → 59.6%.24
This pattern of structural change is similar to that experienced in 
other developed countries. It has been pointed out that the industrial 
structure of Korea in the early 1960s was comparable to that of the 
UK in 1700, the US before 1880 and Japan in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. In all these countries, during the process of industri-
alization, the manufacturing and service industries replaced the agricul-
tural sector in terms of their importance to the national economy. What 
sets Korea apart from these developed countries is the speed with which 
it achieved structural changes. Korea’s industrial structure in 1990 came 
close to that of the UK in 1890, the US in 1950 and Japan in 1970.25
Korea’s phenomenal economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, 
accompanied by economic and industrial structural changes, placed 
it on the path of transformation that other advanced countries had 
taken. Exports and industrialization are not the only things that were 
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pursued actively by the government; vigorous campaigns were waged 
for rural development (Saemaul Undong) and the promotion and appli-
cation of agricultural technology (the Green Revolution and the White 
Revolution) that benefited and enhanced the productivity of this sector. 
All these measures contributed to the economic growth and modernity 
of the nation.
The pace and energy with which the massive mobilization of labour 
and capital, heavy investment in technology and the effective realloca-
tion of resources from less to more productive sectors were carried out 
made the difference. But what Korea was always conscious of and tar-
geting was foreign trade and markets. For Korea, foreign trade played 
a pivotal role by encouraging innovation and accelerating resource real-
location, learning from advanced countries and taking advantage of the 
rapidly expanding global market.
The Period of Policy Adjustments 
and Liberalization
The 1980s marked an important turning point in the economic devel-
opment strategy of Korea. The government’s deep intervention in allo-
cating resources in the 1960s and 1970s was the crystallization of a 
state-led economic development strategy. The impetus behind the five-
year economic development plans was the role played by the govern-
ment, with markets playing ‘supplementary’ roles. This was deemed 
inevitable in the early stages of development where the market mecha-
nism was imperfect.
However, as Korea’s economic scale grew and the role of the private 
sector increased, it became harder for the decision-making of bureau-
crats alone to manage the allocation of resources. Thus, entering into 
the 1980s, the thinking in the government was that the greater involve-
ment of the private sector and markets was necessary. Among other 
things, this was especially so in light of the side-effects of the HCI drive 
in the 1970s: misallocation of resources (excess and duplicate invest-
ments), inflation and income inequality.
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Tackling inflation had been a concern of the government as early as 
1978, but the new government formed in 1980 took up the task of sta-
bilizing the economy much more prominently.26 A radical departure 
from the past was made in the early 1980s, as the government empha-
sized price stability over economic growth. The ‘growth-first’ strategy 
gave way to ‘consolidating growth on the basis of stability’. Private ini-
tiatives were encouraged and liberalization of the market began. Greater 
attention was paid to social policies, and public spending on health, 
welfare and education was increased.
Of course, there were downsides to such an aggressive growth strat-
egy. Reconciling rapid growth, concentration of resources and efficiency 
on one the hand, and equality, stability and fairness on the other would 
not be an easy task in any case, and all the more so for a newly devel-
oping country with scant resources. Still, a factor that was in Korea’s 
favour was that the transitions were swift and progressive, in effect con-
siderably mitigating the overall ‘costs’ of fast-paced development.
The commonly cited problems faced by Korea during this period are 
as follows: financial repression since the 1960s that held back the finan-
cial sector from developing into a fully competitive service industry; 
large business conglomerates, namely the chaebols, increasing their influ-
ence on the back of government support; increasing economic disparity 
amid the phenomenon of concentration of economic wealth and power; 
and a failure to establish sound worker–management relations (until 
labour movements arose in the mid-1980s).
Corporations also wanted greater autonomy from economic insti-
tutions. The financial market became increasingly liberalized in the 
1980s and early 1990s, particularly as many chaebols that were the 
proprietors of non-bank financial institutions demanded deregulation. 
Deregulation began to emerge as an important priority in the late 1980s 
and continued to be addressed seriously in the 1990s.27
Meanwhile, import liberalization measures were announced in 1978, 
but progress proved sluggish owing to the second oil shock that picked 
up speed in 1984. In 1986, Korea registered a current account surplus 
for the first time and the surplus increased in the following years. In 
1989, the government began to reduce quantitative restrictions amid 
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intensifying trade conflict with the US. As Korea’s trade performance 
and economic status improved, in January 1990, it moved into a dif-
ferent category of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
provision and was no longer allowed to impose trade restrictions for 
balance-of-payment purposes. The average tariff rate dropped from 
34.4 to 9.8%, while import liberalization from quantitative restrictions 
increased from 60.7 to 92.0% between 1981 and 1995.28
Compared to trade liberalization, the opening of the capital market 
was markedly slow, as there was a major concern over the control of the 
domestic money supply and the real exchange rate movement. When 
the current account showed large deficits in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, restrictions were strengthened on capital outflows. But when the 
current account moved into a considerable surplus in the latter half of 
the 1980s, the government relaxed restrictions on outward FDI while 
tightening other regulations. The public sector halted borrowing from 
abroad and started to repay foreign debts. Then in 1990–1993, the gov-
ernment began liberalizing long-term capital inflows.
In November 1997, a foreign exchange crisis hit the country, forcing 
it to turn to the IMF for a bailout. This was the first ordeal Korea had 
to face after decades of rapid economic growth. The crisis was such a 
great shock as it was totally unforeseen. Even immediately before the 
outbreak of the crisis, there were no warning signs or abnormalities that 
could be detected. Foreign exchange reserves were quickly depleted and 
a drastic devaluation of the currency ensued as international creditors 
rushed to withdraw their loans to Korean banks. Many explanations 
have been put forward for this, ranging from the weak fundamentals of 
the Korean economy, including ‘crony capitalism’, to the intrinsic insta-
bility of international financial markets.29
At the time, Korea’s macroeconomic indicators were sound, but 
there was an external shock coming from a worsened terms-of-trade 
shock wrought by plummeting semi-conductor prices and a substantial 
increase in external liabilities (especially short-term ones). The increase in 
non-performing loans and the low profitability of businesses led to the 
bankruptcy of chaebols and the general shortage in liquidity afflicted busi-
nesses. The Asian regional financial crisis exacerbated the situation for 
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Korea, so that the international credit rating agencies began to downgrade 
Korea, causing the financial crisis fallout at the end of November 1997.
The crisis inflicted extreme hardship on the Korean people, but 
worked as a catalyst for improving the fundamentals of the economy. 
The IMF bailout required Korea to undertake austere economic meas-
ures and wide-ranging structural reforms. The sudden depreciation of 
the Korean currency wreaked havoc on businesses and the austerity pol-
icies were difficult to bear and unpopular. But the nation, led by the 
new administration of Kim Dae-Jung, faced the challenge head-on. 
Poorly performing businesses were driven out of the market and indus-
trial restructuring was pushed ahead. In just two years, the country 
recovered its previous growth rate, levels and current account surplus. In 
the process, some 3.5 million people joined in the campaign to collect 
gold to help the government repay the fund borrowed from the IMF, 
something unheard of in global history.
The Korean economy came out of the crisis in an entirely different 
shape: it became much more open to international capital flows; trans-
parency of corporate management was substantially enhanced; and the 
functioning of financial market improved substantially.30
New Challenges and Policy Responses
Despite Korea’s remarkable economic success in the past, concerns have 
been raised on the growth potential of the Korean economy. Economic 
growth began to slow down in the 1990s with the decelerating growth 
of the working-age population. Income distribution also started to dete-
riorate in the early 1990s, with the expansion of the knowledge-based 
economy and globalization leaving low-skilled workers at a disadvan-
tage. At the same time, productivity gaps between manufacturing and 
services, between HCIs and light industries, and between large and 
small companies widened, and access to quality jobs has become more 
difficult.
In 2008, Korea was hit by another financial crisis, this time a global 
one, coming from the heart of Wall Street, the global financial centre. 
Korean financial markets were thrown into disarray. The sudden capital 
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outflow led to a plunge in the stock market and domestic banks faced 
serious difficulties in foreign debt servicing. A precipitous fall in exports 
and investment also battered the industrial sector. But the repercussions 
were considerably less painful than had been the case in 1997, as Korea’s 
economic output went back into positive growth in the first quarter of 
2009. This time Korea was able to recover from the crisis even more 
rapidly because, among other reasons, the vulnerability of the financial 
and corporate sectors had been reduced as a result of the reforms and 
restructuring that had been undertaken following the 1997 crisis.
From the standpoint of maintaining economic competitiveness, 
Korea has confronted two basic challenges since the 1990s: technol-
ogy development and market opening. Korea had to tackle the reality 
of developed countries not wanting to transfer advanced technology to 
newly industrialized nations like itself, while also having to worry about 
new competitors. It decided that the best way to respond was to develop 
new industries based on new technologies, while improving the technol-
ogy for existing industries so that their productivity could be boosted.
In the early phases of development, Korea was able to benefit from 
learning technology from developed countries, but as this became 
increasingly difficult, the government and industry had to gear up 
technology development of their own. Since the mid-1990s, Korea 
has relied more on technologies that it developed on its own than on 
foreign-adopted technology. In the 1960s and 1970s, state-financed 
research institutes had already been established to foster development in 
key industrial sectors, and full-scale efforts were launched in this field in 
the 1980s. And since the 1990s, Korean enterprises were able to expand 
their own research and development (R&D) activities and set up pri-
vate-sector research institutions.31 Not only the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry but also the Ministry of Science and Technology actively 
supported technological development. During the period from 1982 to 
1991, the Ministry of Science and Technology invested a total of 964.2 
billion won, of which 65% was allotted to core industrial technology 
(semi-conductors, computers, etc.), 18% to public technology and 17% 
to basic technology.32
The major investment in corporate R&D was vital for the Korean 
firms to develop core technologies in order to attain self-reliance in such 
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new areas as semi-conductors and telecommunications in addition to 
existing industries. The rise of the ICT industry in the 1990s, which 
was possible due to developments in technology, marked a key turning 
point in the industrial development of Korea.33
A series of developments like the launch of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995, Korea’s entry to the OECD in 1996 and 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis pushed Korea towards the full opening 
of its market. Korea has constantly adapted to international markets 
and globalization trends: at an early stage, Korean manufacturers were 
encouraged to focus on export markets rather than depend on a lim-
ited domestic market; and later, in the era of full-fledged globalization, 
Korean manufacturers took the next step of ‘industrial globalization’ 
by diversifying partnerships, establishing production facilities overseas, 
etc., which has contributed to the increased competitiveness of Korean 
industry in its respective sectors. This brought Korea into the top five 
rankings of countries in the fields of automobiles, shipbuilding, elec-
tronics and steel.
The IMF financial crisis in the late 1990s forced the Korean indus-
trial sector to restructure, and some industries, like ICT, came out 
stronger and more competitive following the crisis. However, the pri-
mary industries faced great difficulties. By the 2000s, the challenge 
was how to go about restructuring industries, yet being mindful that 
while some were able to handle changes in terms of market opening and 
technological advancement, others were having trouble meeting these 
challenges. Also, there was the question of how to effectively select and 
promote future engines of growth.
After the era of rapid economic growth followed by the liberalization 
and stabilization period, since the turn of the century, Korea has been 
pursuing ‘new growth engines’ that will sustain economic dynamism 
and growth in order for it to secure the status of an advanced econ-
omy. Up to the 1980s, Korea successfully implemented an ‘industrial 
targeting’ policy for economic transformation. But with the advent of 
the WTO regime in the mid-1990s, the government’s direct fiscal and 
monetary support for businesses was no longer possible and only its 
indirect support in R&D was allowed. Hence, Korea’s industrial pol-
icy turned into technical development policy, and from the 2000s, the 
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government started to nurture new growth industries by focusing on 
technological development.
In 2001, Kim Dae-Jung’s government promoted the so-called ‘five 
technological industries’: IT, biotechnology (BT), nanotechnology 
(NT), environmental technology (ET) and cultural technology (CT). 
In 2003, the Noh Mu-Hyun administration announced ten indus-
tries that would spearhead growth: robots, future cars, next-generation 
semi-conductors, digital TV and broadcasting, new-generation mobile 
communication, display, intelligent home networks, digital contents/
SW solutions, next-generation batteries, new biomedicine and organs. 
In 2009, the Lee Myung-Bak administration presented a vision for a 
new growth engine and strategy, with emphasis on green growth, high-
tech fusion and a high value-addition service industry. The overall per-
formance of these initiatives was mixed, showing partial success.34
Then, the Park Geun-Hye government laid out the vision of achiev-
ing a ‘creative economy’ and planned to develop future engines of 
growth in 2013. In 2014, the government announced economic goals 
of a 4% economic growth rate, USD 40,000 GDP per capita and a 
70% employment rate.35 This was to be realized through a three-year 
plan for economic innovation built on the three pillars of ‘strong funda-
mentals’, a ‘dynamic and innovative economy’ and ‘balancing domestic 
demand and exports’.36
However, this administration came to a halt with the impeach-
ment of President Park in March 2017, before these goals could be 
attained. What should be noted is that since Korea recovered from 
the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, it has experienced a steady 
slip in its economic growth rate, which reflects the typical trend in 
developed economies. During the four years of Park’s administration 
(2013–2016), GDP growth averaged 2.9%, the lowest ever. Since the 
late 1990s, when Korea suffered the IMF crisis, the administrations 
had achieved an average growth rate of 5.1% (Kim Dae-Jung 1998–
2002), 4.5% (Roh Mu-Hyun 2003–2007) and 3.2% (Lee Myung-Bak 
2008–2012).37
The new President Moon Jae-in, who was inaugurated on 10 May 
2017, pledged to enhance the livelihood of ordinary people, taking care 
of employment, reforming business conglomerates, reining in collusion 
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between political and business circles, and promoting equal opportuni-
ties.38 Evidently, Korea has already entered the phase of slow growth, 
given its industrial structure and income level and the size of its econ-
omy. But managing the economy and meeting people’s demands is 
likely to be increasingly difficult with heightening global and domes-
tic competition, and an increase in people’s demands and expectations 
amid the enhancement of their living standards, socio-political aware-
ness and rights.
Besides upgrading technology and focusing on developing new 
growth engines, Korea’s task is to nurture development and enhance 
the competitiveness of existing industries which are vital for the overall 
socio-economic stability of the nation. The issue becomes tricky in the 
case of the primary industries, especially the agriculture sector.
What characterized Korea’s economic development for some 50 years 
was its exceptionally high economic growth: for the period from 1961 
to 2004, the average GDP growth rate for Korea was 7.1%, com-
pared to a global average of 4.0% (83), 3.3% for developed nations 
(22), 5.7% for East Asia (5), 3.7% for Latin America (22) and 4.9% 
for South Asia (4).39 What was the key to Korea’s high growth was the 
accumulation of capital, and until the IMF financial crisis, the accu-
mulation of capital led the economic growth; however, since the IMF 
crisis, the per-capita accumulation of capital rate dropped sharply and 
increases in productivity led the growth.
Manufacturing drove Korea’s rapid economic growth. Over the 
period from 1953 to 2000, Korea’s manufacturing averaged a high 
growth rate of 13.1% annually. Although Korea maintained one of the 
highest industrialization ratios in the world of close to 30% even after 
it dipped slightly in the 1990s, it is deemed to have reached its limits.40
But as Korea achieved high growth, the problem of ‘bipolarization’, 
the widening of the disparity between large corporations and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and between exporting and domes-
tic-oriented industries, has surfaced. Too much concentration of economic 
power in the Chaebols and their overexpansion alongside such problems as 
moral hazard, loose management and bad debt have rekindled debates and 
deliberations over how to appropriately regulate and control their activi-
ties. How to deal with low growth and worsening wealth distribution, 
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balancing or simultaneously pursuing economic growth and strength-
ening welfare remain fundamental tasks for the nation. In addition, 
matters such as revamping the ever-growing service sector and fostering 
innovative SMEs to attain a position of global competitiveness are drawing 
increased attention.
Recapping the Overall Achievements
In 1962, when Korea launched its first five-year development plan, its 
per-capita income was only USD 87, lower than most African countries 
at that time. Korea’s drastic economic transformation is summed up 
in its attainment of ‘20-50 club’ status in recent years. This is a meas-
urement of economic development that combines population size and 
the level of per-capita income. Literally, it means having a per-capita 
income of over USD 20,000 at the same as having the population of 
over 50 million. When Korea entered this club in 2012, it was only the 
seventh country in the world to achieve this feat. The other countries 
are Japan (1987), the US (1988), France (1990), Italy (1990), Germany 
(1991) and the UK (1996). Furthermore, Korea has reached another 
milestone of the ‘30-50 club’ in 2018. As of 2017, Korea is the elev-
enth-largest economy.
In terms of trade volume, Korea was the fifth-largest exporter and 
the seventh-largest importer as of 2014. In 2012, Korea has achieved, 
for the first time, a landmark total trade volume of over 1 trillion dol-
lars, making it the eighth major trading nation. In terms of foreign 
reserves, Korea ranks sixth in terms of foreign exchange reserves with 
369.6 billion dollars (2015), while it ranked thirteenth in the Human 
Development Index (2013). In addition, it topped the rankings in 
the Bloomberg Innovative Country Index for five consecutive years 
(2014–2018).41
By every account, Korea has already entered the threshold of 
advanced economies, which is also symbolized by its joining of the 
OECD DAC in 2009. This has all taken place without Koreans them-
selves being well aware of their achievements. The work to be done 
is how to explain the reasons for success and draw lessons from it. 
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Coming up with a credible ‘Korean model of development’ that can be 
benchmarked in practice by the African countries will be an even more 
significant task, but the purpose of this book is to try to invite and pro-
voke greater deliberations in this field in the years to come. In this vein, 
making sense of what has transpired and what indeed were the key fac-
tors that drove Korea to success is deemed to be important.
In my view, the essence of the Korean model of economic develop-
ment in its simplest terms can be broken down into two main elements: 
(1) compressed economic growth; and (2) effective social mobilization 
for change. Korea’s development is considered so impressive and unique 
because it has somehow found a way to ‘accelerate through’ industrial 
transformation and also has been able to instil the ‘can-do spirit’ into its 
people and has induced them to be active agents of development.
This has taken place against the backdrop of positive role of the gov-
ernment. And there were four fundamental cornerstones upon which 
compressed economic growth and effective social mobilization were 
realised: land reform; empowerment of the people; revolution in edu-
cation; and governmental reform. These seemingly basic but ‘profound’ 
reform measures were taken at appropriate moments, in some ways 
helped by ‘pressures’—constraints, limitations and adversities Korea 
faced as a nation. Of these, I think land reform and empowerment of 
the people were most crucial.
Based on such measures, Korea’s economy evolved, but the whole 
picture of Korea’s development will not be complete without adding to 
it the important aspect of social dynamics, that is, the formation and 
evolution of social or popular mindset change and action-oriented 
campaigns. Addressing Korea’s development from a purely economic 
dimension misses the point entirely. With regard to East Asian develop-
mental states, so many academics and experts have already mentioned 
the key role of the state. But in the case of Korea, besides the govern-
ment’s critical intervention, the people’s mindset and action-oriented 
movements played an equally important part in Korea’s overall 
development.
Korea in the 1950s, after having gone through the Korean War, 
focused on reconstructing the war-torn nation, relying heavily on for-
eign aid, mostly from the US, and employing import-substitution as 
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Fig. 7.1 Schematic itinerary of Korea’s development
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a mainstream economic policy. It was in the early 1960s that Korea 
embarked on a full-scale and systematic effort to develop its economy. 
But earlier, in the 1950s, a number of crucial measures such as land 
reform and government-driven campaigns to empower the people were 
enacted. Broadly speaking, we can say that the compressed economic 
growth of Korea lasted until the end of the 1990s, with Korea achieving 
the status of an advanced economy at the turn of the new millennium. 
Figure 7.1 above provides an illustration of a summary of Korea’s path 
of development that I have mentioned. This cannot be considered as a 
road map because Korea did not pre-plan the scheme of development 
over a period of decades to achieve compressed growth.
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Conceptualizing the Korean Development 
Model
Below, in Fig. 8.1, I have attempted to construction, with a  schematic 
map, what can represent a model of Korea’s development. While 
Fig. 7.1 depicts how the course of Korea’s development unfolded, 
Fig. 8.1 expresses what actually made the transformation possible, that 
is, the central elements of development.
In sum, the Korean development model starts with the four cor-
nerstones. Based on these cornerstones, the economic realm and the 
socio-political realm of Korea each realized a ‘compressed’ developmen-
tal process with more or less common characteristics in each stage of 
development. The top row representing economic domain and the bot-
tom row representing socio-political domain show a full range of Korea’s 
development.
Choi, Joong-Kyung observes:
among the countries that were disconnected from Western industrializa-
tion up until the beginning of the 20th century, Korea is the only country 
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that achieved both Western industrialization and Western democracy. 
Both Israel and Singapore are also regarded as having achieved industri-
alization and democratization, but there were historical reasons … Israel 
was formed by a Jewish population that came from Western industrial 
countries. Singapore was a small city economy and had been a base for 
the UK’s East India Company for a long time, and this was exposed to 
Western-style industrialization from early on.1
In the economic domain, the rule of ‘economic discrimination’ (ED) 
was the principal driving force for growth during the rapid industriali-
zation period. The rough timeline for ‘industrial take-off’ was the 1960s 
and 1970s, while ‘industrial adjustment’ occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s, and ‘industrial maturity’ took place the period from 2000 up to 
the present day. As mentioned earlier, ‘economic discrimination’ is the 
concept coined by Professor Jwa, Sung-Hee. This concept is instrumen-
tal in understanding the success of Korea, particularly in the economic 
take-off period.
Meanwhile, in the socio-political realm, the emergence and expan-
sion of a ‘strong development mindset (DM)’ in the nation was criti-
cal in terms of motivating individuals and mobilizing the general public 
to work harder in order to attain a better life and the modernization 
of the nation. There is no denying that the economic domain and the 
Fig. 8.1 Korea’s development model
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socio-political domain must have had a substantial correlation or inter-
actions. In my mind, what reinforced the rationale and effectiveness of 
both the DM and ED was the ‘egalitarian spirit’ typical of Koreans up 
to now. If we recognize that ED and the strong DM were crucial factors 
for development, ‘egalitarian spirit’ is more of a psychological element 
deeply ingrained in people’s minds that expeditiously matched well with 
those two factors to produce maximal outcomes.
I have already pointed out that Korea boasts notable historical con-
tinuity and homogeneity as a nation. In the twentieth century, Korea’s 
liberation from colonial rule and the Korean War largely demolished 
the existing socio-economic hierarchy and the vested interests struc-
ture. After being devastated by the Korean War, the nation had to start 
again from scratch and everybody was literally on an equal footing. The 
Korean people were all very poor, so there were basically two tendencies: 
either people could resign themselves to their lot or they could try to do 
something special to get out of the misery in which they found them-
selves. Fortunately, the nation did not opt for the former because unlike 
many Sub-Saharan countries blessed with abundant natural resources 
and a favourable climate, making year-round farming possible, Korea’s 
land was resource-poor, rugged and mountainous, making an easy life-
style simply unsustainable. And a strong sense of egalitarian- mindedness 
in the people prompted them to jump on the bandwagon of social 
mobilization.
An egalitarian mindset was important because this encouraged com-
petition and emulation among the people to ‘keep up with the Jones’, as 
if they were saying: ‘If others can do it, why can’t I?’ People were envi-
ous of their neighbours’ or acquaintances’ wealth or success, and this 
made them exert greater effort to try to catch up with them. I think the 
can-do spirit of Koreans is rooted in this egalitarian thinking. It has also 
been observed that: ‘Korea’s development is also remarkable because it 
constituted development with equity, with rapid poverty reduction and 
no increase in inequality throughout the development process.’2
In addition, socio-cultural norm that emphasizes ‘saving one’s face’ 
and maintaining one’s dignity, along with the typical ‘shame culture’, 
has contributed greatly to the emergence and expansion of a hard- 
working, self-sacrificing populace. As illustrated in Fig. 8.1, the period 
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of ‘industrial take-off’ can be characterized as an era of ‘convergence of 
interests’. The interests of the country’s leader, the government, the peo-
ple and companies converged, leading to phenomenal and unparalleled 
economic growth. In the early 1960s, Korea had just experienced the 
troubled government of Rhee, Syng-Man, who was ousted following 
popular opposition. The cabinet system administration that was newly 
formed also found itself unpopular and in turmoil, and as a result, the 
military, led by a group of young officers, staged a coup with the ration-
ale of saving the nation.
The strong role of government based on meritocratic bureaucracy 
is the hallmark of Korea’s success, particularly in the rapid indus-
trialization period, but is also the overarching feature in the overall 
development of Korea that continues to this day. What started as the 
government’s strong interventionist stance in the early 1960s over time 
underwent adjustments and changes so as to become that of an ‘active 
facilitator’. But this does not mean that the government’s function has 
basically ‘weakened’; instead, it reflects changes in government policy.
What is not marked in the Korean development model diagram, but 
is deemed as another important feature for the success of the nation 
is the timely and effective management of crisis or, even better, taking 
advantage of a crisis. This notable feature has crystallized on many occa-
sions throughout Korea’s development path. Not only was Korea able 
to successfully cope with crisis time after time, but it also came out 
stronger than before. The responses to crises or challenges were bold and 
immediate. And Korea made many correct policy choices when con-
fronted with big challenges or tasks. Even when some of these turned 
out to be failures, the government was on track to fix them.
The collapse of Rhee’s government and the ensuing new government 
at the turn of the 1960s was in itself a crisis for Korea. But as it turned 
out, the 1960s marked an important turning point in relation to Korea’s 
development. So, what enabled Park Chung-Hee’s government to be 
successful in driving forward its policies? A combination of factors must 
have been in been in effect, but the ‘right timing’ of the advent of a new 
state leadership and the ‘synchronization’ of policies, national demands 
and aspirations, etc. should also be recognized. The test for the new 
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democratic politics in Korea failed due to various reasons. The  people 
were wary of politics, and uncertainty and instability prevailed. Park 
came from a poor peasant family and his style of leadership was per-
ceived to be down to earth and in touch with the grassroots. Korea was 
at a low point in every aspect and people were willing to support and 
take part in new initiatives.
Meanwhile, because of North Korea’s propaganda and the perception 
held by some South Koreans that North Koreans might be better off 
living under a communist state, there was a constant pressure on the 
government to outperform North Korea in terms of economic develop-
ment. This was all the more reason for Park to vigorously launch the 
national modernization campaign in order to consolidate the legitimacy 
of his rule.
This was a time when the Cold War was at its peak, with the threat 
of North Korean communist military adventurism being very real. The 
ongoing Vietnam War was a stern reminder of what might happen in 
the Korean Peninsula. South Korea was in competition with North 
Korea on multiple fronts: economic, military, political and ideological. 
It was also in a fierce contest with the North to win the ‘approval’ of 
the international community. Korea depended heavily on the US for its 
military capability and national security, but this also represented a vul-
nerability for Park’s regime.
There were also disagreements with the US in certain areas, such as 
Korea’s pursuit of its export-drive policy instead of import- substitution. 
President Park was at times wary of a possible US military pull-out 
from the South, knowing all too well that the US security commit-
ment to Korea hinged on the decisions taken in Washington, DC and 
that it should not be taken as a given. This led Park to hasten economic 
development in order to try to acquire industrial capability including 
defence.
‘Modernization of fatherland’, the motto of Park Chung-Hee’s govern-
ment, was timely and appropriate for the nation, and it would have been 
hard to argue against its logic, given the circumstances in Korea at the 
time. Rather than being populist and trying to cater to the short-term 
needs of the masses, Park emphasized the great challenges that lay ahead 
and the magnitude of the work that needed to be done to pull the nation 
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out of poverty. The term ‘modernization’ implies moving from ‘back-
wardness’ to modernity, realizing economic development and adopt-
ing advanced modes, systems and institutions necessary to upgrade the 
nation so as to join the ranks of the rich nations. Hence, the government 
asked people not only to support the vision and policies but also to actu-
ally participate vigorously and physically in the ‘mobilization’ campaigns.
But the effectiveness of winning popular support and generating 
social mobilization hinged on the government’s leadership and perfor-
mance, and the development momentum of the nation was sustained 
because the government was able to deliver concrete results promptly. 
During the take-off period, Korea’s policies and industrial structure 
underwent big and continuous changes. Korea’s conversion from pro-
tectionism and import-substitution in the 1950s to export-oriented 
policies in the 1960s is hailed by many experts as the most dynamic 
transition since the Second World War. It was in 1962 that the first five-
year economic development plan was launched. The targeted goal of 
economic growth was set at a very high level of 7.1% average annual 
growth, but the actual growth rate attained exceeded this, reaching 
8.5%. The second five-year economic development plan (1967–1971) 
yielded an even more remarkable result of 9.7% average annual growth 
against the original goal of 7.0%.
What was also remarkable about President Park was that he took very 
bold economic measures against the advice of international organiza-
tions and principal donors by pursuing an export-drive policy, estab-
lishing Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) and building the 
eight-lane Gyeongbu Expressway. Choi, Joong-Kyung, who served in 
Korea’s Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, observed that:
at the time, the projects seemed like nonsense and the tasks appeared 
impossible. President Park Chung-Hee was not an economist. He wit-
nessed the success of other countries that faced similar situations as Korea 
and he believed in his intuitions. The case of West Germany (which had 
success with an export-drive policy and hardly had any natural resources) 
caught his attention. The unified Germany still continues to adopt [an] 
export-drive policy. As a small country with a small domestic market and 
with scarce natural resources, such a policy is almost inevitable.3
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According to Choi, for an economy to achieve successful develop-
ment, four basic elements are required: a strong and stable leader-
ship with a clear vision; well-organized economic development plans; 
a competent bureaucracy to carry out these plans; and the financial 
resources necessary to execute meet them. In the case of Korea, these 
conditions were met and ‘without any doubt, the late President Park 
Chung-Hee was the architect who exerted leadership and created 
the strong foundation of the modern Korean economy. The zeal for 
education and a competitive and objective civil service exam made it 
possible to recruit and maintain a competent bureaucracy. Through 
visionary leadership and the efforts of an efficient bureaucracy, it was 
possible to establish highly effective five-year economic development 
plans’.4
In the 1950s, Korea was seen as a ‘hopeless’ and high-risk coun-
try, with the possibility of war breaking out again in the eyes of for-
eign agencies, including the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the World Bank. Korea was unable to 
obtain the necessary loans to push forward with its economic devel-
opment scheme in such circumstances where Samuel D. Berger, the 
US ambassador to Korea, made a negative report to his headquar-
ters regarding Korea’s development plans and the World Bank was 
equally reluctant to extend financial assistance to Korea. Despite 
the unreceptive mood of the international community towards 
Korea’s needs, in 1962 Korea was finally able to sign a commercial 
loan agreement with West Germany. By the terms of agreement for 
a loan of USD 150 million, Korea had to send nurses and miners 
that West Germany needed and the salaries of the workers were set as 
collateral.5
The first job assigned to the Korean nurses who were sent to an alien 
country was cleaning stiffened dead bodies. The miners worked so 
painstakingly hard, risking their lives in caves over 1000 metres deep 
underground fighting geothermal heat. The Korean workers’ zealous 
work deeply impressed the people of West Germany and so President 
Park was invited by President Heinrich Lübke to visit West Germany in 
December 1964. Anxious to greet their President, who has come all the 
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way to West Germany to meet them, Korean miners and nurses gath-
ered in an auditorium all dressed up: the miners in suits and the nurses 
in traditional Korean dress. Prior to the Korean President’s speech, they 
all began singing the Korean national anthem but none of them could 
finish the song because they were all sobbing. President Park put his 
prepared speech into his pocket and said repeatedly ‘let’s work hard’. He 
went on ‘let’s work hard until our bodies turn into shatters so that our 
sons and daughters would not be sold to a foreign country’. The Korean 
workers cried out ‘we will do anything. Please help our country, please 
help our President’, as they knelt down and bowed low to the ground 
for the President of West Germany. Leaving behind sobbing Korean 
workers, on his way back to the hotel, President Park could not hold 
back the tears. President Lübke give him a handkerchief and comforted 
him by saying ‘we will help you; the people of West Germany will help 
your country’.6
Through such hardships and the sacrifice of the people, Korea was 
able to build the stepping stones towards modernization. In addition, 
sending troops to Vietnam helped accelerate the economic growth 
of Korea as the soldiers’ combat allowance money was used to fund 
the Gyeongbu Expressway. The Korean government also obtained 
a  reparation payment of USD 500 million and commercial loan of 
USD 300 million from Japan following the normalization of diplomatic 
ties with Japan in 1965. The payments were used to build the Pohang 
Iron and Steel Company and other investments. Money earned by 
Korean construction workers from construction sites in the scorching 
desert heat of Middle East in the 1970s was another valuable foreign 
currency inflow for Korea. Fabric, shoe and wig factories were packed 
with teenage boys and girls who were saving money to pay for their 
younger siblings’ education.
And yet another drama unfolded when Koreans achieved democrati-
zation. There are two common misperceptions held by many foreigners 
when it comes to the state of Korea’s democracy. One is that Korea is 
still run by an authoritarian or non-democratic regime and the other 
is that Korea was democratized long ago and it achieved development 
under democracy. But neither is the case. First of all, the Korean dem-
ocratic movement ran its full course and could possibly be the most 
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successful case of a Third World nation-turned full democracy since the 
second half of the twentieth century. Korea’s compressed development 
featured ‘compressed democratization’ in addition to compressed eco-
nomic growth and transformation. It would be no exaggeration to say 
that the level and dynamism of democracy exhibited by South Korea is 
highly exceptional in the non-Western world.
Korea’s compressed democratization was fuelled by democratic upris-
ings or movements, although even during the absence of such events, 
there were ongoing awareness and a drive for democracy in society, 
albeit in a subdued fashion. In the post-war era, the first democratic 
movement erupted in 1960 against the Rhee Syng-man regime, culmi-
nating in the 19 April Revolution that finally toppled the government. 
But the new democratic government that was formed was seen to be 
incompetent and powerless, and was overthrown by a military coup just 
after a year.
If President Park lacked full legitimacy because he had taken power 
through a coup, his delivery on impressive economic development more 
than offset this, as shown by his landslide win in the 1967 presiden-
tial election. But he faced increasing opposition to his prolonged rule 
in the 1970s, as he announced a plan to amend the Constitution to 
allow him to run for a third term in October 1972. The new Yushin 
Constitution was legislated in December of that year. Park was assassi-
nated in October 1980 by his aide, the chief of the intelligence service. 
The assassination is largely considered to be an outcome of a collision 
between the repression of Park’s regime and the resistance of the democ-
ratization movement, which was preceded by years of confrontations 
and escalating tensions in political parties under the Yushin system. 
After Park’s assassination, the prospect of democratization appeared to 
be evident in South Korea.
During the early years and up until the mid-term of Park’s rule, suc-
cessful economic development enhanced the legitimacy of the regime. 
However, by the time of Park’s death, the regime had lost much of its 
popular support due to changes in people’s attitudes and values brought 
about by economic growth and the enhancement in people’s stand-
ard of living, and also because Park reinforced coercion to prolong his 
rule. There were high expectations that the end of Park’s dictatorial rule 
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would open a new era of democracy, giving rise to the ‘Seoul Spring’, 
which was the period from 26 October 1979 to 17 May 1980.
But the ‘neo-military forces’ snatched power from the transitional 
government with a military coup and imposed martial law on 17 May 
1980. General Chun Doo-Hwan soon became President and after his 
term finished, Chun’s chosen successor, Roh Tae-Woo, a retired general 
and an army academy classmate, took over. In the meantime, a massive 
anti-government uprising occurred in the city of Gwangju on 18 May 
1980, which is referred to as the Gwangju Democratization Movement. 
During this period, citizens rose up against Chun’s dictatorship. During 
the course of the uprising, citizens took up arms by raiding police sta-
tions and military depots to oppose the government and the imposition 
of martial law, but were ultimately crushed by the army. Hundreds of 
people died in the process. There was another major democratic upris-
ing in June 1987, which pressurized the regime to accommodate some 
institutional and policy changes demanded by the people and the 
opposition.
The democratization movement in the 1980s was no longer lim-
ited to the student and the dissident movement. Instead, it was aligned 
with social movements and particularly with the labour movement. 
Moreover, the opposition party which had been excluded from the 
political scene re-entered the political arena following the general elec-
tion in 1985 and expressed opposition to dictatorship and support 
for democratization more clearly. Accordingly, the democratization 
movement was able to muster the largest coalition of social and polit-
ical forces comprising workers, opposition party and dissidents, and 
students.
Although the democratic transition ended up in the emergence of the 
Roh Tae-woo regime, which succeeded the Chun Doo-Hwan regime, 
the political environment of Korea did change after the transition. 
Above all, the constitutional system began to operate normally under 
the amended Constitution in 1987 and subsequently, the arbitrary exer-
cise of the state’s power was considerably reduced. In addition, political 
and civil society, which had been repressed by authoritarian rule under 
the dictatorial regime, also became normalized due to democratization. 
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A normal political party system based on popular support was created, 
although it was under the influence of ‘regionalism’, and civil society 
also regained autonomy and developed rapidly afterwards.
The election of Kim Young-Sam, the leader of the democratic move-
ment, as Korea’s President in 1993 ushered in a new era of civilian rule. 
Then, after ten years of democratic transition since 1987, Kim Dae-
Jung was elected President in the fifteenth presidential election held 
in December 1997. The emergence of the Kim Dae-Jung government 
was a historic feat because it marked the first ‘parallel’ regime change 
by election and also because the regime change was made by a demo-
cratic opposition party. The Kim Dae-Jung government was followed by 
a successive liberal government led by President Roh Moo-Hyun, who 
came to power in 2003.
After ten years or two terms of rule by liberal-progressive party lead-
ers, the political landscape of Korea shifted back to conservative party 
rule as a businessman-turned politician Lee Myung-Bak from the con-
servative party became President in 2008. Then, the conservative par-
ty’s candidate Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of the late President Park 
Chung-Hee, won the subsequent presidential election to become the 
first female Korean President in 2013. However, Park was implicated in 
a corruption scandal and faced massive public demonstrations demand-
ing that she step down. She was removed from power after being 
impeached in March 2017.
The liberal party opposition leader Moon Jae-In became the new 
President in May 2017. Likewise, the political pendulum continues to 
swing back and forth between the conservative and liberal political par-
ties since the peaceful transition of power was first realized in Korea in 
1998.
Going back to Fig. 8.1, I have pointed out that in the 1960s and 
1970s, the interests of the government and that of the people and busi-
nesses largely converged, producing positive synergy effects that led to 
high economic growth. But afterwards, the bond or unity between the 
government, corporations and the populace loosened, although it did 
not diverge strongly to cause instability of the country.
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What characterized this era of the 1980s and1990s is, I think, ‘divert-
ing interests’. I chose the word ‘diverting’ for a lack of better word, to 
avoid the word ‘divergent’. This is to suggest that the interests of the 
government, the people and businesses started to ‘differentiate’ some-
what, but were not really in conflict with one another.
By this time, South Korea has extricated itself from poverty, so eco-
nomic stability, distributional justice, workers’ rights and democracy 
were higher priorities. One of the signs of change was that the Korean 
private business sector, especially the large business conglomerates, the 
chaebols, now wanted to be more autonomous vis-à-vis the government. 
Labour unions, opposition political parties, intellectuals and social 
activists wanted their voices to be heard and increasingly confronted the 
government and the establishment.
During the Park Chung-Hee era, modernization was the single most 
important goal of the nation and most of its energy and resources 
were devoted to achieving economic development. But afterwards, 
many things were set to change. The early success in economic growth 
is deemed to have set off a chain reaction of: economic development; 
social, political demands and changes; economic policy adjustments; 
evolution of democratization and social dynamism; deepening of eco-
nomic reforms and sophistication of industrial structure, and so on.
But Korea might have started celebrating too early and was compla-
cent without ever suspecting what was to come. To the shock of the 
whole nation, Korea was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to receive 
a financial bailout from the IMF in December 2007. Moral hazard and 
problems in corporate governance on the part of big business, the weak-
ness of the government and its failure to monitor and regulate the prob-
lems, as well as excessive borrowing and spending by the people gave 
rise to a major crisis. This led to a change in the tide, the reassessment 
of unfettered free market economy and the re-alignment or rebalancing 
of interests. The 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis were stern reminders to Korea that a sound regulatory role 
of government is very much in order and that economic globalization 
poses such a grave, immediate and extensive risks to economies if they 
lack the necessary discipline and governance.
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For Korea, this was an occasion to become ‘united’ once again. To 
help the government pay back the IMF debt, the Korean people volun-
tarily launched a movement to donate gold. This was in effect a revival 
of the Saemaul Undong. Such an act of the people giving up their per-
sonal possessions for the public cause is unheard of in the world history. 
The business conglomerates had to undergo serious restructuring, and 
they became more conservative in their investment activities. The last 
phase of ‘industrial sophistication’ is still an ongoing process.
Politically, Korea has become a full democracy, while economically 
it is faced with increasing global competition. The interests of various 
players or entities in Korea can be said to be in the ‘balancing’ stage. 
They do not converge to the extent that they did in the 1960s or 1970s, 
but nor are they as divergent as was sometimes the case in the 1980s or 
1990s. We can say they are somewhere in the middle.
Koreans have responded and adapted appropriately to challenges 
and crises. The ‘Palli Palli (hurry hurry)’ culture, which is typical of the 
Korean people, is deemed to have been instrumental in bringing about 
the rapid development. There is a tendency that people cannot stand 
staying idle or doing nothing, because this will make them uneasy as if 
some kind of penalty will be incurred for doing so. They feel more com-
fortable keeping themselves busy.
Without question, the strong role of government was essential in pro-
pelling the nation forward. The government was effectually ‘interven-
tionist’ during the high growth period, but even during later phases, its 
active role persisted in the form of engagement in regulating and ‘facil-
itating’ the national economy, which has become increasingly complex 
to manage.
Jongryn Mo and Barry R. Weingast explain Korea’s development 
using an analytical method devised by North, Wallis and Weingast 
(2009) referred as the ‘NWW approach’. They attempt to explain 
how the transition of Korea’s political economy from an underdevel-
oped to a developed country took place, that is, from a ‘natural state’ 
or ‘limited-access order’ to an ‘open-access order’.7 Countries have 
different levels of openness or accessibility in their political order and 
economic order, and when the disparity between these two becomes 
large, it causes social tensions that require ‘rebalancing’ measures.8  
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According to the authors, Korea’s successful development came about 
because an increase in economic access was followed by a corresponding 
increase in political access (democratization).9
The Four Cornerstones of Development
Land Reform
The first major impetus for change in Korea came from the land reform, 
that was a powerful and innovative policy based on the land-to-tiller’s 
and market-oriented principles. Korea’s land reform is internationally 
known as one of the most successful cases of its kind. The Korean case 
of land reform stands out as it was rapidly implemented, resulting in 
the collapse of landlords who dominated rural communities at the time. 
This is in stark contrast to the disappointing results seen by many other 
developing countries in their land reforms.
Park, Hyung-Ho observes that:
Korea’s land reform was implemented based on a compound combination 
of political, social and economic factors. In the way that Korea abolished 
a semi-feudal tenancy system as well as landlordism in a relatively short 
period of time, Korea’s land reform is acclaimed as the most successful 
case of land reform all over the world. Therefore, a redistributive land 
reform at an early stage of development can be a crucial means to lay the 
basis for agricultural productivity gains while enhancing growth and pov-
erty reduction prospects. Such government interventions can lead to both 
equity and efficiency gains.10
When Korea was liberated in 1945, it was an agrarian economy in 
which most of the population were tenant farmers without ownership 
of farmland. In view of the slave-like status of the tenant farmers who 
were subordinate to landlords, the 1948 Constitution that established 
South Korea guaranteed private land ownership and proclaimed the 
adoption of a capitalist economic system. While the land reform’s social 
objective was to free the populace from the shackles of servitude, its 
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‘economic objectives were to improve agricultural productivity and the 
income of farmers by dismantling the oppressive tenant farming system, 
to encourage reinvestment, and to provide incentives through owner-
ship of land and production’.11
Korea’s land reform and the Korean War in effect brought about 
equality in income and property in Korea. The vested interest class of 
landlords was disbanded and educational opportunities were extended 
to the people, thereby promoting greater social migration and an egal-
itarian society. The land reform had a huge impact on Korean society. 
The proprietary class, the landowners, inherited lands handed down 
to them generation after generation from their ancestors, while tenant 
farmers remained where they were, leading to ‘the rich get richer, the 
poor get poorer’ phenomenon. But with the sudden collapse of the pro-
prietary class, the conflict between these two classes also came to an end.
The land reform that was undertaken during the time of war was 
considered the most important measure during this phase of develop-
ment. The government purchased the land and redistributed it to farm-
ers in consideration of its market value. The government bought land by 
issuing land securities to the owners, and the farmers paid for the land 
in kind by instalments. In South Korea, landlords were compensated, 
unlike in North Korea, where land was confiscated and redistributed 
forcefully.
The land reform offered the chance for farmers, who made up about 
75% of the Korean population, to farm on their own land. Being given 
the right of ownership was another big change for the vast majority of 
the populace. In itself, the reform did not have an immediate impact 
in terms of increases in agricultural production and income, due to 
the fact that war broke out and the new independent farmers, unlike 
the past landlords, lacked the necessary funds to invest in agriculture. 
However, it had a considerable impact in promoting the capitalist sys-
tem and economic development in South Korea in the 1960s and 
afterwards. It helped South Korea nurture a capitalist society by giv-
ing property rights to farmers, unlike in North Korea, where collective 
farms were the norm. The guaranteeing of private farmland ownership 
in effect also created the necessary conditions for the guaranteeing of 
private property rights in other economic activities.
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An important point to note was that the Rhee government pro-
moted both land reform and education reform at the same time, so that 
human capital could be successfully accumulated in Korean society, and 
this led to successful industrialization after the 1960s. The land reform 
and education reform produced synergistic effects.
It has been pointed out that thanks to the land reform, farmers were 
able to increase production and own what they farmed. They could 
think of climbing the social ladder and becoming rich. That’s how they 
worked harder and created more wealth. Thus, it laid the groundwork 
for economic development and overall social development.12 Scholars 
have recognized that among the fast growing economies in the world, 
the case of South Korea, which has exhibited a remarkable degree of 
overall fairness in terms of income distribution, is exceptional. Many 
Korean experts argue that the roots of such success should be traced 
back to President Rhee Syng-Man’s land reform, as there is a recog-
nition that Korea was able to embark on a modernization path as an 
egalitarian society without this tension between the classes. Under such 
conditions, the possibility of acute conflict between the classes that has 
commonly occurred during the course of the progression of capitalism 
was shielded. It is said that this is the biggest benefit that Korea derived 
from the land reform.13
In the case of East Asian countries like Korea, Japan and Taiwan, the 
successful land reform helped bring about a large middle class, which 
acted as a cornerstone for economic growth and a social ‘buffer’ or bal-
ancer. This is in a stark contrast to many Latin American countries, 
where such a wide gap between the rich and poor exists due to their fail-
ure to properly enact land reform. The effective abolition of the social 
class system in Korea led to the realization of equal opportunities for all, 
and this in turn later gave rise to the spread of a ‘can-do spirit’ typical of 
Koreans.
Hyung-Ho Park states the lessons learned from Korea’s experience of 
land reform: (1) the resistance of the privileged class on behalf of land-
lords should be overcome; (2) land reform should be accompanied by 
follow-up measures to ensure an increase in agricultural production and 
farmer households’ income; (3) educational reform should be promoted 
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concurrently to maximize the social benefits of land reform; and (4) the 
government’s ability to implement reforms is important.14
Empowering the People
As I have pointed out earlier and illustrated in the Korean development 
model in Fig. 8.1, strong development-mindedness (DM) and ED were 
the two key drivers of Korea’s sustained development. What propelled 
and reinforced these two elements further was the egalitarian spirit of 
Korea that was fostered during this time. In turn, the government’s pol-
icy of ‘empowering’ people, along with the land reform, significantly 
contributed to the burgeoning of this national ethos.
The Korean government, in the circumstances in which it found itself 
and with the means at its disposal in the 1950s, was naturally inclined to 
pursue ‘miserly’ policies that sometimes called on the populace to do its 
part or help out the country. This is in stark contrast to many Sub-Saharan 
African countries that in effect use the plague of their people and poor state 
of their economy as leverage to get more offerings or concessions from 
donors. Korea tried to turn things around by itself through self-reflection 
instead of ‘outsourcing’ the burden of finding solutions to its problems to 
the international community. This ‘outsourcing’ trend, rather than dimin-
ishing, is seen to be becoming more pronounced in Africa.
Because Korea was not only devastated by the war but was also poor 
in terms of its natural resources, it had to rely heavily on foreign aid. 
With the massive flow of aid, the society developed a dependency 
syndrome that was seen by the government and intellectuals to have 
reached an alarming level and was having a very negative impact on the 
country. In such an environment of poverty and despair, men became 
idle, drinking and gambling their life away, while women did most of 
the household chores and laborious work.
The campaigns to empower the people led by the government had 
two purposes: other than the need to motivate and instil a work ethos 
in the people, there was a requirement for large-scale labour mobiliza-
tion for pressing public works like land reclamation and reforestation. 
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Because of Korea’s lack of fuel due to its dearth in natural resources, 
the practice of timbering was widespread, meaning that many hills and 
mountains in populated areas were barren. This caused perennial flood-
ing following heavy rainfall, accompanying mudslides, and sanitary and 
environmental problems.
Something had to be done to rectify this state of affairs, as well as to 
address people’s problematic behavioural and ‘mentality’ issues, and the 
response came in the form of ‘empowering the people’. This campaign 
started as early as the late 1940s under the Rhee government. The gov-
ernment wanted to change people’s mindsets and values, and infuse a 
new work ethos: nothing would be free and everyone had to work hard; 
people were asked to work for food under the government-led projects 
and they were paid in wheat flour given by the US as aid. The material-
ization of such a policy showed the willingness of the people to change 
and empower themselves.
This kind of environmental protection public works initiative turned 
out to be a resounding success. The government was not only able to 
get people to participate in it actively, but also managed to sustain it 
in the long term. Preservation of the country’s greenery through the 
planting of trees became a ‘norm’ for the people, and this public cam-
paign has survived to this day. Nearly 21 million people participated in 
the land reclamation and reforestation programme led by the govern-
ment. Over ten billion trees were planted over 30 years, bringing Korea’s 
once-desolate landscape back to life. South Korea had been barren of 
trees after years of excessive deforestation and war, but trees once again 
covered 65% of the country. It was a remarkable achievement and the 
opportunities to make a living and to be rewarded for hard work helped 
establish a new set of values that would serve Korea well during its rapid 
development.15
I believe that the success of programmes to empower the people pro-
vided a useful basis for the Saemaul Undong that was launched in the 
1970s. The former were the government-driven projects to conduct 
specific tasks, while the latter was essentially a bottom-up-style peo-
ple’s voluntary movement with the government’s guidance and back-
ing. The benefit of this was that it made people realize the value and 
necessity of collective work, and become used to the new culture of the 
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mobilization of the workforce that was absolutely necessary at the time 
to initiate effective development.
It was not only the government that tried to empower the people. 
The need to ‘enlighten’ the people was perhaps felt widely across the 
nation and certain entities were engaged in this effort. One institution 
that is renowned in this field is the Canaan Farmers School, which spe-
cializes in mindset change training. It is founded on the Christian faith, 
with the goal of creating a humanistic society and prosperous future 
through moral value education, community education and leadership 
education.
While the school was formally established in 1962, its origins 
can be traced back to a model village that was created in 1931 by the 
founder of the School Kim, Yong-Ki. At the time, Koreans were suffer-
ing from Japan’s severe colonial oppression and he led a farming move-
ment, which was in a way a nationalistic movement to bolster people’s 
self-esteem, determination and hope. The vast majority of the people 
were farmers and the leader of Canaan farmers’ movement saw a fun-
damental national challenge in the form of the mindset of the peo-
ple, and waged a fight against the shortcomings of the populace, like 
powerlessness, idleness, over-indulgence in drinking and dissipation. 
He embarked on the farmers’ enlightenment movement in a bid to 
change the culture of dishonesty and vanity. He claimed that independ-
ence would come about faster when there were a growing number of 
people with the right attitude. The motto was ‘pioneering spirit’.
The Canaan Farmers School is said to have been an inspiration for 
President Park Chung-Hee to launch the Saemaul Undong. As Korea 
had attained high economic growth and the agriculture sector contin-
ued to shrink, the focus of this school also underwent some changes. 
I remember in the 1980s, when I was in my twenties, Canaan Farmers 
School was considered as a sort of mental-reform institution teaching 
the values of self-discipline, thrift and diligence, social responsibil-
ity and ethics, etc. Many groups of people from various backgrounds, 
including public officials, businessmen, students, leadership course 
trainees and farmers, entered the school to be trained. Individuals also 
enrolled on a voluntary basis. Decades later, the school extended its 
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scope of activities to international programmes or development projects 
both domestically and in foreign countries.
There were other similar mindset reform campaigns led by various 
religious entities and social groups, like the Catholic Church’s revival 
of the moral rearmament movement with the motto ‘it’s my respon-
sibility’. In Korean society, you can very often see civil society groups 
expressing slogans for the reforming of citizens’ mindsets. This means 
that Korean society is basically a self-reflecting society and that the 
empowerment of the people is self-generated by the people. This is the 
opposite of how the ‘empowerment’ of the people is understood and 
pursued in some African countries, where grants to a large segment of 
poor people are provided in a way that makes them more dependent on 
the state.
Revolution in Education
It would not be an overstatement to say that Koreans understand the 
value of hard work and education probably more than anyone else. In 
the 1950s, illiteracy among adults was a staggering 77%, and an all-out 
war was waged to fix this. In 1954, the first campaign of the war was 
launched by making primary education compulsory. Primary education 
was deemed most important because in this period in one’s life, people 
learn the basic knowledge and social skills that serve as the foundations 
for human development. What is even more important is that it made 
primary education accessible to girls. So, lack of money was no longer 
an obstacle to receiving primary education.
After 1945, enrolment in primary schools grew rapidly. In less than a 
decade, Korea reached an enrolment rate of 83% in primary education, 
up from only 54% in 1945. By 1959, primary education was within 
reach of everyone. The war on illiteracy was waged in community cen-
tres scattered across the country. Millions of adults learned to read and 
write in schools with US assistance. It was made compulsory that illiter-
ate adults took up more than 200 hours and over 70 days of education. 
In five short years, illiteracy rate among adults fell to just 22%, which 
was a remarkable achievement. Within a decade of the launch of this 
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mandatory education, the number of primary schools grew from 2800 
to 4600, and students from 1.36 million to 3.6 million. Universities also 
grew rapidly, from 19 to 68, with university students increasing from 
8000 to 100,000. Numbers of middle-school students grew by 10 times, 
high-school students by 3.1 times and university students by 12 times.
When we look at the government budget in the 1950s, the portion 
spent on education accounted for about 20% of the total, which is seen 
as an impressive statement of the government’s commitment to educa-
tion, even in a time of war when defence spending took up about 50% 
of the entire budget. This laid the groundwork for what turned out to 
be an icon of Korea: a nation enthusiastic about education. It is often 
said that the ingredients for Korea’s success lie in its human resources. 
About 17 years ago, when a Korean law-maker who was visiting Cote 
d’Ivoire was asked by his counterpart what brought about Korea’s eco-
nomic development, he replied without hesitation that ‘it is the edu-
cation and the will of the people’. I would add to this that what really 
made the difference was the education that went beyond regular aca-
demic studies, like inculcation and regeneration of social values, and 
pragmatic and action-oriented courses like technical training.
Governmental Reform
While three of the ‘four cornerstones of development’—the land 
reform, empowerment of the people, and a revolution in education—
were launched during the Rhee Syng-man government, governmental 
reform, namely the creation of Korea’s National Tax Service, was under-
taken during the Park Chung-Hee government.
In 1966, the National Tax Service, the first of its kind, was established. 
If educational reform was the war against illiteracy, establishing the 
National Tax Service was waging a war against deep-seated corruption in 
government and business. This was symbolic of the government’s efforts 
to undertake self-reform to tackle corruption and improve services. The 
effect of the reform was almost immediate, as tax revenues grew by 51% 
on average from 1966 to 1969. The increase in tax revenue provided crit-
ical fiscal resources and helped Korea to become self-sustainable.
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During the time of President Park’s tenure in office, various efforts 
were made for nation-building and accordingly, many government agen-
cies, mechanisms and policies were created or launched. To name just 
a few, within the five years since Park Chung-Hee assumed power, the 
Economic Planning Board, the Rural Development Administration, 
the Ministry of Construction, the Board of Audit and Inspection, and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology were established. These were 
all very important and foundational organizations, but President Park 
is said to have particularly favoured the National Tax Service, and this 
organization soon became an all-powerful and authoritative government 
watchdog and enforcer of national revenue collection.
It is widely accepted that a meritocratic bureaucracy was critical for 
Korea’s fast development and this is one of the things that set Korea 
apart from most other developing countries. The advent of disciplined, 
capable and patriotic bureaucrats may have been bred by the Korean 
culture, but this would not have been possible in Korea without strong 
leadership and the commitment of the ruling elites to motivate govern-
ment officials in such a way. Recognition and promotion were effective 
tools that were used to maintain the meritocratic bureaucracy.
The ‘governmental reform’—in a wider context of rejuvenating and 
empowering the entire bureaucratic circle to become substantially more 
goal-oriented and ‘functional’—took place during the time of Park’s 
government. As we have seen, the principle of ‘incentives and punish-
ment’ that the government applied to businesses was also in fact applied 
to civil servants and, in this regard, to the general public as well.
On Koreans’ Temperament and Egalitarianism
As Korea went through a half-century of upheaval to enter the 
mature stage of development, it seemed timely that Koreans looked 
back and assess what their ingredients of success were with greater 
depth of perception. Over the years, a number of interesting works 
by Korean experts shedding light on the ‘secrets’ of the Korean peo-
ple’s temperament have emerged. Among them are Baek, Suk-Ki’s 
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Koreans’ Success DNA (2007) and Shin, Gwang-Chul’s Extremist 
Koreans, Extreme Creativity (2013).
What is interesting to note in this regard is that recent efforts to 
find explanations for Korea’s economic or developmental success from 
a Korean perspective are being increasingly drawn to the domain of 
national traits. Early observations both within and outside of Korea 
cited the general traits of Korean people as ‘hard-working’ or ‘diligence’.
But recent studies on the temperament of Koreans have become more 
sophisticated. Baek observes that this temperament has evolved over the 
course of Korea’s history. Traditionally, Koreans were known for their 
paternalism, veneration of literature, respect of traditional and moral 
values, respect for the elderly, originality and optimism, emotional sen-
sitivity, etc. But on the other hand, they also showed vanity, disunity, 
disregard for economy and pragmatism, laxity in terms of morality, 
obsessions with the past, lack of ambitions, lack of rationality and cour-
age, irresponsibility, self-righteousness, exclusivity and ignorance of the 
rule of law.16 However, as the people entered into a dramatic phase of 
transformation in the 1970s, they showed active and aggressive traits, 
blending Western rationality with their traditional values. Veneration of 
literature, social orderliness, courage, a challenging spirit, love of peace, 
ethics, paternalism, a taste for distraction and amusement, an egalitarian 
spirit, democratic values, creativity and humour were stressed. At the 
same time, emphasis on face-saving, emulation and accommodation of 
others, intervention in the affairs of others, superstitions, lack of cohe-
siveness, collective egotism, dichotomic thinking of what is just and 
unjust, and hastiness were pointed out as shortcomings.17
Baek lays out six uniquely Korean facets that drive Koreans to try to 
become ‘number one’ in the world: (1) emulating and meddling in oth-
ers’ affairs in order to surpass them; (2) employing full creativity and 
dynamism to create new values; (3) a bibimbap (mixed rice) culture of 
fusion and harmony (the icon of today’s network society); (4) a palli 
palli (quick, quick or hurry, hurry) temperament, which is ‘an advan-
tage in the digital age’; (5) a shinbalam (love of merriment) spirit serv-
ing as an impetus for the creation of new cultures; and (6) a zealous 
passion for education.18
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Shin, Gwang-Chul’s work is much more historical, detailed and ana-
lytical in terms of identifying and tracing the many originalities and fac-
ets of the Korean national ethos. He traces back as far as the ancient 
Korean kingdoms and highlights Korean cultural heritage as evidence. 
Here, the word ‘extremist’ or ‘extremism’ is used as a term to depict not 
religious or ideological radicalism, but how Korea has accommodated 
and embodied different things that are so different or in contrast to 
each other. Reading his book, I came to realize that the Korean national 
flag is a good reflection of this: the circle in the middle of the flag is 
derived from the philosophy of yin and yang, the balance and harmony 
of opposing forces.
According to Shin, Koreans have traditionally accepted ‘extremities’ 
or ‘opposites’, and this would be quite unique in this world. The char-
acteristics of Koreans are elaborated and summarized as the following 
four points: first, Koreans accommodate totally different and opposite 
elements, internalizing and socializing them; second, Koreans have the 
dynamism to ‘traverse’ between the two extremes to create new things; 
third, Koreans provide ‘middle grounds’ to avoid collisions between the 
extremes; and, fourth, Koreans have the ability to ‘integrate’ differing 
factors to bring about a greater whole.19
For example, when foreigners are asked to name one single trait that 
best describes Koreans, many would say it is the palli palli tempera-
ment. There are both positive and negative connotations to this, such 
as diligence, motivation and a positive work ethic, but also hastiness, 
quick-temperedness, social stress, etc. But interestingly enough, on the 
opposite side of palli palli, there is this trait of ‘composure and perse-
verance’ that is typical of Koreans. Patience, endurance and a ‘never give 
up’ spirit have been the hallmark of the Korean people. On the sur-
face, these two may seem to have no links whatsoever, but what drove 
Koreans to achieve success was not only the palli palli spirit, but, per-
haps more importantly, this contrasting ‘composure and perseverance’.20
In fact, South Koreans do have many inconsistent and conflicting 
attributes. For instance, when there is a ‘get-together night’ for office 
workers, everyone is expected to take part in the fun and revelry until 
very late into the night. They are allowed or encouraged to go to the 
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‘limits’. Often they are told they should not worry about work the next 
day. But it turns out that no one is excused for tardiness and laxity, and 
they are expected to show up on time to work the next day as if nothing 
had happened.
In Korea, different thoughts and ideologies, religion and culture are 
all merged to be re-created. During the last 2000 years, Koreans were 
subjected to Confucianism in every aspect, spiritually as well as in daily 
life. While China and Japan came into direct contact with Western 
powers and half-coercively opened their doors to let in capitalism, 
Korea was more receptive to Western civilization and influence because 
the US liberated Korea from Japanese colonial rule. Koreans were 
so envious of Western ideas, science and technology to the point that 
Koreans’ own traditions and values were being discounted, and hence 
the sense of Korean national identity was seriously curtailed. Korea’s tra-
ditional values were considered obsolete and the strong sense of urgency 
to ‘change’ led to Korea’s compressed economic development.
Having achieved modernization in an unprecedented manner and 
also having experienced the positives and negatives of rapid economic 
development in a competitive environment, Koreans have started to 
look back on their history and national identity. As Shin observes, now 
in Korea, traditional Confucianism and Western capitalism might be 
heading towards a collision. The ongoing talk of ‘economic democracy’ 
in Korea is consistent with the Confucian task of taking care of ‘people’s 
economic plight’. Confucianism values equality and humanism, while 
capitalism is based on competition and materialism. For a long time, 
Confucian values were seemingly put on the back-burner, but they have 
been flowing in the veins of Koreans and, according to Shin, are now on 
the rise.
Koreans may well be at a crossroads in terms of their value system 
and attitudinal orientations. They have achieved both unprecedented 
compressed economic development and democratization. Western ideas 
and system have fuelled the former, while the latter might be attributa-
ble to the ‘re-emergence’ of the Confucian values of egalitarianism and 
humanism. Western countries experienced industrialization and rapid 
economic growth before realizing democracy, and the Korean model 
of development is consistent with this modernization. But there is no 
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denying that the innate Korean national ethos made this transition pos-
sible in such a compressed manner.
Na, Jong-Seok has written a very insightful book on Korea’s 
Confucianism and democracy, in which he claims that Korea was able 
to achieve democracy based on its traditional Confucian values rather 
than through its adoption of the Western ideals of democracy. Na 
asserts that Korea’s democracy has flourished because it is rooted in its 
Confucianism and, unlike conventional thinking, Confucianism and 
democracy are not conflicting values.21 This may be true, and it pro-
vides food for thought for other developing countries struggling with 
political challenges and social cohesion.
The rise in people’s expectations, a rapidly ageing society, the increas-
ing influence of globalization, along with other factors pose new chal-
lenges to Korea. As competition and the income gap increase, so does 
social tension. Furthermore, there are increasing concerns that the 
youth today are mentally vulnerable and weak. Thus, Korea finds itself 
in need of once again reflecting on its national values and the way for-
ward. The new developments in the Korean Peninsula surrounding the 
issue of North Korea’s denuclearization, if it continues to make progress, 
can have no small impact on the national visions.
As Korea fully embarked on the modernization drive, the egalitarian-
ism spirit of Koreans re-emerged, albeit in a different form. The tradi-
tional egalitarianism was more of a ‘passive’ right or idealism bestowed 
or upheld by the kings and the leaders. The new modern egalitarianism 
in Korea was born in the very trying conditions, like the struggle against 
Japanese colonialism, the Korean War and the devastation of the land. 
As mentioned earlier, the 1950s set the stage for a series of bold reforms 
like the land reform that revamped the vested interests, leading the way 
towards a greater egalitarian mindset of the people.
The 1960s can be seen as a turning point in the history of Korean 
egalitarianism: ‘passive egalitarianism’ turned into ‘proactive egalitari-
anism’. This proactive egalitarianism was built on the traditional egal-
itarianism and humanism with the new ‘empowerment of the people’ 
policy pursued by the government. The government’s all-out moderni-
zation drive propelled the people to be more motivated and ‘egalitarian 
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minded’, and this proactive egalitarianism in turn helped the govern-
ment’s agenda of economic growth and rural development such as the 
Saemaul Undong. When Korea was well on its way to rapid industri-
alization, this egalitarian spirit was turning into a formidable force for 
political change. Korean democracy finally came of age in 1998 with 
the first-ever peaceful transfer of political power from the ruling party 
to the opposition party. What seemed impossible happened ‘overnight’ 
when votes were tallied for the presidential election, and the perennial 
opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung was declared the winner.
This showed that Korea is a land of surprises and dynamism that 
constantly reinvents itself. The year 2002 was marked by the ‘eruption’ 
of the Korean people’s passion when Korea co-hosted the FIFA World 
Cup with Japan. It was an important occasion for the Korean people, 
especially the younger generation, to uplift their pride and confidence, 
and rediscover themselves. It was also the year when a tragic accident 
took place, in which two Korean junior high-school girls were hit by a 
US army armoured vehicle. The US military court’s acquittal of the two 
servicemen in the vehicle sparked unprecedented anti-American senti-
ments and protests in Korea. In that year, the presidential election was 
won by Roh Moo-Hyun, the most progressive President the nation had 
ever seen. Roh’s election ushered in a new generation of Korean politi-
cians to power.
The Saemaul Undong (The New Village 
Movement)
In the 1960s, Korea posted record growth under the five-year economic 
development plans, but this policy drive, centred on industrialization, 
deepened the gap between urban and rural areas. Many people left 
rural areas to start new lives in the cities, and the growing discontent 
of the farmers became a political problem. Unemployment and pov-
erty emerged as social issues, and the agricultural sector was faced with 
labour shortages, causing a rise in agricultural production costs and 
threatening the viability of the sector.
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President Park Chung-Hee realized that economic development 
could not be fulfilled without rural development. It was necessary 
to improve the income of rural households and encourage people to 
remain in rural areas by providing more income-earning opportuni-
ties and employment. This called for drastic measures to reverse the 
problems caused by the unbalanced growth that was fuelled by rapid 
industrialization. The Saemaul Undong, which in the beginning had the 
appearance of a campaign for improving rural living conditions such as 
roads, housing, water supply, sewage and irrigation, soon turned out to 
be an all-out movement for transforming the rural sector and the nation 
as a whole.
The Saemaul Undong is a Korean community development model 
which contains the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation that is 
also shared in the urban areas as well. It is said that during those times, 
most rural areas in developing countries, including those in Asia, were 
trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, despite the flow of international 
aid and the government’s efforts. In this regard, the World Bank pointed 
out that it would be difficult to resolve the poverty situation without a 
special reform programme being in place.22
Korea was no exception, and before the Saemaul Undong started in 
the 1970s, in rural areas, about 80% of households were thatched roof 
houses and only 20% had an electricity supply. As there were no village 
entry roads for vehicles, even cultivators could not enter the villages. 
The situation in Korea back then is comparable to or even worse than 
what most Sub-Saharan African countries are facing today. But Korea 
was able to overcome this common and perennial dilemma, the under-
development of the rural-agricultural sector of developing countries, 
and enter the next threshold of development because of the drastic or 
‘revolutionary’ measures initiated by the Korean government in 1970.
Complementing this community movement was the government’s 
efforts to develop new varieties of rice as part of the Green Revolution 
and conducting large-scale land reclamation projects to create farmland. 
In the early stages, the Ministry of Internal Affairs played a leading role 
in this campaign by providing cement and other materials through the 
local administrative network. Later on, more ministries took part in 
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conducting the movement-related programmes, such as assisting rural 
households to find alternative sources of work out of season, forming 
cooperatives for the production of rice and barley, supplying electricity 
to rural areas and building factories.
The Saemaul Undong was launched as a mentally reformative move-
ment to make villagers aware of the spirit of diligence, self-help and 
cooperation, and a mental reform was achieved through practice and 
action instead of words and theory. The secret of the Saemaul Undong 
lies in its practicality, and it was a success because people themselves 
practised it. As was suggested earlier, the Saemaul Undong could not 
have been launched at a more opportune time. There was a sense of 
urgency in the population to get out of the misery in which they found 
themselves, and with the limited resources they could rely on, it was like 
they had no other choice but to work hard in order to earn a better 
living. If Koreans did not embark on such a movement at that time, 
they could have missed the critical opportunity to do so. It would have 
become increasingly difficult for the Korean people to take on hard-
ships or make ‘sacrifices’ for tomorrow as they might have already lost 
hope or motivation, or have fallen into the sinister trap of the vicious 
cycle of dependence that we witness today in many Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries.
The positive thing about the Saemaul Undong was that it bred a vir-
tuous cycle of voluntary collective work producing concrete results, and 
this reinforced the ‘can-do spirit’ of the people, which, in turn, brought 
about competition among villages and widening participation in the 
movement. The spreading of the Saemaul Undong not only in rural 
areas but also in urban areas and factories was like a ‘wild-fire’. What 
appears to have helped the farmers to be enthusiastic and confident was 
that Korea was already witnessing changes in the form of high growth in 
exports and industrialization in the 1960s.
At the beginning of the movement in 1971, the government is said to 
have provided 335 sacks (40 kg per sack) of cement to 33,267 villages, 
leaving it up to the villages to decide for themselves which projects they 
would use the cement for. As a result, villagers held community meet-
ings in which they elected Saemaul Undong leaders and agreed on which 
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projects they would undertake and how they would undertake them fol-
lowing long discussions. For instance, if the villagers decided to con-
struct a village entry road, they would work out specific plans on how 
to secure the necessary workers and land, and how to acquire and trans-
port gravel and sand, the raw materials needed to make concrete.
The Korean government evaluated the projects of all villages in 1972, 
one year after enacting the movement, and named 16,600 villages 
(approximately half of all villages in Korea) as ‘outstanding villages’. 
These outstanding villages were those that had successfully implemented 
Saemaul Undong projects and were provided with an additional supply 
of 500 sacks of cement and one ton of steel by the government. The 
villages that were not given additional government support were stimu-
lated by the government’s differentiated support system and, as a result, 
when all the villages were evaluated again a year later in 1973, some 
6000 villages were found to have implemented Saemaul Undong pro-
jects with their own resources and without government support.
Against this backdrop, the government classified villages into three 
categories: basic villages, self-help villages and self-reliant villages. 
Different projects were implemented in accordance with the level of 
performance and the level of government support was varied as a result. 
The principle of prioritized support to successful villages was applied. 
The strategy of Saemaul Undong can be summed up as being three-
pronged. First, the government played the role of jump-starting or 
igniting the villagers’ participation by giving limited support to spur the 
spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation. Second, villagers started 
with practical projects in which they can participate and benefit from, 
and implemented the projects in a democratic process. Third, villagers 
fully embraced the principle of prioritized support to outstanding vil-
lages designed to induce the spirit of self-help and cooperation.
Jai-Chang Lee elaborates and sheds insights on the spirit of the 
Saemaul Undong: as the Saemaul Undong is a mental reform movement, 
its underlying spirit is emphasized all the more; however, in the past, 
many developing countries around the world attempted to develop the 
rural sector through so-called community development movements 
without success; the most important reason for their failure was that 
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they were devoid of the component of mindset reform given that such 
type of rural transformation initiatives, in essense, requires mindset 
reform based on its own social-moral fabric like cultures, traditions and 
national spirit; this was in contrast to Korea’s Saemaul Undong, which 
was implemented based on the home-grown spirit of diligence, self-help 
and cooperation.23
There are many proverbs that underscore the virtue of the Saemaul 
Undong spirits: ‘the early bird gets the worm (diligence)’, ‘heaven helps 
those who help themselves (self-help)’ and ‘two heads are better than 
one (cooperation)’, to name but a few. In Korea, there was a traditional 
cooperative agricultural group called durae and a traditional culture 
called hyangyak, a village code of conduct followed within agricultural 
communities. These traditional Korean heritages became the basis of 
the Saemaul Undong spirit, and the people’s strong yearning to escape 
poverty ignited the Saemaul Undong spirit of diligence, self-help and 
cooperation.24
In the initial stage of the Saemaul Undong, the government supplied 
villagers with basic raw materials such as cement and steel, while pro-
viding them with some technical guidelines. The villagers were able to 
execute by themselves the projects to improve their basic living envi-
ronment with the backing of the government. For example, kitchens, 
fences and sewages were modernized in households, and village entry 
roads were widened and paved, and public laundry facilities as well 
as public wells were constructed through the Saemaul Undong living 
environment projects. In addition, training was conducted in order to 
enlighten villagers with the Saemaul Undong spirit and to nurture their 
leadership.
The second stage involved building communal infrastructure and 
implementing production and income-generating projects with the 
SMU spirit and project experience that had been acquired. The main 
projects for improving infrastructure included the construction of 
bridges, clearing of village streams, paving farming roads and build-
ing irrigation facilities. Meanwhile, livestock breeding, horticulture, 
non-agricultural income-generating business, cooperative productions, 
greenhouse farming and speciality crop farming, such as of herbs, can 
be cited as examples of the income-generating projects implemented at 
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the time. During this stage, professional education on construction and 
farming as well as mental training was conducted.
In the third stage, various projects for common profit were imple-
mented based on the SMU spirit accumulated through previous pro-
jects. Public funds were raised through the Saemaul Undong credit 
union, cooperative project committees, village stores and the selling of 
food during special events. In addition, public village facilities such as 
village libraries, barber shops, baby care centres, public storages, rice 
mills, workshops and public farming machines were provided.
The fourth stage saw the expansion of the Saemaul Undong to 
urban areas. SMU, which started as a rural development movement, 
further developed nationwide during this stage. Urban Saemaul 
Undong was implemented in the cities by promoting public order, 
kindness and cleanliness. Energy saving, the promotion of frugal life-
styles and the improvement of product quality as well as productivity 
were promoted through quality control campaigns in companies and 
factories.
In more recent times, efforts have been made to promote the Saemaul 
Undong as a new national movement that can adjust to changes in 
Korean society under such slogans as ‘Green Korea, Smart Korea, 
Happy Korea, and Global Korea movement’. Good examples of the 
new Saemaul Undong are the national campaign to gather gold in order 
to recover from economic crisis, a win-win movement to promote coop-
eration between employers and employees in businesses, and various 
social service movements.
Even though great progress was made through the Saemaul Undong, 
trial and error could not be avoided. But the important thing was that 
improvements were made as villagers searched for ways to rectify short-
comings in themselves, while the government provided timely and ade-
quate guidelines.25
Lastly, according to the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre, the suc-
cess factors of the Saemaul Undong can be identified as follows: 
(1) voluntary participation of villagers; (2) democratic decision-making; 
(3) dedicated leaders; (4) differentiated support by the government; and 
(5) grassroots-level (village unit) execution.26
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by villagers and played the role of a leader based on the Saemaul train-
ing they received at the Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute. 
Saemaul awards were given to leaders in accordance with their accom-
plishments to raise their morale. Fourth, the government prioritized 
support to well-performing villages to induce competition based on 
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Traditional villages in Korea were able to bring about cooperative spirit 
and common profit that worked for the Saemaul Undong (Jai Chang 
Lee, 2012).
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Lessons of Fundamentals of Economics 
and Industrialization
Sub-Saharan African countries are still grappling with the issue of how 
to tackle poverty and move up the economic ladder. For any poor coun-
try wanting to break out of its lot and join the ranks of rich nations, 
realizing structural, wide-ranging and continuous changes in all sec-
tors is a necessity. Those economies that have successfully emerged in a 
transformative fashion were able to do so because they were progressing 
on multiple fronts, as was the case in many East Asian and Southeast 
Asian nations. South Korea pushed forward many social, educational, 
economic and governmental ‘reforms’ and launched industrialization 
and rural development in a ‘concurrent’ manner.
The worst-case scenario would be where a poor country with no 
resources remains idle and fails to undertake any significant economic 
initiatives. Resource-rich countries are better off as they can rely on 
these resources, but the danger of the Dutch Disease (the problem of 
production of natural resources causing a decline in other sectors like 
manufacturing) wrought by a commodity-based monocultural economy 
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looms in these countries. Hence, an unsavoury recipe for the countries 
would be a combination of a resource-rich, commodity-dependent 
structure with bad management, and a lack of sense of ownership or 
a workable strategy. Evidently, hardly any countries have successfully 
developed simply by relying on their natural resources.
An IMF report released in April, 2017 confirmed that oil-exporting 
countries and other resource-intensive countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
were showing the worst economic performance in the region.1 Even 
countries like Botswana and Zambia that enjoyed a reputation for 
good governance and were regarded as models in Sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced problems related to a commodity-dependent economy. 
Traditionally, African economies which are primarily reliant on agricul-
tural produce like cacao, coffee and tea have experienced vulnerability 
with the fluctuation of international market prices. While commodity 
prices have been recovering in 2018, various economic forecasts point 
to rather sluggish growth for the resource-rich African countries.
And then, of course, we see a preponderance of economic liberali-
zation, free trade and investment in Africa. Somehow, the myth that 
privatization, liberalization and the influx of foreign companies will, in 
themselves, unleash the full economic potential of their country has set-
tled in Africa. In appearance, this has all the bearings of a positive trend 
and can certainly help, but it masks the untoward side of the reality. 
In order or any policy to be successful, the government must assume 
responsibility and a hands-on posture. All policies have drawbacks as 
well as advantages, and this should not be forgotten. Furthermore, dif-
ferent policies require different conditions and although trial and error 
is inevitable, appropriate rectifying measures must follow. However, the 
tendency seems to be that the authorities opt for convenience and the 
easy way out.
Basically, in order for any organization to function properly, it would 
require positive leadership from the top and adherence to its rules or pol-
icies by the members. The stronger such traits are, the more efficient the 
organization will be. And in the case of governmental bureaucracy, this 
should be all the more evident. The bigger the hierarchical structure of an 
organization, the greater the ‘trickle-down effect’ the quality of leadership 
9 Applicability of the Korean Development Model for Africa     247
will have on the organization. There is an old Korean saying that ‘upper 
stream water must be clean for downstream water to be clean’.
There is also a cliché that says ‘action speaks louder than words’. 
Public services are delivered by actions, and the timely provision of 
services is of the utmost importance. The credibility, authority and 
efficiency of the state stem from the everyday performance of the gov-
ernmental bureaucracy, which is determined by the devotion and 
actions of civil servants. When we are talking about producing real out-
comes, that is, being productive, we mean making an improvement over 
time. The variables are intrinsically ‘change’ and ‘speed’, or how fast this 
change can be made. Change or improvement can be either quantitative 
or qualitative, or both. The measure of progress is how much and how 
fast things can be done.
Myopic vision, which is not looking ahead, and expediency, which 
is choosing what is convenient now rather than what will yield bet-
ter results tomorrow, both come with costs. A typical example is when 
requests are made to build factories, training institutes, etc., but after 
they have gotten them from development partners, the familiar pat-
tern of mismanagement ensues. Often the training and consulting 
provided to local officials and operators are rendered futile as soon as 
they are handed over. Of course, some projects manage to survive and 
last as intended, proving to be useful, but these are the exceptions to 
the rule.
Also, in many countries, there seems to be a tendency for people 
wanting things for the sake of ‘possession’, as an end in themselves, 
rather than to utilize them as a means to extract additional or greater 
benefits. I have met many African officials, businessmen and rural lead-
ers who would say that once they receive investments and factories, 
everything else will take care of itself. But in order to run a factory, 
people need utilities, management, maintenance, skills and capacities, 
funding, etc. Securing a facility in its physical form is one thing, but 
operating it successfully is another thing entirely.
In the context of addressing poverty, African leaders are urging their 
rural populace to get out of the subsistence way of life and engage in more 
productive activities to generate income. For peasants, subsistence means 
getting by with what they can find around them without being far-sighted 
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and having a long-term plan in place. However, the problem of ‘subsist-
ence’ is also inherent in other sectors, including the public sector.
As laid out in the African Union (AU)’s Agenda 2063, all African 
countries aspire to growth and sustainable development, and aim for 
a ‘structurally transformed’ economy. And every leader seems to have 
industrialization in mind. It will be difficult to imagine having struc-
tural transformation of economy without industrialization or a man-
ufacturing sector. Figure 9.1 represents manufacturing as a percentage 
of GDP, comparing Sub-Saharan Africa with East Asia, Southeast 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. It shows the persistently 
low level of Africa’s manufacturing sector in its post-independence era. 
Interestingly, in the early 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa started with a 
higher percentage compared to East Asia, but now there is about a 15% 
difference between them: the figure for East Asia is about 25%, while 
Sub-Saharan Africa is hovering around 10%, and this is even lower than 
Southeast Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
The challenge, as well as the opportunity, facing Africa’s manufac-
turing is shown in the composition of import and exports in Fig. 9.2. 
Manufactured goods make up almost 60% of its imports, while energy 
(mostly oil) constitutes the dominant export. Agriculture makes up 
Fig. 9.1 Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP by selected global regions 
(Source calculation in Ifs v. 7.33 (five-year average); ISS South Africa, ‘Made in 
Africa’ (April 2018))
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around 12% of imports and around 10% of exports. Sub-Saharan 
Africa has a huge agricultural potential, but its dependence on food 
imports is growing, with nine countries depending on imports for 
more than 40% of their demand.2 The weakness in African countries’ 
manufacturing is closely related to the uncompetitiveness or high cost 
of its labour force relative to their average income levels, which is the 
combination of many things: workers’ skill levels, poor infrastructure, 
institutions, health conditions, etc. Hence, it is generally considered 
that ‘African labour cost needs to be cheap enough to compensate for 
other benefits. South Africa stands out as a middle-income country 
with particularly high labour costs and a very capital-intensive indus-
trial sector’.3
Exports are what African countries have counted on, but their share 
of global exports has declined over the past 35 years from 4.5% in 1980 
to 3.0% in 2015, and the exported items are mainly commodities, with 
the share of manufacturing exports declining from 0.4 to 0.3% over the 
same period.4 Even maintaining their level of exports, let alone expand-
ing and upgrading industrial capacity, is not a simple task. In 2016, 
Africa’s GDP growth fell to 1.4%, its slowest rate for more than two 
decades.5
Fig. 9.2 Most important import and export sectors: Africa’s trade with world 
(rest) (Source calculation in IFS? v. 7.33; ISS South Africa, ‘Made in Africa’ (April 
2018))
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There is a choice that Sub-Saharan African countries have to make: 
first, they can either accept the hard reality and make the most of 
(or do what best they could with) the given economic conditions; or, 
alternatively, they can make extraordinary efforts to transform and 
upgrade their industrial and economic structure adopting a set of differ-
ent and bold measures. But neither of these two options would be com-
fortable ones for African countries to espouse. The first choice would be 
difficult for countries to bear because what it really means is resigning to 
the reality and the status quo, while the second choice entails significant 
burdens, commitment, endurance, focus and effective mobilization of 
work.
The choice is up to each Sub-Saharan African nation to make, but 
most African countries can end up stuck in the middle between these 
two options. What Africa leaders and elites really have in mind, and 
what they intend to do, matters. But in any case, what they seem to 
prioritize is to lure as much foreign investment and companies as pos-
sible to stimulate businesses and the economy. However, the possibility 
of a quick fix in the economy is virtually non-existent if it is to be trans-
formational. Such approach will have inherent limitations without the 
expected increase in income and employment, and capital accumulation 
or reinvestment, if many other conditions that Africans themselves need 
to satisfy are not met. And these are essentially all human factors: strong 
oversight for business support, a business-facilitating environment, 
sound corporate governance, a high level of economic-mindedness 
and rational thinking, a sense of public duty and ownership, discipline 
amongst officials, etc.
Should African economies undergo structural transformation, the 
conventional path would be to move from a traditional economy to 
an industrial economy, and then to a tertiary industry economy. The 
world is buzzing about ‘industry 4.0’ or the fourth industrial revolu-
tion, which is the new generation industrial revolution that combines 
manufacturing technologies and ICT.6 Such a development path is that 
which developed countries have undergone. The UK was the leader in 
industrialization, and other European countries and the US followed 
suit. In Asia, Japan was the first to successfully transform and later 
South Korea realized unprecedented compressed economic growth.
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There is no economically developed country that remains a primar-
ily agricultural economy without a manufacturing industrial capability. 
Even an agriculture-based economy will need a certain level of manufac-
turing capability in order to reap meaningful benefits from its agricul-
tural sector. And it requires much greater industrialization to move to 
the second phase of development, and then to the third phase of tertiary 
industry or the service sector, which includes commerce, finance, insur-
ance, tourism, public health, mass media, consulting, education, enter-
tainment and logistics.
Unfortunately for developing countries, we are now living in the 
era of globalization that is so much more competitive. Such an envi-
ronment inhibits the growth of domestic industries in the ‘fragile’ econ-
omies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than moving along each stage in 
a linear trajectory, developing countries may have to pursue all these 
three phases concurrently, given the circumstances of today’s globalized 
world.7
However, African countries should not give up industrialization 
because they need to, and actually can, achieve industrialization, even 
while the age of ‘new globalization’ of industrial robots and 3D printers 
is dawning before us: their best chance of industrializing in the com-
ing decades will be to focus on intra-regional trade and targeting agri-
culture-based industrialization, because these are less affected by global 
competition and trends. The developing agricultural sector is also cru-
cial in that it can absorb the fast-growing youth population into rural 
areas.8
On the other hand, while Africa’s industrialization lags behind, 
the new global developments may now work to Africa’s advantage: 
the impact of digitization of production and the trend towards locat-
ing manufacturing closer to markets—what Baldwin termed the new 
globalization and the phenomenon of the ‘great convergence’.9 Such 
characteristics of the ‘new globalization’ like greater participation by 
emerging economies and the growing role of small enterprises is I think 
worth noting from Africa’s perspective.
According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the ‘new globaliza-
tion’ that has emerged in the twenty-first century is different from the 
‘old globalization’ of the twentieth century, and these two forms of 
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globalization have contrasting features: tangible flows of physical goods 
vs. intangible flow of data and information; flows mainly between 
advanced economies vs. greater participation by emerging economies; 
capital and labour-intensive flows vs. more knowledge-intensive flows; 
transportation infrastructure being critical for flows vs. digital infra-
structure becoming equally important; multi-national companies drive 
flows vs. the growing role of small enterprises and individuals; the flow 
mainly of monetized transactions vs. more exchanges of free contents 
and services; ideas diffusing slowly across boarders vs. instant global 
access to information; and innovation flows from advanced to emerging 
economies vs. innovation flows in both directions.10
Some argue that leapfrogging in terms of technology is both possi-
ble and desirable for many Sub-Saharan African nations. To a certain 
extent, this is already happening in the region, like the widespread usage 
of wireless internet and mobile phones forgoing communication requir-
ing wire connection, and economic transactions using ICT like mobile 
money services. Others point out the global trend of the expanding ser-
vice sector and the dwindling manufacturing sector, but this does not 
negate the need for Africa to continuously pursue industrialization.
Reflecting on the Korean Experience and Africa’s 
Reality
Korea’s economic dynamism is a testament to the veracity of the princi-
ples of the market economy. As we have seen, Korea did not rely solely 
on market mechanisms, but it certainly used markets to its full advan-
tage. There are differing views on whether Korea’s economic success is 
due to the adoption of orthodox capitalism and free market-oriented 
policies, but it is fair to say that Korea utilized other measures to supple-
ment and reinforce capitalism and markets, and not to substitute them. 
In hindsight, this was perhaps inevitable and necessary. Otherwise, 
Korea would not have achieved such a feat if it were not for the extraor-
dinary measures it took, considering the disadvantageous conditions 
and state of underdevelopment in which it found itself.
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All things considered, the Korean model of development does pro-
vide good lessons and reference points for emulation for Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Although the Korean case can be considered an 
exceptional and dramatic example, and hence difficult for others to rep-
licate with success, this does not diminish its value and relevance—it 
serves as a forceful reminder of what is possible for developing nations.
One of the lessons to draw from Korea’s experience is that develop-
ment efforts can only work if they are supported by the essential ‘foun-
dations’ that must be put in place at the early stages of development. 
This is to say that a sort of ‘multi-tasking’ is required. The reason why 
economic and development policies do not work well in Sub-Saharan 
African countries is that the basic foundations that are necessary to sup-
port them are very weak or almost non-existent.
There cannot be a quick fix to economic challenges and the fun-
damentals must always be observed. If development is to take place 
nationally and sustainably, then industrialization should go hand in 
hand with rural-agricultural development and empowerment of the 
people. The industrial sector cannot be built out of thin air. Even if 
the physical conditions are favourable for industrialization, there is still 
a need for human resources to make it work. In order for factories to 
properly operate, what is required are capital, a skilled labour force, 
good management, a steady supply of utilities, satisfactory infrastruc-
tures, etc. In the region, things tend to degenerate into vicious circles 
because one thing after another is lacking, and there is little effort made 
to fix the situation.
Returning to the fundamentals of economics, the basic production 
factors—land, labour and capital—are all necessary means for indus-
trialization, and technology, which is treated as an exogenous variable 
in economics, is a key element for enhancing production. In order for 
any underdeveloped country to modernize, it would need capital in the 
form of both physical and human capital. So, how can countries amass 
the necessary capital for development in the first place? The answer is 
that they should start with utilizing what is already available to them. 
In the early stages of economic development or industrialization, except 
for city states or commercial hub cities, the majority of the populace 
would be living in rural areas, working in the primary sectors that 
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include agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries, etc. Without the devel-
opment of these sectors, there cannot be wealth creation enabling a 
transition to the secondary industry of reprocessing and manufacturing, 
ranging from light industries to heavy industries.
As we have already seen, the Korean government laid the ground-
work for industrial transformation with rural reform, namely land 
reform and pro-poor empowerment of people policies, before embark-
ing on an export drive in the early 1960s. The Saemaul Undong was 
launched in 1970, and following this, urban and rural development was 
concurrently pursued, while export promotion and the Saemaul Undong 
produced synergistic effects.
The ideal for developing countries would be to push for agricultural- 
rural sector development and industrialization at the same time in a way 
that results in these two producing mutually reinforcing effects. But in 
Africa, the primary industry largely remains ‘traditional agriculture’. A 
sensible path for economic development would be prioritizing industri-
alization in the agricultural sector, where their comparative advantage 
lies. This makes sense not only economically but also politically, because 
the vast majority of people are villagers and farmers. Today, as the mar-
ginalization of the rural populace continues amid a population explo-
sion and worsening income disparities, the countries should have no 
choice but to deal with this challenge more proactively.
The example of Korea is not the only case of vindication of the pro-
poor rural-agricultural policy for developing countries. Unlike many 
African countries, Korea is resource-poor and has unfavourable natural 
conditions. Africa, with its vast arable land, fertile soil and abundance 
of natural resources, has all the more reason to be enthusiastic and 
focused on rural-agricultural development. Scholars who have studied 
the divergence in development between Asian and African countries will 
notice what is underlying the situation, as David Henley does:
In South-East Asia, elite attitudes to village life, although condescending, 
are often also marked by nostalgia and a degree of admiration. Although 
Africa has had no lack of rulers with rural origins, their attitude to rural 
life has mostly been much less positive. Consequently they have tended to 
see development not as a matter of improving the living conditions of the 
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peasant masses in situ, but rather as a question of accelerating the tran-
sition from rural backwardness to urban modernity, of which their own 
lives have been a microcosm. This has led them to favour elitist develop-
ment strategies aimed at acquiring symbols of developed-country status 
(universities, steelworks, information technology, human rights) rather 
than meeting the urgent practical challenge of making poor people richer 
by whatever means lie immediately at hand.11
It is understandable that in Africa, frustrations are vented by those 
who follow the news on global trends like ‘the fourth industrial revolu-
tion’. A Ugandan intellect asks:
Why Sub-Saharan Africa has never undergone an industrial and manu-
facturing revolution, despite repeated declarations and summit commu-
niqués by heads of state during the past 50 years? … we must try to look 
for the root causes, while acknowledging that the failure to industrialise 
is not due to absence of blue prints or elaborate government policy doc-
uments in the ministries, like that of industry. Today, we live in an era 
of national visions, with target dates, to which we add international blue 
prints issued by the United Nations.12
He went on to admit that the role of the government is central for 
industrialization, but blamed the dictates of the World Bank and the 
IMF’s liberalization for greatly undermining the role of the state.
The tasks for latecomers to industrialization were to learn, emulate 
and adopt the know-how and technology of advanced industrial econ-
omies. Under the circumstances, Sub-Saharan African countries need a 
combination of technologies: hi-tech, modern, conventional and appro-
priate. The benefit of being developing countries is that it is easy to 
get technical transfers from other countries. These and so many other 
things should have already been done by African countries. And let 
us not forget that before contemplating the ‘industrial revolution’ and 
developing the manufacturing sector, rural-agricultural development 
initiatives should have been undertaken.
Speaking of the capitalist economic system, there were a number of 
different types of capitalism in the world history. A crude form of mar-
ket economy had existed since the beginning of world civilization, and 
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agrarian capitalism, mercantilism and industrial capitalism existed well 
before modern free-market capitalism.13 What should be noted is that 
nearly all the currently existing capitalist economies are mixed econo-
mies, which combine elements of free markets with state intervention 
and, surely in some cases, economic planning. There is no such thing 
as a 100% liberal market economy in our reality, as pointed out by 
Ha-Joon Chang (2002, 2008, 2010). On ‘transformative industrial 
policy for Africa’, Chang stressed that industrialization must remain 
at the centre of African development, despite the prevailing economic 
orthodoxy, and that manufacturing and agriculture can work to sup-
port each other. He saw that African countries can still find room 
amid World Trade Organization regulations and the penetration of 
monopoly producers to achieve high levels of development through 
industrialization.14
No doubt, as was argued by Joseph Schumpeter, capitalism is the 
most effective economic system that the world has seen, as it creates 
wealth through the continuous process of advancing levels of produc-
tivity and technological sophistication. Therefore, in order to advance 
the state of economic development of African countries, due attention 
must be paid to advancing their ‘capitalistic system’ in terms of eco-
nomic performance. However, amid vague expectations that somehow 
the free market will get things working, the fundamentals have been 
ignored. And what happened to innovations and ‘creative destruction’ 
that are supposed to come about following the progression of capitalism 
in Africa?
For decades, the Washington Consensus, the imposition of the 
neo-liberalist approach and even the giving of foreign aid itself were 
frequently cited by Africans and others as obstacles to Africa’s develop-
ment. But irrespective of the extent to which these have actually had 
an impact on African countries, these countries cannot be ‘exonerated’ 
from failing to carry out their innate responsibilities. The case of Korea 
is a sobering reminder of what needs to be done for a poor nation to 
move up the ladder of development, and its lesson is that aid, whether 
in the form of grants or financial loans, will be helpful when properly 
utilized. Foreign assistance itself is not the problem, as it is simply a 
means to an end. One can use it usefully or render it useless, and aid 
9 Applicability of the Korean Development Model for Africa     257
would not necessarily root out resources for the private sector or inhibit 
its growth. Business and the economy fail not flourish in the region not 
because there is too much aid, but because there is a lack of economic 
activities in the first place: modest entrepreneurship, a non- committal 
attitude when it comes to economic activities and investing their 
resources for future gains, etc.
Successful and creative entrepreneurs have certainly emerged in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but they are too few in number and it takes much more 
than talented businessmen to turn around the economy. Recent reports 
confirm that Africa is still the most commodity-dependent continent 
in the world. In order to uplift and invigorate the economy, African 
countries need to have manufacturing industries that can export to cre-
ate jobs and generate income for the rapidly growing population. Of 
course, it has become harder to industrialize. When developed countries 
and Asian countries industrialized, they did so in a different interna-
tional setting from that in which African countries now find themselves. 
However, we should ask why Africa has not been able to build up a 
manufacturing industry when many others have been able to do so. As 
even African Development Bank experts point out, regardless of the 
hurdles facing Africa today, ‘manufacturing remains the best hope for 
SSA to generate a large number of good jobs and reduce the prospects 
of political and social instability’.15
Achieving successful economic transformation would be unthinkable 
without an evolution in the manufacturing sector. Yes, there has been 
a lot of talk of entrepreneurship and buzz about business start-ups in 
many Sub-Saharan African countries, encouraged by the likes of CNN’s 
African Start Up and Africa Marketplace programmes. While this is to 
be commended as positive, there is also some cause for worry. Leaving 
the vast segment of the populace in the private sector to survive in the 
wilderness of open markets by virtue of their creativity may be not the 
most responsible thing to do. Even in one of the most innovative coun-
tries like Korea, today about 70% of all start-up businesses fail within 
a few years. We should heed the warnings that premature deindustri-
alization is neither a desirable nor an inevitable trend for developing 
countries.
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Many prominent scholars like Dani Rodrik, Ha-Joon Chang and 
Joseph Stiglitz have stressed the importance of realizing and deepen-
ing industrialization for developing countries. As noted earlier, Rodrik 
has written about the ‘perils of premature deindustrialization’. Chang 
stressed that the idea put forward by neo-liberalists that countries can 
skip the industrialization phase and move on to the deindustrialization 
stage is simply an illusion; since the service industry is inherently small-
scale and has limitations in terms of its production capacity, it cannot 
be a sufficient driving force for economic growth. Furthermore, ser-
vice goods are not easily traded, so service sector-based economies lack 
exporting capabilities; according to Chang, this in turn curtails export 
earnings and the ability to purchase foreign technologies, jeopardizing 
economic growth.16
Joseph Stiglitz has lately expressed that the government plays a cen-
tral role in shaping the economy, not only through formal policies 
(industrial, and expenditure and tax), but also in writing the rules of the 
game, and the economic structure is inevitably affected by the way in 
which the government structures markets.17 In that sense, Stiglitz men-
tions that every country has an industrial policy, but some countries 
do not know it, and when governments are not self-conscious in their 
direction of the economy, this opens up the possibility of special inter-
ests greatly influencing the economy, leading to pervasive inefficiencies, 
lower growth and more inequality.18
One would think that Korea has already achieved a full cycle of 
industrialization, but in his recent book There Is No Korea After 3 Years, 
Byeong Ho Gong warns Korea against deprioritizing the manufactur-
ing sector.19 If the manufacturing industry is still vital for countries like 
Korea, which is the sixth-largest exporting nation in the world, what 
does this say about other developing countries?
Building an industrial economy for Sub-Saharan African countries 
should begin in the agricultural sector. In fact, on many occasions, 
African heads of state have convened to be reminded of, and recom-
mit to, this need. For instance, they recommitted themselves to the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
in Malabo in 2014. The CAADP is a continental framework with a 
2025 vision for promoting inclusive growth and prosperity through 
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investment in the agricultural sector. African countries are said to 
have taken the lead and put in place their own National Agriculture 
Investment Plans (NAIPs). Once again, there is no lack of expres-
sion, but the problem always lies in the implementation. The com-
missioner for the rural economy and agriculture at the African Union 
Commission writes:
According to World Bank, evidence shows that in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), investing in agriculture is 11 times more rewarding in reducing 
poverty than investment in other sectors. Data show that 80% of mar-
keted agricultural production in SSA comes from smallholders, 60% 
being women. The issue, therefore, is no longer whether the agriculture 
sector is important; it is rather how Africa should invest boldly in its agri-
food systems so as to leapfrog the structural transformation of the overall 
African economies … In order to sustain the achievement and to accel-
erate the implementation of agricultural plans, countries will need to 
invest in systemic capacity building. The youth should be equipped with 
knowledge, if we want our agriculture to go the extra mile. African coun-
tries should rethink their capacity building strategies by focusing more on 
vocational training.20
A collective awareness that agriculture must be the priority sector to 
target for Africa’s development seems to have materialized and gathered 
momentum among African leaders and experts, as well as international 
organizations like the World Bank. Without any doubt, the establish-
ment of a sound agricultural industry will form the bedrock of eco-
nomic transformation in Sub-Saharan African countries.
As much as rural-agricultural development is strategic for Sub-
Saharan Africa, its realization cannot be expected to happen overnight 
either. However challenging the task may be, African governments and 
peoples must be patient and persist in their efforts. To begin with, while 
it would be desirable to add value to agricultural products and enhance 
the value chain, it is also crucial, in the meantime, to boost the produc-
tion of crops. People were inclined to believe that because there is no 
market and poor infrastructure to transport agricultural goods in Africa, 
there is no use producing in mass quantities. But more and more African 
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farmers are realizing that good production, in terms of both quantity 
and quality, is paying off. The stable production of large amounts of 
commodities of consistent quality are what everybody—the government, 
investors, private firms, donors and international organizations—is look-
ing for, and the demand for these seems to be on the rise.
Korea’s experience underscores the importance of the agricultural 
sector. Korea realized its Green Revolution and White Revolution 
during the period of the modernization drive in 1970s and 1980s. 
Throughout Korea’s history, for the sake of stability and security amid 
external threats and invasions, increasing food production was a long- 
cherished desire of the nation. From the early 1960s, Korea set out its 
first National Economic Development Plan to pursue self-sufficiency in 
food production, making it a priority on the national agenda. As the 
government actively pursued various policies to increase food produc-
tivity, by the latter half of 1970s, Korea was able to achieve 100% self- 
sufficiency in rice production, which is the main national staple.21 The 
achievement of self-sufficiency in rice production in Korea is referred to 
as the Green Revolution. This was accomplished through R&D efforts 
in the agricultural sector and a new technology transfer system, such as 
increased rice productivity through improved rice varieties, as well as 
the development of cultivation technologies and the swift dissemination 
of new technologies to farmers.
This process was also driven by the government’s commitment 
through its policies and practices on building infrastructure related to 
rice production, flexible production and supply chains for materials 
such as fertilizers and chemical pesticides. Self-sufficiency in rice pro-
duction became a cornerstone for strengthening the basis of national 
economic development not only for procuring food security and boost-
ing incomes of farm households, but also for saving foreign currency 
required to import foreign rice.
The White Revolution refers to the modernization of the structure, 
material and technology of greenhouses in Korea needed to achieve the 
rapid expansion of protected cultivation areas and to produce a stable 
supply of vegetables from the 1970s to the 1990s. The name derives 
from the extensive use of white-coloured plastic or polyethylene films 
for greenhouses. Before the 1970s, all plastic films were imported into 
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Korea, but greenhouse vegetable production became popular from the 
1970s onwards, when Korea built up its petrochemical industry. In this 
respect, industrialization greatly benefited the agricultural sector.
Before vinyl houses or greenhouses were used in Korea, vegetables 
could not be grown in winter, but once they became available, farmers 
were able to produce them all year round, which also benefited consum-
ers, who could enjoy fresh vegetables all the time. In the 1980s, flower 
growing became possible, and now even fruits (including some tropical 
fruits) are being produced in greenhouses in Korea. Nowadays, ‘smart 
greenhouses’ with remote control technology are being developed. The 
White Revolution greatly contributed to Korea’s rural employment and 
income generation, which in turn helped support the national economy. 
Economic growth as well as government plans and policies enabled the 
rapid expansion of protected cultivation using greenhouses in a very 
short period of time.22
Another critical element in Korea’s successful development is the land 
reform that has been mentioned earlier. In many African countries, 
the system of ownership of land is managed in a ‘flexible’ but ‘random’ 
manner. While there is a need not to disrupt the status quo in land 
rights for the sake of social stability, a systematic and universal designa-
tion of land ownership must be enacted in the longer run for the effi-
cient use of land for economic purposes.
Relevance of the Korean Development Model or 
Experience
South Korea’s development experience and ‘model’ has many implica-
tions for Sub-Saharan African countries and it should be heeded from a 
practical as well as an academic viewpoint. Having come across a wide 
range of works on Africa’s development conducted by a multitude of 
entities and having attended so many meetings, seminars and lectures 
on the topic, I cannot shrug off the impression that today’s business 
in development has become too technical and routine, without being 
substantive. We seem to be lost in a world of logic and science, as if 
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sharing rational and sophisticated thinking is the solution to problems. 
However, the essence of development is about doing, often needing to 
touch base with people at the grassroots level.
Africa’s development programmes have failed to bear fruit not 
because the methods were wrong, but because people were not enacting 
them. Hence, the task is twofold: to basically ‘adapt’ to local conditions, 
but at the same time to ‘challenge’ the locals to change their attitudes 
and behaviour for the better. Thus, how to bring about change is key, 
and shaping perceptions, incentives and disincentives (or ‘punishments’) 
are of great importance. In this respect, Korea’s development experience 
can provide useful food for thought as the Korean model is, in itself, an 
epitome of ‘development as practice’.
In this respect, so much needs to be done, and one part of this is 
strengthening the social capital in African communities and society at 
large from the standpoint of practicality. However, albeit slowly, a cer-
tain level of awareness and endeavours to this end seem to be materializ-
ing in the region. For instance, Amin Mawji, who is the Representative 
of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Uganda, has com-
piled best practice ideas of civil society in Africa in his book Poverty to 
Prosperity, in which he emphasizes values and ethics besides highlighting 
the best practices, and notes that ‘an interesting challenge facing society 
today is how to motivate people from a cross-section of society – across 
tribe, colour, creed – to collaborate, to work together, to share’.23
The success of Sub-Saharan African countries is not assured even if 
they all adopt the same model of development, but their performance 
will depend not only on how they work on the basics, but also on how 
they compete and collaborate among themselves. And in the end, each 
nation has to figure out and pursue the best strategy for it to be compet-
itive. And there is no need to prejudge or presume what is appropriate 
for the countries on their behalf. The value of the development model 
and examples should be gauged not on how much they can be easily 
replicated, but rather on how much motivation and positive impact 
they can bring to the countries.
Some experts are dismissive of the Korean case, claiming that it is an 
exceptional case and one which cannot have much relevance for devel-
oping countries. But there is strong merit in the Korean case being 
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dramatic, forceful and clear-cut, and thus it should not be dismissed. 
In terms of an educated population, a skilled workforce and a sense 
of national unity, Korea may have been ahead of Sub-Saharan African 
countries at the time of its independence, but it was at a greater dis-
advantage in other areas. Also, many developing countries at that time 
surpassed Korea in various categories.
One could point out the different international setting for Korea 
at the time, which might have been more favourable for it compared 
to what African countries faced then and now. But on the flip side, 
it could be argued than some African countries as well as many other 
non-African developing countries may have had many more advan-
tages than Korea in different ways. Generally, there are always many 
different ways to undertake personal, organizational, social and 
national tasks. If people make it a habit to think ahead and learn from 
previous experiences, the assignments they assume can be more easily 
and routinely carried out. This will enable more activity, output and 
speed.
People who harbour pessimistic realism or classist ideology may think 
that African leaders and elites, and foreign governments and companies, 
want the maintenance of the status quo in Africa—that is, continued 
underdevelopment—in order to safeguard their vested interests. And 
I also have heard from ordinary Africans that their leaders and ruling 
elites seem to not want the people to become enlightened or empow-
ered because they fear that this might endanger their privileged status 
and interests. Some even suggest that African leaders are now themselves 
practising colonialism by exploiting their own people.
Resorting to tribalism, ethnic-regional division, taking advantage or 
fomenting security threats and conflicts, abusing security-military appa-
ratus, etc. are traditional methods of ruling and maintaining power in 
many parts of the developing world, especially Africa. And unfortunately, 
in most instances, electoral democracy has degenerated into unwhole-
some contests to maintain power, influence and wealth. But the reality 
holds many truths. Normally, political leaders would neither be totally 
exploitive nor benign, but would fall somewhere in between these 
extremes. And no African leader would be able to fully manipulate and 
suppress their people. By all indications, the current rulers of Sub-Saharan 
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African countries are nowhere near the position of wielding complete 
control over their people without also jeopardizing their own status.
African leaders, from their perspective, could be apprehensive of the 
rise of public disgruntlement towards them, which can lead to social 
unrest. Internet usage and social media have also become widespread in 
Africa, and regional and international pressures are also significant, so 
that African rulers also have to watch their backs. All in all, Africa’s per-
sistent problems are primarily due not to the monolithic power of gov-
ernments suppressing their people, but to a lack of coherence and unity 
in the nation, and a weak sense of purpose and commitment for devel-
opment among leaders and people in general. The crux of the matter is 
that the nature of Africa’s problems is portrayed mostly in terms of peo-
ple’s ‘rights’ (through the political prism), when in fact it is really about 
‘work ethics’ or social conduct (functional, economic attributes). Today, 
just about everything is seen in a political light, and Africa’s develop-
ment is perhaps the greatest victim of this.
When the priority of African countries should be placed on find-
ing human solutions to what are obviously problems of human nature, 
whether superficial or deep-seated, the trend of our times is moving 
away from this, following business, technical and educational sophis-
tication, and the fanfare of innovation. So, there can be a misplaced 
‘conviction that progress can only be achieved by a quantum leap from 
(rural) backwardness to (urban) modernity’.24 And what is also con-
cerning is that the gap between the ‘two worlds’ inside African countries 
seems to be widening instead of narrowing.
Pursuing the trend of the times is a natural and smart thing to do. 
But such efforts will be hollow if the more fundamental tasks facing a 
nation are skipped over or forgotten altogether. South Korea was able 
to transform itself into a developed economy in such a short time not 
because it merely exerted itself in terms of adopting to the trend of the 
times, but, more importantly, because it focused vigorously in closing 
the ‘development gap’ by means of expeditiously tackling the innate 
basic obstacles that are characteristic of poor countries.
Who can refute that a nation has to be diligent for it to be success-
ful in all aspects of life? This is self-evident, but I can hardly see any 
utterance of the word ‘diligence’ or ‘hard work’ in today’s world, as if 
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this is a thing of the past. Now and then, I see African leaders scolding 
their officials for being negligent and failing to get the job done, but I 
have rarely heard them enunciating the value of diligence as a norm that 
the civil servants or people should practise. Korea’s turnaround required 
extraordinary work on the part of the people. If the Korean people were 
not supportive of the government’s policies and did not actively take 
part in the development process, the nation would not have achieved 
such progress.
Many people seem to misunderstand that development or transfor-
mation will somehow occur over time and can be prompted by ‘trans-
fers’ of capitals, know-how, technology, etc. But development is not 
about ‘knowing’, ‘getting’ or just desiring; rather, it is essentially about 
‘doing’ things. Unfortunately for African countries, the world is becom-
ing increasingly competitive and the human capital gaps are widening. 
This is why a dramatic turnaround in the mindset of the African popu-
lation is necessary sooner rather than later. This is because development 
or transformation is equivalent to ‘change’, and the scale and depth of 
positive change over time matters. ‘Speed’ is also critical because if the 
changes take too long, it will offset any gains and might lead to other 
problems and even to regression. When you are nimble, there are 
advantages because you not only can go faster, but you can also have 
more time to fix things or turn back to find other routes when things 
are not right. A good example of this is Korea’s response to the 1997 
IMF bailout crisis.
Another crucial factor is the role of the government. South Korea is 
just one of many cases throughout history attesting to the importance 
of active government intervention to induce economic transformation 
and growth. We do not need to go back hundreds of years to the likes 
of Frederick List, Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton to be 
reminded of the genesis and tradition of government intervention to 
support the industry and economy. Today, governments of the devel-
oped world play expansive roles, albeit in a more intricate and technical 
fashion than in the past.
I have yet to see a businessman who has not admitted that the gov-
ernment’s assistance is vital for his business. This holds true for all busi-
nessmen, regardless of their nationality and location. When it comes to 
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doing business overseas, especially in new markets and in unfamiliar ter-
ritories like Africa, businessmen say that the government’s intervention 
is all the more crucial. Many advanced countries, including the US, are 
very regulatory in nature. The consequences of the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis give the case in point, proving the necessity of this stance. As 
for developing countries, governments can and should promote eco-
nomic growth by playing an active role of facilitator and taking vigor-
ous pro-capitalistic measures. Most importantly, the states should focus 
their energies on pushing for industrialization alongside the develop-
ment of the rural-agricultural sector.
This is where the logic of ‘economic discrimination’ comes in. The 
word ‘competition’ is of essence in the economic world. And the forces 
that promote positive competition are incentives and disincentives or 
‘punishments’. If governments can be instrumental in encouraging 
many winners to emerge, this will spur economic growth. The eco-
nomic history of the world is about winners. The rise and fall of powers, 
the surge of Western economies and the new rivalry unfolding among 
major economic powers today can all be seen in the context of who 
emerges triumphant over others. Hence, the future of the economies 
of Sub-Saharan African countries will hinge on whether and to what 
extent they espouse the rule of competitive economy and society.
There is an opportunity for change in the midst of challenges in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The dissatisfaction of the masses in relation to their live-
lihood and the performance of states can remain latent and subdued, 
or can accumulate to generate pressure for reform, or cause unrest and 
chaos. But the leaders cannot remain complacent and idle because in 
order to stay in power, they have to be able to mobilize the resources to 
meet the minimum public demands. Most of all, the population explo-
sion and the growing unemployed youth phenomenon must be dealt 
with before it reaches an untenable level.
What African leaders and governments have been doing is not work-
ing, nor is it desirable in terms of development. There are clear limi-
tations on what foreign entities like foreign businesses, development 
partners, international organizations and NGOs can do for African 
countries, and whatever measures they take, it will revert to how African 
nations respond and what actions they take.
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Therefore, the solution lies in breaking the psychological 
yoke—that they do not have the capability and are destined for 
 underdevelopment—that has inhibited Africa from moving forward 
with confidence. As Ha-Joon Chang (2010) pointed out, Africa is not 
destined for underdevelopment: Africans are not poor because of any 
mysterious or immutable factors; they are poor for the same reasons 
other nations were once poor, which means that their poverty can be 
fixed if they apply the same solutions that other nations have applied. 
But before the right policies can be pursued, the psychological barrier 
that is at the heart of Africa’s problem must be overcome.
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The Need for a Drastic Turnaround
In Chapter 5, I talked about the ‘missing links’ in Africa’s development. 
The three things that I highlighted are the sense of nation, develop-
ment-mindedness and the active role of the state. Mystified as to why 
so many things appeared not be working properly in the region, I pon-
dered at great length as to what might be the reason for this. Over time, 
it occurred to me that basically these three things were fundamentally 
lacking.
Attaining these missing links expeditiously may not be easy but they 
are achievable, just as the Western and Asian countries, as well as oth-
ers, have been able to do. Perhaps too many people, both Africans and 
outsiders, have come to have a fixed idea that African people cannot 
develop on their own and have to be helped continuously. But there can 
be nothing more detrimental for development than such thinking. No 
meaningful development can take place with outside assistance alone, 
regardless of how much assistance one can get from others. External 
supports can be of value only if they are used as instruments for bigger 
purposes than as short-term ends in themselves.
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It is not enough simply to lay out national visions and express aspi-
rations. Elaborate road maps and master plans that you see so often in 
many countries in the region have no bearing on development if proper 
and intensive actions are not taken in a methodical and sustained way. 
And there is no question that a nation will fare much better if it has 
a stronger sense of purpose and inclination to act in order to achieve 
whatever goals they might pursue as a nation. There have been no 
shortage of verbal expressions and written works stressing what must 
be done, but everybody seems to be waiting for someone else to take 
action. So, why is it that people are reluctant to take action?
Maybe a better question to ask would be: ‘What induces people to 
act?’ Here, the concept of sinsangpilbhur—the rule of incentives and 
sanctions (punishment) or economic discrimination—may come in 
handy. In the absence of incentives for good deeds, people will be less 
inclined to take positive action than otherwise would have been the 
case; equally, if there were no sanctions for misdeeds, people will be 
more inclined to repeat them than if there were sanctions. Hence, it will 
be an ideal proposition for a society to have in place a strong mecha-
nism of incentives and sanctions for the maintenance of social order and 
productivity. The logic of ‘doing’ (being functional) should prevail over 
the logic of ‘being’ (being overly fixated on rights).
Regarding incentives, there is a general theory in psychology con-
ceived by Abraham Maslow called ‘the hierarchy of human needs’, 
which is described in a pyramid structure. According to Maslow, human 
motivations follow a general pattern of movement up the ladder from 
basic needs to sophisticated needs: ‘physiological needs’ → ‘safety and 
security’ → ‘social needs’ → ‘esteem’ → ‘self-actualization’ → ‘self-tran-
scendence’. Originally, this comprised five stages, but Maslow later 
added ‘self-transcendence’ to his hierarchy. ‘Physiological needs’ refers 
to survival or basic instincts like wanting air, shelter, water, sleep, sex, 
etc. ‘Safety and security’ means individuals wanting to avoid immediate 
threads and dangers to their lives. ‘Social needs’ means love and belong-
ing, like having friendship and family. ‘Esteem’ is about self-respect, con-
fidence and achievement; ‘self-actualization’ means the realization of a 
person’s full potential; and ‘self-transcendence’ is the achievement of one’s 
‘highest’ goal outside of regular dimensions in altruism and spirituality.1
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Where there are human needs, there are incentives. Hence, the secret 
to success in achieving development may lie in inducing positive actions 
amongst the people using incentives that conform to their needs. But 
what are the incentives? This is essentially a relative and variable term, 
and their value or appeal depends on the perception of the people. For 
instance, all human beings would seek basic needs, but not necessarily 
everyone would pursue ‘esteem’ or ‘self-transcendence’, or at least not 
to the same degree. The meaning and importance of ‘self-actualization’ 
may vary greatly depending on the individual’s social, cultural, eco-
nomic background, and it also depends on personal traits and the level 
of ambitions of individuals.
So, what shapes human incentives? And how can they be structured? 
Can society and the state, together with the private sector, shape the 
structure of incentives for people in a way that can enhance national 
development? The answer is yes, and they should do so. These questions 
are related to perceptions, and therefore to mindsets. Along with incen-
tives, punishments or sanctions can be a powerful and effective motive 
which can be conducive to development. But their value and effective-
ness are only good insofar as they are perceived as such. This is why 
mindset change campaign is crucial, and the necessary interventions 
should be sought right away. Below is an illustration of how these are 
structured to meet national developmental goals.
The following figure illustrates incentives and punishments from the 
short-, mid- and long-term perspective. Short-term incentives for indi-
viduals would correspond to basic human needs or instincts for physical 
survival, like getting food and money. Mid-term incentives correspond 
to needs like securing a job, earning income and being recognized. 
Long-term incentives are the desires to realize self-fulfilment or gratifi-
cation from the perspective of life accomplishment (Fig. 10.1).
Punishments are ‘negative’ incentives or disincentives. Punishments 
are applied for various acts—violations, misconduct, failures, crimes, 
etc.—that are censured by society. Short-term punishments are 
applied rightly and expeditiously, like when one is caught stealing. 
Mid-term punishments can be brought about by incompetence, 
under-performance, misjudgement, maladjustment, etc. and manifest 
themselves in the form of loss of trust, job, business opportunities, etc. 
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Long-term punishments would include more serious sanctions like 
long-term imprisonment, public censure and stigmatization, being 
banned for life from a profession, etc.
Once we recognize the basic elements of the incentive-punishment 
structure existing in the society, we may ask, how can they be applied? 
Figure 10.2 should be easy to understand. The vertical axis indicates 
different levels of interest that people seek, ranging from personal to 
national: self-interest, broader interest beyond individuals that can be 
called collective interest, and the national interest. The horizontal axis 
shows the timeframe: short-term, mid-term and long-term. If we can 
indeed engineer people’s interest or incentive structure to evolve for the 
Fig. 10.1 The basic structure of incentives and punishments
Fig. 10.2 The desired trajectory of pursuit of interest (incentives)
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better, the desired path would be from point A to point B. People’s pur-
suit of their personal interests is a matter of course. But people should 
always try to see the bigger picture of their environment and society 
because the ‘inordinate’ pursuit of personal interest by everybody will 
fundamentally deteriorate the conditions of their organization or soci-
ety and make them unhealthy, which will, in turn, have detrimental 
effects on their personal interests—hence the importance of social order, 
social capital and collective/social interest. The same holds true for the 
national interest, and national development can be achieved only if 
national interests are promoted.
Figure 10.3 illustrates the missing links to achieving transformative 
and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a sense of nation or 
national identity, a strong and proactive role played by the government 
and development-mindedness (knowing, practising, owning, passion: 
KPOP). ‘Sense of nation’ corresponds to ‘social fabric’; ‘active role of 
government’ represents ‘effective governance’; and ‘development-mind-
edness’ translates into ‘productivity’. The pyramid shows in what order 
these three elements were put to work in realizing the economic (and to 
a certain degree political) transformation of South Korea.
Korea is a good case study highlighting the typical features of East 
Asian developmental states. Koreans developed a strong sense of 
national identity and unity during their struggle against Japan’s colo-
nial rule, the fight for independence and the push for post-war national 
Fig. 10.3 The missing links to development
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reconstruction.2 In fact, throughout its history, Korea has been con-
stantly subjected to aggression or threats by its neighbours and in the 
late nineteenth century, it became the arena of geopolitical rivalry 
among foreign powers.
Immediately after achieving independence in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, Korea was divided and subsequently engulfed in a 
civil war that devastated the entire nation.
Overcoming incessant adversities and challenges was at the core of 
the Korea’s story of survival, modernization and full-fledged devel-
opment. In the midst of despair and disorientation, the government’s 
role was paramount in spearheading the nation forward on the path to 
modernization, particularly in the early stages of economic take-off. The 
government was the standard-bearer and initiated the empowerment of 
the people by instilling development-mindedness in them. The people 
positively complied, producing an extraordinary synergistic effect of 
government–people–business collaboration.
While this is not illustrated here, there can be alternative paths 
(in terms of sequence) for countries where a sense of nation, national 
identity and unity are still weak. For example, a strong government ini-
tiative bringing on board various political, social and regional leaders 
and groups could foster a sense of nation and development- mindedness. 
This could be done by national campaigns spearheaded by political 
leaders.
Before we deduce a development formula or model, which is an 
important aim of this book, it will be informative to also try to illus-
trate what is the basic structure of development of Sub-Saharan African 
countries. This is shown in Fig. 10.4. You can see that ‘government’ and 
‘firms’ are marked much smaller relative to ‘market’ and ‘foreign assis-
tance’, and that the area of overlap of these components is also small. 
This means that the role of or dependency on the market and foreign 
aid is relatively much higher. And often it is difficult to make distinc-
tions between business and development activities.
Here, a widespread market liberalization is a common feature and the 
economy is left to the market system to take care of itself. There is little 
government intervention or role played to promote and stimulate the 
economy. Naturally, foreign assistance or donors’ support is substantial, 
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but this is not well integrated or converted into real economic growth. 
Businesses are lacklustre in terms of their numbers, scale, activities and 
contribution to national income. If we exclude foreign companies and 
multi-national corporations, it is further reduced. There is little fusion 
and synergy among these four economic elements, as the figure shows. 
I have indicated ‘negative elements’ because these are also substantial 
impediments to the attainment of development visions. Evidently, for 
most Sub-Saharan African countries, they seem to have ‘sound’ state 
institutions, superficially, that is, in statutory terms.
But there are many negative elements as well as shortcomings at 
various levels and stages of policy formation and implementation. 
Fig. 10.4 The basic economic development structure of Sub-Saharan Africa
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Enough has been said of corruption, lack of transparency and account-
ability, bad governance, disregard for the rule of law, etc. and these are 
not only the causes of problems, but also the reflections and outcomes 
of more deep-seated problems. Simply denouncing and wishing these 
away will not be helpful; what is more important is to tackle the under-
lying causes of these problems. The fundamental way to do so would be 
through a mindset change geared towards development.
Figure 10.5 depicts the ‘holy trinity of economics’ and ‘economic dis-
crimination’, the terms coined by Sung-Hee Jwa.3 He stresses that the 
market is not the sole entity in the capitalist economy and that the govern-
ment and firms are also very important players. The picture shows that the 
market, the government and firms, the ‘holy trinity’ of economics, can be 
closely intertwined and can interact with one another to produce sustain-
able and dynamic economic growth, with ‘economic discrimination’—the 
rule of incentives and punishments—playing a pivotal role at the centre, as 
was the case in South Korea. This will be addressed again later. Figure 10.6 
shows a proposed model of development for Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
also provides a summary of the theme of this chapter.
The Sub-Saharan African nations have for so long underperformed 
and under-achieved in terms of their potential, while being unable to 
take advantage of opportunities, because they have not come to terms 
Fig. 10.5 The holy trinity of economics and ‘economic discrimination’ (Source 
Sung-Hee Jwa (2017))
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Fig. 10.6 The new development formula for Africa
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with what must be done to enable real progress in relation to economic 
livelihood and status. But people may not fully grasp what they have been 
missing and can even be misled by unfounded praise. It was fashionable 
to talk about ‘Africa-rising’ and the continent has been touted as the last 
frontier of the global market. Citing the fast and sustained economic 
growth registered in Sub-Saharan African countries, some wondered 
whether African development has indeed turned the corner. However, 
Africa’s growth started to dip in 2011, hitting a low in 2016. The region’s 
economic growth has been picking up again from 2017, helped by the 
global economic recovery, but the trajectory seems to be a very moderate 
recovery, as projected by the African Development Bank (2018).
The lessons learned dictate that we need to be cautious. Many point 
out that the recent economic growth in Africa has serious shortcomings. 
For example, David Booth and Diana Gammack point out that the pat-
tern of economic growth of Sub-Saharan Africa is not leading to the 
structural transformation that is needed because it:
is not having a large impact on mass poverty, mainly because it is not 
rooted in agricultural productivity gains. It is not leading to a diversifi-
cation of production and exports or to the acquisition of technological 
capabilities by new generations of productive enterprises. Much of the 
current growth is jobless growth, a fatal feature given that sub-Saharan 
Africa’s population is expected to rise from 800 million today to 2.5  
billion with a generation, with over one half of the total living in cities. 
(Mills and Herbst 2012: 18–19)4
Likewise, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu poses a question: ‘But let us 
pause and ponder. Is this development, in which Africa has come to be 
regarded as the “last frontier” of the global economy – an inevitable out-
come of globalization – really a cause for celebration? Will it lead to the 
real rise of the continent as an economic power house in the mould of 
Asia or the West? Is Africa engaging the world – and globalization – on 
its own terms?’5 And he adds that Africa’s economic growth is not trans-
formative, considering that its economic growth statistics are derived 
mostly from cyclical benefits from a structural dependence on primary 
commodity products.6
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It seems that African countries and the international development 
community alike have stayed too long in a state of blindness. Many of 
them are likely to have fixed views on Africa, taking Africa’s situation 
as a given and trying to get things done under the premise of the given 
circumstances. The fatal mistake was trying to do everything from one 
end—donors—while very little was done from the receiving end, the 
end where change needs to take place. Although foreign assistance did 
not ‘fit’ Africa because of a fundamental mismatch between the two, 
both sides stuck to doing the same thing for too long.
This compatibility matter is not confined to development assistance; 
it also applies to regular business, trade and investment, and other 
exchanges in various fields. The continued mismatch occurs because 
there is no proper process of ‘incorporation’ or internalization on the 
part of the protagonists. An African observer states: ‘Many still blame 
colonialists, but more than 50 years of independence, is Africa where 
it ought to be? Aren’t we also to blame for our continent’s delayed 
transformation? A lot, if not all of our crude transformation imped-
ing mentalities come from our culture–families which form our 
foundational perceptions, and interactions with the wider society … 
Who do we expect to perform magic of correcting these erroneous 
mentalities?’7
As shown in Fig. 10.6, I have ‘remodelled’ the ‘holy trinity’ formula 
to fit the Sub-Saharan African countries by adding two more elements 
to it: people and development partners. This reflects the different envi-
ronment African countries are facing compared to those that Korea 
and East Asian countries faced during their high growth period. First, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is heavily dependent on foreign aid and funding. 
Second, the ‘people’ factor needs to be gauged because African govern-
ments are confronted with additional challenges in terms of garnering 
popular support due to intrinsic socio-cultural dynamics as well as the 
influence of democracy and globalization.
The merits of the ‘holy trinity’ model need to be mentioned. For 
developing countries, a move towards privatization and liberalization 
is a positive step forward and should be commended. As was the case 
in some African countries, reforming the economy to undo the gov-
ernment’s ownership of business and wealth concentration that stifles 
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incentives for private sector was a good thing. But government actions 
that fuel inefficiencies by excessive, improper government controls, 
uncompetitive policies and managerial incompetence are a very dif-
ferent thing from the government’s positive intervention to facilitate 
the market mechanism, even correcting ‘market failures’ and gener-
ating economic dynamism. It is a grave mistake to confuse these two. 
Privatization and liberalization will not solve all the problems and will 
not be sufficient in themselves.
This is where disciplined, responsible and competent government 
leadership can make all the difference. While this seems to be a far 
cry from Africa’s reality, it must be worked on, otherwise there is little 
chance that African countries will escape the trap of bad governance, 
inefficiencies and poverty.
The problems African states are faced with today mostly stem from 
inaction or non-implementation. And many African experts acknowl-
edge this: ‘The real challenge is to just get on with “doing it” … Most 
Africans understand that factors such as ethnicity or corruption have 
been big problems for the continent. But the real problems are at a 
full level below. They are foundational, and can only be addressed by 
a transformation that begins in the mind, in the way Africans think. 
Thinking is often more important than we think.’8 The task of taking 
up the ‘missing links’ is all about genuinely committing to mindset 
change.
In the process of implementing the aforementioned formula for 
development, it is also important to keep things from reverting back to 
the negative realm. Progress made in this endeavour will have positive 
repercussions on the whole mechanism. It is no coincidence that Korea’s 
development model reaped success, as it had the advantage of being 
action-oriented, pragmatic and strictly incentives-oriented.
Below, I will elaborate on the three important areas in the context of 
policy recommendations: the role of government and governance, edu-
cation, and economic policy. So many recommendations, policy blue-
prints or technical studies, etc. have already been presented to Africa, 
and this is yet another. But the explanations and examples given here, 
which are easy to digest, do provide a valuable glimpse into Korea’s 
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experience and highlights some fundamentals that are integral to 
national development and therefore that should be put to work in uni-
son with each other.
The Role of the Government
For any country, the importance of the role of the government cannot 
be emphasized enough, particularly in the case of developing countries. 
The general characteristic or the strength of government bureaucracy is 
being ‘impersonal’ and ‘rationalistic’ in the way in which it functions. 
But the routinization of the work of government organizations tends to 
entail unintended problems if the people who run them become forget-
ful of the purpose they are supposed to serve. Government bodies will 
deviate from the public’s expectations over time if conscientious efforts 
to ‘humanize’ and invigorate the bureaucracy are not made. That is why 
even in developed countries, there are constant calls for reforming and 
reinvigorating the government.
As for most of African states, considering their areas of weaknesses, 
the government mode must shift gears towards: (1) performance; 
(2) a rigorous disciplinary regime for civil servants; and (3) the intro-
duction of a practical and comprehensive e-government system to 
enhance service and transparency, and to curb irregularities and corrup-
tion. For these, a sensible and practical evaluation system must be put 
in place. And it is important not to fall into ‘legislature-institutional 
traps’; it is equally important to maintain a sense of balance as well as 
some degree of flexibility in upholding norms and regulations on the 
one hand and making things work on the other hand. Figure 10.7 pro-
vides an illustration of this.
Returning to the question of balance and flexibility, as is often the 
case in developing countries where certain regulations are non-existent 
or weak, they tend to ‘copy and paste’ or combine various regulations of 
developed countries to fill the void. But the problem is that these provi-
sions can be too stringent or unrealistic for developing countries that do 
not yet have the necessary conditions or level of governance to match 
them.
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A case in point is that we see elaborate procurement laws in place 
in the Sub-Saharan African region, but because of their complex condi-
tionality, this leads to delays in public projects, along with increases in 
costs, inefficiency and corruption. An example of this is Uganda’s pro-
curement regulation for public construction works, which requires at 
least nine months before the funds can be dispersed for the projects.9 
People are either stuck in the regulations and waste so much time over 
technicalities, or they try to short-circuit the process by forging docu-
ments. A simple problem like potholes that should be repaired instantly 
is abandoned because of irrational procurement regulations. Laws and 
regulations in themselves do not prevent shoddy work; rather, it is the 
Fig. 10.7 The desired mode of governmental reform for Sub-Saharan Africa
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supervision on the ground, work ethics and discipline that actually 
count in terms of getting things done.
Regarding the functioning of the state organization, the goal should 
be ‘incremental progress’. While the mindset change and commitment 
for renovation in bureaucratic circles ought to be sought rigorously and 
promptly, the goals pursued should be realistic, continuous and long-
term. The optimal outcome would be ‘incremental progress’. Given the 
circumstances of Sub-Saharan African countries, setting overly ambi-
tious targets for governmental transformation is most likely to fail. To 
gather momentum for such drive would require a strong political will 
and a national campaign supported by the people.
The ‘back-tracking syndrome’ that I have already mentioned is also 
prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa’s bureaucratic society. This is the result 
of the penchant of government officials for their personal interests vis-
à-vis the public interest, a lack of discipline (such as negligence in their 
duties and absenteeism), a failure to report and follow through, etc.
Performance, discipline and e-governance should be considered as 
the ‘tripod’ for the governmental reform in Africa. The lessons of coun-
tries that industrialized early and ‘developmental states’ justify the need 
for well-functioning and credible government in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, and political leadership and consensus must gather force to 
push reform in this respect.
Basically, we can categorize governmental roles into three types: 
‘state-dominant’, ‘citizen-dominant’ and ‘diffused-dependent’: The 
state-dominant type refers to the transformational states playing a 
strong role as ‘facilitators’ of development, prioritizing performance; the 
citizen-dominant type means the advanced and mature state of nations 
where citizens and the private sector have an important bearing on the 
output and quality of the state’s functions, ensuring stability; and the 
diffused-dependent type refers to the case in which most Sub-Saharan 
African countries find themselves i.e. being neither state-dominant nor 
citizen-dominant, which literally means there is a weakness in both the 
government’s role and the people’s participation and contribution with 
respect to development. So, in comparison to the first two types, the last 
type does not have apparent advantages, showing a variety of weaknesses 
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like a tendency towards dependence on outside forces, continued pov-
erty and the government’s underperformance.
From this, we can deduce three different government orientations: 
politically oriented, performance-oriented and governance-oriented. 
The politically oriented kind is typical in most Sub-Saharan African 
countries: the government’s attitude, engagement and day-to-day activ-
ities are driven more by political considerations and personal interests 
than by a true sense of duty to perform and deliver for the sake of the 
public interest. Executive functions are so closely knit to ruling party 
politics as well as the personal agendas of the powerful so that one can 
sense there is ‘too much politics’; government departments conveniently 
serve as tools for politics in every way. The performance-oriented type is 
geared towards government output and is the hallmark of developmen-
tal states. The governance-oriented type, which is characteristic of devel-
oped countries, places priority on policy implementation and public 
service delivery in conformity with regulations and norms. Consistency, 
transparency and rationality, among other factors, are key measurements 
of success.
In reality, such distinctions would not be easy to make in a equally 
simple, clear-cut manner, and states will likely have to embody a mix-
ture of different features. For the countries that need to catch up with 
the more developed countries, the primary role of the government 
should be spearheading development rather than maintaining the sta-
tus quo. The prevailing thinking of established economies tends to view 
big governments and government interventions as something negative, 
causing distortions and inefficiencies in the economy. While this may 
be valid from the viewpoint of developed economies, it may not address 
the circumstances of developing countries.
Figure 10.8 shows various combinations of the intensity and orien-
tations of the governmental role: on the y-axis, three different levels of 
government intervention—high, medium and low—are marked, while 
the horizontal axis indicates three types of government role orienta-
tion (political, performance and governance-oriented). A vast majority 
of Sub-Saharan African countries would belong to this category. As to 
whether or what countries in the region can be called developmental 
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states (the candidates can be such countries as South Africa, Rwanda 
and Botswana), the situation is unclear and debatable.
Also, what areas of government intervention we are talking about 
matters—it can be about only industrialization or the whole array of 
administrative tasks. Among the states with the highest levels of state 
intervention are countries like North Korea and Cuba. The actual place-
ment of the countries in the matrix may vary when different criteria are 
applied. The same goes for governmental orientation. For instance, the 
orientation of a state’s role can vary from sector to sector, and multiple 
orientations can concurrently exist. An example is Rwanda: the govern-
ment’s motivation is frequently seen to be political, economic, perfor-
mance-oriented and governance-striving at the same time.
Given the necessity for African states to make their governments 
more functional, that is, being action-oriented, meeting the public’s 
demands and policy goals, how to overhaul the structure and activi-
ties of government to make this possible needs to be considered. Once 
again, incentives and sanctions, sticks and carrots must be applied. 
Fig. 10.8 Combinations of government intensity and orientation
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This requires a strong governing body or mechanism to supervise and 
enforce civil servants’ compliance and delivery. We can start with the 
introduction of a regular ‘mindset change’ training of public officials 
and a tight regime of monitoring their performance.
Upgrading performance needs many things, like being focused, dili-
gent and committed, while simple, routine administrative duties would 
only require steady work. But routine work is by no means a given in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where civil servants’ absenteeism and undertaking 
of multiple jobs is commonplace. But such behaviour on a broad scale 
should not be allowed to continue as it will only add to the vicious cycle 
of poverty and underperformance. Because of the widespread practice of 
negligence and corruption at the organizational level, if left unchecked, 
government institutions, especially those in the public service sector, 
will continue to deteriorate over time, becoming in themselves a serious 
problem for the nation.
For African countries that are in great need of transformational pol-
icy planning and execution across the board, the role of policy-makers 
and bureaucrats having the authority to carry out the necessary changes 
assumes particular importance. Institutions are weak in Africa, but the 
institutions themselves are moulded through the long-term accumula-
tive practices of the nation. As such, the best way in which the devel-
opment of African countries can be effectively driven is by starting with 
conscientious and calculated reforms within the government.
The government elites should be held to the highest standards in 
terms of upholding public interests. Officials undertaking the assign-
ments must have pride, devotion and responsibility in serving their 
nation. The embedded ‘sense of mission’ to serve their nation ought to 
be the key attribute of bureaucratic elites, but unfortunately, this does 
not seem to be the case in Africa, as the majority of African elites are 
seen to have a weak sense of duty and responsibility, and often don’t 
seem to know very well what they are supposed to do.
On the other hand, it might be unfair to denounce African elites 
for all of Africa’s ills. The ‘culture’ and the demands of the people also 
undoubtedly play an important part in this. While the effectiveness of 
government rests with the ability of its officials, it is ultimately the peo-
ple and public opinion that shape the outcome of governance. That is to 
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say, bureaucratic society does not function in a vacuum, but constantly 
interacts with, and is affected by, the environment and various entities, 
the most important of these being the people.
I have heard many African political, bureaucratic and business elites 
admitting dissatisfaction and frustration with their people. On their 
part, they complain that their constituents or their relatives back home 
expect too much from them and that this is unsustainable. Realistically, 
a certain balance should be sought between simply trying to ‘conform’ 
to the demands of the people and informing or educating them that not 
only is this not sustainable, but that is also detrimental to society. But 
the African elites are giving in and are opting for the former, while fail-
ing to challenge the public with respect to what is right, rational and 
beneficial from the long-term perspective.
‘Cultural pressures’ that have detrimental impacts on society need to 
be tackled responsibly and persistently. It is only fitting that the wealthy 
and privileged class of Africa, rather than being detached from their own 
environment, must assume greater social and moral responsibility for 
their nations. If the elites and intellectuals fail to take a stand and lead 
society forward in a positive fashion, society will likely remain stagnant.
Only when the government and the people look squarely at each 
other and share common ideas and objectives can the state function 
properly in the long term. It could be said that the political leaders 
are only as good as the people who chose them. Hence, it is crucial 
to empower the people to take genuine ownership of their lives and 
nationhood. This means cultivating people to be not only assertive of 
their rights and vigilant against government’s exercise of power, but also 
to have a strong sense of the common good, social and moral values, 
and collective interests.
In developing countries in particular, and even in some Western 
countries, democracy is often being stretched to its limits. In some 
cases, it is ‘abused’ in such a way that people think they can do anything 
in the name of freedom and democracy. When the society’s dominant 
pattern becomes too transactional and everyone is bent on immediate 
personal gains without some counterbalance of a broader, collective 
restraining social mechanism in place, ‘freedom’ is much more vulner-
able. In the extreme case, this can entail a deep turmoil and national 
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crisis. Freedom and democracy are being stressed without equal empha-
sis on social and moral values and the maturity of the society to uphold 
civic standards and norms. In this respect, education, particularly in 
relation to civic duties, work ethics and development-mindedness, is of 
paramount importance.
The performance of government and the discipline of bureaucratic 
organization go hand in hand. In order for the government to deliver 
what the public requires, civil servants should be both motivated and 
disciplined with a sense that their goal and duty is to serve the pub-
lic. To ensure this on a broader level, the general public should act as 
the ultimate vanguards to preserve and uphold the integrity, stability 
and prosperity of their nation. Parliament is expected to act as a check 
and balance vis-à-vis the executive body, but Parliament’s competence 
and credibility is again dependent on the engagement and will of the 
people. It is on such grounds that I have gone to great lengths in this 
book to stress the need to build the social fabric, social capital, sense of 
nation and patriotism, and ‘development-mindedness’ in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
In addition to the reorientation geared towards greater perfor-
mance and discipline, e-governance can be added as the third pillar of 
governmental reform. The logic behind e-governance is that there is 
an enormous value in it for enhancing efficiency and transparency in 
administration and public services: it promotes discipline in govern-
ment officials as the room for human error, irregularities or manip-
ulation is greatly reduced, and illicit transactions in particular can be 
substantially curbed.
Korea has energetically promoted e-government as a central tool to 
make its government more competitive by capitalizing on its world’s 
leading information and communications technology (ICT), including 
broadband Internet. The Korean government laid the groundwork for 
e-government schemes, such as the National Basic Information System 
(NBIS) computer networks in the 1980s, and streamlined applicable 
laws and institutions in the 1990s. It then made the implementation of 
e-government a major national agenda for the 2000s, concentrating on 
11 major tasks for e-government (2001–2002) and 31 major tasks for 
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the e-government roadmap (2003–2007). With such proactive meas-
ures, e-government has become firmly established in all areas of the 
Korean government.10
The benefits of Korean e-government were visible and manifold: 
the efficiency and transparency of administrative work have both 
greatly improved; administrative civil services have been substantially 
enhanced; and people’s access to and participation in the policy-making 
process has expanded. Korea’s e-government initiative has become a 
 success story of its own, and the effectiveness of its e-government is now 
acknowledged worldwide so that its various e-government systems are 
being exported to foreign countries. The UN Global E-Government 
Survey, held in 2010 and 2012, ranked Korea first among all the mem-
ber countries, with the highest possible scores given in the categories of 
the Online Service Index and the e-Participation Index.11
In Korea, what started as computerization of administrative work 
to reduce the workload (like handwriting) of civil servants in the con-
text of the simplification of public documentation, developed into 
the overall informatization of the national administration and pub-
lic service, after going through many different stages of informational 
platforms. Today, almost all work in government, both central and 
local, is computerized. The relative information is shared within the 
government and this is used to enhance the work efficiency of civil 
servants.
The ultimate goal of e-government or e-governance should be to real-
ize a deepening of democracy through the enhancement of public ser-
vice and the efficiency of public administration against the backdrop of 
the evolution of an information society. That is why the proliferation of 
e-government is regarded as synonymous with progress in governance. 
The technical advantage of e-government is that it can instantly carry 
out a number of tasks simultaneously with the least amount of effort 
and the lowest cost. This is evident in such a case as where a client does 
not need to visit a government office to get whatever service is required, 
but can instead use the Internet or visit portal sites to do the same. This 
makes personal contacts between civil servants and the public unnec-
essary, providing convenience to people while curtailing the possibility 
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of corruption that is likely to take place in face-to-face encounters. The 
openness and transparency with which communication and service are 
carried out promotes a positive atmosphere and outcomes.
The City of Seoul adopted the Online Procedures Enhancement for 
the Civil Application (OPEN) system, which is the digitalization of 
the process of producing authorizations and permits for citizens from 
the stage of application to issuance. The OPEN system is used for 
such areas as construction and sales, which are prone to solicitations, 
delays, irregularities, etc. By removing the necessity of personal contacts 
between city officials and the general public, the OPEN system effec-
tively curtails the roots of corruption while promoting the transparency 
of the public administration. The public’s satisfaction with the OPEN 
system service and civil servants is exceptionally high.12
Most developing countries do not seem to be ready to fully embrace 
a comprehensive program of e-government. Rather than wait for total 
readiness, an approach of learning by doing and consolidating small 
gains is recommended. But it is really up to African leaders and the 
people to make strategic decisions as to where they want to be head-
ing. They should realize by now that e-governance is more than a tech-
nological trend and that it represents a genuine opportunity to attain 
qualitative, cost-effective government services and a better relationship 
between the government and the public. Its benefits can go beyond the 
efficiency of public service and administration to enhance good gov-
ernance and empower citizens. Online systems for users have not only 
cut the time spent on processing applications and thereby increased the 
efficiency of transactions, but have also made them transparent, easily 
traceable and accessible.
The benefits that Sub-Saharan African countries can reap from 
e-government are deemed to be huge. E-government promotes effi-
ciency and also helps people to break away from unwholesome temp-
tations. While the fundamental way to do this is through the ‘mindset 
change’ of the people, a much simpler but practical means that can 
be employed alongside this endeavour is digitalization, or ‘impersonal 
transactions’ of public service. The positive effects of e-government can 
be immediate and far-reaching.
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But corrupt rulers and the privileged class enjoying vested interests 
are likely to resist the full-scale application of this tool. There is an inter-
esting story coming out of donor circles that a fragile African country 
that has become another sad story of state failure in the region had 
refused an offer by a donor country to have an e-government system 
installed for it. At first, the government welcomed this offer, but after it 
learned that the system was designed to curb illicit financial transactions 
by making everything transparent, which it did not want to happen, it 
apparently rejected it.
To install an e-government system throughout government depart-
ments and agencies that would have a palpable impact on the nation 
would require considerable resources and capacity. But this can be done 
even in poor countries with the will of the government. Rwanda is an 
example that is moving in this direction and is yielding actual results.
The three key ingredients mentioned that Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries need to adopt to strengthen and reform the government are per-
formance, discipline and e-government. In pursuing these measures, it 
is also important to retain some degree of flexibility to make this pos-
sible in practice. Regulations should be observed, but the emphasis 
should be placed on how to get things done rather than on the formal-
ity and technical correctness. An appropriate outcome of such govern-
ment ‘reorientation’ or reform will be ‘incremental progress’, because 
gradual, steady progress is the most realistic goal to achieve under the 
existing constraints. Setting an over-ambitious goal can easily derail 
well-intentioned efforts from the initial stages, and the key is to keep 
the momentum alive and avoid stalling which most often happens in 
Africa.
Making e-government work requires commitment, devotion, 
resources and the right mindset. And this boils down to mindset 
change. Nonetheless, investing in e-government can only have beneficial 
results in terms of enhancing governance, public services and the effi-
ciency of administrations. For African countries, it is all the more advis-
able to pursue e-government as aggressively as possible, as it is the most 
practical and effective way to tackle the kind of widespread irregularities 
that the region suffers from.
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Economic Policy
For any country, navigating the economy towards stability and growth 
is front and centre of all government policies and is the greatest pre-
occupation of the state leaders. But sound management of economic 
affairs is all the more imperative for African countries that have wide-
spread irregularities to contend with alongside the formidable task of 
overcoming poverty and achieving economic prosperity. But the reality 
is that serious, in-depth discussions and analysis in relation to African 
countries’ economic policies have been driven mostly by international 
development organizations and donors.
Africa’s economic growth was a mere 1.7% in 2016, lower than all 
other developing regions except Latin America and the Caribbean, 
placing the narrative of ‘Africa Rising’ into question (UNECA 2017). 
The joint report of the African Development Bank, the OECD and 
the UNDP, African Economy Outlook 2017, attributed this to low com-
modity prices, the sluggish performance of the global economy, the 
slowdown of growth in emerging economies like China, second-order 
effects of the Arab Spring, amplified by the prolonged conflict in Libya, 
and bad weather conditions such as droughts in some African coun-
tries.13 But African countries were expected to recover in the coming 
years thanks to a gradual rise in commodity prices, increasing private 
demand, including in domestic markets, sound macroeconomic policy 
management adopted by many countries, a generally improving busi-
ness environment, etc.14 Also, Africa’s advances in trade and regional 
integration were noted: over the last two decades, Africa’s trade with the 
world has quadrupled; the continent’s trading partners are more geo-
graphically diverse; and regional cooperation is gaining momentum. 
This is possible ‘because African countries have adopted more open 
policies, invested in infrastructure and continued to pursue regional 
integration’.15
The report recommended that Africa diversify its exports to 
reduce exposure to commodity price shocks, improve the capacity of 
intra-Africa trade and focus on regional integration. While recognizing 
that human development is slow and uneven, political and economic 
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governance has shown some encouraging signs. According to the report: 
‘the most recent data show improvements in Africa but also challenges 
to overcome. Governments are using public resources more efficiently 
and delivering more social services, thanks to regulatory reforms and 
digital innovations. They are also working to enhance the quality of the 
business environment to catalyse private sector investment’.16
The report also mentions that ‘promoting industrialization is back 
on Africa’s economic policy agenda, with renewed impetus and vigour’, 
but the strategy that about half of African countries are pursuing—
which is to create labour-intensive industries to enhance job growth—
does not address the needs of firms that have high growth potential. 
Governments should design strategies that remove the existing binding 
constraints on high-potential entrepreneurs; implementing productiv-
ity strategies requires full commitment, strong and far-sighted political 
leadership, efficient government coordination and active private-sector 
participation.17
UNECA’s Economic Report on Africa 2017 offers a more straightfor-
ward and sobering look into the state of Africa’s economy that declined 
to a decade-low of 1.7% (1.4% for Sub-Saharan Africa) in 2016 from 
3.7% in 2015, below the global average of 2.3%. It points out that 
African countries’ reorientation from an investment-led to a consump-
tion-based economy has hit them through a fall in demand and also indi-
rectly through lower global commodity prices. To make matters worse, 
African inflation rose from 7.5 to 10%, due to supply-side factors, rising 
electricity prices and falling values of currencies.18 Such weakness in both 
the supply and demand side of the economy, along with weaknesses in 
other economic fundamentals, make Africa’s transformational develop-
ment that much more difficult to attain and place Africa into a position 
of greater dependence on its development partners and foreign investors.
Among many aspects of Africa’s social economy, what is of particu-
lar concern is a set of human elements: high population growth, low 
and subdued labour productivity, and rapid urbanization. It is projected 
that by 2035, Africa’s urban population rate will reach 49%, and ‘this 
shift has profound implications for achieving the continental and global 
targets for inclusive growth and transformation, including Agenda 
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2063 and the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. Theory and 
global experience show that urbanization and structural transformation 
are closely linked – but less so in Africa, which has largely followed its 
own urbanizing path weakly tied to structural transformation, including 
industrialization’.19
Sub-Saharan African countries have many challenges and obstacles to 
confront and overcome, and a long way to go to reach the position of 
a transformed economy free from poverty and enjoying sustainability, 
stability and prosperity. The issue with the economies of Sub-Saharan 
Africa is that there is no lack of policy vision and identification of their 
problems, as many policy recommendations have been made by various 
international and regional development organizations, often in conjunc-
tion with African states.
Coming up with fresh new recommendations on economic policy 
for Africa may not be easy. As Joong-Kyung Choi suggests, applying a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach will be very difficult and unrealistic, while on 
the other hand, a ‘Christmas tree’ approach that suggests ‘every chal-
lenge in every field should be solved at once … is difficult to be imple-
mented taking the government’s capacity of the developing country into 
account’.20 Choi points out that the desirable thing is to set priorities 
among the agenda items and then deal with them one by one. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, there is the extra burden of pushing forward with multi-
ple tasks at the same time to avoid regression or fall-back.
Economic policy recommendations for African countries in light of 
their reality, the lessons of Korean development and the global regime 
of economic governance can be classified into four categories: (1) mac-
roeconomic stability; (2) effective industrialization; (3) human capacity 
development; and (4) reinvigoration of the market mechanism (eco-
nomic principles having precedence over political considerations). In 
order for these recommendations to yield results, it should be matched 
by unrelenting determination and deeds. This all seems simple and 
clear, but contemplating on the grand scheme of inter-connecting and 
implementing these objectives, and actually delivering them are the hur-
dles that demand extraordinary efforts in order to be overcome.
Basically, I think that the countries can choose from the three options 
of ‘low intensity’, ‘medium intensity’, and ‘high intensity’ approaches: 
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the ‘low intensity’ option is more or less following the existing regime 
with improved efforts in basic areas like macroeconomic stability and 
good governance. The ‘medium intensity’ option is sort of a middle 
ground, while the ‘high intensity’ option is tantamount to vigorously 
pushing for full-scale transformational development similar to that 
which South Korea was able to do. The ‘medium intensity’ option can 
be described as that which in principle prescribes to the ‘high intensity’ 
approach, but, being ‘restrained’ by various conditions and limited in 
terms of national capacity, settles for the ‘second-best’ option.
These three options represents different levels of ‘costs and benefits’ 
or ‘risks and rewards’: the ‘low intensity’ approach is rather easy to pur-
sue, without having to go through ‘great pains’, but its downside is that 
the ‘benefits’ or ‘returns’ will be modest, and the resulting change will 
be limited at best. On the other hand, the ‘high intensity’ alternative 
would be very demanding on nations, imposing a heavy burden on 
them on all fronts, but it could produce many great benefits if properly 
enacted.
The mainstream donor community and international organizations 
have not been avid champions of industrial policy for developing coun-
tries. Today, what is most frequently and widely stressed are macroeco-
nomic stability, free markets and an open economy, a business-friendly 
environment, entrepreneurship, good governance, etc. Of course, 
macroeconomic stability is important for every country, but this and 
the free market system alone cannot ensure the substantive economic 
transformation of poor economies. Effective allocation of resources 
or production factors is a most basic condition for a well-functioning 
economy. But the more fundamental task for the poorest countries is 
how to achieve economic dynamism to broaden the economy in an 
expeditious manner.
In all fairness, the ‘low intensity’ approach is essentially a rec-
ipe for the status quo rather than evolution. Macroeconomic stabil-
ity is the outcome of the accumulative work of managing inflation, 
interest rates, currency rates, deficits and the debt burden. It is what 
can be achieved by continued vigilance and prudent engagement by 
the authorities. With globalization and the high level of dependence 
of African countries on foreign resources, companies and markets, 
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African governments must have an equally high level of discipline in 
terms of managing macroeconomic stability.
Compared to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when Korea was able 
to achieve phenomenal economic growth, the international economy 
nowadays is more competitive, interdependent and inter-linked, while 
the global financial and trade regimes have become more binding on 
national governments, making the ‘autonomous’ pursuit of economic 
policies considerably more difficult for developing countries. Moreover, 
African countries now face less lenient international trade regimes than 
was previously the case. How much leeway African countries can have 
under the current economic regimes if they decided to push ahead 
aggressively with industrial policy and export promotion is unclear and 
would require a more detailed examination. And there can be a grey 
area between what is stipulated in theory and allowed in practice. But 
for the poor economies in the region, there should still be quite a num-
ber of possibilities of which to take advantage and many ways to navi-
gate through the situation if they are seriously committed to doing so.
Perhaps there is a fourth option: the ‘incremental change’ approach. 
The goal here would be to first reach the ‘low intensity’ target of mac-
roeconomic stability and sound governance, but rather than stopping 
there, moving on to the next phase of meaningful industrialization and 
then to high-end industrialization and a service sector economy. The 
goal for every nation would be to enjoy growth and stability at the same 
time.
Korea started out in the early 1960s with an aggressive export pro-
motion and economic growth policy, followed by a policy of gearing-up 
HCIs in the 1970s. But Korea had to pay more attention to economic 
stability during the process of economic development. Overall, Korea’s 
‘high intensity’ development approach was about growth first and then 
stabilization afterwards. Since the 1990s, Korea has been trying to bal-
ance the two, with special lessons learned from the 1997 IMF financial 
crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis on the need to manage finan-
cial transactions and markets.
In relation to industrial policy, Korea provides an example of fun-
damental but long-forgotten lessons of industrialization: that an econ-
omy has to undergo different stages of policy orientations in order to 
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attain full-scale development. For Korea, each phase was extraordinarily 
clear-cut: (1) post-war national rehabilitation (the 1950s); (2) laying the 
foundations for a ‘self-supporting’ economy (the 1960s); (3) upgrading 
the industrial structure and modernizing the rural sector (the 1970s); 
(4) shifting towards openness and liberalization (the 1980s); and (5) 
espousing globalization and structural reforms (the 1990s).
Korea’s situation in the aftermath of independence and the Korean 
War was not very different from that which Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries faced upon their independence. But what sets Korea apart from 
African countries is that Korea was able to fulfil all the stages of eco-
nomic development following the path of industrialization of developed 
economies, albeit in a very compressed manner.
In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, it seems evident that of 
these five phases, phase 2 and phase 3 have not properly taken place. 
The relevant policies have not been effectively pursued in a timely and 
systemic manner, and the countries have thereby missed many opportu-
nities. African countries have opened up their economy, liberalized the 
market and privatized companies without fully understanding the impli-
cations of doing so. Without taking up crucial tasks of laying the foun-
dations for a ‘self-supportive’ economy and pushing for industrialization 
and rural development, they have opted for an easier solution of open-
ing up and liberalizing. In so doing, they have essentially outsourced 
most of the components needed for a successful national economy.
As a consequence, all kinds of policy goals are pursued in juxtapo-
sition, complicating efforts and compounding the already challeng-
ing tasks. Still, many African countries have not completed laying the 
groundwork for statehood and economic development. Korea achieved 
rapid growth based on the solid cornerstones of development: land 
reform, socio-economic mobilization and empowerment of the people, 
the creation of various agencies, proactive government initiatives, etc., 
and these turned out to be vital ‘building blocks’. More important was 
the actual follow-up actions to these plans.
But instead of exercising true ownership of their economy, Sub-
Saharan African countries have frequently taken a regressive and del-
eterious stance. After a half-century of independence, many African 
leaders are still blaming the influence of colonialism and international 
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environment for their economic failures. Apart from the lack of grand 
economic schemes, the post-independence African economy suffered 
severely from a deficiency of participation and support from various 
indigenous players and sectors. Unlike Korea, which made the most 
of what little resources it had in laying the groundwork and setting up 
bodies for national development, African states wasted their precious 
resources and opportunities through inaction, misconduct and missteps.
Sub-Saharan African nations received more financial inflows and aid 
grants in the context of development assistance than any other region in 
the world. The tasks they faced—uniting the nation, providing security, 
achieving economic growth and welfare, democratization and good gov-
ernance, etc.—are the basic things that the leaders and people of every 
country have to assume as their own responsibility. The African prob-
lems have been caused not by acts of nature and irresistible forces, but 
by human failings. African leaders readily invoke sovereignty or non-in-
terference in domestic matters, but when it comes to economic prob-
lems, they are quick to put responsibility on external causes and colonial 
legacies, Western imperial designs and so on.
On the flip side of Africa’s energetic open-arms policy towards for-
eign investors, there is a disquieting reality of dependency and oppor-
tunism by the ‘well-connected’ for rent-seeking. ‘Upper-echelon’ 
African business circles seem to be have evolved in an unwholesome 
manner. Rather than trying to be entrepreneurial and competitive 
in their own right by showing commitment, making investments and 
taking risks on their own, many seem to want to act as ‘middlemen’ in 
order to gain short-term profits or windfall gains.
The common challenges facing Sub-Saharan African countries are 
rapid urbanization amid a population explosion, acute unemployment 
for the youth and college graduates, etc. But the overarching problem 
is the myopic thinking when it comes to business, often being seriously 
blindsided and, worse still, not really doing the things that need to be 
done. Sub-Saharan African countries have no shortage of policy papers, 
road maps and master plans laying out ‘what is lacking’, ‘what is to be 
achieved’ and ‘what is the way forward’. But the persistent problem is 
always the implementation, and it reverts back to intent, commitment 
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and practice. The question is: how much are elites and the privileged 
class conscious of public interests, and how patriotic and devoted are 
they to contributing to the improvement of lives of their compatriots 
beyond their own personal gains?
Jennifer Blake compared Africa and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and pointed out that there are three aspects 
of the ASEAN growth experience that can provide useful lessons for 
Africa. First, ASEAN countries have made many of the reforms and 
investments needed to ensure longer-term prosperity; measurable pro-
gress has been achieved across the region in terms of tearing down red 
tape and putting in place institutions, educational systems and infra-
structure. Over the past four decades, they have improved their produc-
tivity by diversifying their economies rather than depending on volatile 
commodity prices. Second, they have been much more successful in 
regional integration compared to African countries, recognizing that in 
a rapidly evolving global context, they must join forces to reap the econ-
omies of scale. Third, economic outcomes are driven by positive expec-
tations: ‘In much of Asia there is an inherent belief that countries will 
experience rapid economic progress – of course driven by past experi-
ence but also a general confidence in the future – and this tends to rein-
force a positive self-fulfilling prophecy. Greater confidence in the future 
would be a boon in Africa, which is particularly at risk due to the pres-
ent slowdown.’21
When all approaches stumble time after time, then it is likely that 
something simple and basic rather than something very complex and 
technical has gone wrong. When everybody, including development 
experts, is looking everywhere to find reasons, the ultimate answer may 
lie in the fundamentals, like being steady and consistent. I concur with 
David Henley’s view that what successful development strategies aim to 
do is ‘to alleviate poverty on a massive scale (outreach), with great speed 
(urgency), and with a pragmatic and sometimes ruthless eye for simplic-
ity (expediency)’.22
Returning to the development path of Korea, post-war national reha-
bilitation self-supporting’ economy most Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries have barely fulfilled even a few of them. African countries have 
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seemingly ‘jumped’ to phases (4) and (5) without properly fulfilling 
steps (1), (2) and (3). And the steps taken ((4) and (5)) are not perfect 
either. The first three stages indeed require arduous work and are by no 
means rudimentary. The post-war national rehabilitation era of Korea 
should approximate the early period of post-independence of African 
countries. All-out efforts in nation-building should have been made at 
this time, with a renewed sense of national identity and unity translated 
into a vigorous institutionalization of state structures and a push for 
modernization, but apparently this has not happened in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries have not completed nation- 
building and laying the foundations for economic development, hence, 
the next step—upgrading the industrial structure and modernizing the 
rural sector—is still far from reach. When the countries under this ‘pre-
mature’ state merely open up markets, they can drift further away from 
the desired path of development, with the outcome that we see today: 
a commodity-dependent economy, the domination of multi-national 
corporations and foreign companies, the underdevelopment of the 
agricultural sector, a meagre manufacturing industry, a huge informal 
economy, snowballing youth unemployment, rising debt, widespread 
corruption, etc.
There is still a tendency for African rulers to complain about the 
‘unfair treatment’ of Africa by the West. They do so when they benefit 
vastly from, and rely so heavily on, aid, funds, investments and busi-
ness operations from rich nations. An East African state leader pointed 
out that Africa is on the rise and ‘even as we rise, the international sys-
tem maintains an irrational unjust structure that relegates Africa to 
[the] periphery, that defends injustice and double standards as a matter 
of course, and, which impoverishes us’. He questioned the dividends 
of globalization and implored African leaders to look more inwardly 
by promoting intra-African trade for its people’s prosperity in a ‘rigged 
international system’, adding that ‘even in the face of an international 
order stacked against us, built on our backs, Africans have made painful 
progress’.23
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Besides pointing out the need for African regional integration, it has 
also become fashionable for African countries to create industrial parks 
in a bid to attract investments and form industrialization hubs. But due 
to poor infrastructure, administrative hurdles, a lack of available materi-
als and skilled labour, corruption, a lack of capable local partners, etc., 
this has mostly not materialized in any satisfactory way.
We have discussed macroeconomic stability and industrialization. 
Now we turn to human capacity, which includes entrepreneurial skill 
with the emphasis on management capacity, as well as the quality of the 
workforce in general. The surest way to move towards an industrialized 
economy is to have local, home-grown companies flourish and expand, 
with local businessmen having true ownership of their business. For this 
to occur, a major increase in skilled workforce and competent manage-
ment that will support the expanding businesses and economic growth 
is necessary. But what is clearly the weakness is ‘management capac-
ity’. There is a very good chance that the threshold of transformation 
will be reached when the overall managerial capability of the people is 
enhanced. Figuring out what holds this capacity backs and how it can 
be substantially raised will be a game changer for sure.
Sung-Hee Jwa stresses that it is not the market but enterprises that 
are the most important driving force for economic growth in develop-
ing countries. He rebukes the theory of the ‘invisible hand’ of the free 
market mechanism, arguing that thriving companies are the answer to 
successful industrialization and that, without them, developing coun-
tries will remain as agrarian societies.24
So, what are the conditions for indigenous or local companies to 
successfully emerge as competitive and sustainable businesses? The pro-
ductivity which allows the quantity and quality of commodities and 
services, as well as the managerial skills that render this possible, read-
ily comes to mind. The reason why there are so few prominent ‘native’ 
enterprises in the region is because of the lack of such capabilities. In 
this regard, what African governments can take away from Korea’s expe-
rience is that the government must do much more and must fundamen-
tally reposition itself from being an ‘onlooker’ to taking the helm in 
relation to industrial planning and the promotion of business and eco-
nomic growth.
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The restraints on the competitiveness of Sub-Saharan African countries 
are mostly human factors, and hence they can be tackled. A prevalent 
problem is the poor work or low credibility of the workforce. Supervision 
is a very demanding and arduous task, and this pushes up costs in terms 
of extra time, labour and money spent. Basically, it is an innate issue of 
individuals rather than being structural or externally influenced, but the 
accumulative impact on the economy is huge. At the institutional or 
organizational level, rampant corruption and unhealthy practices, such as 
public officials openly engaging in private business, further undermines 
the overall economic efficiency of the countries in the region.
To put things into perspective, the opportunities were always there 
for the taking. I have heard political leaders in the region citing suc-
cesses that the Indian business communities have been able to reap in 
eastern and southern Africa over so many decades, while deploring the 
fact that their own people do not exert themselves in the same way; oth-
ers have pointed out that the Lebanese expatriates have been doing the 
same all over western Africa. It is not mere commercial savvy, but, more 
importantly, hard work, commitment, discipline and perseverance that 
determine the outcome of business. Ideas and plans are only as good 
as their implementation. And implementation hinges on what I have 
termed ‘development-mindedness’: knowledge, practising, ownership 
and passion (KPOP).
Education in Ethics and Mindset Change
When we are dealing with a magnanimous goal like changing the course 
of a nation, people should embrace it wholeheartedly, and it is always 
good to begin with a sound education. The progress of Sub-Saharan 
African countries thus far is disappointing, considering how much poten-
tial they have, but how little they have advanced over the decades in terms 
of strengthening their social, economic and political fabric. The inter-
national community which has struggled in terms of its development 
endeavours on Africa, should also reflect on whether there had not been 
blind-spots in its methods rather than just go about doing business the 
same way.
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This calls for objective, cool-headed reassessment of Africa’s prob-
lems. And it should begin with a recognition of the nature of the prob-
lems. What kind of a response is needed would depend on the nature 
of the problem. If the problem is technical, it would require a techni-
cal approach. If it is more fundamental and deep-seated, it should be 
approached differently, in the context of ‘tailored response’. But in order 
to be able to do this, countries must recognize their problem as such 
and also accept the required means.
Anyone who has worked on African development ought to under-
stand that what is required in terms of addressing the nature of the 
challenges facing Africa is not simply distributive, welfare or poverty-re-
lief types of responses. It is not only about a ‘lack of capacity’ either. 
Rather, the answer lies elsewhere, at a different level: the mindset and 
behaviour of the people. There seems to be a big gap between what is 
desired and what is necessary. Changes will come when people under-
stand how wealth is created and through what process it can be repro-
duced and sustained. The blind-sights or negligence have continued for 
so long because no meaningful evolution in terms of the mindset has 
occurred.
From the development partners’ perspective, there can be an issue of 
‘short-memory’, a short cycle and turnover of projects, frequent shifts in 
the officials in charge, etc. They could also be ‘captured’ or entrenched 
in their own systems, without themselves knowing that this is the case. 
People could make the mistake of treating such subjects like people’s 
mindset and culture as taboos on the premise that these are intrinsi-
cally unchangeable. But as I have already pointed out, cultural heritage, 
identity and traditions that are objects of national pride and hence need 
be cherished should not be confused with ‘social behaviourism’ that 
can and should evolve over time when necessary. Development itself 
is about evolution, and hence sticking rigidly to old habits is counter-
productive in terms of development and is tantamount to self-denial of 
improvement. People cannot have it both ways: ‘comfort’ and ‘progress’ 
are mutually exclusive. I deplore it when I see people complaining and 
even indulging in self-pity when they are willing to do so little to help 
themselves.
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Development means changing for the better. That is why we have 
education, public campaigns, activist movements and so on. Today’s 
degradation of the natural environment, increasing security threats and 
growing competition in business, among other factors, demand change 
on the part of the people, even if only for their survival, let alone from 
the perspective of development. The logic of social development, peo-
ple’s empowerment, as well as economic principles, should serve as the 
basis for healthy politics; it should not be the other way round, where 
everything is being driven by political considerations.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, so many things break down and deteriorate 
in everyday life that such phenomena are accepted as normal. Self-
regulating or correcting mechanisms in society are feeble, and responses 
to public requirements, accidents, crimes, natural disasters and contin-
gencies are not swiftly and effectively taken, and are sometimes grossly 
neglected. Expectations of and trust in the public service is very low, 
and the general sense of people’s powerlessness and detachment from 
the country’s centres is perceived to be widespread. Even the elites and 
the privileged class have their fair share of frustrations and uneasiness in 
relation to their society.
But the vast majority of people seem to accept the reality with a ‘sub-
sistence’ mindset and, as a result, society is bogged down in a languid 
state. You rarely see any expressions of social outrage or calls for fun-
damental change in the form of large-scale public demonstrations and 
campaigns. In certain countries, we see demonstrations and strikes all 
too often, but these are almost entirely protests against poor public ser-
vices, labour unions demanding better wages and the poor demanding 
more welfare.
Moreover, activist movements that are energetically pursued are not 
in evidence either. Under the circumstances, Africa’s politics have man-
aged to adapt to the reality in their own way, not in strengthening gov-
ernance and fabric of the society, and empowering the people, but by 
following a ‘minimalist’ strategy and catering to the people’s needs that 
remain largely subsistence-oriented.
Problems stemming from the weak fundamentals of civil society, like 
people’s sense of themselves and their community, civic values, work 
ethics, etc., that pertain to the realm of human development should 
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be recognized and dealt with in a serious fashion and should not be 
left to be addressed in the political context or politicized. The interna-
tional community also has to be careful of the traps of taking a politi-
cal approach from their end. Mainstream partners sometimes make the 
mistake of focusing on what is nominal and lose sight of the issues that 
plagues Africa’s development.
The ills of an overdose of politics are consequential: diversion of 
attention to politics; loss of opportunities to engage in issues of more 
substance, like work culture and work ethics; dependency on politics 
and political figureheads; division and fragmentation of society stem-
ming from politics, etc. The profound harm done is that the people, 
especially the rural population and the youth, become so dependent on 
politicians and assistance from the state that they lose any motivation to 
work and take ownership of their lives.
The workings of the elite class, entrepreneurs and foreign partners, 
under the given circumstances, will not be sufficient in themselves for 
the countries to overcome poverty in a transformative fashion, regard-
less of how many resources may be injected. It is the broad section of 
the masses, the ordinary people that have to be empowered and enlight-
ened. Only then will African societies be able to enjoy sustainable devel-
opment and prosperity. In order for this to occur, the expectations and 
ambitions of individuals for their lives must also be raised substantially. 
Without people’s sense of self-esteem and pride, expectations for a bet-
ter tomorrow and, most importantly, the willingness to take on respon-
sibilities, all the endeavours made will most likely end up achieving 
little.
So, how can countries turn around the degradation of people’s values 
and the sense of ownership in their lives and work ethics? The only log-
ical answer that I can find is through education in ethics, human and 
social development emphasizing the need for dynamic change. There 
should be a boldness to include in the curriculum the resocialization 
or reorientation of existing modes. African nations ought to take this 
matter very seriously and wholeheartedly and carry out the entire task 
forcefully. This is the field where the role of donors can be vague and 
limited, as it will be an uncharted territory for the traditional donor 
community.
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Korea provides a good set of examples of mindset change initiatives 
that Africans may find relevant and appealing. In a sense, such endeav-
ours can be considered as the nation-building process, and hence for 
developing countries, there is great value in conscientiously launching 
them in a campaign-like fashion. Development is about changing for 
the better and people cannot expect positive things to happen when 
they are not willing to change themselves. Korea’s experience in this 
field offers a worthy example from which countries can readily take 
inspiration.
Ethics has been taught in Korean schools as a regular subject on the 
curriculum since 1955, when the relevant provision was enacted. Along 
with ethics, an early vocational course called ‘practical arts’ (shilkwa ) 
was also established in the same year. Both of these are still taught in 
Korean schools. The subject of ethics in primary schools is called barun-
senghwal or ‘right habits of life’, in secondary schools dodeok or ‘ethics’ 
and in universities it was called kokminyoonli or ‘national ethics’ up to 
the mid-1990s, but later changed to ‘ethics’. It started with the purpose 
of teaching the basic morals like attitudes of individuals befitting dutiful 
members of society, patriotism and a law-abiding spirit, responsibility 
towards one’s family members, etc.25
Furthermore, in 1968, in an effort to solidify the foundation of a 
national ethics and ethos, the Charter of National Education was prom-
ulgated by the Korean President. The reason for its promulgation was 
because of the need to address various shortcomings of the nation: 
Korea’s valuable traditions and heritage were not being followed and 
advanced; there were imbalances or disharmony between material devel-
opment and people’s value systems, the latter lagging behind the for-
mer; people lacked a sense of state, society and national identity; and 
national education indicators were ambiguous, while spiritual and ethi-
cal education was being neglected.
The Charter’s main body is broken down into three parts empha-
sizing: the pride and duty of the Korean nation; norms and virtues in 
everyday life; and national unification and evolution of democracy. 
The sentiments underpinning the charter are: (1) the establishment of 
a national identity; (2) the creation of a new national culture through 
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harmony between tradition and progress; and (3) the development of 
democracy by means of harmonization of individuals and the state.26
In the 1990s, the Charter was removed from Korean textbooks. 
As for the ethics course, although it has been maintained for a long 
time, it is gradually being phased out, reflecting political and social 
changes in Korea. For example, ‘national ethics’ was dropped from 
exams to recruit civil servants in 1994. In more recent years, since 
2014, ethics is no longer taught in high schools. Although the eco-
nomic achievements of Korea during the ‘developmental dictatorship’ 
era are undeniable, Korean people living in a different era of democ-
ratization, a pluralistic society and in a situation of economic pros-
perity tend to hold a more sophisticated or critical view of past events 
and legacies.
But the mindset change, moral and work ethics-oriented initi-
atives that Korea undertook should not be dismissed easily as being 
out of touch with today’s reality. These can be all the more relevant 
in developing countries. In fact, Korea’s public or state-led mindset 
change and ethics campaign did not come out of nowhere, but had 
deep roots in Korea’s history and society. Korea, having undergone a 
process of economic, political and social evolution, has placed greater 
emphasis on public service and ethics codes for civil servants and 
politicians.
The Canaan Farmers School is reputed to have positively contributed 
to development by spearheading changes in its own way. Founded in 
1931, the Canaan Farmers School methodology is said to have been 
adopted later in the model of the New Village Movement, the Saemaul 
Undong, which was launched in 1970.
This school’s ideas are about making people disciplined, voluntary, 
active, hard-working, forthright, ethical, frugal and responsible as indi-
viduals and community members. It tries to instil the ‘I work first, I 
serve first, I sacrifice first’ mentality in people, with the motto of ‘let’s 
learn until we know, let’s devote ourselves to work, let’s serve in humil-
ity’. It has an eye-catching slogan that is emblematic of its ethos: ‘do not 
eat to eat, but eat to work. If you don’t like to work, do not eat. Work at 
least four hours for each meal’.27
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The school also teaches ‘mindset pioneering’: that it is all up to the 
people to get things done, so they should have a positive ‘can-do’ spirit. 
Individuals are urged to wake up early before dawn to start the day, and 
changing oneself for the better, being passionate and faithful pioneers 
and the need to maintain one’s own good health are also emphasized.28
The logic of the school’s approach is that while various projects for 
poverty eradication and sustainable development are necessary, it is 
more important to educate leaders who will effectively drive these pro-
jects forward and have the ability to lead others. The basic component 
of leadership training is mindset transformation based on the belief 
that a person can change only when his or her mind changes. The task 
here is to make the changes in mindset embedded in the personality of 
trainees so that they will act differently, in a more positive manner. The 
expected benefits are twofold: the creation of model communities of 
poverty eradication based on mindset transformation and raising leaders 
who practise and live out the changed mindset.29
The founder of the Canaan movement, Kim Yong-ki (1909–1988), 
spent his whole life cultivating barren land and enlightening farmers 
during Korea’s most difficult times of Japanese occupation and the post-
war periods when the nation was suffering from extreme poverty and 
hunger. He said:
For a country like ours, learned people must get involved in agriculture. 
Agriculture is the core of all industries. But on the contrary, learned peo-
ple are avoiding agriculture and only ignorant rural people have been 
working as farmers. This has kept our nation’s economy and civilization 
primitive, resulting in loss of our sovereignty to Japan. To recover our sov-
ereignty, we must gain economic independence. And for that, there is no 
other way but for the learned to get involved in agriculture and increase 
food production.30
He would also say: ‘Don’t tell people to work but be the one to work 
first’, ‘Don’t just keep your appearance clean but keep your heart clean’, 
‘If you don’t like to work, do not eat’, ‘Take courage, my country’, ‘You 
will reap as you sow’, ‘Young men, go to the countryside’, ‘Do good and 
do not lose hope’ and ‘Be the pioneer to change your fate’.
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Kim Yong-ki’s extraordinary passion to fight against the odds and 
break ‘the status quo’ by tackling head-on what could be extremely 
onerous and almost impossible, but essential undertakings for trans-
formative development—changing the mindset of people—is remarka-
ble. It is said that his thoughts and conviction on the Canaan Farmers 
movement were rooted in his Christian faith. In any case, from the 
perspective of development, I think that ‘his thoughts and deeds form 
imperative basis for mindset transformation of leaders in developing 
nations’.31
According to the Canaan Farmers School, immediately after General 
Park Chung-Hee took power following a military coup in 1961, he vis-
ited the school. When he visited the school again in March 1962, he is 
said to have remarked ‘we led a political revolution, but you led a life-
style revolution’. In April 1962, hundreds of district leaders led by the 
Vice Minister of Home Affairs came to the school for training.32
The Canaan Farmers School seems to have strongly inspired 
President Park to envision and launch the Saemaul Undong, the New 
Village Movement, in 1970.33 As the school was increasingly recognized 
at the start of the 1970s, it attracted not only farmers but increasingly 
people from all walks of life, including soldiers, civil servants, business-
men, professionals, college and high school students. As a result, the 
school’s facilities and training courses were also expanded. Over time, 
the curriculum went through some changes in its content to reflect the 
changes in reality of Korea, but the mindset-change approach and the 
heritage of farmers’ education continued to be its central component.
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The Need for a Success Story
In view of the nature of the task of Africa’s development, the key word 
to be used is ‘change’. This is because development itself implies change, 
while in Sub-Saharan Africa, so many things remain unchanged. In a 
fast-moving society like Korea, ‘change’ is almost synonymous with 
‘survival’. ‘Change’ could mean many things: improvement, adapta-
tion, progress, achievement, innovation, etc. In Korea, the fervour for 
‘change’ was evident during its rapid growth era, but even now it is 
regarded as a virtue and a necessity. I recall that even in around 2005, 
when Korea was already well underway in terms of innovations, there 
was a boom in demand for innovative leadership training sessions all 
over Korea. These sessions would stress that ‘change’ is innovation. 
Increased competition under globalization and technological innova-
tions requires people to become more nimble.
But what is surprising is that in spite of this necessity, Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been so silent on ‘change’. Basically, it is perceived that the 
political leaders and elites with vested rights want to maintain the status 
quo. But, in addition, the masses who should be outraged and yearning 
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for change have chosen the status quo by adhering to their subsistence 
way of life. Add to this the dependency syndrome or the welfare-ori-
ented policies and mindset, and you get the picture of Africa that we see 
today. Breaking old habits is as important as having a rejuvenated and 
committed governmental leadership.
I have come across a number of foreign professionals, both Western 
and Asian, working in Africa who expressed that after having spent 
many years in Africa, they have become convinced that Africa’s funda-
mental obstacle is ‘cultural’ in nature. Some believe that the ‘yoke’ of 
the ‘traditional way of life’ of the locals is far stronger than anything else 
and supersedes even their professed religion.
But we can understand this from a different angle. It is not neces-
sarily the cultures impeding development, but rather that development 
efforts failing to have an impact so that the cultures remain intact. 
Transforming various aspects of life is the very aim of development. 
Experts can be burdened by the connotations of the word ‘culture’, but 
this should be approached in a practical manner. As I have mentioned, 
‘culture’ can be broken down into two categories: (1) cultural heritage; 
and (2) behavioural modes. Needless to say, the former, in the form 
of arts, languages, food, lifestyles, traditions, etc., are to be cherished 
and upheld, but the latter, when necessary, can and should be modi-
fied or ameliorated. This is where education can be instrumental. An 
appropriate synthesis of civic values, education and development pro-
jects can yield positive outcomes in this respect. Since development 
is about changing, why shouldn’t behaviour modes that impede the 
improvement of lives not be targeted for change? Once this necessity 
is recognized, then the next logical step would be to find and apply an 
‘antithesis’ to the problem at hand.
Korea’s Saemaul Undong campaign is a resounding success story 
of turning around the mindset of the people to realize transformative 
development. In every respect, the Saemaul Undong, which was based 
on the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation, is deemed an ideal 
model of development for Sub-Saharan African countries because it 
invokes voluntarism and hard work in the people.
While the Saemaul Undong was a national campaign carried out 
ambitiously in the 1970s and continued afterwards in Korea, as the 
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Korean economy and society became increasingly sophisticated, it began 
to be viewed as a ‘relic’ which had merits when Korea was poor but 
was not so relevant to the current situation. People became less com-
munal, more urban life-oriented and individualistic, and the attention 
has shifted towards undertaking Saemaul Undong programmes overseas 
in view of its popularity among developing countries that continue to 
struggle with poverty and underdevelopment.
It is against such a backdrop that Korea’s development agency 
KOICA launched Smart Saemaul Undong in September 2015, which 
coincided with the adoption of the SDGs. It refers to a holistic com-
munity development initiative capturing the partnering government’s 
willingness for development and the people’s voluntary participa-
tion. Its strategy is to implement an integrative programme utilizing 
appropriate technology, creating value chains and strengthening part-
nership, based on the foundation of governance and social capital. 
This includes embedding the Saemaul Undong into partner countries’ 
community development policy, promoting the spirit of the Saemaul 
Undong, and establishing sound governance. Detailed components 
of this strategy involve: (1) a sector-integrative programme; (2) the 
appropriate technology; (3) a value chain; (4) competition and incen-
tives; (5) village-level development; (6) Saemaul Undong education tai-
lored to the needs of each community; and (7) partnership with the 
private sector.1
Regarding sector-integrative programmes, it is argued that the 
Saemaul Undong has great potential to contribute to the achievement 
of SDGs as an integrative community development model that encom-
passes agricultural sectors such as livestock and fisheries, social sectors 
such as education, health, hygiene and gender, and technology sectors 
such as ICT, energy and the environment.
With respect to appropriate technology, the Saemaul Undong aims 
to drastically raise performance in improving the level of income within 
a short period of time by identifying and mobilizing technologies that 
are the most appropriate in specific settings of partner countries. As for 
improving value chains, including production (land, seeds, equipment, 
micro-financing and cultivation technology), harvesting, storage, pro-
cessing, distribution, marketing and sales are important if income is to be 
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increased on a sustained basis. Thus, the value chain is taken into consider-
ation in planning what activities to carry out in order to generate income.
‘Competition’ fuelled by incentives (and disincentives) constitutes 
another key aspect of the Saemaul Undong. Without the willingness 
and commitment of the beneficiaries, real and sustainable development 
cannot happen. Thus, places in which a Saemaul Undong project is to 
be undertaken are carefully examined to confirm whether the targeted 
community or entity has sufficient willingness to change. To meas-
ure the outcomes of projects, performance indicators are devised and 
reviewed on an annual basis to identify and reward high-performing 
communities.
The Saemaul Undong is undertaken at a village level. However, in 
Korea, this turned into a pan-national movement, so while villages were 
the main implementers of various projects, other networking bodies 
existed as well. The Saemaul Undong was an integrative work in itself 
and in the process of actively promoting this movement, an enhanced 
governance structure in the form of a newly integrated local administra-
tive system emerged.
‘Saemaul Undong education tailored to the needs of each community’ 
means that the local community must provide training to its members, 
which can be done through the collaboration of village leaders learning 
from each other and coming up with Saemaul Undong textbooks devel-
oped following internal discussions. This is important because the learn-
ing process is internally driven, making the villagers self-serving with a 
true sense of ownership, in contrast to ‘outside experts’ seemingly dic-
tating everything, as is the case in many development projects. Local 
problems should be solved through locals’ understanding and participa-
tion, and by mobilizing local resources.
The KOICA President expressed that ‘KOICA is currently receiving 
requests from 50 developing countries to share knowledge in Saemaul 
Undong or community development. In addition, international organ-
izations such as [the] World Food Program (WFP), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and world-re-
nowned scholars, including Professor Jeffrey Sachs, have lauded Saemaul 
Undong as an excellent development model’.2
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The Korea Saemaul Undong Centre was created in 1980 with sub-re-
gional organizations at the national level, along with five member asso-
ciations, including the Central Council of Saemaul Leaders, the Central 
Council of Saemaul Women’s Club, the Central Council of Corporation 
and Factory Saemaul Undong, the Federation of Saemaul Mini-libraries 
and the Federation of Saemaul Credit Unions. These organizations, 
like the Saemaul Undong Centre, all have vertical sub-regional net-
works. While this centre has been in existence for a long time, it is only 
recently that it has started to embark on the Global Saemaul Undong 
programme in around 2009.
In order for the Saemaul Undong to have any real impact on African 
countries, a pragmatic scenario would be having success stories of the 
Saemaul Undong emerge in Africa so that they can be replicated and 
expanded over the region. The Saemaul Undong will not be met with 
the same degree of enthusiasm in all countries, so the programme needs 
to be strategically focused.
Saemaul Undong in Uganda
Although the Ugandan example may not be the representative case for 
the whole Sub-Saharan African region, it should provide an informative 
case in understanding what can be possible in this region. The Saemaul 
Undong in Uganda is in a burgeoning stage, making it an interest-
ing and valuable testing ground for its African and international pro-
gramme. The Saemaul Undong was formally introduced in 2009 when 
the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre collaborated with Korea Africa 
Investment and Development (KAID) that was established by a Korean 
missionary body to conduct model Saemaul Undong village projects in 
Kitemu and Katereke in Nsangi sub-county, Wakiso District.
Around this time, or actually a little earlier, the Canaan Farmers 
School also began its activity in Uganda. Government leaders in 
Uganda had shown a keen interest in many aspects of Korea’s develop-
ment, and in 2009, some 20 Ugandan governmental leaders and offi-
cials, including the Vice President, visited Korea to attend the Canaan 
Farmers School’s training course. The idea to train these government 
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officials in the school came from President Museveni, and the Ugandan 
government paid for their travel costs.
Until a few years ago, the Saemaul Undong village pilot project in 
Uganda, which was sponsored by the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre, 
was largely unknown in Uganda due to the low-profile approach that 
the Centre followed. On the other hand, the Canaan Farmers School 
was quite popular, as President Museveni himself was fond of this 
institution.
It was on 31 May 2013, when President Museveni visited the Korea 
Saemaul Undong Centre in Sungnam, that he understood the differ-
ence between the Canaan Farmers School training and the Saemaul 
Undong. He learned that the school focused on mindset change train-
ing by emphasizing hard work, frugality, a disciplined life, etc., along 
with farming skills, whereas the Saemaul Undong was a more extensive 
and systematic community development movement based on the spirit 
of diligence, self-help and cooperation. The latter was a national move-
ment involving the government, while the former was a private organi-
zation for training.
There are three main entities carrying out Saemaul Undong pro-
grammes in Uganda: KOICA, the UNDP and the Korea Saemaul 
Undong Centre. The earliest to arrive in Uganda was the Korea Saemaul 
Undong Centre’s programme mentioned above. KOICA followed suit 
with the launch of the Mpigi Saemaul model village project in December 
2015. Also, KOICA’s National Farmers Leadership Centre (NFLC) in 
Kampiringisa, Mpigi, was officially launched in May 2016. The third 
entity is the UNDP, which launched the ‘inclusive and sustainable new 
communities (ISNC) in Uganda’ project adopting the Saemaul Undong 
model in July 2015. This project was an outcome of the Memorandum 
of Understanding signed between KOICA and the UNDP on the 
Saemaul Undong in 2013. Meanwhile, the Canaan Farmers School con-
tinues to train Ugandans in Korea. The school’s programme may not be 
considered as Saemaul Undong per se, but is seen as complementing the 
Saemaul Undong through its mindset change training.
As already mentioned, Korea has announced the four key areas it will 
engage in to implement the SDGs, and the Project to Establish Saemaul 
Model Villages (ESMV) in Uganda, which was launched in December 
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2015 in Mpigi District by KOICA, falls into the first category of 
Inclusive and Sustainable Rural Development.3
Mpigi was chosen as the project site because KOICA wanted the 
NFLC, which was being located nearby, to have a synergistic effect 
with this project. The objective was to apply the new paradigm of the 
Saemaul Undong to achieve sustainable and integrated rural develop-
ment. The activities involves the following: enhancing villages’ agricul-
tural productivity and income, improving the living environment and 
the rural community infrastructure; strengthening social capital by 
instilling a spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation; strengthening 
the capacity of farmers’ cooperatives and local central government. This 
was a three-year project (2015–2018) worth a total of USD 3 million.
As the beneficiaries of this project, seven villages were chosen by 
based on a baseline survey: Tiribogo village (Muduuma sub-county, 
224 families, population 856), Kololo village (Kiringente sub-county, 
249 families, population 1023), Nsamu village (Mpigi Town Council, 
171 families, population 682), Kiwumu(A) village (Kammengo sub-
county, 97 families, population 441), Kumbya village (Buwama 
sub-country, 131 families, population 671), Lwaweeba village (Kituntu 
sub-county, 129 families, population 666) and Lukonge village (Nkozi 
sub-county, 1078 families, population 4765). An important point to 
note is that these villages are not just beneficiaries, but are in com-
petition with one another. Competition and motivation through 
incentives are central elements of the Saemaul Undong. The level of 
assistance they receive will depend on the results (KOICA Office 
Uganda).
The expected outcomes of the project are: (1) strengthening social 
capital—earning higher credibility, nurturing a sense of community 
and an increase in the frequency of town hall meetings; (2) increasing 
agricultural productivity and rural income—an increase in both agri-
cultural and non-agricultural income and improvement in product of 
crops and livestock; (3) improving infrastructure and the living envi-
ronment—the supply of clean water, better access to medical services, 
improving living quarters, better access to markets and improvement 
of the students-per-class ratio; and (4) improving governance in model 
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villages—an increase in the number of projects carried out, enhancing 
the quality of project planning and reducing the time taken to resolve 
village issues.
The history of this project can be traced back to May 2013, when 
President Museveni visited the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre and 
appreciated the Saemaul Undong programmes. He said that Ugandans 
have gotten used to welfare policies and foreign aid since independence, 
and in the process Uganda’s communal tradition like Bulungi bwansi 
had been lost, and thanked the Centre for refocusing on the lost tradi-
tions of Uganda.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock of Uganda 
submitted a formal request for the project on September 2013, which 
led to the dispatch of a KOICA site survey team the following year. 
Consultations and the signing of a MOU took place in April 2015. 
Then in November 2015, the project office was set up and the steer-
ing committee leaders were trained in Korea, and seven model pro-
ject villages were selected. The official launching ceremony took place 
in December 2015. In March 2016, members of the committees and 
sub-committees of these model villages were appointed, and rules on 
competition and incentives were finalized. It was decided that project 
funds would be allotted to each village, taking into account their perfor-
mance. In April 2016, training in Saemaul leadership and general devel-
opment issues for the committee members was conducted. A baseline 
survey on the villagers’ feedback and the progress of projects as well as 
the formulation of a Saemaul action plan was completed in May 2016.
From the perspective of KOICA project management (PM), the four 
main tasks are: dispatch of experts; supply of logistics/materials; per-
formance management; and public relations. KOICA sent two Korean 
experts to oversee the project on the ground, while setting up a project 
team with local employees, as well as drawing up the project scheme. 
The KOICA Office supplied the necessary logistics, like an office facil-
ity, official vehicles and various kinds of materials. Performance man-
agement entails using baseline surveys, mid-term appraisal and final 
assessment to measure performance and draw lessons from the stand-
point of the Saemaul Undong. Public relations activities include regular 
press briefings, distribution of brochures, etc.
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The flagship of the Korean development project in Uganda is the 
NFLC, which was built in Kampirignisa, Mpigi District, to showcase 
a comprehensive Korean model of rural-agricultural development. 
As the then Korean President pointed out in her speech during the 
opening ceremony of the centre, this is the first of its kind in Africa. 
President Museveni had expressed his desire to the Korean side in 
March 2010 to have such an institution (modelled on the Canaan 
Farmers School) built in Uganda so that Ugandans could be trained in 
Korean-style mindset change programmes.
This project to establish the NFLC was carried out from April 2011 
to May 2016 with a budget of USD 4.4 million. While the centre was 
formally opened in 30 May 2016, the project was extended for a year 
in order to place it on a stronger footing in terms of operational capac-
ity and financial sustainability before its handover to the Ugandan side, 
which took place in May 2017. The NFLC project’s vision is the estab-
lishment of a ‘top-notch’ leadership centre in Uganda and East Africa 
that will lead to the development of the rural community and the coun-
try. Its mission is: (1) to transform mindset and empower farm lead-
ers, civic and political leadership at all levels of government; (2) to train 
leaders who will be a role model to others by working, serving and sac-
rificing first; and (3) to impart agricultural technologies to transform 
from subsistence to commercial farming for wealth.
This NFLC’s basic approach is combining the Saemaul Undong spirit 
and agro-technologies. The expectations of the NFLC were very high 
indeed in Uganda, and hence there was considerable pressure on the 
key stakeholders to deliver the expected outcomes. The project has three 
facets: physical infrastructure, a ‘delivery system’ or operation and the 
contents or substance. But making these three things happen or work 
is no easy task and poses big challenges. The physical construction of 
the NFLC entailed a prolonged and laborious process due to the various 
obstacles that face construction projects in Africa. Here, the ‘contents’ 
are the Korean model of rural-agricultural development, including the 
Saemaul Undong. No matter how good the infrastructure and the con-
tents, these will be worthless if the delivery—the project operation—
does not match up.
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Hence, KOICA focused on making the NFLC operation efficient 
and sustainable before it handed over this project to the Ugandan side. 
The devil is in the detail and the technical aspect of the project—the 
question of how to make it sustainable—is a major challenge, especially 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. KOICA’s work plan for the operation of the 
NFLC had the goal of setting up a sustainable operation system of the 
NFLC through capacity-building.4
Before the NFLC was officiated in May 2016, it conducted test 
operations for more than a year, and over 400 people were trained in 
Saemaul Undong and agricultural skills. Since the official opening, the 
NFLC has collaborated with the Saemaul model village project (ESMV) 
in Mpigi District, providing training for the latter.
The NFLC had an operational structure of cooperative links between 
the KOICA Uganda Office and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). They signed a MOU on co-manage-
ment of the NFLC on 25 May 2016. The project management con-
sultant (PMC) led by the Chonbuk National University consortium 
worked under the KOICA Office. Within this PMC, there was a pro-
ject manager (PM) who worked as the Cooperation Head of the NFLC 
to conduct operation of the NFLC, develop modules and a master 
plan, and run training programmes and farms with his team of Korean 
experts. On the Ugandan side, a steering committee composed of vari-
ous officials concerned was placed under the Ministry, while the prin-
cipal was tasked with contacting the Ministry, securing a governmental 
budget, legalizing the status of the NFLC, organizing a steering com-
mittee and recruiting staff.
The UNDP Saemaul Undong project, the Inclusive and Sustainable 
New Communities (ISNC) Project in Uganda, is the first Saemaul 
Undong programme that the UNDP has launched in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In September 2014, Uganda’s Ministry of Local Government 
officials met UNDP officials in New York and learned from them that 
the UNDP was planning to pilot the Saemaul Undong model in some 
developing countries, particularly in Africa. The Uganda officials per-
suaded the UNDP officials to include Uganda in this programme. 
Then, in October 2014, a team from the UNDP headquarters visited 
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Uganda to work with the Ministry to start putting together the project 
document for the ISNC programme.
The Ugandan Ministry of Local Government appreciated the fol-
low-up actions of the UNDP as appropriate and timely, as Uganda 
was re-examining its development agenda through the National 
Development Plan II with a vision to becoming a middle-income 
country by the year 2030. It recognized that the project, which would 
activate the Saemaul Undong principles of diligence, self-help and coop-
eration, would provide the much-needed result-oriented development 
impetus that is poised to pull the country out of poverty.
This ISNC project is based on the rural development model of the 
Saemaul Undong with the goal of transforming communities with a 
long-term shared vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthu-
siasm for local development, sustained by volunteerism at the commu-
nity level. The project ran for two and half years (July 2015–December 
2017) with funding of USD 1 million provided by Korea. It was imple-
mented in the three districts of Kabarole, Maracha and Luuka, targeting 
a total of 15 communities. The envisioned results were: (1) a strength-
ened institutional system of local development; (2) enhanced cohesive-
ness and inclusiveness in community development; (3) improved and 
increased local resources and financing mechanisms; (4) scaled up of 
proven sustainability innovations; and (5) the documentation and dis-
semination of generated knowledge.
The Minister of Local Government of Uganda spoke about the 
Saemaul Undong model on the occasion of the launching of the ISNC 
in July 2015:
During my visit to South Korea in October 2014, I witnessed the trans-
formation that the country underwent over the years and was mesmerized 
by the impact that was caused by the model. I was particularly intrigued 
to learn that the model was premised on the platform of spirit of dili-
gence, self-help and cooperation among the rural communities. In Korea, 
this led to improved livelihoods, but more significantly, transformed com-
munities to develop a long term shared vision of a better life for all, and 
an infectious enthusiasm for local development, sustained by volunteer-
ism at community level.5
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The Korea Saemaul Undong Centre started its project in Uganda in 
2009 with the two model villages of Kitemu (500 households, popula-
tion 2500) and Katereke (250 households, population 1500) of Nsagni 
sub-county, Wakiso District, over a five-year period. Then in 2015, 
it newly designated six model villages in Mityana District: Bbanda 
(110 households, population 480); Nabaale (105 households, popula-
tion 450); Kyabombo (110 households, population 390); Mawanga 
(100 households, population 490); Ndirabweru (96 households, pop-
ulation 470); and Buwala (98 households, population 440). Besides 
these model villages that are officially supported by the Korea Saemaul 
Undong Centre, ‘autonomous’ Saemaul villages (estimated to be more 
than 40 as of July 2016) that have adopted the Saemaul Undong volun-
tarily are growing at a fast pace in Uganda.6
The typical Saemaul Undong programmes for these villages fall into 
three categories: improvement of the living environment, increase in 
agricultural production and household incomes, and education. All the 
work is done by the village residents collectively. Improving the living 
environment includes constructing Saemaul Undong halls, public toilets, 
public wells, boda-boda (motorcycle taxis) shelters, improving kitch-
ens, and cleaning up villages and flattening out dirt roads. Examples of 
activities to increase agricultural production and incomes are operating 
cooperative farms (to produce mushrooms, vegetables, maize, bananas, 
ground-nuts, etc.), factories (to produce feed, blocks, candles, soaps, 
slippers, furniture, etc.), fish-ponds, piggeries, goat banks, pig banks, 
sewing schools, beauty parlour schools, Saemaul banks, etc. Lastly, the 
education programme involves training Ugandans in the Korea Saemaul 
Undong Centre and operating a ‘mobile Saemaul School’ in Uganda. 
Around 170 Ugandans were trained in Korea from 2009 to 2015, and 
the mobile school has been in operation since 2014.
The Uganda Saemaul Undong Centre was formed to undertake 
Saemaul Undong programmes in Uganda supported by Korea’s Saemaul 
Undong Centre. Its activities have been steady and engaging, but there 
is a room for greater expansion. The irony is that the first-term model 
village assistance for five years by the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre 
showed a rather mediocre performance, while the voluntary Saemaul 
villages like Busanza and Kiboba, which received no direct support 
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from Korea, did markedly better and their mode more closely resem-
bled the typical model practised by Korean villages. It could be that 
Kitemu and Katereke villages are located near the Capitol Kampala and 
have semi-urban features. Also, because many leaders and members of 
this sub-county have had the chance to visit Korea to be trained there, 
and received some sort of support on a continuous basis, this probably 
made them ‘dependent’ without being really motivated. Of course, the 
assistance provided by the Korean centre was modest in amount, and 
in many cases it came in the form of matching funds. But, overall, the 
two villages did not meet the expectations of being pioneering Saemaul 
Undong villages in Uganda. The leaders and officials became familiar 
with the Saemaul Undong skills and approach, and did well in presenta-
tions, but fell short in terms of energizing, expanding and promoting 
this movement in their region. This turned out to be a very important 
lesson in itself.
The strength of the Uganda Saemaul Undong Centre lies in its local 
presence and local networking. While Korean experts, volunteers or 
officials come and go, the Uganda Saemaul Undong Centre run by 
Ugandans has accumulated expertise on the ground and through 
its contacts with Korean side. Its activities have been widened as it 
started to provide mobile Saemaul Undong clinic services and collabo-
rate with the NFLC, ESMV and ISNC projects. The Korean Embassy 
in Kampala, working closely with the KOICA Office, has provided 
oversight for Saemaul Undong-related programmes and activities for 
Uganda. Communications with the host government and relevant enti-
ties, and public diplomacy, among other activities, comprise the embas-
sy’s regular work.
To help promote the Saemaul Undong in Uganda, the embassy 
itself has held related events. First, it held a Saemaul Undong demon-
stration day event on four occasions between December 2013 and 
December 2014 in Kampala and Wakiso District. This was a simple 
cleaning-up exercise designed to draw public attention to the Saemaul 
Undong and to enhance awareness of and support for this movement. 
Later on, it organized annual the Uganda National Saemaul Undong 
Competition, which started in 2015. The competition plan was 
announced to interested village leaders, religious leaders, civil society 
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representatives and journalists who gathered at the embassy. The next 
step was communicating with competition participants. The embassy 
responded to inquiries and applications, explaining the guidelines of the 
competition. Then, an evaluation process was carried out on the work 
schemes submitted by each village. Participants were also required to 
present implementation reports with photos of the proposed project sites 
before and after the execution of the work. Subsequently, an on-site eval-
uation was conducted, and after going through each committee assess-
ment, the winners were chosen and awards were presented at the end of 
the year. A total of 190 villages applied for the competition in 2015.
The evaluation criteria basically comprised four elements: (1) the 
creation or amelioration of the village’s common properties (wells, 
expansion of village roads, etc.); (2) the enhancement of the village 
environment and living conditions (how much cleaner the village 
became after entering the competition); (3) organizational capacity 
(how efficiently structured the village leadership and organization had 
become for the implementation of Saemaul Undong activities); and 
(4) voluntariness (how much did the people contribute in terms of 
labour and funds, how regularly did the villagers gather to conduct joint 
projects, etc.)
The awards, comprising certificates of recognition and a prize, were 
given to the top seven villages. The awards ceremony, the finale of 
this competition, was filled with the joy and excitement of the partic-
ipants, and attracted media attention. The prizes given were not cash, 
but in-kind materials that the villages were in need of and had asked 
for. The purpose of the awards was to instil a sense of accomplishment 
and honour in the practitioners and to encourage them further, in 
line with the ‘incentives and punishment’ principle. The embassy also 
held stakeholder meetings to inform Ugandan and international part-
ners about Saemaul Undong projects and to seek their collaboration. 
On 30 June 2015, it hosted the High Level Seminar on the Saemaul 
Undong, with participants including the Minister of Local Government, 
the Chairman of the National Planning Authority, the Permanent 
Secretaries of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Local 
Government, the Vice President’s senior assistant, the UNDP Resident 
Coordinator, the KOICA Office and the KOPIA Centre heads.
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On 15 December 2015, the embassy organized with the UNDP a 
seminar on implementing SDGs in Uganda. The Senior Advisor to the 
President on Economic Planning and representatives of various organ-
izations like the UNDP, USAID, the EU, the World Bank, KOICA, 
KOPIA and civil society attended this meeting. An important subject 
on the agenda was sustainable rural development, and naturally the 
Saemaul Undong model was discussed.
One of the most memorable moments was when I participated, 
together with the visiting Secretary General of the Korea Saemaul 
Undong Centre, in the third National Saemaul Undong Convention 
organized by the Uganda Saemaul Undong Centre on 23 October 2015 
in Kampala. Vice President Edward Ssekandi, other high-level govern-
ment officials, UNDP representatives and over 1000 Saemaul Undong 
practitioners representing various districts gathered together. The 
Secretary General was in awe at seeing with his own eyes the fervour 
of the participants. The Vice President stressed that the dependency 
syndrome was seriously impairing Uganda’s development and that the 
Saemaul Undong emphasizing diligence, self-help and cooperation was 
the ‘best approach’ to overcoming Uganda’s problems.
The Proposed Scheme for Africa
I have cited Uganda’s example of the Saemaul Undong to highlight its 
possibilities, challenges and applicability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda 
is considered to be a notable case of the Saemaul Undong taking root 
in Africa. There are other candidates like Rwanda and Ethiopia, but 
Uganda could be the best testing ground for the Saemaul Undong in 
terms of its application to the region as a whole.
Many Sub-Saharan African countries have a tradition of commu-
nal self-help similar to the Saemaul Undong. As far as I know, these 
include Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Tanzania, but there 
must be many more. Also in South Africa, a similar tradition exists, 
the Ubuntu, an obscured legacy that needs to be revived. Ubuntu spir-
its are enhlonipho (respect), abantu (fellowship), illlima-letsema (work-
ing together), stokvel and lekgotla (community dialogue). But a very 
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meaningful development is unfolding: the Saemaul Undong programme 
entitled the ‘Saemaul Mindset DEEP (Development Experience 
Exchange Partnership) programme’, a joint project between KOICA 
and the Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform of South 
Africa, was launched on 16 July 2018 in Pretoria.
Over the years, various Korean organizations have been actively col-
laborating with Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda in the Saemaul Undong. 
There are also other countries in western and southern Africa that are 
interested in the Saemaul Undong, but East Africa is deemed to be the 
most active and successful thus far in this endeavour. South Africa is the 
latest addition. Overall, Saemaul Undong programmes are in a fledgling 
stage in Africa.
Rwanda tops the region when it comes to the level of governance and 
its Saemaul Undong project seems to be undertaken in a most organ-
ized manner in Africa. But the general features of Rwanda make it 
somewhat ‘atypical’ in the region. The nation has a very small territory, 
while having one of the lowest levels of ethnic diversity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In contrast, Uganda is considered to be ethnically the most 
diverse nation in the world, with a territory nearly ten times larger than 
that of Rwanda. Ethiopia is also a much bigger country facing greater 
challenges for expanding and managing development projects like the 
Saemaul Undong.
All in all, Uganda provides an interesting case study to test the via-
bility of the Saemaul Undong in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are several 
major players involved in Uganda: KOICA, the Korea Saemaul Undong 
Centre, the UNDP and the Canaan Farmers School, as well as other 
various institutions on rural-agriculture development. Hopefully, in 
due course, when enough information and records have been accumu-
lated on the progress of Saemaul Undong projects in the African region, 
a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the impact of the Saemaul 
Undong on the region will be possible. But for the time being, strenu-
ous efforts need to be made both in terms of the application and in the 
studies of the Saemaul Undong to keep the momentum going.
In light of what has transpired in Sub-Saharan Africa over many 
decades, we might as well try things differently and more aggres-
sively in relation to development projects for the region. Most of the 
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development projects that have been carried out in Africa were repe-
titions of what was done in the past. It is true that capacity-building 
or educational programmes, and rights-oriented programmes to pro-
mote social justice or peace, to protect and empower people, etc. also 
share a common goal of trying to change people’s attitudes and behav-
iour. But there is a major difference between these approaches and the 
Saemaul Undong. In terms of substance, the established programmes 
are either theorectial or technical in nature but the Saemaul Undong 
is all about practicality, directly and firmly anchored in the mindset 
change scheme.
A textbook form of generalized education as well as overly special-
ized programmes might not yield the desired results. Rather, voca-
tional, technical training is far more desirable for Africa, but this needs 
to be supplemented by mindset change or ‘resocialization’ programmes 
underscoring work ethics to have the necessary actual ripple effects. The 
advantage of the Saemaul Undong is that it encompasses and inter-links 
players at different levels—individual, village or community, regional 
and society at large—to produce immediate and palpable benefits to 
those who practise it. It is a pragmatic approach that goes ‘with the 
grain’ of local traditions in African countries. And the practice of ‘doing 
things’ with a ‘can-do spirit’ that the Saemaul Undong promotes is what 
African countries desperately need.
There are elements conducive to the Saemaul Undong as well as many 
challenges in Uganda. What is definitely positive is that there is wide 
support among Uganda’s leaders and people for the Saemaul Undong. 
The level of enthusiasm may vary depending on people’s background, 
but they seem to all see the necessity to pursue such an action-oriented 
initiative as a rational alternative to the existing modes.
For those who are more insightful and practical-minded, the Saemaul 
Undong is even more appealing. Many Ugandan politicians, officials, 
civil society and religious leaders have expressed a strong desire to have 
the Saemaul Undong introduced to their districts. Because African rural 
areas are largely in a state of destitution, they welcome any support pro-
grammes they can get, and it is understandable for Ugandan’s interest 
in the Saemaul Undong. But there are also many who genuinely like the 
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movement, knowing it is something very different and that can have 
more substantive impact on them.
Another merit of the Saemaul Undong is that it has a strong appeal 
from the perspective of national development policy and the availability 
of state resources. Sub-Saharan Africa’s number one priority is arguably 
rural-agricultural development, as the majority of population reside in 
rural areas. How to effectively achieve rural-agricultural development on 
a national scale should be the ultimate task of the leaders. In Africa, suc-
cessful industrialization is likely to emerge from the agricultural sector, 
making such an approach all the more worthwhile. It is argued that in 
Korea, the Saemaul Undong served as ‘the second economic movement’ 
supporting the government-led economic growth policy.7
Political stability and security are also important factors for the suc-
cess of the Saemaul Undong. In this respect, Uganda enjoys a rather 
favourable politico-security environment compared to other Sub-
Saharan countries, making it a good testing ground. Also, the fact that 
Uganda is blessed in terms of rich natural endowments and favoura-
ble agricultural conditions, but is experiencing persistent poverty can 
prompt people to rethink their existing methods and espouse a new 
approach such as the Saemaul Undong.
Thus, there are good reasons for countries to embrace the Saemaul 
Undong if they know what it is about. But then again, even with all the 
good intentions and enthusiastic support of stakeholders, various bar-
riers remain. These challenges are what the proponents of the Saemaul 
Undong must continuously fight against and which also demand a dif-
ferent mindset on the part of the Korean development partners. The 
reason why most development projects do not live up to expectations 
and wither shortly after donors have completed their mission and 
hand them over is because the recipients have inherently little zeal to 
take ownership of and responsibility for them. Hence, it is important 
for donors to conduct post-management of projects in whatever fashion 
possible and not to totally terminate engagement for a certain period.
Foreign development partners in the field are faced with double 
jeopardy. Not only do they have to follow very tough guidelines and 
regulations of their home country, but they also have to deal with 
everyday hardships on the ground and worry about the possibility of 
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the failure of their projects due to problems beyond their control. But 
knowing all too well how things will likely to unfold given the prac-
tices and conditions of the country they are assigned to, it would almost 
seem irresponsible for foreign aid workers to ignore reality altogether. 
Hence, regardless of how difficult it may be, development partners 
should be more demanding, proactive and straightforward in ‘pushing’ 
locals to comply and carry out their necessary part in the process. What 
is required is much more intrusive enforcement of disciplined work 
standards, supervision and the rule of ‘incentives and punishment’.
This vindicates the adoption of a stringent mindset change approach 
like the Saemaul Undong in the Sub-Saharan African region. What 
came to me as an important reckoning was that serious self-reflection 
must come from within Africans themselves, and it should not be the 
job of the development partners to spell out the problems of which the 
African people should be all too aware. A first meaningful step forward 
would be to recognize that ‘something is wrong’ and that it needs to be 
dealt with. I have seen people blaming others, so often but rarely do 
they put blame on themselves.
There is a delicate balance between the need for the Saemaul Undong 
to be welcomed and voluntarily espoused by the locals on the one hand, 
and the need to be strict and really be ‘pushy’ so that it can produce the 
desired outcome on the other. For foreign workers, making the locals 
change their attitude and behaviour is a very difficult as well as a sensi-
tive task. Therefore, Saemaul Undong programme managers or instruc-
tors need to have extra passion, perseverance and devotion to their 
duties. They themselves should have strong communication and leader-
ship skills.
In the case of poor countries, there is no choice for them other than 
to rely on a labour-intensive sector to build and grow the economy. 
But the socio-economic dynamics of the world have changed and peo-
ple’s work ethic in general is deemed to have deteriorated. Even in the 
poorest countries, it cannot be taken for granted that ordinary people 
would be willing to undergo toil and hardships in order to make it in 
life. A virtue like the Protestant work ethic, which, by the way, has sim-
ilar features to the teachings of the Canaan Farmers School, may be dis-
sipating fast. There are signs that even the poor and jobless in Africa 
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are increasingly shunning laborious work and are instead aspiring for 
easy-going, high-paid jobs that are out of their reach. But there is not 
much to hope for when the population continues to be neither produc-
tive nor diligent.
Other unwholesome trait that I have discovered to be prevalent even 
among African elites is a lack of confidence which can turn into a more 
serious form of defeatism. Lack of confidence and motivation breeds 
inaction, dependence and loss of self-esteem, which in turn can lead to 
expediency, deviation, irregularities and abandonment of one’s respon-
sibilities. Lack of confidence and commitment is reflected in the ten-
dency to ‘regress’ or ‘give up early and have other thoughts’.
The lessons learned from the operation of the Saemaul Undong 
in Uganda over the past six years or so can be summed up as follows: 
(1) poverty is opportunity; (2) competence and drive in grassroots lead-
ers makes all the difference; (3) flexibility and incremental scaling up of 
governance is required; (4) apply Goldilocks principle in assistance; and 
(5) an ‘organically’ interlinked system of support should be developed.
In Korea, the Saemaul Undong was successfully implemented because 
so many people took an active part in it, and the ultimate factor behind 
this was poverty: people were united in terms of wanting to get out 
of poverty and improve their livelihood. And the confidence that was 
bred into them only made them more passionate. It is believed that the 
Korean rural population complied actively with this movement because 
they were hopeful in light of the success of the government’s export pro-
motion in the 1960s.
In Uganda, as in other Sub-Saharan African countries in general, rural 
regions remain poor without much, if any, change taking placing, despite 
the evolution of the times and technological advances. For those people 
who are conscious of their situation, who know very well their limitations 
in the means (and the limited support they can get from their govern-
ment or donors), but who desire a better life, the Saemual Undong can be 
appealing. But there is variation in the responsiveness to this according 
to the type of communities: (1) communities near urban or commercial 
centres, having easily access to business, economic activities; (2) ‘commu-
nal’ villages in provincial districts; and (3) hard-to-access, very remote and 
isolated ‘troubled regions’ (with a weak social fabric and dire poverty). The 
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type that is most likely to have the best chance for the Saemaul Undong 
is communal villages. In sum, poor ‘communal’ villages having a certain 
level of yearning for a better life and hope have been found to be most 
suitable for the Saemaul Undong.
Since the Saemaul Undong is undertaken at the grassroots commu-
nity level, no matter how organized and buffed up the external support 
system may be, if there is no interest, commitment and implementation 
on the part of the villagers themselves, then there is no point in pursu-
ing the programme. Villages with certain people or a group of people 
with exceptional vigour in this regard can make a big difference. Thus, 
it is crucial to identify and assign such leaders during the early stages of 
planning and launching of the Saemaul Undong. A good example is the 
‘Greater Masaka Mindset Change Agents Club’ of Uganda. This youth 
group that underwent training in the NFLC in April 2017, formed this 
club during the training and returned to their villages to implement the 
Saemaul Undong in an energetic manner.8
For the Saemaul Undong to take root and expand successfully in 
African countries, and not end up as merely a banal project, the gov-
ernment, both at the local and the central levels, must be engaged in a 
meaningful fashion. Hence, there is a need for a matching administra-
tive system or governance to be put in place. Regarding the governance 
of the Saemaul Undong, it would be unrealistic to expect the African 
countries to form a strong system of the Saemaul Undong governance, 
even if it is espoused at the state level, because the state of governance 
in African countries itself is weak in the first place. Endorsement by 
the head of state and the support of the relevant ministry are definitely 
encouraging and helpful, but these are not enough. Rather than making 
this a task in itself, it would be practical to start with a flexible approach 
of focusing on a grassroots movement to prove the usefulness of the 
Saemaul Undong with concrete outcomes. This will bring about the gov-
ernment’s involvement in a natural way.
The fourth lesson is about applying the Goldilocks principle (‘just 
right’) in terms of providing assistance for Saemaul Undong. Neither 
indifference nor ‘full support’ is desirable. The ‘just right’ thing is to be 
moderate and deliberate in Saemaul Undong projects: provide intensive 
training at the initiative stage, but allow the local leaders and residents 
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to take up on their own in the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooper-
ation. Encouragement and appreciation of their efforts are important, 
but direct material support should be very limited and measured, only 
being provided as an incentive in consideration of their actual perfor-
mance. It is much better and more effective to enhance people’s pride 
and inspire them further through face-to-face communications and 
‘symbolic’ rewards rather than assisting them with material means, oth-
erwise they will simply remain dependent.
What is also important is to nurture an environment of openness 
and possibilities of collaboration. Motivation, passion and optimism 
are what drive the Saemaul Undong. These can only be sustained when 
people see the benefits of the Saemaul Undong and the positive links 
it has for their income generation in the longer run. And as a matter 
of course, this is the area where African governments should play their 
necessary part. But the Saemaul Undong can collaborate with other 
relevant Korean projects, the host country’s projects and other foreign 
development partners as well. The purpose here is to provide synergis-
tic effects and prevent duplication of efforts through coordination. For 
example, a network comprising the NFLC, the KOPIA Centre, various 
Saemaul Undong activities and UNDP programmes is being fostered in 
Uganda. Also, the relevant Saemaul Undong bodies can team up with 
the Ugandan government’s Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) that is 
being implemented to support rural households’ agricultural produc-
tion. I realized that in order for all this arrangement to succeed, a cen-
tral oversight authority was still very much necessary.
Then how should we engineer the Saemaul Undong for Sub-Saharan 
Africa? Coming up with a blueprint that is applicable for the whole 
region in a detailed fashion will be almost impossible because not only 
does the situation vary from country to country, but each provincial 
region within a given country would have its own unique features. The 
practical thing to do would be to set some kind of general criteria or 
benchmarks to start with.
Under the principles or core values of the Saemaul Undong— 
diligence, self-help and cooperation—we can deduce ‘three targets’ and 
‘six measures’ that are deemed pertinent to Africa. The three targets 
are: (1) income generation; (2) contribution or burden-sharing by the 
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locals; and (3) formation of economic links for value chains and market 
access. The six measures required to achieve them are: (1) maintaining 
openness and outreach to other initiatives/programmes; (2) adopting 
and teaching national, social and work ethics at schools, in government 
circles and in local communities; (3) forming an interactive network 
among central government, local government and communities; (4) fos-
tering competent and dedicated Saemaul Undong leaders; (5) promoting 
a strong community-centred mechanism like town hall meetings; and 
(6) developing cooperative business arrangements for increased value 
addition and access to markets.
Moreover, agents serving as a medium between these targets on the 
one hand and the relevant measures on the other are mindset change, 
skills/know-how and financial ownership, which I will refer to as ‘MSF’ 
(‘M’ standing for mindset change, ‘S’ for skills/know-how and ‘F’ for 
financial ownership of the locals). An important thing to note is that 
these three agents or components need to occur simultaneously and 
to be synchronized. Figure 11.1 below illustrates this. At the very top 
you can see the guiding principles of the Saemaul Undong: diligence, 
self-help and cooperation. The three targets that are placed under these 
principles are income generation, burden-sharing by the locals, and 
forming value-chains and economic linkage.
To simplify things, the basic goals of Korea’s Saemaul Undong were 
twofold: first, improving living quarters and community infrastructure; 
and, second, increasing household and community incomes through 
various agricultural and manufacturing activities. In order for economic 
development to be felt by the ordinary people, it should take place 
where the majority of the population live—in the rural regions. Thus, 
improving the basic living environment for rural residents is an impor-
tant step in realizing national wellbeing.
This is important not only in terms of cleanliness, sanitation and 
order of rural communities, but also for people’s healthiness of mind, 
which is conducive to socio-economic development. It also helps 
strengthen the social capital. Not only does one feel much better living 
in a clean and orderly neighbourhood, but it also makes one more moti-
vated and responsible to maintain that level of living. The work went 
beyond cleaning up, fixing and building living quarters, like upgrading 
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Fig. 11.1 The Saemaul Undong scheme for Sub-Saharan Africa
11 Engineering Rural Development for Africa     341
and expanding various forms of physical infrastructure in the commu-
nity: improving and enlarging roads, constructing bridges, flood-pre-
vention structures, etc. This not only made living in rural areas much 
more convenient, but also created a beneficial environment for com-
mercial activities and opportunities for locals. The appearance of order-
liness reflects the state of mind of the people and says a lot of about the 
possibility of development.
The second category I mentioned is the enhancement of rural income 
through improved agricultural production and other income-generating 
activities. Income generation for rural areas is the ultimate goal as well 
as the benchmark of success of the Saemaul Undong in Africa. So, in 
order for the Saemaul Undong to prove its worth and hence be able to 
flourish as a relevant development model in the region, there must be a 
marked positive outcome—income generation—derived from it.
Another target is people’s contribution or burden-sharing. This can-
not be over-emphasized, as the Saemaul Undong is about empowering 
the people by instilling a ‘can-do’ spirit and a sense of ownership in 
them. People will feel true ownership if they invest and have a stake in 
the work they undertake. Many existing development projects involve 
only the one-way provision of assistance or delivery of facilities or 
equipment to beneficiaries. In other words, they do not directly invoke 
positive change in recipients by making people act or contribute imme-
diately. The important thing is to strictly uphold the rule that ‘nothing 
is free’ and that the locals should play their due part in return for the 
benefits they receive.
The third target is the formation of economic links in terms of value 
chains and market access. For Saemaul Undong villages, being con-
nected to markets and business or industrial centres is crucial to their 
viability and welfare as communities. Without such economic con-
nectivity, communities will not be able to achieve autonomous and 
sustainable development. In Sub-Saharan Africa, most villages in rural 
areas are remote from economic centres, main roads and markets, and 
these largely ‘isolated’ areas are cut off from even what little commer-
cial opportunities are available in provincial regions. A severe shortage 
of road networks, poor condition of roads and poor means of trans-
portation limit economic and social spill-over effects and exacerbate the 
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divide that exists between the capital city and the rest of the country. 
When left unchecked, a vicious cycle in the form of double dipping—
the growth of slums and over-population in cities, and the marginali-
zation and deprivation of rural areas—will continue. So, the pursuit 
of regional economic links should be especially underscored in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
As a means of reaching these three targets, I have laid out six meas-
ures, which, in turn, have to be driven by the three elements of MSF in 
a concurrent fashion: mindset change, skills and know-how, and finan-
cial ownership. First, if people go about doing business with the same 
frame of mind, this will not make a difference in terms of speed and 
quality of work. Second, having a strong and positive mindset is crit-
ical for individuals to be self-serving and become more adept in their 
work and training. In African urban areas and rural regions, there is 
a great gap in education and knowledge. Hence, conscientious efforts 
must be made to enlighten, train and educate the rural population, but 
the desire to learn must come from the residents themselves. And the 
embodiment and application of mindset change and skills will not be 
sufficient if this is not accompanied by ‘financial ownership’. Having 
financial ownership means that people have to put their own resources 
in the project from which they wish to benefit. This makes everybody 
a worthy member of the community, each contributing to, and having 
a stake in, the success of the work carried out in their community. It is 
also good for nurturing civic values.
Learning that ‘nothing is free’ is a big part of the Saemaul Undong, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. A government official and politi-
cian from northern Uganda told me that no matter how much he helps 
his constituents, ‘no one is willing to even contribute one dollar’ to the 
community projects that they will be benefiting from. Practising finan-
cial ownership can also bring dividends in terms of encouraging badly 
needed savings in Africa.
With MSF as the driver of the Saemaul Undong in Africa, six meas-
ures should be taken to ensure the overall success and expansion of this 
rural development model: ethics/civil education; openness and outreach; 
networking; fostering local leaders; community decision-making and a 
consensus-building mechanism; and cooperatives. Of these, the first two 
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seem particularly pertinent for Africa, while the others are more obvious 
and generally applicable to other regions of the developing world.
First on the list of measures to be taken is embarking on a pro-
gramme of national education in ethics. The need for a major overhaul 
in national educational contents in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be over-
emphasized. African countries must adopt more vocational, techni-
cal courses in schools as opposed to the current theoretical, academic 
subjects. But more importantly, they need to introduce and vigorously 
launch public education in ethics—social ethics, work ethics, national 
ethics, etc.—for all levels of students and also for adults.
The matter of ethics seems to be taken either too lightly or too seri-
ously. First of all, the issue of ethics has many dimensions. We can break 
down ethics in three categories: (1) moral ethics; (2) collective ethics; 
and (3) functional ethics. The first of these is usually referred to as ‘mor-
als’ or personal character. The word ‘ethics’, in comparison to ‘morals’, 
connotes a social context. And I think what is ignored in many devel-
oping countries is collective and functional ethics. While moral ethics 
or morality is innately personal and spiritual, collective ethics is more 
about one’s attitude, beliefs and behaviour in relation to one’s commu-
nity, society and nation. While the former is ‘inwardly oriented’, the lat-
ter is ‘outwardly oriented’. The former asks whether we are decent and 
rightful, while the latter asks what inclination we have towards various 
units of the society. Lastly, functional ethics is about how we ‘do’ things, 
or the tendency that we have in our actions and work.
It is crucial that we bring elements of behavioural science into the 
discourse of development in order for it to be more relevant in our 
search for answers or solutions. The problems in the first category— 
corruption, irregularity, bad governance, crimes, etc.—are tied to social 
and structural problems like poverty and underdevelopment, and they 
will not go away easily. The second category is more concerned with 
how to perceive things, to go about doing work, living one’s daily life 
and contemplating one’s situation and role in the society. We need to 
differentiate between these two and pursue them simultaneously, but on 
different tracks.
When I say that ethics is taken too lightly, it means that we are not 
realizing how much difference people’s mindset and ethics can make in 
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relation to development. On the contrary, taking the subject too seri-
ously means that people become so fixated on the notion that nothing 
could be done about it. Neither of these two views is helpful and we 
need to find a happy medium where we clearly understand the gravity 
of the problem and act forcibly and continuously to root out the nega-
tive socio-psychological syndromes.
In Africa, there is no shortage of general teachings on personal moral-
ity. These come in the form of expressions of universal values, civil 
education and religious-moral teachings, etc. from various entities, 
including developing partners, government leaders, NGOs and rights 
groups, social and religious leaders, etc. But what is very much lacking 
in the discourse of development is the collective and functional ethics.
As for functional ethics, the word ‘functional’ may not seem very fit-
ting to the realm of ethics as it implies the ‘capacity’ of people and how 
people work. But when this becomes problematic, it entails unnecessary 
cost—human toil, both in relation to time and financial—and the issue 
of responsibility. Keeping time for appointments and delivery of work, 
making things in a ‘standardized’ and acceptable manner, being focused 
on the job in hand so that things are done properly first time and do 
not have to be done all over again, etc. are standards are often not kept 
to the satisfaction in the region.
In this sense, the term ‘functional ethics’ is similar to ‘work ethics’. 
But the term ‘works ethics’ implies a generalized meaning of desirable 
attitudes for work and fails to capture the innate characteristics and 
issues typical in Sub-Saharan African. That is why I have rephrased it 
as ‘functional ethics’ to signify a wide range of attitudinal tendencies—
micro-, organizational and social—to explain the case in the region.
Particular emphasis should be placed on education on the collective 
ethics and functional ethics for Africa; a comprehensive education plan 
should be implemented to ‘inculcate’ students and the general populace 
on civil (or social or national) ethics, how to be rational, effective and 
successful in their daily work and jobs, and organizations or business. 
Functional ethics should also include technical and detailed ways of 
handling basic work.
‘Morality’ is synonymous with ‘rightness’ or ‘goodness’, but the term 
is subjective, being influenced by religious beliefs, a traditional social 
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code of conduct or norms, cultures, philosophical orientations, etc. 
Enumerating what are evidently universally accepted immoral acts is 
much easier: stealing, cheating, lying, adultery, raping, murdering, etc. 
Then there are civility and virtues like being polite, responsible, hon-
est, generous, diligent, indulgent, patient, helpful, selfless, etc. More 
lofty and abstract attributes include ‘integrity’, ‘inspirational’, ‘vision-
ary’, ‘saintly’, etc. And there is a whole array of ‘misdemeanours’ or 
‘misconducts’ construed as offences or improper and unlawful acts. And 
of course, acts of ‘deviation’ and crimes, whether simple, white-collar, 
organizational or collective, are committed everywhere all the time.
But such common forms of practice that people take for granted 
in the region, like failing to keep time for service deliveries, failing to 
be punctual for appointments, not keeping promises or following up, 
etc., should be also treated seriously. Such a matter lies somewhere in 
between moral norms and cultural practices or customs, but its accu-
mulative effect leads to a fundamental curtailment of development.
Most of all, what appears to be the unending and unabating wide-
spread practices of irregularities or corruption taking place every day 
at all levels of society needs to be addressed. The problem derives from 
a weak social fabric and a genuine lack of a ‘culture of shame’. How 
to rectify this is really in the hands of Africans and something must be 
done about it.
Collective ethics is a different category. It is routine business for 
development partners, Africa’s civil society and NGOs to raise human 
rights abuses and governance issues. But they will likely find collective 
ethics and, to a greater extent, functional ethics a bit odd. By collec-
tive ethics, I mean a sense of nation, patriotism and community; people 
recognizing the necessity and inevitability of their connection with the 
larger units of life outside their own. Western ideas of liberal democracy 
stress human rights and individual freedom, but this is premised on the 
existence of a potentially powerful state (‘leviathan’) that can infringe 
upon the rights of citizens.
What the people need is a stable but evolving environment in 
which to lead decent and better lives and build their society and 
economy. And it is basically through state-building and making the 
state to function properly that nations can prosper. Without having a 
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well-functioning state mechanism in place and without a certain level 
of social capital being nurtured, development endeavours will be seri-
ously jeopardized. The state or society needs to empower the people so 
that the people, in turn, will be able to develop their nation. This is a 
mutually reinforcing process. There needs to be a kind of binding social 
fabric conducive to the formation of a wholesome nationhood for long-
term or sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Countries lacking this essential foundation will continue to struggle 
with the challenges they face today. It will not be easy to engender a 
renewed national ethos or a sense of nation in the people, but it is cer-
tainly achievable, as many others have already done so. But of course, a 
special level of commitment is necessary.
The first step will be to embark on a national campaign of enlighten-
ment or mindset renewal. Adversities can be turned into opportunities. 
There can be more harm than meets the eye in nations believing that all 
they need to do is to follow the trend of globalism and open up their 
economy, while adopting and emulating developed countries’ institu-
tions and values in a literal sense without understanding the prerequi-
sites and underlying issues. Perhaps the greatest barrier to any attempt 
to overcome such limitations is African politics and populism. The lead-
ers and elites seem to shun what is difficult but what is the right thing 
to do, and instead opt for what is unwholesome but is politically expe-
dient or the easy thing to do.
Development partners should also pay attention to the issue of col-
lective ethics. And while the initiative must come from within—from 
African people—it would do no harm if development partners also 
engage themselves in this endeavour to assist African nations in this 
process. This can be a new and challenging task for the development 
community, and would require extra sensitivity, patience and time, but 
it may pay off in the end.
What is hindering the formation of a healthy ‘nationalism’, patri-
otism or national identity in many African countries is party politics. 
Because of the divisive nature of politics and people’s suspicion that 
there is a political agenda behind public campaigns led by government, 
it is become more difficult to win people’s approval and support and 
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mobilize them to get things moving. This is the irony of a contempo-
rary electoral democracy that appears robust in Africa, but in reality 
in many instances is hindering much-needed real changes needed for 
national development.
An independent body along with civil society, joined by the govern-
ment and even development partners, can drive the process forward. 
But politics should be avoided at all costs, otherwise it will be doomed 
from the start. It has to be collaborative work among various stake-
holders, with the general public at the centre. It should be conducted 
through gathering public opinions, advice from social and religious 
leaders, education experts, intellectuals, etc., as well as benchmarking 
relevant cases in foreign countries. The process can be contentious and 
noisy, but this is how difficult things are done.
There is always the possibility that such an initiative, even if it were 
to be launched, will lose steam and wither quickly like so many others 
have done. But my response to this is that if you want transformative 
development, it has to be done because inherently, there is no quick fix 
and easy way out in relation to developmental challenges. Being intrin-
sically action-averse is the reason why Africa is struggling in this regard.
Functional ethics is another important area and it is all about going 
back to basics. ‘Orderliness’ is the key word. Among many things, a fac-
tor hindering development is the lack of a basic work ethic for observ-
ing ‘orderliness’. There has been much talk about ‘skilling’ youth or the 
workforce, but the terms like ‘skilling’, ‘capacity-building’ and ‘tech-
nical training’ disguise what is the real underlying challenge—it is not 
so much the lack of ‘knowledge’ and information, but the attitude and 
pattern of behaviour that counts. There is much ado about ‘creativity’, 
‘innovation’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ these days, but what is overlooked is 
the importance of being organized and conforming to ‘standardization’. 
African products and services are less competitive and African workers 
are less frequently employed by foreign companies than they should be 
because of this.
Development can be achieved when individuals do their best with 
the tasks and the means given, and do not wait for everything to be 
right. In most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where so many basic needs 
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are left uncared for and so much work needs to be done to get people 
out of a state of destitution, a sense of urgency to do something about 
the situation is largely absent. It appears that there is little, if any, appe-
tite on the part of leaders and elites to really sound the alarm and spear-
head campaigns to turn things around.
Orderliness and geometrical correctness are part and parcel of all 
the goodness and signs of advancement. They need to be observed and 
internalized by workers, businesses and society to make them com-
petitive, viable or generically wholesome. Whether it is about simple 
manual work, the fabrication of goods, engineering or sophisticated 
tasks, the most basic rules or standards of work must be followed. 
While African people in general recognize and value manual dexter-
ity, they sometimes fail to understand that the most basic element to 
observe at all times in work is geometrical correctness. In a larger con-
text, this is the matter of ‘standards’ directly connected to economic 
competitiveness.
Cursory work done with a lack of focus and attention to detail, along 
with a lack of skills has many negative impacts on society and the econ-
omy. First, the direct outcome of the labour is poor-quality work. And 
costs—time and extra labour demands (including extra supervisory 
work)—go up, seriously curtailing the competitiveness and credibility 
of those workers. The typical work pattern of labourers is that they sim-
ply come in and do things without setting a proper work scheme and 
carefully conducting measurements.
Standardization, which is an essential prerequisite for manufactur-
ing, engineering and industrialization, is also critical for social order-
liness and quality of life. It is impossible to imagine achieving skills, 
technology and science while neglecting geometry. One of the reasons 
why many businesses in the region struggle to be competitive is because 
of shortcomings in their packaging skills as well as the quality for 
their products. Many decry the state of African trade that is driven by 
exporting raw commodities with low value addition, and they call for 
local processing and value addition of the products and the building of 
manufacturing industries. But again, it is only through a fundamental 
‘reorientation’ of people’s attitudes and behaviour that such progress can 
come about.
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The second measure is ‘openness and outreach’. What makes this 
necessary is because of the unique opportunity as well as the limita-
tions existing in the region. There are community-oriented traditions 
or customs in Africa that the Saemaul Undong can utilize or collabo-
rate with so that it is actually ‘going with the grain’ in relation to local 
practices. As I have mentioned, Sub-Saharan African people in general 
are very open-minded towards outsiders and in many cases there is a 
natural ‘affinity’ for movement such as the Saemaul Undong in Africa. 
Furthermore, rural-agricultural development is very high on the agenda 
in the minds of African leaders and the public.
Many leaders in Africa do appreciate and welcome the Saemaul 
Undong, and if African governments take this model seriously and fol-
low it up with care, then there will be a much better chance for its suc-
cess. But as we all know, in most cases Sub-Saharan African countries 
are not known for the efficient delivery of public services. In any case, 
the strong backing of central government is no doubt conducive to the 
success of the Saemaul Undong.
For the development partner overseeing the programme, in 
this case Korean agencies, executing Saemaul Undong projects in 
a well-coordinated, systematic manner will be quite a challenge. 
Therefore, the Saemaul Undong needs to be pragmatic and flexible in 
its approach and be open to collaboration with other similar initiatives. 
This means not only accommodating ‘local variance’ to the Korean pro-
totype by taking local practices and conditions into account, but also 
working in conjunction with other ongoing programmes. There can 
be a trade-off between ‘outreaching’ and ‘fine-tuning’ of the Saemaul 
Undong, and which is more important is debatable. But considering 
the circumstances, a certain degree of flexibility and localization is both 
inevitable and practical to facilitate the ‘replication’ and expansion of 
the Saemaul Undong in the region. The important thing is to adhere to 
the core principles and modes of the Saemaul Undong; the rest can take 
different forms in varying situations.
Third on the list is networking. According to So, Jin Kwang, the for-
mer President of the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre and Professor of 
Gachon University, the benefits of the Saemaul Undong as a national 
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movement can be summed up as follows: (1) governance; (2) social 
capital; and (3) sustainability.9 Through the Saemaul Undong, a new 
‘governance’ system linking central government, the provinces and 
grassroots communities emerged in Korea in the 1970s. This greatly 
enhanced central government’s administrative capacity and efficiency 
vis-à-vis provinces. Previously, different ministries and agencies were 
dealing with provincial issues, but the Saemaul Undong streamlined 
and integrated communication and policy implementation channels 
between the government and local entities.
The essence of the Saemaul Undong is a bottom-up, voluntary 
movement by the local population. But the role of government was 
also critical in designing the Saemaul Undong as a national campaign, 
encouraging and stimulating the movement by offering incentives and 
awards. What makes the Saemaul Undong different from other pro-
grammes is that the government did not provide direct assistance to 
local communities. The Korean government had a grand vision for the 
Saemaul Undong, but it was the local population themselves that under-
took the village projects.
The goal of Saemaul Undong projects for Sub-Saharan Africa is to 
churn up exemplary villages so that they can be emulated by other vil-
lages, with the expectation that this will lead to the expansion of the 
Saemaul Undong on a national scale. Undoubtedly, if this model under-
scoring diligence, self-help and cooperation can take root and expand 
in Africa, it will have many unexpected positive repercussions on the 
development of the region.
The viability of the Saemaul Undong will hinge on, among other things, 
the central government’s continued engagement with and ‘ownership’ of 
this campaign. At least in the villages where the Saemaul Undong pilot 
projects are being conducted, there needs to be a close working relation-
ship between the central government, local government and the villages. 
An ideal scenario would be that the central government officially endorses 
and incorporates Saemaul Undong programmes in its rural-agricultural 
development policies. This will ensure a favourable and stable environ-
ment in which Saemaul Undong proponents can pursue their activities.
Another essential measure is fostering competent local leaders who can 
inspire and lead people in the Saemaul Undong. Korea’s success with the 
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Saemaul Undong came about because of passionate people who were led 
by passionate leaders. No matter how many resources the Korean govern-
ment an provide for Africa’s Saemaul Undong programmes, if the Africans 
themselves are not enthusiastic, it will be pointless pursuing them.
That is why it is critical that ‘true believers’ of the Saemaul Undong 
emerge continuously. Conventional development assistance methods are 
mostly about imparting knowledge and skills, and they are carried out 
in a matter-of-fact fashion. I have not seen a development programme 
in any other country that emphasizes such a level of passion, devotion, 
collective efforts and sacrifice of the people being targeted. But we have 
reached a point where the international development community should 
give serious thought to employing a value-oriented approach as a supple-
mentary means to existing development endeavours for change. Outside 
the realm of religious or spiritual teachings, there clearly exists a domain 
of ethics that can be widely accepted and applied internationally. This 
should not be a job for religious and spiritual leaders, and moral activists 
only—it should be taken up by the mainstream players of development, 
including government circles and civil society in general.
In 2013, the Saemaul Undong archives were recorded in the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s 
(UNESCO) Memory of the World Register. At the time, the UNESCO 
International Advisory Committee stated that ‘the movement became 
the cornerstone of Korea’s rapid growth from a poor country to one of 
the world’s top ten economic powers and a precious asset to the history 
of mankind’. It added that ‘since it gives the whole picture of how suc-
cessfully the movement was carried out to modernize 34,000 selected 
rural villages across the nation, the archives are valuable resources to 
developing countries and international development agencies who seek 
to eliminate poverty and modernize rural areas’.10
The established international community does not hold back when 
speaking out against political, human and humanitarian rights abuses. 
But why is the community silent when it comes to the ‘economic devel-
opmental rights’ of poor nations? It is evident that negative practices, 
mindsets and syndromes that hinder development are preponderant 
in the region. So, if development partners care about the livelihood of 
African peoples, why are they not speaking out on the issue? Which is 
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more evil: being diplomatically and politically correct or being honest 
and straightforward? The former is a case of being nice but hypocritical, 
while the latter is about being blunt but genuine. On development mat-
ters, our purpose should be to try to make a difference, even if we have 
to sometimes stray from our ‘comfort zone’ and that of others. I think it 
is actually immoral to keep silent or not speak out on fundamental mat-
ters that fundamentally impact the lives of people simply for the sake of 
avoiding discomfort (and likely criticism). Civility and sincerity must 
go hand in hand.
The word ‘transformation’ is popularly used in Africa to accentu-
ate the goal of development. But transformation does not come about 
easily and is the outcome of an arduous and painful process. National 
transformation cannot take place with some instances of excellence dis-
played by a few, but through the mobilization and efforts of the masses. 
The people must come on board and this requires a substantial and 
growing number of ‘agents of change’, the leaders who will urge oth-
ers to join the path towards development. Since the Saemaul Undong 
is basically a communal campaign (although it can be practised in fac-
tories, companies, schools, etc.), its success derives from the vitality of 
‘community activism’, which in turn is dependent on the unity and 
enthusiasm shown by individual members in their communal work.
There are already similar rural development projects that have been 
undertaken by various international organizations and bilateral develop-
ment partners, which all put forward ‘sustainable rural development’ as 
their goal. But they are overwhelmingly assistance-oriented programmes 
trying to help the locals in various fashions (skills training, provision of 
equipment and facilities, micro-financing, creating marketing oppor-
tunities, etc.) to engage in agricultural production or agribusiness. And 
they may have yielded some positive results, mostly modest and limited, 
but not to an extent that is ‘transformative’.
So, there is an innate risk that Saemaul Undong programmes, if not 
properly understood and pursued, will follow the same fate as other 
aid programmes. This is particularly so if donor agencies as well as the 
locals carry out Saemaul Undong programmes without sufficient inputs 
by Saemaul Undong experts. But there is a major difference between the 
Saemaul Undong and other aid initiatives in that the former is essentially 
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a self-reliant community movement that includes self-planning, 
self-decision-making, and the self-execution of work projects.
Community activism is a positive thing as it has many benefits: pro-
motion of grassroots democracy, information-sharing, building and 
strengthening the ‘social fabric’, collective problem solving and educa-
tion, etc. And economic spill-over effects in the rural regions can be far 
greater than expected when communities come together. It is so much 
easier to deal with community units, if they conform to a common 
cause, than belabouring to somehow win over all the people on an indi-
vidual basis.
Another important measure to take for the success of the Saemaul 
Undong is taking advantage of cooperatives, which has many parallels 
with the Saemaul Undong and which has proven to be a very good tool 
to supplement the Saemaul Undong in the case of Korea. A cooperative 
is an autonomous association of people joined to own or operate enter-
prise for their mutual benefit. The association’s characteristics are that 
it is formed voluntarily, operated democratically by those working for 
their own benefit (self-help), and managed autonomously. It has a long 
history and the current, modern form of cooperatives is said to have 
originated in Europe, but Korea also has a very old tradition that is sim-
ilar to cooperatives.
While the Saemaul Undong was a national spiritual ‘reform’ move-
ment as well as a driving force for economic growth, Korea’s agricultural 
cooperatives greatly contributed to rural-agricultural development since 
its inception in 1961. Korea’s agricultural cooperatives collaborated 
with the government in Korea’s Green Revolution (involving the devel-
opment of new rice varieties) and the Saemaul Undong in the 1970s. 
The major projects of Korean agricultural cooperatives include financial 
services like trust guarantees for farmers, agricultural technical train-
ing, protection of farmers’ rights, improvement of rural livelihood, sup-
porting agribusiness (the sale of products, the purchase and supply of 
agricultural equipment and basic necessities for farmers), etc. In Korea, 
the successful combination of the Saemaul Undong along with the dis-
semination and application of agricultural technology and cooperatives 
were instrumental in bringing about rapid development in the rural 
region. Cooperatives had significance as the final-stage guarantor of the 
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agribusiness value chain. Many farmers found confidence, stability and 
security in their production activities because of the efficient cooperative 
system.11
Normally, cooperatives are economic associations formed by econom-
ically and socially underprivileged people who want to improve their 
situation and meet their needs. Therefore, if the cooperatives are oper-
ated properly, this can greatly benefit the vast majority of African villag-
ers and farmers. In Uganda, cooperatives have failed in the past due to 
improper management or (political) abuses, but now the government is 
trying to revive the system, recognizing its merits.
Along with the introduction of cooperatives, enhancing mar-
ket access for rural regions is considered crucial for the success of the 
Saemaul Undong. Naturally, in order to invigorate cooperatives, the 
market accessibility of rural regions needs to be continuously upscaled. 
Market access, in addition to the value-addition of farm products, is a 
fundamental challenge for Africa’s rural regions, where the vast majority 
of the population resides.
To sum up, as was shown in Fig. 11.1, Saemaul Undong projects 
should be implemented with MSF as the driving force to achieve the 
three targets (income generation, burden-sharing and the formation of 
economic links) based on the six measures outlined above. Once this is 
achieved, it would have positive outcomes (spill-over, governance, social 
capital and sustainability) and feedbacks.
Notes
 1. ‘Smart Saemaul Undong Story’, an information pamphlet published by 
KOICA in the autumn of 2015.
 2. Ibid.
 3. The four areas are: (1) Inclusive and Sustainable Rural Development; 
(2) Better Life for Girls; (3) Safe Life for All; and (4) Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) for Better Life.
 4. JEE Hyeong-jin, the Co-Head of the NFLC, presented this plan on 
20 July 2016 during the project launching workshop at the NFLC.
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was confronting the negative mindsets of the villagers.
 9. Jin Kwang So, President of the Korea Saemaul Undong Centre, gave 
a lecture on the Saemaul Undong to Baanda village (Saemaul model 
village) in Mityana District on 18 August 2016 during his visit to 
Uganda.
 10. UNESCO Memory of the World, ‘Archives of Saemaul Undong New 
Community Movement’, http://www.unesco.org.
 11. National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (www.nonghyup.com), 
Choi Byung-ik and others, Saemaul Undong and ODA (Chungyang: 
Kukjemunwha University, 2014), pp. 46–48.
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Realizing the Nature of the Problem
Recollecting my memories when I first stepped on to African soil in 
1973 and then returning back in 2001 and again in 2011, I found out 
that there are two clear trends taking place: one was urban growth, 
while the other was the levelling-up of freedom of expression and the 
means of communication. But the manner in which these were unfold-
ing was quite different from what I expected or was used to seeing in 
my native country and other regions.
In most cases, I noticed deterioration rather than improvement in 
the overall orderliness, infrastructure management and environment of 
urban centres. An observer would note: ‘Although Sub-Saharan Africa 
is the least urbanised continent, its rate of urbanisation is among the 
highest in the world. While urbanisation can be a welcome engine for 
socio-economic development, innovation, and employment creation, it 
can also bring about a number of challenges, most of which are mani-
fest within the sphere of urban environment … [which are] crowded liv-
ing conditions; poor disposal of wastes; inadequate basic infrastructure; 
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pollution of water and air; and the decline of the urban green frame.’1 
And I would add to this the unbelievable traffic congestion and chaos.
Another striking feature was a noticeably greater extent of freedom 
of expression enjoyed in the countries compared to the past. By and 
large, this is the effect of globalization and the spread of technology. The 
acceleration in usage of the Internet and mobile phones in the region is 
remarkable and the flourishing of mass media in terms of the number of 
outlets and variety available is something that was unimaginable in the 
old days. This is not to negate the reality that sometimes oppression of 
expression is exercised for political purposes by rulers, but largely such a 
liberal trend is evident.
As countries increasingly engage with the outside world, and manag-
ing public and economic affairs becomes as complex as ever, they need 
to have stronger capacity in this regard. But this not being the case, we 
see the unruliness, disorganization and mismanagement of affairs that 
is typical of Sub-Saharan Africa today. At the heart of the problem lies 
the tendency of ‘right here, right now’: people trying to merely ‘adapt’ 
to (rather than tame or overcome) the circumstances or environment in 
which they find themselves, or wanting to settle things now, opting for 
‘immediate’ rather than ‘delayed’ gratification.2
Everything is relative and no society is perfect or doomed. But attitu-
dinal orientations matter. No matter how far our times and technologies 
have evolved, and however old-fashioned it may sound, the importance 
of the human mind and determination cannot be emphasised enough. 
As the moral of Aesop’s Fable on the turoise and the hare would tell 
us, individuals can beat seemingly formidable odds, while people can 
quickly end up as losers despite their physical or material advantage 
over others. There is a good chance that a society enjoying an abun-
dance of natural resources and other means, but lacking sincerity and 
commitment would fare worse than a society which has the opposite 
traits.
Since people’s actions are in the end derived from their perception, 
attitudinal orientations and goals, despite all the hoopla and excitement 
over new ideas, technologies and innovations, if any meaningful devel-
opment is to occur, it has to be accompanied by a mindset change in 
the people. By development, we are talking about positive changes that 
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are accountable and visible. It can take many forms that are discerni-
ble: the cleanliness and orderliness of living quarters and the neighbour-
hood and public facilities; the improvement of infrastructure and the 
delivery of service; improved education and health facilities; enhanced 
economic activity, productivity and income generation, etc. Hence, if 
such improvements do not happen, with or without foreign assistance, 
it means that people are not being responsive and something must be 
done about it.
There is plenty of blaming going on, but at least people are recogniz-
ing that there are problems. Many African leaders have their fair share 
of frustrations with the lack of progress being made in terms of develop-
ment. For instance, as reasons for Africa’s underdevelopment, Uganda’s 
President Museveni has blamed poor education, underdeveloped human 
resources and skills, a lack of indigenous entrepreneurs, hindrance to 
private businesses, small markets and inadequate infrastructure, and a 
lack of energy resources. He also cites tribal, religious and gender ide-
ological disorientations, a lack of industrialization and a lack of viable 
pillars in the judicial and defence sectors leading to a collapse in the 
state’s authority.3
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) meeting held on 26 
August 2016 in Nairobi adopted, as Africa’s development blueprint 
guide, President Museveni’s paper on Africa’s ten bottlenecks: ideolog-
ical disorientation; a weak state exemplified by a weak army; human 
resource underdevelopment; poor infrastructure; a failure to industrial-
ize; fragmented markets; underdevelopment of the service sector; under-
mining of the private sector; a laissez-faire attitude that is crippling the 
agriculture sector; and past shortcomings in democracy.4 African leaders 
and elites seem to understand what their countries are lacking, but the 
obstacles that were identified can be seen largely as the outcome and not 
the causes of more deeper and fundamental problems.
Some mention that the top seven reasons why Africa is still poor 
are civil wars and terrorism, unending corruption, an education and 
knowledge gap, poor health and poverty, geographical disadvantages, 
international aid and unfair trade practices.5 Greg Mills mentions in 
Why Africa Is Poor that the main reason why Africa’s people are poor is 
because their leaders have made this choice, not because of all the things 
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cited as lacking or being blamed for this: African rulers have external-
ized their problems, blaming donor countries and bodies for all their 
unaccomplished ills.6
Those who subscribe to mainstream economic liberalism tend to 
define the essence of economy too simply or narrowly: in terms of free 
market mechanism. But what is much more important to developing 
countries is ‘effective capitalism’. ‘Markets’ existed since the begin-
ning of human civilization and are nothing new or special. In theory, 
a market is nothing more than a supply-and-demand mechanism. It is 
of course the most basic means or medium for the exchange of goods 
and allocation of resources, but in order for wealth creation and eco-
nomic prosperity in a society and nation to come about, so many more 
things are needed, like the robust entrepreneurship of business leaders, 
a skilled and devoted labour force, socio-political stability and security, 
capital mobilization, an appropriate role played by the government (like 
‘strategic oversight’ or guidance in industrialization), a positive ‘national 
ethos’ or work ethic, technology, social capital, good governance, a 
favourable natural endowment, geographical conditions … and the list 
goes on.
The reality is that it is not that simple to treat everything in a 
dichotomic context: liberal (good) and protectionist (bad). And govern-
ments can indeed play a key role in economic development if they act as 
facilitators and drivers of effective capitalism. What matters is keeping 
politics out of the economic realm as much as possible. Fostering com-
petent and disciplined bureaucracy insulated from political influences is 
a good way to start and it is never too late to do so. South Korea’s case 
is a vindication of the ‘holy trinity’ of economics: markets, corporations 
and government. Reforming government is the way to go, not doing 
away with it.
There is no question that the national rulers are the ones most 
responsible for their country’s state of development. But we should not 
underestimate or overestimate their ability. We can talk about the issue 
of too much ‘political correctness’, but we should also be aware of the 
flaws of ‘intellectual correctness’ or ‘academic correctness’, which places 
all the blame on the rulers and portrays the masses as victims. This can 
be more detrimental than meets the eye. We should also note Joseph 
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de Maistre’s quote that ‘every nation has the government it deserves’. 
And the following observation has also makes a salient point: ‘the lead-
ers of any given society, club or country are just the picture of that soci-
ety, club or country at large … People are trained by the society. The 
value system of that given society is what teaches them what to believe, 
how to behave, what to pursue with their lives and how to lead their 
people’.7
The leaders of states get their agendas implemented through their 
teams of elites and civil servants, and ultimately through the workings 
of the people. The rulers cannot control everything and cannot be effec-
tive in managing their economy and other affairs if they are not suffi-
ciently supported by many layers of ‘collaborators’. South Korea would 
not have achieved an economic miracle if it were not for the sacrifice 
of hardworking people and the enterprising private sector, as well as its 
bureaucrats.
The state leadership should be the key drivers of development as well 
as its last bastion. But still, many African leaders are corrupt and abu-
sive of their power, and seek to maintain the status quo. It is also true 
that any leader with a reasonable mind would dearly want to prove their 
worth through economic performance, as the pressure is mounting on 
them to deliver whatever they can to satisfy the rising expectations of 
the masses. Therefore, economic performance is deemed to be the sur-
est answer to achieving political success. In most cases, African leaders 
come short in terms of their goals because they are stuck in the comfort 
zone of compromising with reality even before earnestly attempting to 
produce results. Thus, it takes much more than the simple decisions of 
leaders.
While it is easy to destroy what was achieved in an instant, it would 
require mammoth efforts to rebuild whatever has been undone. Raila 
Odinga, the former Prime Minister of Kenya, spoke on the day of the 
Centenary of Nelson Mandela’s birth that Africa’s ills can no longer be 
blamed on the colonial legacy, but rather that Africa’s deterioration has 
been brought about by bad politics and African leaders abusing their 
power. The main root cause of Africa’s continued poverty is undoubt-
edly the mindset issue, which hinders positive action being taken. 
But the prospect of confronting the root causes may be daunting for 
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political leaders, policy-makers and even civil society. Many African 
nations are by no means static. On the contrary, you see so much 
vibrancy in individuals when they come together in social life—cultural 
events, social gatherings, public celebrations, commemorations, etc. 
What is desirable (and it could be a strategic move) is to induce the 
people to show an equal level of liveliness and passion in their work-
places and businesses.
For this purpose, ‘leaders’ are always needed in every corner and level 
of society. When the people, especially the poor, are left on their own, 
they feel powerlessness and alienation, but when they come together 
as an entity, they form a sense of social belonging and can suddenly 
feel inclined to act. This holds true both in rural-communal areas and 
semi-rural urban localities. In such an environment, a ‘communal’ 
approach such as that adopted by the Saemaul Undong can be effective 
in driving people to act in the pursuit of shared goals. Motivation and 
confidence can be built up easily through associations. However, when 
their orientation is misplaced and becomes primarily ‘transactional’, and 
matters are settled in courts, the society is likely to further degenerate 
and it will be difficult to turn back the tide. That is why initiatives like 
mindset change campaigns need to be executed, with leaders setting 
examples.
Figure 12.1 below illustrates the persistent gap between the devel-
oped world and Sub-Saharan African countries. The y-axis represents 
the level (quality) of the social and institutional fabric, as well as the 
technical, productive skills. Since independence, the overall level of the 
social and institutional fabric of African countries in terms of social 
capital, civic values, governance, respect for norms and regulations, etc. 
has remained largely unchanged at a low level. Hence, there are still big 
gaps that need to be reduced. The curves are rough depiction of the esti-
mations of the levels assessed.
Of the two gaps—that in the social and institutional fabric, and that 
in skills and technology—the latter can have particularly deep repercus-
sions on African countries in the low end as having a competitive edge 
in terms of skills and technology on a global scale is of great importance 
today.
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The upper dotted line in Fig. 12.1 represents the global competitive 
skills and technology (mainly for business) level, which is much higher 
than that of Sub-Saharan Africa. The trend is that the gap between the 
world’s and Africa’s skills and work capacity is widening.
What this implies is that Sub-Saharan Africa, which is open for busi-
ness, is exposed to and can partner with foreign and multi-national 
companies with the highest competitive capacity, skills and technology. 
And there is an increasing number of visits between Africa and the rest 
of the world. So, there seems to be good exposure and opportunities for 
Africa to make up for its weakness by way of opening up its markets.
However, this will not resolve the problem of poverty because the 
fundamental gap will continue to exist under the circumstances. 
Without a proper policy, governance and mindset in place, it will be 
difficult not only to ‘harness’ foreign businesses, but also to properly 
‘support’ and utilize them so as to reap the maximum level of mutual 
benefits.
There is a good example in Latin American countries that missed the 
opportunity to achieve rapid economic growth and successful trans-
formation in the early stages of development due to their unsuccessful 
import substitution policies, premature introduction of foreign direct 
Fig. 12.1 Development gaps: the problem of being transfixed
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investment and heavy reliance on multi-national corporations. Many of 
them are now paying the price for repeated missteps, like not being able 
to industrialize at auspicious moments, and giving into populism and 
the demand for welfare surpassing the means, as well as a failure to curb 
corruption.
Liberalization or globalization cannot be all bad for Africa. But when 
countries use these forces to forgo their own responsibility while try-
ing to find solutions in foreign partners, the possibility of attaining eco-
nomic viability in the context of self-empowerment will be diminished. 
Without addressing mindset and fundamental challenges, they will drift 
further away from the desired path of development.
Attitudes and Work Ethics
Attitudes and work ethics do matter—very much in fact—regardless of 
whether we are in a traditional working environment or high-tech sec-
tors, and most likely also AI industries in the future. Basically, in the 
labour-intensive economic structure that characterizes Sub-Saharan 
Africa (only South Africa has a very capital-intensive industrial sector), 
the work ethic assumes a great significance. But even in capital- and 
technology-intensive sectors, where the cost of human failure in deci-
sion-making or management could be far greater, attitudes and ethics 
are deemed all the more crucial. People may not be amply aware that 
no matter how far machines, automation and artificial intelligence can 
be advanced, there is still room—and considerable room at that—
for human interventions, as even the most sophisticated robots can-
not replace humans (there are already troubles surfacing in relation to 
overmechanization).
As long as we choose to remain as ‘humanity’ irrespective of tech-
nological innovations, we cannot do away with norms like work ethics. 
Thus, many things depend on human attitudes and they can impede or 
stimulate progress. If people do not have the ‘proper’ set of attitudes, all 
the natural endowments available or all the technical and institutional 
support offered would quickly lose their value. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
an ironic case in that it probably has the largest ‘untapped’ and most 
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‘concentrated’ fertile land mass in the world, but its agricultural output 
is one of the lowest in the world.
And how are Africa and international organizations trying to cope 
with the situation? The common solutions that are sought seem to be 
mainly technical and material, and such a pattern of recourse seems to 
be stubbornly followed in spite of repeated setbacks. Acquiring ‘knowl-
edge’ is crucial, and knowledge and attitude go together, but consider-
ing that the methods used have barely improved, there must have been 
a serious neglect or a blind-sight in the efforts. Or it may be that the 
international community, having not yet found a better alternative, has 
no other choice but to continue its course.
In 2015, the African Development Bank recommended that Africa 
can boost agricultural productivity by doing the following eight things: 
develop high-yielding crops; boost irrigation; increase the use of fertiliz-
ers; improve access, regulation and governance; make better use of tech-
nology; adopt genetically modified (GM) crops; reform land ownership 
with productivity and inclusiveness in mind; and step up integration 
into agricultural value chains (AVCs).8 This all sounds fine in theory 
and would go down well with conference attendants, but from the per-
spective of policy-makers and farmers, how helpful will this be? Such a 
long shopping list of the things that ordinary people can hardly manage 
to undertake cannot be the best practical solutions.
An increasing number of experts seem to agree that natural endow-
ments, physical resources or even technical know-how do not matter 
greatly in terms of making the difference in the absence of a positive 
attitude or mindset in the locals. For instance, Piet van Asten explains 
that an in-depth study shows how farmers in East Africa make deci-
sions in farming is depended on how they percieve reality rather than 
the actualy conditions on the ground, and given that attitudes of farm-
ers plays an important role, understanding their attitudes will provide 
insights into their actions, and thereby some clues as to what can be 
done to assist them.9 But understanding attitudinal traits is one thing 
and deciding what to do about it is quite another.
Naturally, such an attitudinal issue is not confined to farmers, but 
affects the whole spectrum of society. In this book, I have tried to dissect 
the meaning of ‘mindset’, which is a broad and general concept. And I 
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think it boils down to ‘attitudes’ and ‘work ethics’ from a developmental 
perspective. There are many nuances to the word ‘attitude’, but from the 
point of view of development, it can be defined as ‘a manner of thinking, 
feeling, or behaving that reflects a state of mind or disposition the way a 
person views something or tends to behave towards it, often in an eval-
uative way’.10 Different people see and respond to problems in different 
ways and for different reasons. The issue of being ‘transfixed’ is not only 
a problem for Africa, but is also a factor in the approach of the interna-
tional community. Things will remain static when activities only touch 
upon what is on the surface, without going deeper to address the root 
causes. In just about everything, ‘rationality’ is assumed and the efforts 
to bridge the ‘divide’ have been dismal at best, so the ‘parallel’ continues.
Essentially, there are two dimensions to Africa’s needs: first, the 
improvement of basic conditions and quality of life; and, second, sustain-
able economic development. The former concerns the basic human needs 
and rights of the people, while the latter concerns more mid- to long-
term tasks of nations, like achieving structural change in the economy.
However, it is true that the mainstream donor community is seen to 
be principally focused on the former while ‘neglecting’ the latter. On 
the other hand, China, an emerging donor, literally confines itself to 
the ‘hardware’ sub-division of the latter, like infrastructure construc-
tion and energy development projects. What seems to be increasingly 
evident is that the promotion of the former (the fulfilment of human 
needs and rights) does not necessarily lead to progress in the latter (sus-
tainable economic development). Equally, it is certainly the case that 
Sub-Saharan African countries are in dire need of physical infrastruc-
ture, but infrastructure constitutes just one of the many things necessary 
for national development, and the issues related to the construction of 
infrastructure, like corruption, rises in the cost and delays of work, poor 
management, etc., revert back to the question of governance, the ethics 
of individuals and the norms of society. As such, there is no quick fix or 
a means of circumventing the fundamentals.
Only the people of Africa can do what it takes to effectively close the 
perennial poverty gap, although the international community can cer-
tainly help. Without wasting more time and resources, we should come 
to terms with the fact that the principal root cause of Africa’s poverty is 
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the mindset issue, and therefore we should re-align our efforts to tack-
ling this matter. Recently, I have discovered a casual way of getting my 
message across and starting a conversation without sounding too blunt 
or judgemental (or undiplomatic): I would say ‘I think the reason why 
Africa remains poor is not necessarily because people lack the resources 
or the means, but rather, it’s more due to the management problem’. No 
one objected and people could not agree with me more.
I was recently reminded, once again, that we too often take it for 
granted, or presume, that others’ thoughts, behaviours and needs are the 
same as ours, when in fact they may not be. I heard from a number 
of experts from international aid agencies that in order to ensure effec-
tiveness of aid programmes, donors must understand the culture and 
attitudes of the locals. I have had an opportunity to consult with the 
representatives of UN specialized agencies, who told me that the inter-
national development community makes the common mistake of pur-
suing an individual-oriented approach when the typical characteristic of 
African locals is familial or communal in nature—in other words, that 
people’s actions are bound up with their kinship.
During the discourse, the head of the UNDP office in Uganda told 
me about some interesting episodes that occurred with a number of 
projects to assist women and girls in the rural region. They provided 
borehole pumps to the villages to save them from walking many kilo-
metres a day just to fetch water. However, it turned out that the girls 
were not using the pumps in their villages, but instead were continuing 
to fetch water from the remote water sources. The explanation for this 
was that they wanted the privacy and ‘free time’ by themselves, to meet 
and chat with their friends, perhaps to escape boredom (or the shack-
les of their in-laws) or to refresh themselves. As such, the organization 
decided to provide bicycles to girls, but this did not work either, and 
men were using them instead. Another story was about young women 
shunning newly built latrines in or around their homes. It is said that 
women do not feel comfortable either sharing or being seen using the 
same latrine with other family members or relatives, especially the 
elderly; they would rather find remote places.
Therefore, the advice of these experts was that before we, the donors, 
embark on assistance programmes, we should consider the culture and 
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attitudes of the beneficiaries to ensure that these programmes have the 
desired impact on them. They also suggested that mindset change takes 
time, and we should expect the results to come slowly and gradually. 
I was all ears and their arguments made good sense to me. I thanked 
them for enlightening me about what I have not known before.
But later that day, when I tried to figure out what lessons could be 
taken away from the meeting, I realized that the perceptions within 
the international development community can also be highly diver-
gent. I could not brush off the feeling that what these international 
aid officials were suggesting implicitly was that their logic and meth-
ods were essentially geared towards maintaining the status quo. 
More agents of change, not less, are needed. There is every reason to 
acknowledge and take local cultures and practices into account, but 
there is also a danger that by doing so, we could fall into the trap of 
perpetuating the status quo, which is exactly what development efforts 
should fight against.
Currently, there are basically two different trains of thought under-
lying international aid and development with respect to Africa. As 
mentioned earlier, one is about prioritizing basic human needs and 
their rights; the other is about prioritizing the building of physical 
infrastructure. People might think that this covers the essentials, but it 
does not. In fact, there is a big blind-spot in the existing development 
architecture, a third arm which we can call mindset change or a ‘power-
of-the-mind’ approach or empowering the people with a development 
mindset.
The benefit of this mindset change approach, when properly applied, 
can reap enormous results, as demonstrated by the South Korean case. 
The advantage of this mindset change approach is that while the first 
‘basic-human-needs-and-rights (BHNR)’ approach and the second 
physical infrastructure building approach both breed strong dependency 
on the part of the recipients, this, on the contrary, promotes the attrib-
utes of self-reliance, independence and self-ownership. Not only can, 
and should, this approach be employed to complement the first and the 
second approaches, but when successfully pursued, it will make these 
two approaches redundant. For example, in the case of South Korea, 
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the amount of aid it received for BHNR and physical infrastructure was 
minimal, and the duration of such assistance was far shorter compared 
to other countries.
Figure 12.2 below represents a proposed new formula of develop-
ment assistance to Africa, the tripod of development assistance: the 
existing BHNR approach and physical infrastructure building projects, 
and the addition of the new mindset-change approach. The BHNR 
approach is what the traditional donors have mostly been engaged in, 
while physical infrastructure projects are what China and, to a lesser 
extent, other emerging donors have been mostly focusing on.11
The mindset-change approach is not unique to Korea, but is applied 
routinely in the everyday lives of all the people. Whether in films, dra-
mas or novels, we almost always see someone taking the lead in uplift-
ing others to fight on or rise to the occasion and not give up in despair. 
This does not happen only in dramatic scenes; even small words that 
touch our hearts and encourage us can unleash powerful forces in indi-
viduals. In schools, companies, factories, sports teams, hotels, hospitals, 
the military, government agencies, etc., people are repeatedly and persis-
tently reminded of their ‘code of conduct’ and are urged to exert them-
selves in order to fulfil their duties.
Fig. 12.2 The tripod of development assistance
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In every society, there is a constant need to ‘energize’ people to act 
positively, and this is a vital part of the management process for any 
institution or organization. And the mechanism for motivating or ener-
gizing people is, of course, ‘rewards (remuneration) and sanctions (pun-
ishments)’, as mentioned earlier. The problem is that we have forgotten 
to do all this when it comes to Africa’s development.
Going back to the term ‘development-mindedness’ or KPOP, all 
this seems to underscore the importance of the last ‘P’, which stands 
for ‘passion’. I have pointed out that Korea’s uniqueness of its mindset 
change approach can be found in the ‘reverse engineering’: the act of 
instilling passion in people first and letting the power unleash itself, 
which will take care of the rest.
The achievement or success of a nation is not assessed in terms of 
how the powerful and the privileged have amassed wealth and lead pros-
perous lives; instead, it is the overall level of living of the whole popu-
lation that counts and matters. That is why when we are talking about 
national development, it is crucial to have a set of initiatives that con-
nect with the people and are relevant at the national level. This is the 
area in which most Sub-Saharan Africa countries find themselves at the 
weakest point.
What Africa lacks most, and hence needs to assign the highest pri-
ority to, is none other than the software compartment of mindset 
change. Without an attitudinal change in the people and the leaders, 
and understanding what constitutes or enables development, all the 
assistance provided by the international community, and all the invest-
ments and other business opportunities that foreigners may offer will 
be to no avail, since Africans will not be the true drivers and owners of 
development.
The first thing to do is to be aware of the necessity of mindset 
change. The next challenge is how to focus on and implement this task. 
The mindset change campaign itself should come from Africans them-
selves. For donors, their role should be assisting such efforts in a supple-
mentary and facilitating fashion.
Critics have pointed out the ills of continuous flows of aid to Africa. 
If a wise thing to do is not cut these drastically—and I do not see this 
happening anytime soon—then both donors and African countries 
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should at least work closely together to foster a new environment of 
development partnership. It should start with the premise that peo-
ple’s attitudes are ‘changeable’. And the practical way to launch this 
endeavour is to bring the locals, the leaders and the masses to the point 
where they comprehend the inevitability of change in their mindset and 
behaviour if they want to lead better lives. A strong community drive 
in which committed leaders from different backgrounds come together 
can be instrumental in this regard. People should be made to realize that 
relying on handouts from their government or aid organizations will get 
them nowhere and will only disempower and impoverish them further.
Such initiatives should not just target the ‘development-mindedness’ 
of the people in general, but should also involve concrete measures to 
curtail specific obstacles that undermine development. For example, a 
typical hindrance commonly experienced by donors are delaying and 
‘sabotaging’ efforts by the officials in charge. Such acts are committed 
due to a lack of supervision and enforcement of disciplinary rules, as 
well as the overall weakness in the governance of the state. If African 
governments can put in place a more stringent administrative oversight 
and accountability enforcing mechanism in their system, it would con-
siderably enhance the performance of development projects.
The continued gaps and discrepancies between what the develop-
ment community is pursuing and what will actually take place are more 
attributable to ‘attitudinal’ factors than ‘capacity gaps’ and local condi-
tions that the people on the receiving end often cite as the reason for 
such shortcomings.12 By suggesting that a lack of capacity is the pri-
mary reason for failures, they are in fact asking for open-ended support 
from donors. They try to conveniently avoid responsibility by invoking 
their ‘lack of capacity’, when the real reason is their intent. Attitudes 
and capacity are two very different things, and attitudinal problems 
should not be masked by such terms as ‘lack of capacity’.
The word ‘capacity’ implies the ability of someone to carry out cer-
tain assignments or demonstrate their skills, and is based on accumu-
lated knowledge and training. So, when people say that the problem is 
due to a lack of capacity, they are insinuating that its nature is techni-
cal and what is needed is more investment for building capacity. But 
the reality is that the most egregious transgressions are often committed 
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by those who know all too well the field of their expertise and hence 
should know better. The issue is far more profound than simply accu-
mulating knowledge and capacity.
There is no denying that in the region, many people do lack the nec-
essary education and technical skills training, and the illiteracy rate in 
Africa in general as a continent is probably the highest in the world. Of 
the top ten countries with the highest illiteracy rate in the world, nine 
are from Africa, with only one country coming from outside the conti-
nent (Afghanistan).13 Fighting illiteracy and providing greater education 
opportunities to the population should be the rudimentary responsibil-
ity of the state. But what is necessary is moving beyond people’s ability 
to read and write, as this is only the first step in the long process of 
human development.
The question is not only how we can fight widespread irregularities 
and corruption, but also how the people can be uplifted and empow-
ered. The reason why Sub-Saharan African countries are not faring well 
compared to many other developing nations in Asia and other parts 
of the world is that the ‘double drawbacks of underdevelopment’— 
corruption and poor work ethics—are markedly more serious here 
than elsewhere. And these will not take care of themselves in a social, 
economic and political environment that seeks to maintain the status 
quo. A ‘shock-therapy’ type of approach and an all-out campaign at a 
national level might be needed.
A Westerner once asked me why I thought when there is so much 
corruption in China, just like Africa, China still manages to reap eco-
nomic success. I replied that it must be due to differences in the level 
of work ethics. Africans themselves know better than anyone else how 
much corruption there is in Africa, so they are curious to hear from for-
eigners how their countries were able to deal with corruption. A Dutch 
colleague of mine once told me that when he was asked by a Ugandan 
businessman whether there was corruption in the Netherlands just like 
in Uganda; he responded that corruption exists everywhere, but the dif-
ference is that in the Netherlands those who commit irregularties are 
likely to be held accountable for it while in Uganda they are not.
I have discussed the preponderance of the ‘commission culture’ and 
the ‘allowance culture’ in Sub-Saharan Africa that is eating away at the 
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competitiveness and public interest of the nations in the region. The 
former is an unwritten practice, while the latter is institutionalized in 
the governmental sector. In any case, they reflect unwholesome oppor-
tunism, laxity or loopholes in supervision and disciplinary mechanisms, 
and the temptation to seek windfall gains whenever possible. Another 
widespread practice in governmental circles in Africa that I still do 
not understand is the failure on the part of the government to pay its 
employees’ monthly salaries on time. The payment of regular salaries 
should be a predictable task and it is purely due to administrative laxity 
that this is not the case, so there cannot be any excuse for that.
Why governments and their public sectors seem to always fall short 
in terms of delivering public service and spurring economic dynamism 
in Africa is due not so much to bureaucratic bottlenecks and inef-
ficiencies, but rather a lack of supervision and managerial negligence, 
in addition to the prevalence of irregularities and corruption. In most 
countries, the function of government falters not necessarily because of 
‘bureaucratization’, but rather because the organization is deficient in 
‘life’ and a sense of purpose. Generally, the merit of public service is the 
honour to serve one’s nation, as well as job security. Since government 
officials’ salaries and budgets come from taxpayers, they have the obliga-
tion to serve the public interest. If an employee wants to amass wealth, 
they should be in the private sector doing business. The same holds true 
for elected officials and parliamentarians in particular. Carrots and sticks 
are always necessary in the management of personnel and the operation 
of any organization. And, of course, the important thing is to enforce 
them vigorously. Most of all, ‘sticks’ or ‘sanctioning mechanisms’ are 
required to prevent civil servants from committing detrimental acts.
Frederick Herzberg, who studied employees’ attitudes and motiva-
tions in order to come up with the ‘motivation-hygiene theory’, claims 
that there are satisfying and dissatisfying factors in employees’ work 
environments. Satisfying factors, which he called ‘motivators’, include 
recognition, achievement and the challenge of work itself. Meanwhile, 
dissatisfying factors, which he termed ‘hygiene factors’ that do not give 
positive satisfaction or lead to higher levels of motivation (though dis-
satisfaction results from their absence), include status, job security, 
salary, fringe benefits, work conditions, good pay, paid insurance and 
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holidays. The word ‘hygiene’ is used in the sense that these are mainte-
nance factors.14 The conclusions drawn from the case in the US, where 
the study was conducted, cannot be applicable to all other regions. But 
the most striking feature that is typical of Sub-Saharan Africa may be 
that the management system to effectively apply incentives and disin-
centives for employees is difficult to find.
If the employers or leaders of organizations were truly dedicated to 
enforcing carrots and sticks, exercising their powers in a constructive 
way, we would probably see a far different situation from the one we 
see today. The gross failure in management comes not from a lack of 
‘knowledge’ or ‘capacity’, but from an unwillingness to take the trou-
ble to see to it that things are working properly. It is basically an atti-
tudinal rather than a technical problem. But then the same holds true 
for employees. Workers need to have an ‘earning-one’s-way-to-success’ 
mentality and their catchphrases should be ‘work ethics’, ‘devotion’, 
‘consistency’ etc.
Regarding methodology, it would be worthwhile if comprehensive 
and in-depth research on the mindset of the people could be conducted. 
A study of the mindset can become a field where many ‘mysteries’ or 
paradoxes can be unlocked, and hence solutions can be discovered. 
Confronting the matter of the mindset of people can be both a daunt-
ing and an onerous task, and there can be a disinclination to address the 
topic at all. But this is an opportunity to think creatively and enlarge 
our boundaries of engagement with respect to development. I hope this 
book spurs new interest in this field.
A famous phrase—‘truth will set you free’—comes to my mind at 
this point. There are many issues around the world, and some seem to 
be simply too daunting to rein in. Fighting natural disasters and the 
effects of climate change, dealing with conflicts that are based on polit-
ical, ethnical, and religious divides and that reflect direct conflict of 
interests or a stalemate in power dynamics are some examples. However, 
the truth is that lifting Africa out of poverty should by no means be 
an insurmountable task because there is no inherent conflict of inter-
ests or strategic stalemate involved here; that is, no intrinsic or inten-
tional obstacle exists to discourage Africa’s development. Thus, there 
is no point in shying away or refraining from ‘searching’ for the truth 
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because the truth and the facts will only lead to ultimate solutions. As 
far as the development of Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, there are no 
risks involved in assuming a bold, proactive posture in order to move 
forward.
As was the case in South Korea, the kind of mind transformational 
initiatives must come from within. This requires the courage to con-
front ‘inconvenient truths’ rather than hiding behind the cloak of 
political and academic correctness. Ethical and civic society can only 
be attained from the self-reflection of individuals through the embod-
iment of ethics, and this cannot be provided externally. People might 
be tempted to seek explanations and solutions to the problems outside 
of themselves, but this will do no good even in the short term. Being 
truthful to oneself or, to put it differently, ‘internalizing’ one’s respon-
sibilities is the entry point of social correctness. When individuals only 
blame others, they are choosing to become a mere ‘dependent variable’ 
of others.
Especially in development, the question of attitudes is a core issue 
and it should be recognized as such by all the stakeholders involved. For 
instance, being optimistic and having confidence is always a good trait. 
But having an empty sense of pride or being overly naive that somehow 
everything will turn out for the best or that someone else will take care 
of the problems will not help.
‘Mindset’ is a term encompassing ‘attitudes’ and ‘work ethics’. There 
is no given definition of ‘work ethics’ and it could be defined simply 
as ‘an ethical principle that places greatest value on hard work and dil-
igence’.15 Business etiquette expert Jacqueline Whitmore talks about 
seven elements of strong ethics: professionalism, respectfulness, depend-
ability, dedication, determination, accountability and humility.16 We 
can see how far in depth we can go with the term ‘work ethics’ and how 
much it is relevant in today’s business and our livelihood in general. 
Hence, unless the work ethics of the people of developing nations are 
successfully targeted and changed, business, foreign aid or development 
projects will continue to have only a very limited output. What is in 
everybody’s interests is to avoid turning material or financial support or 
resources into de facto handouts that have no visible impact on Africa’s 
development.
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People’s work ethics make all the difference in the performance of a 
nation. I do not wish to be seen as biased, but there is such a thing 
as a typical work pattern of the local workers. To cite an example, this 
becomes evident when you are moving in and out of countries. I know 
that moving household goods out of your home and loading them into 
a 40-foot container truck takes half a day’s work in Seoul. In Rome, it 
took a full day plus some extra hours the next day. In Abidjan (the cap-
ital of Cote d’Ivoire), it took two full days. In Uganda, three days were 
needed to get everything out.
Increasing economic efficiency and competitiveness does not happen 
easily over time and the most practical way of enhancing it is through 
strengthening the work ethics of workers. Whether it is simple manual 
work or a technical assignment, what must be done must be done, and 
cutting corners always has consequences.
In sociology, there are theories of social movements or revolutions 
explained in terms of ‘relative deprivation’, such as James C. Davis’ 
J-curve theory (1962). According to this theory, revolution occurs when 
the gap between people’s ‘expected need satisfaction’ and ‘actual need 
satisfaction’ widens to an intolerable level. But from the perspective of 
development, the correlation between people’s level of ‘desires’ and level 
of ‘work ethics’ could be more meaningful.
In the economic sense, ‘work ethics’ has bearing on ‘supply’ aspect 
of market mechanism as work ethics affects productivity, output, com-
petitiveness, quality of work, service delivery, etc.. The work ethic of a 
nation is deemed to be a fundamental determinant of its economic per-
formance. And logically, people’s demand (desires) should be matched 
by supply (work ethics) to ensure the stability, satisfaction and prosper-
ity of society or nation. Needless to say, as in the case of J-curve theory, 
the growing discrepancy between people’s expectations and reality can 
have a negative impact on society.
We should pay attention to what different combinations of desire 
and work ethics imply. A society showing both desire and work eth-
ics on a steady rise is an ideal state for developing nations that need to 
escape poverty and attain sustainable development. When countries 
have achieved economic transformation and enter the phase of mature 
industrialization or post-industrialization, the overall level of the work 
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ethic in the people measured in conventional terms (hours of work, 
labour intensity, etc.) will drop. When countries become wealthier, they 
can afford to provide better working environments for people, but the 
rich nations’ desires, which are already high, may continue to rise. In 
such a case, the gap should be filled by innovative measures enhancing 
the efficiency and competitiveness of the workforce, institutions and 
policies.
When the levels of both desires and work ethics remain unchanged at 
low levels, this represents a stagnant society with an economy stuck in a 
state of underdevelopment. Meanwhile, when the work ethic stays slug-
gish, but desires continue to ride high, this means that a society cannot 
satisfy its own demands, possibly resulting in the public’s dissatisfaction 
and distrust in the government and the system, increased dependency 
on outside assistance and investments, a deterioration in public services, 
corruption and irregularities, etc.
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In this volume, I have laid out many issues that are pertinent to 
Sub-Saharan Africa and have stressed what are deemed to be the pri-
orities for Sub-Saharan African countries in order to attain trans-
formative development. Describing problems may be the easy part, 
but the root causes of the problems must be identified if they are to 
be tackled. The overall assessment is that Sub-Saharan Africa appears to 
have fallen further behind the rest of the world in terms of economic 
competitiveness, work capacity, industrialization, income equality and 
possibly the social fabric. But the tide can be turned and some countries 
are doing better. Africa’s blessings in terms of its natural endowment 
and economic potential are undeniable, and hence the fundamentals 
should be worked on assiduously to reap the maximum dividends from 
such possibilities.
As I have mentioned, development should be a way of life. Indeed, 
national and political leaders, their vision, and government policies serve 
as signposts for this, but ultimately it all comes down to how people—
the elites, civil servants, businessmen, workers, farmers, etc.—conduct 
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themselves in their everyday lives, which will have an accumulative effect 
as a nation. Perhaps the most deceptive caveat to development is the 
complexity of the development narrative or the ‘professionalism’ of this 
field: development is portrayed and pursued too much in technical terms 
aloof from reality.
The world is fast-moving and everybody is busy trying to catch up 
with the trends that are taking place. And in the process, people can 
lose sight of the bigger picture, which is the basics or the fundamen-
tals of economic and social development that apply universally. In any 
field—and this is particularly evident in science and technology, and 
sports—the fundamentals are the most important factor. They are called 
‘fundamentals’ not because they are rudimentary and easy, but because 
they are the most crucial elements. In science, for instance, ‘applied 
technology’ is derived from ‘original technology’, which is extremely dif-
ficult to acquire. No matter how elaborate the applied technology, if it 
is not based on original technology, it will not work. In sport, one can-
not expect to become a top athlete without embodying all the sound 
fundamentals of the discipline.
Therefore, to treat the fundamentals of development as ‘outdated and 
irrelevant’ is a grave mistake. The world has long forgotten the funda-
mentals of development and in Africa they never seem to have been 
properly put in place. I believe that in development, there are funda-
mentals within fundamentals and it is crucial to understand and capture 
these. In this context, drawing on Korean development model (Fig. 8.1) 
can be most useful.
To simplify, and go straight to the crux of the matter, the two 
most essential principles of development that are universally applica-
ble are economic discrimination in the economic realm and develop-
ment-mindedness in the socio-political realm. But strictly speaking, 
these two are interactive and inter-connected. Korea’s development was 
driven by these two principles, which acted as engines of development. 
This was particularly true during the decades of high growth, but their 
relevance is by no means lost today.
In the case of Korea, the ‘four cornerstones’ (land reform, empow-
erment of the people, educational reform and governmental reform), 
which now may seem rudimentary, constituted the crucial groundwork 
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for development. The active role played by the government was another 
major ingredient of success. And what made economic discrimination 
and the strong development mindset work effectively was the ‘egali-
tarian spirit’ of Koreans. The development path was basically followed 
two tracks: economic discrimination propelled economic transfor-
mation while the strong development-mindedness led socio-political 
transformation.
A development formula for Sub-Saharan African countries (Fig. 10.6) 
was deduced from the Korean development model, i.e., lessons learned 
from the Korean development experience, taking into account Africa’s 
circumstances. As was the case in Korea, African countries also need 
‘economic logic’—economic discrimination—to prevail for the sake 
of their business and economic growth. As was explained, economic 
discrimination works through the inter-play of the market, businesses 
and government. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, international donors or 
development partners have a big stake in the economy and hence I 
have included them in the equation. ‘People’ is also included in light of 
Africa’s large, unorganized informal sector and the fast-growing youth 
population that can make a difference for the economy if they are prop-
erly targeted.
Running parallel alongside the economic track are the ‘missing 
links’, which comprise of sense of nation, development-mindedness 
and the active role of the state. These are deemed important for Sub-
Saharan African countries to embrace and adopt. Last but not least, 
active measures to counter and ultimately stamp out various negative 
elements are considered crucial for the region’s development. Countries 
must vigorously fight the negative elements—the back-tracking syn-
drome, short-sightedness, inaction, the ‘what’s-in-it-for-me’ syndrome, 
the dependency syndrome and a commission culture—that can quickly 
offset various development endeavours made by the countries and inter-
national partners.
So the tasks confronting Sub-Saharan African countries are signifi-
cant as already laid out. But since these are essentially human factors, 
they are achievable and the important thing is to work on multiple 
fronts at the same time. Here, speed is of the essence and a ‘slow and 
piecemeal approach’ should be avoided. There cannot be progress 
386     J.-D.  Park
when any new gains made in a certain area are undone by lack of pro-
gress in another. It should be noted that Korea was successful because 
the reform was conducted expeditiously in many areas to produce 
 synergistic effects.
Many economic aspects in the region have the characteristics of being 
‘static’, when ‘dynamism’ is the trait that developing countries should be 
embracing. For example, in Africa, there seems to be too great a level of 
preoccupation with how to allocate the ‘pie’ (wealth or resources) when 
much greater emphasis should be placed on how fast they can enlarge 
the pie. So the key question for Africa is how the dynamism on the part 
of the people and the economy can be acquired and enhanced.
In fact, there are so many ways to make improvements and make 
them fast: working harder (faster and longer hours), becoming more 
focused and organized, reducing wastage, being more consistent and 
predictable, better conforming to norms and regulations, etc. It does 
not require extra skills, technology and resources to be able to do all 
these things; it concerns human factors like attitudes, work ethics, the 
level of determination and discipline, etc.
There is no hidden agenda or risks in such an attitudinal or mindset 
change approach. There is absolutely nothing to lose and everything to 
gain with this kind of approach as its merits are so evident. But working 
out how to effectively pursue this as a public or national initiative may 
not be so easy. The ability to enter this threshold of social mobilization 
will, in itself, represent a milestone. But we should ask who should be 
spearheading such an initiative and through what mechanisms it should 
be pursued.
Ideally, this could take the form of being a grassroots citizens’ move-
ment with the support of the state. But in reality, the role of national 
leaders will be central, at least at the launching stage. The vision, drive 
and wisdom of leaders will no doubt be important. The majority of 
African countries do not yet have credible and efficient political and 
governance systems in place, so the personal capability and traits of 
national leaders can be all the more important. Ideally, they should be 
fervent patriots and their ideas should be zealously followed and imple-
mented by the nation’s civil servants. But there is also the danger of 
the campaign being seen as politically motivated, which would greatly 
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undermine its legitimacy. Hence, a national consensus should be sought 
and a politically neutral body should be formed to oversee and drive the 
movement forward.
It would be meaningless if there is no participation in this process 
by the people. And in the end, the people must be able to deliver what 
matters most for development: economic outputs and the promotion of 
social, political changes. People can always empower themselves through 
their actions without waiting to be empowered by the government.
Speaking of empowerment of the people, perhaps nothing is more 
relevant than instilling in the people the ‘development-mindedness’ that 
I have termed ‘KPOP’. The components of KPOP, which are detailed 
in Chapter 5, are the basic ingredients that make people productive and 
successful as individuals. If an increasing proportion of the population, 
especially the youth, were to embody such traits, and the trend prevails, 
the nation will be on a promising path. From the perspective of individ-
uals, these can be attained in the given order, but as I have explained, in 
Korea, ‘reverse engineering’ was successfully applied: rather than start-
ing from the ‘knowing (learning)’ phase, working from the last phase of 
imbuing or motivating ‘passion’ proved to be very effective. When peo-
ple feel passionate about something, then the rest (learning, practising 
and owning) comes naturally. Passion breeds actions and outcomes, and 
these lead to confidence. The benefits of such virtuous cycle are deemed 
to be immense.
In Korea, it was the Korean leaders, both civil and public, who 
taught, encouraged and mobilized the people to be empowered. It was 
not foreigners or aid organizations. Technical know-how can be learned 
or introduced from abroad and development partners can assist in train-
ing, but the promotion of the campaign to empower the people should 
come from African leaders themselves. Foreigners do not need to spell 
out to Africans that they need a mindset change to escape from pov-
erty and achieve economic development. This should be the work of 
the African leaders, intellectuals and ordinary people, who will gain the 
most by undertaking such a campaign for change.
Without a noticeable enhancement in the development-mindedness 
of the people in general, the prospects for achieving successful national 
development will not be good. It is up to the African nations to 
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aggressively take on the tasks and effect changes, as development-mind-
edness of the people can only be attained through their own efforts. 
Foreign partners can only show how it could be done in the preliminary 
stages; the real work itself has to be undertaken by the protagonists.
From ‘Dualism’ to a ‘Medium-Bridging’ 
Approach of Development
This book highlights the attitudinal factors and the ‘missing links’ that 
have long been forgotten, ignored or underestimated in the discourse 
and practice regarding Africa’s development. However, I think there is 
another blind-spot that needs to be mentioned here, which is the failure 
to properly grasp the significance of the ‘middle ground’ between the 
‘traditional’ sector and the ‘modern’ sector. For so long, the perception 
of ‘economic dualism’ appears to have dominated the minds of experts 
and ordinary people alike, especially when it comes to the issue of 
Africa’s development. A dual economy refers to the state of two separate 
economic sectors existing within a country, divided by different devel-
opment and technology levels. The concept was first conceived by Julius 
Herman Boeke to describe the coexistence of modern and traditional 
economic sectors in a colonial economy (social dualism).1
Later, Benjamin Higgins developed the idea into ‘technological dual-
ism’, which proposes that resources and technological constraints in two 
sectors—modern and traditional—limit development in poor coun-
tries.2 The most familiar dualist theory is Arthur Lewis’ ‘dual sector 
model’, which postulates a rural low-productive, low-income subsist-
ence sector with a surplus population and an expanding high-productive 
urban capitalist sector. He argued that developing economies could 
achieve substantial economic growth by encouraging labour to move 
from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. The Lewis 
model is considered to have remained for more than 50 years as one of 
the dominant theories of development economics.3
All theories have their limitations, especially if they relate to social 
sciences, because they are inherently incapable of handling all the cases 
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and variables of the complex reality of our world—that is why they are 
theories. Theoretical debates aside, what really matters is the possible 
negative impact that cursory interpretations of such ideas can have on 
developing nations. Economic theories should not be taken literally, 
but need to be understood each time in the different context that one is 
dealing with. As has already been pointed out, Africa’s predicament con-
tinues because basically its problems are dealt with in a static context, in 
a rather superficial way without going through a sufficient thought pro-
cess. Many African leaders and elites are seen to have harboured ‘dual-
istic’ thinking for a long time. In a desire to move out of backwardness 
and towards modernity, they have been drawn to the standards of rich 
countries and have sought the expertise and training that the advanced 
world has to offer, as well as promoting trade and investment. Terms 
like ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘value-addition’, ‘agribusiness’, ‘innovation’ 
have been frequently used in Africa. And almost always, there seem to 
be gaps between what is desired and what is achievable. For instance, 
some inexperienced leaders have unrealistic desires to have mammoth 
ultra-modern hospitals, new town complexes, etc. built with foreign 
assistance, without giving any thought to their cost and sustainability.
There is no such thing as making leaps and bounds when it comes 
to national development or transformation involving major structural 
changes. Nations cannot just move from one state of being to another 
in a routine fashion. Transformation cannot take place simply through 
making good policy choices, receiving good advice from donors or 
receiving investment and technology from foreign partners. Many 
Africans tend to take these as an end in themselves, but they are noth-
ing more than a means and everything is dependent on how much the 
nation vigorously works towards development.
In Sub-Saharan Africa at least, a policy prescription based on the 
thinking of dual economy would not be very effective. Many countries 
must have at one point or another pursued such an approach, appar-
ently with no or very little success. Lewis’ dual-sector model does not 
apply well to Africa because there is such a big gap between the tradi-
tional and the modern sectors, and the modern sector is actually very 
small and weak. Furthermore, the modern sector, which is the manu-
facturing industrial sector, is mostly owned and run by multi-nationals, 
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foreigners and the minority business community. In Africa, population 
growth is explosive, resulting in a youth-heavy population, which causes 
concern in view of the limited job opportunities for them. And, of 
course, there are the issues of attitudinal, cultural and social ‘restraints’ 
or limitations that have to be overcome.
The circumstances in Africa are that even with an open economy 
and business-friendly policies, the largely subsistence-oriented rural 
 sector, to which most of the people belong, has not been impacted by 
or received much benefit from the modern sector. But the rural pop-
ulace, especially the youth, flock to the cities, where they remain mar-
ginalized. Hence, it is not the growth of the manufacturing industrial 
sector (the modern sector) matched by a reduction in the traditional 
sector that we are witnessing, but an increase in the number of peo-
ple at the ‘periphery’ of two sectors: relatively large rudimentary busi-
nesses or those linked to the ‘informal’ sector. The workers here do not 
really belong to the modern sector, though in a sense they might look 
entrepreneurial. This is due to a lack of skills/capacity, a lack of market 
demand or buying power, a lack of capital and investment, etc.
But the biggest consequence of this is the dearth of social capital, like 
trust, cooperation, bonds, reciprocity and sense of the common good. 
Probably the best way to close the gap between the traditional sector 
and the modern sector, or to move from the former to the latter, is to 
strengthen social capital so that it can serve as a mediatory force or a 
medium that facilitates the transition from the traditional sector to the 
modern sector. Social capital is deemed to be a very practical and effec-
tive means which can be created in any situation and is not depend-
ent on foreign resources. On the other hand, financial capital is hard 
to come by and can be misused, as we see so frequently in the region. 
Another advantage of building social capital is that it can induce other 
positive values like good work ethics in addition to strengthening the 
social fabric of a nation.
The logical next step will be figuring out how to best foster social cap-
ital in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the ways in which I think this could 
be done is by developing the ‘medium’. This ‘medium’ I am talking about 
here can be defined as a ‘sector’ within the traditional sector that has 
potential ‘developmental’ elements which can be turned into a tool for 
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the transition of the traditional sector into a modern sector. People would 
need to embody the necessary social, attitudinal qualities before they could 
be effectively incorporated into modern sector. The medium, as social 
capital or bond, can have a multitude of uses and could act as a powerful 
vehicle leading to the development of the modern sector. Therefore, identi-
fying and promoting the medium should be actively carried out.
The ‘medium-bridging approach’ purports to explore and take advan-
tage of positive elements inherent in developing nations’ local practices, 
and reinvigorating them to expedite the transformation of the tradi-
tional sector into a modern sector. Since the potential elements of the 
medium are embedded in the local contents, it is easy to revive and 
resuscitate them.
In Korea, the ‘medium’ was successfully established and operated in the 
form of ‘empowerment of the people’, ‘mindset change’ and the Saemaul 
Undong (new village movement) campaigns. The contents of ‘medium’ 
can be found in traditional values or practices, or in the form of some-
thing that has been ‘reinvented’ and ‘updated’ to suit the current situa-
tion. Whether it is old or new is not important; what matters is whether 
or not it is initiated, ‘owned’ and subscribed to by the local populace.
As for the prospects of success of the ‘medium’ or ‘home-grown solu-
tions’ in Africa, there are already promising signs to this effect in newly 
emerging countries like Rwanda. Of course, Botswana, a more estab-
lished country in this respect, is in a class of its own. Rwanda provides 
an interesting case study as it is likened to South Korea. The two coun-
tries share many common traits. Both are small, resource-scarce, moun-
tainous countries. The flat, habitable land is hard to find, so there is a 
high population density in the residential districts. But this contributes 
to a high rate of Internet connection. Both countries are surrounded 
by bigger neighbours and have faced major crises. The history of Korea 
is fraught with tribulations: harsh colonial rule, national division and 
the devastation of the Korean War. Rwanda suffered an unprecedented 
genocide in 1994 that still haunts the country. Korea turned the cri-
sis into an opportunity, and so have Rwandans. When Korea had to 
rebuild from the ashes of war, it had nothing to rely on but its human 
resources. Korea is one of key benchmarking countries for Rwanda, 
along with Singapore.
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Rwanda stands out all the more because in the region, such features 
as good governance that Rwanda displays are a rarity. Of course, there 
are issues in the political realm, but overall it is succeeding in winning 
the confidence of the international community. A number of the biggest 
international hotel chains have opened for business in Rwanda, the lat-
est being the Kigali Marriott Hotel, which opened in September 2016. 
Now the meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions (MICE) 
business is flourishing in Rwanda.
What is the secret behind Rwanda’s impressive turnaround in its gov-
ernance, public services and business? According to President Kagame, it 
is the home-grown solutions that have improved citizens’ participation 
and accountability: ‘We have very high ambitions and scarce resources. 
Before we go out begging for things we may never get, we have to ask 
ourselves, “have we exhausted the resources around us?” This is how 
home grown solutions start.’4 ‘From our history as a nation, it became 
evident to us, in the hardest way possible, that we can only count on 
ourselves. Thus self-reliance became the rationale for life. Now, given the 
challenges that Rwanda is facing, and the ambitions and aspirations we 
have for the future, it is impossible that conventional approaches will get 
us there in the time-frame we want; hence, home-grown solutions.’5
This sounds strikingly similar to Korea’s Saemaul Undong. Rwanda’s 
home-grown solutions include Abunzi (mediation committees), Gacaca 
(speedy justice), Umuganda (communal self-help), Umushyikirano (citizen 
participation), Itorero (civic education) and Umwhiherero (national leader-
ship retreat).6 Similarly, Botswana has applied its own socio-cultural tradi-
tions like the system of chiefs—Kgotla—to enhance its development.
Many developing countries faltered in joining the ranks of the 
advanced economies because they succumbed to the challenge of ‘dual-
ism’ and let the ‘international economic tide’ get the better of them. 
Besides the Asian Tigers, the reason why even the Southeast Asian coun-
tries have had much more economic success than African countries 
(in the 1960s and even the 1970s, the two regions were more or less at 
the same level) is that they were not tied to a ‘dual-structure’ mentality, 
but pursued pro-poor, pro-rural agricultural policies at an early stage of 
development. Perhaps less dramatic or successful than Korea’s case but 
the ‘medium’ was in the works in these countries.
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The lesson drawn from this is that African countries must find solu-
tions for development from within. ‘Internalizing’ or taking owner-
ship of development should be an integral part of the nation-building 
process, but African countries seem to have long forgotten about 
nation-building. As such, they prematurely ‘exposed’ themselves to the 
outside world before they got their own house in order and were pre-
pared for this new venture. And just when the governments had the 
chance to duly take charge of their economy, they were quick to ‘out-
source’, liberalize and privatize. This signified the abandonment, not the 
exercise, of the government’s mandate.
It is during the nation-building phase that the government’s grip and 
role need to be most robust. The political slogan ‘small but efficient gov-
ernment’ (although I do not hear it much these days) is premised on 
the ‘overgrown’ government bureaucracy. But it is doubtful that African 
countries have come near the threshold of strong, ‘full-fledged’ states. 
The size of the government itself is not so relevant, as the strength of 
government comes from its functionality, coherence and discipline, but-
tressed by good political leadership and the watchful eye of the public.
Figure 13.1 depicts the dual-economy structure and the medi-
um-bridging approach used to deal with this. The top graph in the 
figure shows a typical underdeveloped economy with a very large tra-
ditional sector and a modest modern sector. The y-axis shows the scale 
of the population (number of people) and the x-axis the level of devel-
opment, technology or productiveness. Apparently, there is a big gap 
between the two sectors so that the transition from a traditional sector 
to the modern sector is virtually at a standstill.
The middle and bottom graphs in the figure show how the 
 medium-bridging approach works. The first thing to do in Phase 1 is 
to nurture the medium. Building the medium is critical for poor coun-
tries because this is the opportunity for the people to take ownership of 
development by internalizing it. In order for this endeavour to succeed, 
confidence, optimism and eagerness must be manifested, and the neces-
sity of the campaign must be brought home to the people. In addition, 
the strong leadership of popular leaders will be required in this regard.
Once the medium is successfully formed through the participa-
tion and support of the public, it is important to keep the momentum 
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Fig. 13.1 The dual economic structure and the medium-bridging approach
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going in order to expand the base of the medium and intensify its 
strength. For this, both the government and private engagement should 
ensue. The benefit of this initiative is that it promotes social capi-
tal, development-mindedness and local governance. Then, when the 
medium assumes a life of its own and is running, its positive impact on 
the economy can be substantial. The traditional sector is labour-inten-
sive, while the modern sector is capital- and technology-intensive. The 
significance of the medium is that it is social capital-intensive, which the 
African nations sorely need.
We can see that the traditional sector is reduced with the growth 
of the medium which originates from the former. The traditional sec-
tor is being transformed into a modern sector through the vehicle of 
the medium. The end result is a transformed economic structure with 
a substantially enlarged modern sector and an equivalent decrease in 
the traditional sector. When the transition has run its full course, the 
medium, having exhausted its usefulness, will wither. A highly devel-
oped economy will have a very small traditional sector and a dominant 
modern sector, and will no longer need the medium. If the medium is 
not strong and large enough to have an impact on the economy, it can 
end up simply as ‘peripheral’.
Aid Versus Business?
There has been a lot of talk about the worthiness of aid versus business 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. But discussions on this topic do not seem to 
have much merit. African development issues have continued for too 
long and have extended so widely that it is no longer a simple matter of 
‘aid versus business’. However, many people still seem to view the mat-
ter through such a lens, so there is a need to revisit this topic.
In Africa, aid and business are closely intertwined. Such a phenome-
non is the outcome of natural forces at work rather than by design. In 
Africa, many drawbacks like weakness in management capability, work 
ethics and governance, as well as the prevalence of irregularities, persist. 
It will be difficult for Africa to extricate itself from poverty and other 
predicaments under such conditions. Foreign aid has not caused Africa’s 
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problems; it is the latter that has invited the former. Foreign assistance 
has flaws of its own for certain, but this is due to various limitations in 
reality, so it cannot be the central issue. When African countries start to 
get to grips with their fundamental challenges and do something about 
them, foreign aid will naturally dissipate.
Under such circumstances, business will not be business in strict terms. 
In other words, in many cases, some sort of development assistance has 
to be involved to support even private business activities. For example, 
because of various business risks posed by security issues, weak admin-
istration and governance, poor infrastructure, the lack of a productive 
local workforce, etc., foreign companies wanting to do serious business 
in Africa have to undertake activities well beyond the traditional scope of 
private business: offering technical support, capacity training, even gov-
ernance and physical infrastructure, besides bringing in capital invest-
ment and management personnel. It is not the usual business partnerships 
between the ‘equal’ business collaborators that we see in other regions. 
‘Dependent partnership’ is probably a better term to describe this.
Advocates of the neoliberal school of thought have been most critical 
of foreign aid while fervently supporting free trade and business. Their 
criticism of foreign aid to Africa is understandable as they have rightly 
pointed out that aid has had a limited impact on alleviating poverty and 
has aggravated the dependency syndrome in Africa. And I agree with 
the argument that entrepreneurship and the robustness of the private 
sector are what ultimately drive economic growth. Without question, 
the economic growth and strength of a nation hinges on the vitality of 
its private sector and businesses. But that is about as far as neoliberalism 
can go in terms of logical coherence; the rest is full of weaknesses. It nei-
ther describes the reality correctly nor offers persuasive and responsible 
policy prescriptions. It disregards so many factors that are in play, par-
ticularly in African countries.
The problems that make aid ineffective are also those that stymie busi-
ness and the economy in general. These are not two different options that 
can be separated from each other, especially in the case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. If more business and investment with less aid was the answer to 
Africa’s predicament, then aid to Africa would not have been the problem 
in the first place. What makes aid ineffective and problematic is what also 
makes business and investments ineffective and problematic.
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When there are few successful enterprises and industrial development 
virtually remains at a standstill in the region, there must be good rea-
sons for this state of affairs. African countries need to work strenuously 
to overcome their shortcomings in the fundamentals, while also tack-
ling the many negativities or ‘leakages’ that undercut their progress. In 
these circumstances, replacing foreign aid with business and investment 
will not work wonders, as some have suggested. South Africa is the most 
industrialized and advanced economy in the region, but the disparity 
and ‘dependency’ structure within it is all too evident.
There are many business elements in aid programmes and, equally, 
many business activities are closely linked with development in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In this respect, the region’s economic dependence on 
foreign partners and the international community in general has not 
diminished: Western countries continue to provide budgetary sup-
port to Africa; an increasing number of aid projects are undertaken in 
the form of public-private-partnerships (PPPs); African economies are 
heavily dependent on foreign companies and investments; direct for-
eign involvement, like foreign entrepreneurs’ on-site management and 
the influx of foreign capital, is what supports the economies of many 
African countries; many major national projects like large-scale infra-
structure building projects are carried out using foreign loans and tech-
nology. The trading of consumer goods, equipment and intermediary 
products is done by the private sector, but the limited purchasing power 
of locals poses an immediate challenge for business.
In terms of development assistance, foreign partners, the host govern-
ment and other entities share the responsibility, and hence there is at the 
very least some level of governance exercised for the projects. But in private 
business, there is no assurance of such governance. As has been mentioned 
repeatedly, in the region, the nation-building task is largely unfinished and 
ongoing, and the social fabric and social capital are still weak. In these cir-
cumstances, foreign aid and business cannot be so clearly distinguished 
from each other, and both are needed. Aid indeed has its flaws and may 
not be the best thing for Africa, but the benefits that the whole array of 
foreign aid has brought to African countries, if these can be measured in 
real terms, would not be negligible. As I have pointed out, when the inter-
national community has given so much assistance for so many decades to a 
particular region, there must have been good reasons to make this happen.
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And the people should reflect on what would have transpired had 
foreign aid not been provided to Africa. Here, foreign aid should not be 
considered as merely simple material or financial assistance, but a very 
wide range of means and activities, including management support and 
supervision, technical training and capacity-building, consulting, edu-
cation, governance-enhancing measures, support for private businesses, 
the provision of various facilities and infrastructures, and even various 
donor ‘pressure’ on African governments to conform to universal norms 
and values. The actual value of these will be difficult to measure, but 
would African countries have fared better if there had been no such 
interventions and they were left entirely to the free market mechanism? 
By all accounts, it is likely that situation would have been much worse.
Basically, African countries remain poor and underdeveloped not 
because they lack resources and means, but because they have issues 
with respect to management from the very top to the very bottom 
across all sectors. This is the reflection of the countries’ inability to take 
charge of their national development mission. Trade and investment do 
not come about simply by wishing it to be so; it has to make business 
sense. Business deals do not occur in a vacuum, but follow profitable 
markets while avoiding risks. For business in Africa to flourish, many 
things need to be enhanced or secured, like work ethics, the skills and 
capacity of the locals, accountability, good governance, active govern-
ment support, better security, etc.
If aids and business both have limitations in Africa, then what is the 
alternative? Those who want to find a middle ground could fancy ‘social 
entreprises’ being a solution. Social entreprises look and work like regu-
lar, traditional enterprises because they are revenue-generating, but that 
have the goal of having a positive impact on society in terms of the well-
being of the environment and human life.7 But social entreprises that 
operate at the borderline between the for profit and non-profit domains 
can be even more difficult to manage successfully given the challenging 
conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
There is more to Africa’s business model than meets the eye, and tack-
ling relevant policy matters should begin with the understanding of 
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more basic factors that lie beneath the surface. Having an overly rosy 
picture of the role of the private sector and business when the social fab-
ric and the role of the government remain very weak is simply naive and 
detrimental: mismanagement, inefficiencies, shut-downs and corruption 
are the price to pay for this way of thinking.
The Last Word
Continued poverty and underdevelopment, not to mention various 
instabilities and conflicts, in the region can be attributed primarily to 
gross negligence on the part of the countries in terms of their task of 
nation-building. All African nations aspire to achieve economic pros-
perity and talk about transformation, but what they have not done is 
to actually put in place the things that allow such progress to occur. 
Because what is at stake and matters ultimately today is the most signif-
icant ‘unit’, the nation. When a nation becomes independent and forms 
a state, every effort should be made to make it worthwhile, otherwise 
there is no point in having a state to begin with.
Ethnical, racial and regional divides create a hurdle, but this is not 
uniquely an African issue. In fact, there are many developed and devel-
oping countries outside of Africa that have multi-ethnic, cultural fea-
tures as well as regional divides. Therefore, such elements cannot serve 
as a good excuse for underdevelopment. Dealing with these matters is 
simply a part of the normal, everyday business of all nations. But what is 
intriguing is that many people want to treat Africa differently, forgetting 
the general rule applicable to all people in our history—no nations had 
all the right or favourable conditions (including doorstep or initial con-
ditions for industrialization) to develop successfully when they emerged 
as nation states or territorial states. It is the process of consolidation, 
integration, harmonization and building the capacity to deal with vari-
ous challenges that makes states viable. In this respect, nation-building, 
which is essential for national development, is not one-time event, but 
one which has to be worked on persistently in order to be achieved.
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So the reason that Sub-Saharan African countries continue to 
struggle—despite their enormous riches in terms of natural endow-
ments and external assistance, as well as the goodwill and opportu-
nities provided to them by the international community at large—is 
because they have not done their part at their end. The worst thing 
that can happen is further ‘internationalization of Africa’s problems’ 
or increasingly turning Africa’s problems into the responsibility of the 
international community, thereby incapacitating African nations for-
ever. Despite all the talk inside the African Union about Africa taking 
ownership of the Union, its members cannot agree to stop depending 
on outside assistance to finance its operations. In this regard, initi-
atives and progress to launch the African Continent Free Trade Area 
(AfCFTA) in 2018 are a positive development for the region. But the 
question remains how expediently and thoroughly will this be pursued 
and operated, and if it will not become another New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development?
Improving basic living conditions and rights of the people, and 
achieving sustainable economic and social development should be the 
primary goals of African countries, and the role of the international 
donor community should be assist them in this respect. But in order 
to move in the direction of progress, efforts must be made to break the 
status quo and the elements that perpetuate the current state of poverty 
and underdevelopment. And it all comes down to people’s mind and 
behaviour which determine how much and what kind of change can be 
brought about under the given circumstances.
Regarding work ethics, it is undeniable that when people become 
more diligent and disciplined in their work, things improve markedly. 
But people cannot simply be told to work harder or expected to behave 
in this way; they have to be ‘motivated’ to act differently. Among many 
things, what is probably more important is to have higher expectations 
or desires in life. People should be dissatisfied with their present lot and 
should be aspiring for a better life. Some African leaders implore their 
people to get out of a subsistence way of life and become more pro-
ductive, but a perennial impediment is the minimalist tendency in the 
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lifestyle of the people in general: exerting minimal effort while expect-
ing minimal returns.
Mindful of this, a shift should be made from such a minimalist 
stance to a ‘more-for-more’ type of approach: people having greater 
desires and expectations in life, and exerting greater efforts to achieve 
them, while at the same time contributing in terms of economic value 
addition. A lesson from the Korean case is that during the emerging 
state of the economy at least, for the sake of rapid economic growth, it 
is vital to avoid the politicization of the economy; in other words, it is 
better to delink economic policies from political consideration as much 
as possible.
An interesting example in this respect is South Africa. Despite all its 
advantages compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries, South 
Africa suffers from an exceptionally low economic growth rate and a 
reduced credit standing. Mismanagement, corruption, inordinately 
politically oriented economic policies and uncertainties in politics, 
among other factors, are the challenges facing the new President Cyril 
Ramaphosa in the aftermath of Jacob Zuma’s era of misrule and ‘state 
capture’. The impending land expropriation without compensation 
is another potential ‘dynamite’ issue that may rock the country if it is 
not appropriately pursued. Besides its socio-economic ramifications, in 
purely technical terms, considering the lack of capacity and corruption 
in government circles, land reform poses another great hurdle for the 
nation.
Without a general change in people’s mindset or their value system, 
and most importantly their ‘motivational-behavioural system’, it will 
be illogical to expect substantive progress to come about. The ‘speed’ of 
work is another thing that I have stressed, because development is essen-
tially about how much change can be made over time. A most simple 
measurement of development could be represented as follows:
Here ‘change’ means the extent of positive net change or improve-
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to become more actively oriented in a positive fashion? There can be 
a number of approaches at different levels and in order to be effective, 
they should be synchronized or pursued in unison. As explained, the 
basic economic principle or mechanism should be ‘incentives and sanc-
tions’. Here, a ‘meritocracy’ should be strictly observed, based on ‘com-
petition’ and performance. And extra efforts need to be made to bring 
about positive attitudinal change on the part of the people, and a vigor-
ous campaign to instil development-mindedness and KPOP in the pop-
ulace may prove to be very useful.
There are clear limitations in terms of the extent to which a nation can 
develop in a transformational and sustainable way if the people are not 
increasingly empowered and if only a small number of people and compa-
nies remain productive and drive the economy forward. Foreign partners 
or companies can be brought into fill the gaps, but even this would not 
yield the expected outcomes in the end without the overall improvement 
in the conditions and capacity of the host nations. A national economy 
that is overdependent on foreign entities with the vast majority of its peo-
ple remaining dependent and unproductive cannot be a sign of success. 
This is where Asian countries contrast with Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, the former being able to empower and economically mobilize a large 
section of their population, while thus far, the latter has not able to do so.
The fastest way to transform for developing countries would be when 
there is both good governance and strong, effective mobilization of 
the people. But it could be considered as a given that poor countries 
lack such attributes and, as a consequence, they remain poor. In Africa, 
many things do not seem to work as they are supposed to, and some 
experts can claim to know more about the reasons why than others. 
However, coming to have a better understanding of an issue does not 
necessary mean that one will deal with it more proactively. Knowing is 
one thing, but taking action is quite another. It all depends on how, and 
with what objective, one approaches the issue.
Even governance and work ethic levels which people would think 
are more or less fixed should be regarded as variables that can altered. 
Experts can inadvertently promote the status quo rather than change 
with their ‘this is how it works, so this is how it should be done’ kind of 
attitude. I believe there is always a price to pay for choosing to remain 
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in one’s comfort zone, and catering to people’s needs cannot be an end 
in itself for the sake of development.
Everything begins from the basics, and problems that are funda-
mental in nature call for equally fundamental responses. Whether it 
concerns daily business, construction works, technical training or insti-
tution-building, laying a solid foundation or embodying sound basics 
is the key to success. Development is a building-block process, and the 
quality as well as the quantity of inputs will determine the outputs. 
There is no silver bullet or shortcut to improving the state of the econ-
omy of a nation. It is not a simple matter of choice or timing like hav-
ing the right things at the right time; it is a matter of how well and 
expeditiously things are actually done. So let us not be consumed by 
debates pitting ‘aid vs. business’, ‘liberalization vs. protectionism’ or 
‘private sector vs. government intervention’ because these are peripheral 
topics that mask and divert our attention away from the central issues. 
We should also pay more attention to institutions; the indications are 
that the performance of institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa is weaken-
ing instead of improving, as noted by the World Bank.8 Even in more 
advanced countries like South Africa, ‘there had been a profound weak-
ening of state institutions and a generalisation of criminality across the 
state and not only in national departments’ (see Note 8).
Each person has different individual attributes, abilities and level 
of ambitions, and everyone can contribute to their society in different 
ways through the division of labour. The important thing is that indi-
viduals each play a part that matches their purported role. ‘Small and 
steady progress’ may not sound like a big deal, but means a lot. And it 
will take commitment and consistent efforts to achieve incremental pro-
gress on a sustained basis, including actions to prevent or minimize vari-
ous ‘leakages’ that happen every so often across Africa. Small and steady 
improvement, on all fronts, can mean everything for the development 
of a nation. When improvements, even modest ones, add up, significant 
transformational changes can come about. Big achievements do not 
happen overnight, but must be worked on assiduously. The miraculous 
economic development of South Korea is the outcome of such a broad-
based ‘incremental and sustained’ approach involving or mobilizing a 
large segment of the populace and driven by multiple actors.
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But the voice of conscience has not died down. In South Africa, the 
Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) emerged as early as 1997 with 
a sense of urgency in the midst of rising violence, intolerance and dis-
regard for the wellbeing of others.9 In 1994, the first post-apartheid 
government of Nelson Mandela was formed, but the legacy of apart-
heid manifested itself in an unexpected fashion, for example, in the 
rise of the black-on-black violence, despite the achievement of democ-
racy. Hence, Mandela introduced the concept of the MDM, which he 
termed the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) of the 
soul.10 This movement goes on unabated in view of its apparent need, 
but there can be limits to such a campaign if it is confined to a mor-
al-religious context. What is much needed alongside this is a differ-
ent empowerment of the people, a social mobilization movement that 
drives people to become more positively oriented in their actions.
There should be some points to take away from this book that shed 
light on important things that were literally ignored. I will mention 
just two here. The first one is that, surprisingly, the development com-
munity, both international and local, has not identified and targeted 
human factors to any serious degree; that is, they have not gone straight 
to the heart of the matter. Development assistance has largely turned 
into diplomatic and political events that talk about the niceties on the 
surface, but avoid touching the innate, hard-to-deal-with subjects. If 
the intrinsic factors are not recognized and dealt with forcefully, then 
development efforts will continue to be a ritual or superficiality. The 
second point to take away is that the mainstream international devel-
opment community and African countries have not heeded facts, truths 
and examples of economic development that history and the world have 
demonstrated for all to see and applied them in practice.
The best indicator of development is looking at it from the stand-
ard of ‘way of life’. ‘Has the way of life of people changed and become 
more developmental?’ should be the central criterion. The measurement 
should not be how much funds or material wealth are transferred to the 
benefit of the recipients. So, various grant offering programmes that 
do not change people’s behaviours but make them even more depend-
ent are detrimental as they are anti-developmental and perpetuating 
poverty.
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If the South Korean example is anything to go by, for a very poor 
country to emerge successfully in the way it did, improvements must be 
made in all aspects of nationhood and lives of the people: nation-building, 
national ideas and goals, work ethics, ambitions to lead better lives, civ-
ic-mindedness, adherence to norms, rules and regulations, democracy 
and universal values, etc. In fact, in the early stage of Korea’s develop-
ment, the focus was on nation-building, empowerment of the people 
and work ethics; in its latter phase, democracy, international standards, 
civic values and universal norms were increasingly pursued and valued.
I think these are all essential elements and features that characterize 
developed nations. But the established international community tends 
to place emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good 
governance, while African states in general are seen to stress law and 
order, stability and security, or ‘national interests’ and unity above oth-
ers. Meanwhile, in some African countries, the leaders or governments 
have launched moral campaigns or pleaded with the people to become 
more economically productive.
In any case, national objectives, international rules and global values 
are all necessary for African countries to espouse in their path to devel-
opment. Thus far, the methods used to ‘inculcate’ the people with these 
values have not proven to be very effective. What then would be a more 
practical, effective and natural approach to use in this situation? I think 
one of the answers to this is the ‘community approach’, as explained 
earlier.
In Africa, people’s attachment to their relatives and community is 
unmistakable. Inculcating values and ideas in the people, let alone 
changing their mindsets, may not come easily through public lecturing. 
Instead, it would require a mechanism of voluntarism and constraints 
that can be applied directly to the people. The advantage of the commu-
nity approach is that ‘community’ is already embedded with certain ele-
ments of voluntarism and constraints, so there is already a mechanism 
in place that can be utilized. If worked on properly, this can turn out to 
be an effective ‘medium’ for development that can act as the bridge for 
converting a traditional sector into a modern one. The most prominent 
example of this presented in this book is Korea’s Saemaul Undong.
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To elaborate on the second point to take away from this book, 
developed countries, international organizations and African nations 
alike have long drifted away from the very fundamentals of economic 
development and have been looking for answers in the wrong places. 
The proper approach should have been to spell out the core elements 
or ‘undeniable truth’ in development and then, based on this, engineer 
implementation plans by making the necessary adjustments in their 
existing methods.
In hindsight, it is quite surprising that the examples and lessons of 
South Korea and other Asian countries that provide the latest and pos-
sibly the most valuable case studies for African countries have not been 
more seriously considered and applied. But it is never too late, even if 
the international economic environment has changed considerably 
over recent decades. As such, there needs to be fresh new thinking in 
both theory and practice when it comes to African development. In this 
regard, Sung-Hee Jwa mentions that: ‘Under whatever circumstances, 
the Korean lessons of keeping to economic discrimination principle in 
building economic institutions and policies as well as in creating the 
self-help spirit should not be ignored for those seeking economic devel-
opment because this principle is the key to economic as well as human 
development by helping to overcome the constraints of resource endow-
ment and the international environment as well as developmental- 
unfriendly tradition and culture.’11
Development is about ‘changing for the better’. The Cambridge 
Dictionary defines it as ‘the process in which someone or something 
grows or changes and becomes more advanced’. So when nations want 
to achieve development without themselves making the necessary 
changes, it means that they either do not understand what develop-
ment stands for or think that others can do the work for them. Wanting 
change without changing, which sounds like an oxymoron, is a deep-
seated impediment to development in the region.
Turning to the private sector, the fact that Africa is open to the world 
for business, and that new and innovative technologies are increasingly 
being applied to its markets, while creative entrepreneurs are emerg-
ing in start-ups gives new hope for economic dynamism in Africa. 
But in order for these private initiatives to flourish, they will need an 
13 Enacting a Bold but Harmonious Change     407
equally favourable environment and conducive support system, includ-
ing administrative assistance, to facilitate their activities. In essence, it 
comes down to the management of state affairs and governance.
It is true that the current state of Sub-Saharan Africa requires many 
interventions in wide-ranging areas, and the various efforts made to this 
end by so many entities should not be overlooked. And we must go fur-
ther in actively promoting development-mindedness, work ethics, social 
capital, civic values, etc. based on such spirit as voluntarism, owner-
ship and ‘harmonious change’. Although they are diverse, so we should 
always heed the call not to treat them as interchangeable, Sub-Saharan 
African countries can indeed all achieve successful economic transfor-
mation, under the present circumstances, should they espouse the key 
principles of development. And a more prosperous and stable Africa will 
be good for everybody and for the whole world.
In addition, the political stability and security that Africa’s economic 
success will enhance will also greatly contribute to international peace 
and security. The best way to deal with the problem of refugees, ille-
gal immigrants and modern-day slaves from Africa pouring into Europe 
and other parts of the world is by making Africa stable and prosper-
ous. Hence, the global community should be more open-minded in its 
objectives and approach, and should work more in unison.
In this book, I have tried to make the case that a different approach 
is necessary for development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In laying out some 
ideas for ‘reinventing Africa’s development’, I did not jump to the main 
points, but reviewed Africa’s journey and its problems, the root causes of 
its underdevelopment; I then elaborated on South Korea’s development 
model and experiences, and introduced relevant projects undertaken in 
Uganda as a main reference.
Certainly, there is room for improvement, and more cases in African 
countries could have been reviewed. While admitting limitations, I will 
leave the task to be further pursued in the near future. In any case, this 
endeavour was a challenging task, and my objective was to highlight the 
significance of the ‘missing links’ in Africa’s development, and to bring 
the focus back to the ‘basics’ of social, economic and political devel-
opment that the South Korean case very forcefully demonstrates. The 
grand theme of reinventing Africa’s development is ‘mindset change’, 
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and under this proposition, I have attempted to link Africa’s develop-
ment to the Korean model of development, highlighting the mindset 
change approach and focusing on Korea’s ingredients of success that are 
applicable to Africa. In order to do so, I had to newly construct the con-
ceptual model of Korea’s development to make sense of Korea’s experi-
ence by accommodating socio-political alongside economic factors. The 
results are the derivation of a set of policy implications and recommen-
dations for Africa.
Let me end by citing Nelson Mandela: ‘The first thing is to be honest 
with yourself. You can never have an impact on society if you have not 
changed yourself.’ These priceless words are displayed for everyone to 
see in Johannesburg’s Apartheid Museum.
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